The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. 09 (of 12)

XIX. That the said Hastings had declared, in his said letter of the 16th June, 1784, that the Mogul's right to our assistance had been constantly acknowledged, that the Mogul had been oppressed by the lesser Mahomedan princes in the character of his officers of state and military commanders, and he did plainly intimate that the said Mogul ought to be relieved from that servitude. And he did, in giving an account to the Court of Directors of the conferences aforesaid, assure them that "his inclinations [the inclinations of the Mahratta chief aforesaid] were not very dissimilar from his own"; and that "neither in this nor in any other instance would he suffer himself to be drawn into measures which shall tend to weaken their connection, nor in this even to oppose his [the said chiefs] inclinations": the said Hastings well knowing, as in his letter to Colonel Muir of the – he has confessed, that the inclinations of the said Sindia were to seize on the Mogul's territories, and that he himself did secretly concur therein, though he did not formally insert his concurrence in the treaty with the said Mahratta chief. It is plain, therefore, that he did all along concur with the Mahrattas in their designs against the said king and his ministers, under the treacherous pretence of supporting the authority of the former against the latter, and did contrive and effect the ruin of them all. For, first, he did give evil and fraudulent counsel to the heir-apparent of the Mogul "to make advances to the Mahrattas," when he well knew, and had expressly concurred in, the designs of that state against his father's, the Mogul's, dominions; and further to engage and entrap the said prince, did assert that "our government" (meaning the British government) "was in intimate and sworn connection with Mahdajee Sindia," when no alliance, offensive or defensive, appears to exist between the said Sindia and the East India Company, nor can exist, otherwise than in virtue of some secret agreement between him, the said Sindia, and Warren Hastings, entered into by the latter without the knowledge of his colleagues and the government, and never communicated to the Court of Directors. And, secondly, he did, in order to further the designs of the Mahrattas, contrive and effect the ruin of the said Mogul and his authority, by setting on foot, through the aforesaid Major Browne, sundry perplexed and intricate negotiations, contrary to public faith, and to the honor of the British nation; by which he did exceedingly increase the confusion and disorders of the Mogul's court, exposing the said Mogul to new indignities, insults, and distresses, and almost all of the northern parts of India to great and ruinous convulsions, until three out of four of the principal chieftains, some of them possessing the territories lately belonging to Nudjif Khân, and maintaining among them eighty thousand troops of horse and foot, and some of which chiefs wore the ministers aforesaid, being cut off by their mutual dissensions, and the fort of Delhi being at length delivered to the Mahrattas, the said Sindia became the uncontrolled ruler of the royal army, and the person of the Mogul, with the use of all his pretensions and claims, fell into the hands of a nation already too powerful, together with an extensive territory, which entirely covers the Company's possessions and dependencies on one side, and particularly those of the Nabob of Oude.

XX. That the circumstances of these countries did, in the opinion of the said Warren Hastings himself, sufficiently indicate to him the necessity of not aggrandizing any power whatsoever on their borders, he having in the aforesaid letter of the 16th June given a deliberate opinion of the situation of Oude in the words following: "That, whilst we are at peace with the powers of Europe, it is only in this quarter that your possessions under the government of Bengal are vulnerable." And he did further in the said letter state, that, "if things had continued as they had been to that time, with a divided government," (viz., the Company's and the Vizier's, which government he had himself established, and under which it ever must in a great degree remain, whilst the said country continues in a state of dependence,) "the slightest shock from a foreign hand, or even an accidental internal commotion, might have thrown the whole into confusion, and produced the most fatal consequences." In this perilous situation he made the above-recited sacrifices to the ambition of the Mahrattas, and did all along so actively countenance and forward their proceedings, and with so full a sense of their effect, that in his minute of the 24th December, 1784, he has declared, "that in the countries which border on the dominions of the Nabob Vizier, or on that quarter of our own, in effect there is no other power." And he did further admit, that the presence of the Mahratta chief aforesaid, so near the borders of the Nabob's dominions, was no cause of suspicion; for "that it is the effect of his own solicitation, and is so far the effect of an act of that government."

XXI. That, in further pursuit of the same pernicious design, he, the said Warren Hastings, did enter into an agreement to withdraw a very great body of the British troops out of the Nabob's dominions,—asserting, however truly, yet in direct contradiction to his own declarations, that "this government" (meaning the British government) "has not any right to force defence with its maintenance upon him" (the Nabob); and he did thus not only avowedly aggrandize the Mahratta state, and weaken the defence upon the frontier, but did as avowedly detain their captain-general in force on that very frontier, notwithstanding he was well apprised that they had designs against those dependent territories of Oude, which they had with great difficulty been persuaded, even in appearance, to include in the treaty of peace,—and that they have never renounced their claims upon certain large and valuable portions of them, and have shown evident signs of their intentions, on the first opportunity, of asserting and enforcing them. And, finally, the said Warren Hastings, in contradiction to sundry declarations of his own concerning the necessity of curbing the power of the Mahrattas, and to the principle of sundry measures undertaken by himself professedly for that purpose, and to the sense of the House of Commons, expressed in their resolution of 28th May, 1782, against any measures that tended to unite the dangerous powers of the Mahratta empire under one active command, has endeavored to persuade the Company, that, "while Sindia lives, every accession of territory obtained by him will be an advantage to this [the British] government"; which if it was true as respecting the personal dispositions of Sindia, which there is no reason to believe, yet it was highly criminal to establish a power in the Mahrattas which must survive the man in confidence of whose personal dispositions a power more than personal was given, and which may hereafter fall into hands disposed to make a more hostile use of it.

XXII. That, in consequence of all the before-recited intrigues, the Mogul emperor being in the hands of the Mahrattas, he, the said Mogul, has been obliged to declare the head of the Mahratta state to be vicegerent of the Mogul empire, an authority which supersedes that of Vizier, and has thereby consolidated in the Mahratta state all the powers acknowledged to be of legal authority in India; in consequence of which, they have acquired, and have actually already attempted to use, the said claims of general superiority against the Company itself,—the Mahrattas claiming a right in themselves to a fourth part of the revenues of all the provinces in the Company's possession, and claiming, in right of the Mogul, the tribute due to him: by which actings and doings the said Hastings has to the best of his power brought the British provinces in India into a dependence on the Mahratta state: and in order to add to the aforesaid enormous claims a proportioned force, he did never cease, during his stay in India, to contrive the means for its increase; for it is of public notoriety, that one great object of the Mahratta policy is to unite under their dominion the nation or religious sect of the Seiks, who, being a people abounding with soldiers, and possessing large territories, would extend the Mahratta power over the whole of the vast countries to the northwest of India.

XXIII. That the said Warren Hastings, further to augment the power of the said Mahrattas, and to endanger the safety of the British possessions, having established in force the said Mahrattas on the frontier, as afore-recited, and finding the Council-General averse in that situation to the withdrawing the British forces therefrom, and for disbanding them to the extent required by the said Hastings, did, in a minute of the 4th December, 1784, after stating a supposition, that, contrary to his opinion, the said troops should not be reduced, propose to employ them under the command of the Mogul's son, then under the influence of the Mahrattas, in a war against the aforesaid people or religious sect called Seiks, defending the same on the following principles: "I feel the sense of an obligation, imposed on me by the supposition I have made, to state a mode of rendering the detachment of use in its prescribed station, and of affording the appearance of a cause for its retention."

XXIV. That the said Hastings did admit that there was no present danger to the Company's possessions from that nation which could justify him in such a war, as he had declared that the Mahrattas were the only power that bordered on the Company's possessions and those of the Vizier; but he did assign as a reason for going to war with them their military and enthusiastic spirit,—the hardiness of their natural constitution,—the dangers which might arise from them in some future time, if they should ever happen to be united under one head, they existing at present in a state little different from anarchy; and he did predict great danger from them, and at no very remote period, "if this people be permitted to grow into maturity without interruption." And though he doth pretend that the solicitations of the heir-apparent of the Mogul, who, he says, did repeatedly and earnestly solicit him to obtain the permission to use the Company's troops for the purpose aforesaid, had weight with him, yet he doth declare, as he expresses himself in the minute aforesaid, that "a stronger impulse, arising from the hope of blasting the growth of a generation whose strength might become fatal to our own, strongly pleaded in my mind for supporting his wishes."

XXV. That the said Warren Hastings, after forcibly recommending the plan aforesaid, did state strong objections, that did, "in his judgment, outweigh the advantages which might arise from a compliance with it." Yet the said Hastings, being determined to pursue his scheme for aggrandizing at any rate the Mahratta power, in whose adult growth and the recent effects of it he could see no danger, did pursue the design of war against a nation or sect of religion in its infancy, from whom he had received no injury, and in whose present state of government he did not apprehend any mischief whatsoever; and finding the Council fixed and determined on not disbanding the frontier regiments, and thinking that therein he had found an advantage, he did ground thereon the following proposition.

"If the expense [of the frontier troops] is to be continued, it may be surely better continued for some useful purpose than to keep up the parade of a great military corps designed merely to lie inactive in its quarters. On this ground, therefore, and on the supposition premised, I revert to my original sentiments in favor of the prince's plan; but as this will require some qualification in the execution of it, I will state my recommendation of it in the terms of a proposition, viz., that, if it shall be the resolution of the board to continue the detachment now under the command of Colonel Sir John Cumming at Furruckabad, and if the prince Mirza Jehander Shah shall apply, with the authority of the king, and the concurrence of Mahdajee Sindia, for the assistance of an English military force, to act in conjunction with him, to expel the Seiks from the territories of which they have lately possessed themselves in the neighborhood of Delhi, it may be granted, and such a portion of the said detachment allotted to that service as shall be hereafter judged adequate to it."

XXVI. That the said Warren Hastings did, in the said proposal, endeavor to circumvent and overreach the Council-General, by converting an apparent and literal compliance with their resolution into a real and substantial opposition to and disappointment thereof. For his first proposal was, to withdraw the Company's troops from the Vizier's country on the pretence of relieving him from the burden of that establishment, but in reality with a view of facilitating the Mahratta pretensions on that province, which would then be deprived of the means of defence. And when the Council rejected the said proposal on the express ground of danger to the province by withdrawing from the Mahrattas the restraint of our troops, the said Hastings, finding his first scheme in favor of the Mahrattas against the provinces dependent on the Company defeated by the refusal of the Council to concur in the said measure of withdrawing the troops, did then endeavor to obtain the same purpose in a different way; and instead of leaving the troops, according to the intention and policy of the Council, as a check to the ambition and progress of the Mahrattas, he proposed to employ them in the actual furtherance of those schemes of aggrandizement of which his colleagues were jealous, and which it was the object of their resolution to counteract.

XXVII. That, in the whole of the letters, negotiations, proposals, and projects of the said Warren Hastings relative to the Mogul, he did appear to pursue but one object, namely, the aggrandizement of the lately hostile and always dangerous power of the Mahrattas, and did pursue the same by means highly dishonorable to the British character for honor, justice, candor, plain-dealing, moderation, and humanity.

XIX.—LIBEL ON THE COURT OF DIRECTORS

I. That Warren Hastings, Esquire, was, during the whole of the year 1783, a servant of the East India Company, and was bound by the duties of that relation not only to yield obedience to the orders of the Court of Directors, but to give to the whole of their service an example of submission, reverence, and respect to their authority; and that, if they should in the course of their duty call in question any part of his conduct, he was bound to conduct his defence with temper and decency; and while his conduct was under their consideration, it was not allowable to print and publish any of his letters to them without their consent first had and obtained; and he was bound by the same principles of duty, enforced by still more cogent reasons, to observe, in a paper intended for publication, great modesty and moderation, and to treat the said Court of Directors, his lawful masters, with respect.

II. That the said Warren Hastings did print and publish, or cause to be printed and published, at Calcutta in Bengal, the narrative of his transactions at Benares, in a letter written at that place, without leave had of the Court of Directors, in order to preoccupy the judgment of the servants in that settlement, and to gain from them a factious countenance and support, previous to the judgment and opinion of the Court of Directors, his lawful superiors.

III. That the Court of Directors, having come to certain resolutions of fact relative to the engagements subsisting between them and the Rajah of Benares, and the manner in which the same had been fulfilled on the part of the Rajah, did, in the fifth resolution, which was partly a resolution of opinion, declare as follows: "That it appears to this Court that the conduct of the Governor-General towards the Rajah, whilst he was at Benares, was improper; and that the imprisonment of his person, thereby disgracing him in the eyes of his subjects and others, was unwarrantable and highly impolitic, and may tend to weaken the confidence which the native princes of India ought to have in the justice and moderation of the Company's government."

IV. That the said resolutions being transmitted to the said Warren Hastings, he, the said Warren Hastings, did write, and cause to be printed and published, a certain false, insolent, malicious, and seditious libel, purporting to be a letter from him, the said Warren Hastings, to the Court of Directors, dated Fort William, 20th March, 1783, "calculated," as the Directors truly affirm, "to bring contempt, as well as an odium, on the Court of Directors, for their conduct on that occasion"; and the said libel had a direct tendency to excite a spirit of disobedience to the lawful government of this nation in India through all ranks of their service.

V. That he, the said Warren Hastings, among other insolent and contumacious charges and aspersions on the Court of Directors, did address them in the printed letter aforesaid as follows. "I deny that Rajah Cheyt Sing was a native prince of India. Cheyt Sing is the son of a collector of the revenue of that province, which his arts, and the misfortunes of his master, enabled him to convert to a permanent and hereditary possession. This man, whom you have thus ranked among the princes of India, will be astonished, when he hears it, at an elevation so unlooked for, nor less at the independent rights which your commands have assigned him,—rights which are so foreign to his conceptions, that I doubt whether he will know in what language to assert them, unless the example which you have thought it consistent with justice, however opposite to policy, to show, of becoming his advocates against your own interests, should inspire any of your own servants to be his advisers and instructors." And he did further, to bring into contempt the authority of the Company, and to excite a resistance to their lawful orders, frame a supposition that the Court of Directors had intended the restoration of the Rajah of Benares, and on that ground did presume in the said libel to calumniate, in disrespectful and contumelious terms, the policy of the Court of Directors, as well as the person whom he did conceive to be the object of their protection, as followeth. "Of the consequences of such a policy I forbear to speak. Most happily, the wretch whose hopes may be excited by the appearances in his favor is ill qualified to avail himself of them, and the force which is stationed in the province of Benares is sufficient to suppress any symptoms of internal sedition; but it cannot fail to create distrust and suspense in the minds both of the rulers and of the people, and such a state is always productive of disorder. But it is not in this partial consideration that I dread the effects of your commands; it is in your proclaimed indisposition against the first executive member of your first government in India. I almost shudder at the reflection of what might have happened, had these denunciations against your own minister, in favor of a man universally considered in this part of the world as justly attainted for his crimes, the murderer of your servants and soldiers, and the rebel to your authority, arrived two months earlier."

VI. That the said Warren Hastings did also presume to censure and asperse the Court of Directors for the moderate terms in which they had expressed their displeasure against him, as putting him under the necessity of stating in his defence a strong accusation against himself, and as implying in the said Court a consciousness that he was not guilty of the offences charged upon him,—being, as he asserts, in the resolutions of the Court of Directors, "arraigned and prejudged of a violation of national faith, in acts of such complicated aggravation, that, if they were true, no punishment SHORT OF DEATH could atone for the injury which the interest and credit of the public had sustained in them"; and he did therefore censure the said Court for applying no stronger or more criminating epithets than those of "improper, unwarrantable, and highly impolitic," to an offence so by them charged, and by him described. And though it be true that the expressions aforesaid are much too reserved for the purpose of duly characterizing the offences of the said Hastings, yet was it in him most indecent to libel the Court of Directors for the same; and his implication, from the tenderness of the epithets and descriptions aforesaid used towards him, was not only indecent, but ungrounded, malicious, and scandalous,—he having himself highly, though truly, aggravated "the charge of the injuries done by him to the Rajah of Benares," in order to bring the said Directors into contempt and suspicion, the paragraphs in the said libel being as follow.—"Here I must crave leave to say, that the terms 'improper, unwarrantable, and highly impolitic' are much too gentle, as deductions from such premises; and as every reader of the latter will obviously feel, as he reads, the deductions which inevitably belong to them, I will add, that the strict performance of solemn engagements on one part, followed by acts directly subversive of them and by total dispossession on the other, stamps on the perpetrators of the latter the guilt of the greatest possible violation of faith and justice."—"There is an appearance of tenderness in this deviation from plain construction, of which, however meant, I have a right to complain; because it imposes on me the necessity of framing the terms of the accusation against myself, which you have only not made, but have stated the leading arguments to it so strongly, that no one who reads these can avoid making it, or not know it to have been intended."

VII. That the said Hastings, being well aware that his own declarations did contain the clearest condemnation of his own conduct from his own pen, did in the said libel attempt to overturn, frustrate, and render of none effect all the proofs to be given of prevarication, contradiction, and of opposition of action to principle, which can be used against men in public trust, and did contend that the same could not be used against him; and as if false assertions could be justified by factious motives, he did endeavor to do away the authority of his own deliberate, recorded declarations, entered by him in writing on the Council-Books of the Presidency; for, after asserting, but not attempting to prove, that his declarations were consistent with his conduct, he writes in the said libel as follows: For "were it otherwise, they were not to be made the rules of my conduct; and God forbid that every expression dictated by the impulse of present emergency, and unpremeditatedly uttered in the heat of party contention, should impose upon me the obligation of a fixed principle, and be applied to every variable occasion!"

VIII. That the said Hastings, in order to draw the lawful dependence of the servants of the Company from the Court of Directors to a factious dependence on himself, did, in the libel aforesaid, treat the acts and appointments of their undoubted authority, when exercised in opposition to his arbitrary will, as ruinous to their affairs, in the following terms. "It is as well known to the Indian world as to the Court of English Proprietors, that the first declaratory instruments of the dissolution of my influence, in the year 1774, were Mr. John Bristow and Mr. Francis Fowke. By your ancient and known constitution the Governor has been ever held forth and understood to possess the ostensible powers of government; all the correspondence with foreign princes is conducted in his name; and every person resident with them for the management of your political concerns is understood to be more especially his representative, and of his choice: and such ought to be the rule; for how otherwise can they trust an agent nominated against the will of his principal? When the state of this administration was such as seemed to admit of the appointment of Mr. Bristow to the Residency of Lucknow without much diminution of my own influence, I gladly seized the occasion to show my readiness to submit to your commands; I proposed his nomination; he was nominated, and declared to be the agent of my own choice. Even this effect of my caution is defeated by your absolute command for his reappointment independent of me, and with the supposition that I should be adverse to it.—I am now wholly deprived of my official powers, both in the province of Oude, and in the zemindary of Benares."

IX. That, further to emancipate others and himself from due obedience to the Court of Directors, he did, in the libel aforesaid, enhance his services, which, without specification or proof, he did suppose in the said libel to be important and valuable, by representing them as done under their displeasure, and doth attribute his not having done more to their opposition, as followeth. "It is now a complete period of eleven years since I first received the first nominal charge of your affairs; in the course of it I have invariably had to contend, not with ordinary difficulties, but such as most unnaturally arose from the opposition of those very powers from which I primarily derived my authority, and which were required for the support of it. My exertions, though applied to an unvaried and consistent line of action, have been occasional and desultory; yet I please myself with the hope, that, in the annals of your dominion, which shall be written after the extinction of recent prejudices, this term of its administration will appear not the least conducive to the interests of the Company, nor the least reflective of the honor of the British name: and allow me to suggest the instructive reflection of what good might have been done, and what evil prevented, had due support been given to that administration which has performed such eminent and substantial services without it."

And the said Hastings, further to render the authority of the said Court perfectly contemptible, doth, in a strain of exultation for his having escaped out of a measure in which by his guilt he had involved the Company in a ruinous war, and out of which it had escaped by a sacrifice of almost all the territories before acquired (from that enemy which he had made) either by war or former treaties, and by the abandoning the Company's allies to their mercy, attribute the said supposed services to his acting in such a manner as had on former occasions excited their displeasure, in the following words. "Pardon, Honorable Sirs, this digressive exultation. I cannot suppress the pride which I feel in this successful achievement of a measure so fortunate for your interests and the national honor; for that pride is the source of my zeal, so frequently exerted in your support, and never more happily than in those instances in which I have departed from the prescribed and beaten path of action, and assumed a responsibility which has too frequently drawn on me the most pointed effects of your displeasure. But however I may yield to my private feelings in thus enlarging on the subject, my motive in introducing it was immediately connected with its context, and was to contrast the actual state of your political affairs, derived from a happier influence, with that which might have attended an earlier dissolution of it": and he did value himself upon "the patience and temper with which he had submitted to all the indignities which have been heaped upon him" (meaning, by the said Court of Directors) "in this long service"; and he did insolently attribute to an unusual strain of zeal for their service, that he "persevered in the VIOLENT MAINTENANCE OF HIS OFFICE."

X. That, in order further to excite the spirit of disobedience in the Company's servants to the lawful authority set over them, he, the said Warren Hastings, did treat contemptuously and ironically the supposed disposition of the Company's servants to obey the orders of the Court of Directors, in the words following. "The recall of Mr. Markham, who was known to be the public agent of my own nomination at Benares, and the reappointment of Mr. Francis Fowke by your order, contained in the same letter, would place it [the restoration of Cheyt Sing] beyond a doubt. This order has been obeyed; and whenever you shall be pleased to order the restoration of Cheyt Sing, I will venture to promise the same ready and exact submission in the other members of the Council." And he did, in the postscript of the said letter, and as on recollection, endeavor to make a reparation of honor to his said colleagues, as if his expressions aforesaid had arisen from animosity to them, as follows. "Upon a careful revisal of what I have written, I fear that an expression which I have used, respecting the probable conduct of the board in the event of orders being received for the restoration of Cheyt Sing, may be construed as intimating a sense of dissatisfaction applied to transactions already past.—It is not my intention to complain of any one."

XI. That the said Hastings, in the acts of injury aforesaid to the Rajah of Benares, did assume and arrogate to himself an illegal authority therein, and did maintain that the acts done in consequence of that measure were not revocable by any subsequent authority, in the following words. "If you should proceed to order the restoration of Cheyt Sing to the zemindary, from which, by the powers which I legally possessed, and conceive myself legally bound to assert against any subsequent authority to the contrary derived from the same common source, he was dispossessed for crimes of the greatest enormity, and your Council shall resolve to execute the order, I will instantly give up my station and the service."

XII. That the said Warren Hastings did attempt to justify his publication of the said libellous letter to and against the Court of Directors by asserting therein that these resolutions (meaning the resolutions of the Court of Directors relative to the Rajah of Benares) "were either published or intended for publication": evidently proving that he did take this unwarrantable course without any sufficient assurance that the ground and motive by him assigned had any existence.

XX.—MAHRATTA WAR AND PEACE

I. That by an act passed in 1773 it was expressly ordered and provided, "that it should not be lawful for any President and Council of Madras, Bombay, or Bencoolen, for the time being, to make any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war, against any Indian princes or powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace, or other treaty, with any such Indian princes or powers, without the consent and approbation of the Governor-General and Council first had and obtained, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the orders from the Governor-General and Council might arrive." That, nevertheless, the President and Council of Bombay did, in December, 1774, without the consent and approbation of the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, and in the midst of profound peace, commence an unjust and unprovoked war against the Mahratta government, did conclude a treaty with a certain person, a fugitive from that government, and proscribed by it, named Ragonaut Row, or Ragoba, and did, under various base and treacherous pretences, invade and conquer the island of Salsette, belonging to the Mahratta government.

II. That Warren Hastings, on the first advices received in Bengal of the above transactions, did condemn the same in the strongest terms,—declaring that "the measures adopted by the Presidency of Bombay had a tendency to a very extensive and indefinite scene of troubles, and that their conduct was unseasonable, impolitic, unjust, and unauthorized." And the Governor-General and Council, in order to put a stop to the said unjust hostilities, did appoint an ambassador to the Peshwa, or chief of the Mahratta state, resident at Poonah; and the said ambassador did, after a long negotiation, conclude a definitive treaty of peace with the said Peshwa on terms highly honorable and beneficial to the East India Company, who by the said treaty obtained from the Mahrattas a cession of considerable tracts of country, the Mahratta share of the city of Baroach, twelve lacs of rupees for the expenses of the said unjust war, and particularly the island of Salsette, of which the Presidency of Bombay had possessed themselves by surprise and treachery. That, in return for these extraordinary concessions, the articles principally insisted on by the Mahrattas, with a view to their own future tranquillity and internal quiet, were, that no assistance should he given to any subject or servant of the Peshwa that should cause disturbances or rebellion in the Mahratta dominions, and particularly that the English should not assist Ragonaut Row, to whom the Mahrattas agreed to allow five lacs of rupees a year, or a jaghire to that amount, and that he should reside at Benares. That, nevertheless, the Presidency of Bombay did receive and keep Ragonaut Row at Bombay, did furnish him with a considerable establishment, and continue to carry on secret intrigues and negotiations with him, thereby giving just ground of jealousy and distrust to the Mahratta state. That the late Colonel John Upton, by whom the treaty of Poorunder was negotiated and concluded, did declare to the Governor-General and Council, "that, while Ragonaut Row resides at Bombay in expectation of being supported, the ministers can place no confidence in the Council there, which must now be productive of the greatest inconveniencies, and perhaps in the end of fatal consequences." That the said Warren Hastings, concurring with his Council, which then consisted of Sir John Clavering, Richard Barwell, and Philip Francis, Esquires, did, on the 18th of August, 1777, declare to the Presidency of Bombay, that "he could see no reason to doubt that the presence of Ragoba at Bombay would continue to be an insuperable bar to the completion of the treaty concluded with the Mahratta government; nor could any sincere cordiality and good understanding be established with them, as long as he should appear to derive encouragement and support from the English." That Sir John Clavering died soon after, and that the late Edward Wheler, Esquire, succeeded to a seat in the Supreme Council. That on the 29th of January, 1778, the Governor-General and Council received a letter from the Presidency of Bombay, dated 12th December, 1777, in which they declared, "that they had agreed to give encouragement to a party formed in Ragoba's favor, and flattered themselves they should meet with the hearty concurrence of the Governor-General and Council in the measures they might be obliged to pursue in consequence." That the party so described was said to consist of four principal persons in the Mahratta state, on whose part some overtures had been made to Mr. William Lewis, the Resident of Bombay at Poonah, for the assistance of the Company to bring Ragoba to Poonah. That the said Warren Hastings, immediately on the receipt of the preceding advices, did propose and carry it in Council, by means of his casting voice, and against the remonstrances, arguments, and solemn protest of two members of the Supreme Council, that the sanction of that government should be given to the plan which the President and Council of Bombay had agreed to form with the Mahratta government; and also that a supply of money (to the amount of ten lacs of rupees) should be immediately granted to the President and Council of Bombay for the support of their engagements above mentioned; and also that a military force should be sent to the Presidency of Bombay. That in defence of these resolutions the said Warren Hastings did falsely pretend and affirm, "that the resolution of the Presidency of Bombay was formed on such a case of imminent necessity as would have rendered it dangerous to postpone the execution of it until the orders from the Governor-General and Council might arrive; and that the said Presidency of Bombay were warranted by the treaty of Poorunder to join in a plan for conducting Ragonaut Row to Poonah on the application of the ruling part of the Mahratta state": whereas the main object of the said treaty on the part of the Mahrattas, and to obtain which they made many important concessions to the India Company, was, that the English should withdraw their forces, and give no assistance to Ragoba, and that he should be excluded forever from any share in their government, being a person universally held in abhorrence in the Mahratta empire; and if it had been true (instead of being, as it was, notoriously false) that the ruling part of the administration of the Mahratta state solicited the return of Ragonaut Row to Poonah, his return in that case might have been effected by acts of their own, without the interposition of the English power, and without our interference in their affairs. That it was the special duty of the said Warren Hastings, derived from a special trust reposed in him and power committed to him by Parliament, to have restrained, as by law he had authority to do, the subordinate Presidency of Bombay from entering into hostilities with the Mahrattas, or from making engagements the manifest tendency of which was to enter into those hostilities, and to have put a stop to them, if any such had been begun; that he was bound by the duty of his office to preserve the faith of the British government, pledged in the treaty of Poorunder, inviolate and sacred, as well as by the special orders and instructions of the East India Company to fix his attention to the preservation of peace throughout India: all which important duties the said Warren Hastings did wilfully violate, in giving the sanction of the Governor-General and Council to the dangerous, faithless, and ill-concerted projects of the President and Council of Bombay hereinbefore mentioned, from which the subsequent Mahratta war, with all the expense, distress, and disgraces which have attended it, took their commencement; and that the said Warren Hastings, therefore, is specially and principally answerable for the said war, and for all the consequences thereof. That in a letter dated the 20th of January, 1778, the President and Council of Bombay informed the Governor-General and Council, that, in consequence of later intelligence received from Poonah, they had immediately resolved that nothing further could be done, unless Saccaram Baboo, the principal in the late treaty (of Poorunder) joined in making a formal application to them. That no such application was ever made by that person. That the said Warren Hastings, finding that all this pretended ground for engaging in an invasion of the Mahratta government had totally failed, did then pretend to give credit to, and to be greatly alarmed by, the suggestions of the President and Council of Bombay, that the Mahrattas were negotiating with the French, and had agreed to give them the port of Choul, on the Malabar coast, and did affirm that the French had obtained possession of that port. That all these suggestions and assertions were false, and, if they had been true, would have furnished no just occasion for attacking either the Mahrattas or the French, with both of whom the British nation was then at peace. That the said Warren Hastings did then propose and carry the following resolution in Council, against the protest of two members thereof, that, "for the purpose of granting you [the Presidency of Bombay] the most effectual support in our power, we have resolved to assemble a strong military force near Calpee, the commanding officer of which is to be ordered to march by the most practicable route to Bombay, or to such other place as future occurrences and your directions to him may render it expedient"; and with respect to the steps said to be taking by the French to obtain a settlement on the Malabar coast, the said Warren Hastings did declare to the Presidency of Bombay, "that it was the opinion of the Governor-General and Council that no time ought to be lost in forming and carrying into execution such measures as might most effectually tend to frustrate such dangerous designs." That the said Warren Hastings, therefore, instead of fixing his attention to the preservation of peace throughout India, as it was his duty to have done, did continue to abet, encourage, and support the dangerous projects of the Presidency of Bombay, and did thereby manifest a determined intention to disturb the peace of India, by the unfortunate success of which intention, and by the continued efforts of the said Hastings, the greatest part of India has been for several years involved in a bloody and calamitous war. That both the Court of Directors and Court of Proprietors did specially instruct the said Warren Hastings, in all his measures, "to make the safety and prosperity of Bengal his principal object," and did heavily censure the said Warren Hastings for having employed their troops at a great distance from Bengal in a war against the Rohillas, which the House of Commons have pronounced to be iniquitous,[17 - 28th May, 1782.] and did on that occasion expressly declare, "that they disapproved of all such distant expeditions as might eventually carry their forces to any situation too remote to admit of their speedy and safe return to the protection of their own provinces, in case of emergency."[18 - 15th Dec, 1775.] That the said Warren Hastings nevertheless ordered a detachment from the Bengal army to cross the Jumna, and to proceed across the peninsula by a circuitous route through the diamond country of Bundelcund, and through the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, situated in the centre of Hindostan, and did thereby strip the provinces subject to the government of Fort William of a considerable part of their established defence, and did thereby disobey the general instructions and positive orders of the Court of Directors, (given upon occasion of a crime of the same nature committed by the said Hastings,) and was guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor.

That the said Warren Hastings, having taken the measures hereinbefore described for supporting those of the Presidency of Bombay, did, on the 23d of March, 1778, "invest the said Presidency with authority to form a new alliance with Ragoba, and to engage with him in any scheme which they should deem expedient and safe for retrieving his affairs." That the said Hastings was then in possession of a letter from the Court of Directors, dated the 4th of July, 1777, containing a positive order to the Presidency of Bombay in the following words. "Though that treaty" (meaning the treaty of Poorunder) "is not, upon the whole, so agreeable to us as we could wish, still we are resolved strictly to adhere to it on our parts. You must therefore be particularly vigilant, while Ragoba is with you, to prevent him from forming any plan against what is called the ministerial party at Poonah; and we hereby positively order you not to engage with him in any scheme whatever in retrieving his affairs, without the consent of the Governor-General and Council, or the Court of Directors." That the said Ragoba neither did or could form any plan for his restoration but what was and must be against the ministerial party at Poonah, who held and exercised the regency of that state in the infancy of the Peshwa; and that, supposing him to have formed any other scheme, in conjunction with Bombay, for retrieving his affairs, the said Hastings, in giving a previous general authority to the Presidency of Bombay to engage with Ragoba in any scheme for that purpose, without knowing what such scheme might be, and thereby relinquishing and transferring to the discretion of a subordinate government that superintendence and control over all measures tending to create or provoke a war which the law had exclusively vested in the Governor-General and Council, was guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor.

That the said Warren Hastings, having first declared that the measures taken by him were for the support of the engagements made by the Presidency of Bombay in favor of Ragoba, did afterwards, when it appeared that those negotiations were entirely laid aside, declare that his apprehension of the consequence of a pretended intrigue between the Mahrattas and the French was the sole motive of all the late measures taken for the support of the Presidency of Bombay; but that neither of the preceding declarations contained the true motives and objects of the said Hastings, whose real purpose, as it appeared soon after, was, to make use of the superiority of the British power in India to carry on offensive wars, and to pursue schemes of conquest, impolitic and unjust in their design, ill-concerted in the execution, and which, as this House has resolved, have brought great calamities on India, and enormous expenses on the East India Company.

That the said Warren Hastings, on the 22d of June, 1778, made the following declaration in Council. "Much less can I agree, that, with such superior advantages as we possess over every power which can oppose us, we should act merely on the defensive. On the contrary, if it be really true that the British arms and influence have suffered so severe a check in the Western world, it is more incumbent on those who are charged with the interests of Great Britain in the East to exert themselves for the retrieval of the national loss. We have the means in our power, and, if they are not frustrated by our own dissensions, I trust that the event of this expedition will yield every advantage for the attainment of which it was undertaken."

That, in pursuance of the principles avowed in the preceding declaration, the said Warren Hastings, on the 9th of July, 1778, did propose and carry it in Council, that an embassy should be sent from Bengal to Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar,—falsely asserting that the said Rajah "was, by interest and inclination, likely to join in an alliance with the British government, and suggesting that two advantages might be offered to him as the inducements to it: first, the support of his pretensions to the sovereign power" (viz., of the Mahratta empire); "second, the recovery of the captures made on his dominions by Nizam Ali." That the said Hastings, having already given full authority to the Presidency of Bombay to engage the British faith to Ragonaut Row to support him in his pretensions to the government or to the regency of the Mahratta empire, was guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor in proposing to engage the same British faith to support the pretensions of another competitor for the same object; and that, in offering to assist the Rajah of Berar to recover the captures made on his dominions by the Nizam, the said Hastings did endeavor, as far as depended on him, to engage the British nation in a most unjust and utterly unprovoked war against the said Nizam, between whom and the East India Company a treaty of peace and friendship did then subsist, unviolated on his part,—notwithstanding the said Hastings well knew that it made part of the East India Company's fundamental policy to support that prince against the Mahrattas, and to consider him as one of the few remaining chiefs who were yet capable of coping with the Mahrattas, and that it was the Company's true interest to preserve a good understanding with him. That, by holding out such offers to the Rajah of Berar, the said Hastings professed to hope that the Rajah would ardently catch at the objects presented to his ambition: and although the said Hastings did about this time lay it down as a maxim that there is always a greater advantage in receiving solicitations than in making advances, he nevertheless declared to the said Rajah that in the whole of his conduct he had departed from the common line of policy, and had made advances where others in his situation would have waited for solicitation. That the said unjust and dangerous projects did not take effect, because the Rajah of Berar refused to join or be concerned therein; yet so earnest was the said Hastings for the execution of those projects, that in a subsequent letter he daringly and treacherously assured the Rajah, "that, if he had accepted of the terms offered him by Colonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with the government of Bengal upon them, he should have held the obligation of it superior to that of any engagement formed by the government of Bombay, and should have thought it his duty to maintain it, &c., against every consideration even of the most valuable interests and safety of the English possessions intrusted to his charge." That all the offers of the said Hastings were rejected with slight and contempt by the Rajah of Berar; but the same being discovered, and generally known throughout India, did fill the chief of the princes and states of India with a general suspicion and distrust of the ambitious designs and treacherous principles of the British government, and with an universal hatred of the British nation. That the said princes and states were thereby so thoroughly convinced of the necessity of uniting amongst themselves to oppose a power which kept no faith with any of them, and equally threatened them all, that, renouncing all former enmities against each other, they united in a common confederacy against the English, viz.: the Peshwa, as representative of the Mahratta state, and Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, that is, the principal Hindoo powers of India, on one side; and Hyder Ali, and the Nizam of the Deccan, that is, the principal Mahomedan powers of India, on the other: and that in consequence of this confederacy Hyder Ali invaded, overran, and ruined the Carnatic; and that Moodajee Boosla, instead of ardently catching at the objects presented to his ambition by the said Hastings, sent an army to the frontiers of Bengal,—which army the said Warren Hastings was at length forced to buy off with twenty-six lacs of rupees, or 300,000l. sterling, after a series of negotiations with the Mahratta chiefs who commanded that army, founded and conducted on principles so dishonorable to the British name and character, that the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, by whom the rest of the proceedings in that business were reported to the House, have upon due consideration thought it proper to leave out the letter of instructions to Mr. Anderson, viz., those given by the said Warren Hastings to the representative of the British government, and concerning which the said committee have reported in the following terms: "The schemes of policy by which the Governor-General seems to have dictated the instructions he gave to Mr. Anderson" (the gentleman deputed) "will also appear in this document, as well respecting the particular succession to the rauje, as also the mode of accommodating the demand of chout, the establishment of which was apparently the great aim of Moodajee's political manoeuvres, while the Governor-General's wish to defeat it was avowedly more intent on the removal of a nominal disgrace than on the anxiety or resolution to be freed from an expensive, if an unavoidable incumbrance."

That, while the said Warren Hastings was endeavoring to persuade the Rajah of Berar to engage with him in a scheme to place the said Rajah at the head of the Mahratta empire, the Presidency of Bombay, by virtue of the powers specially vested in them for that purpose by the said Hastings, did really engage with Ragonaut Row, the other competitor for the same object, and sent a great part of their military force, established for the defence of Bombay, on an expedition with Ragonaut Row, to invade the dominions of the Peshwa, and to take Poonah, the capital thereof; that this army, being surrounded and overpowered by the Mahrattas, was obliged to capitulate; and then, through the moderation of the Mahrattas, was permitted to return quietly, but very disgracefully, to Bombay. That, supposing the said Warren Hastings could have been justified in abandoning the project of reinstating Ragonaut Row, which he at first authorized and promised to support, and in preferring a scheme to place the Rajah of Berar at the head of the Mahratta empire, he was bound by his duty, as well as injustice to the Presidency of Bombay, to give that Presidency timely notice of such his intention, and to have restrained them positively from resuming their own project; that, on the contrary, the said Warren Hastings did, on the 17th of August, 1778, again authorize the said Presidency "to assist Ragoba with a military force to conduct him to Poonah, and to establish him in the regency there," and, so far from communicating his change of plan to Bombay, did keep it concealed from that Presidency, insomuch that, even so late as the 19th of February, 1779, William Hornby, then Governor of Bombay, declared in Council his total ignorance of the schemes of the said Hastings in the following terms: "The schemes of the Governor-General and Council with regard to the Rajah of Berar being yet unknown to us, it is impossible for us to found any measures on them; yet I cannot help now observing, that, if, as has been conjectured, the gentleman of that Presidency have entertained thoughts of restoring, in his person, the ancient Rajah government, the attempt seems likely to be attended with no small difficulty." That, whereas the said Warren Hastings did repeatedly affirm that it was his intention to support the plan formed by the Presidency of Bombay in favor of Ragoba, and did repeatedly authorize and encourage them to pursue it, he did nevertheless, at the same time, in his letters and declarations to the Peshwa, to the Nizam, and to the Rajah of Berar, falsely and perfidiously affirm, that it never was nor is designed by the English chiefs to give support to Ragonaut Row,—that he (Hastings) had no idea of supporting Ragonaut Row,—and that the detachment he had sent to Bombay was solely to awe the French, without the least design to assist Ragonaut Row. That, supposing it to have been the sole professed intention of the said Hastings, in sending an army across India, to protect Bombay against a Trench invasion, even that pretence was false, and used only to cover the real design of the said Hastings, viz., to engage in projects of war and conquest with the Rajah of Berar. That on the 11th of October, 1778, he informed the said Rajah "that the detachment would soon arrive in his territories, and depend on him [Moodajee Boosla] for its subsequent operations"; that on the 7th of December, 1778, the said Hastings revoked the powers he had before given[19 - On the 15th of November.] to the Presidency of Bombay over the detachment, declaring that the event of Colonel Goddard's negotiation with the Rajah of Berar was likely to cause a very speedy and essential change in the design and operations of the detachment; and that on the 4th of March, 1779, the said Hastings, immediately after receiving advice of the defeat of the Bombay army near Poonah, and when Bombay, if at any time, particularly required to be protected against a French invasion, did declare in Council that he wished for the return of the detachment to Berar, and dreaded to hear of its proceeding to the Malabar coast: and therefore, if the said Hastings did not think that Bombay was in danger of being attacked by the French, he was guilty of repeated falsehoods in affirming the contrary for the purpose of covering a criminal design; or, if he thought that Bombay was immediately threatened with that danger, he then was guilty of treachery in ordering an army necessary on that supposition to the immediate defence of Bombay to halt in Berar, to depend on the Rajah of Berar for its subsequent operations, or on the event of a negotiation with that prince, which, as the said Hastings declared, was likely to cause a very speedy and essential change in the design and operations of the detachment; and finally, in declaring that he dreaded to hear of the said detachment's proceeding to the Malabar coast, whither he ought to have ordered it to proceed without delay, if, as he has solemnly affirmed, it was true that he had been told by the highest authority that a powerful armament had been prepared in France, the first object of which was an attack upon Bombay, and that he knew with moral certainty that all the powers of the adjacent continent were ready to join the invasion.

That through the whole of these transactions the said Warren Hastings has been guilty of continued falsehood, fraud, contradiction, and duplicity, highly dishonorable to the character of the British nation; that, in consequence of the unjust and ill-concerted schemes of the said Hastings, the British arms, heretofore respected in India, have suffered repeated disgraces, and great calamities have been thereby brought upon India; and that the said Warren Hastings, as well in exciting and promoting the late unprovoked and unjustifiable war against the Mahrattas, as in the conduct thereof, has been guilty of sundry high crimes and misdemeanors.

That, by the definitive treaty of peace concluded with the Mahrattas at Poorunder, on the 1st of March, 1776, the Mahrattas gave up all right and title to the island of Salsette, unjustly taken from them by the Presidency of Bombay; did also give up to the English Company forever all right and title to their entire shares of the city and purgunnah of Baroach; did also give forever to the English Company a country of three lacs of rupees revenue, near to Baroach; and did also agree to pay to the Company twelve lacs of rupees, in part of the expenses of the English army: and that the terms of the said treaty were honorable and advantageous to the India Company.[20 - Resolution of the House of Commons, 28th May, 1782.]

That Warren Hastings, having broken the said treaty, and forced the Mahrattas into another war by a repeated invasion of their country, and having conducted that war in the manner hereinbefore described, did, on the 17th of May, 1782, by the agency of Mr. David Anderson, conclude another treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance with the Mahrattas, by which the said Hastings agreed to deliver up to them all the countries, places, cities, and forts, particularly the island of Bassein, (taken from the Peshwa during the war,) and to relinquish all claim to the country of three lacs of rupees ceded to the Company by the treaty of Poorunder; that the said Warren Hastings did also at the said time, by a private and separate agreement, deliver up to Mahdajee Sindia the whole of the city of Baroach,—that is, not only the share in the said city which the India Company acquired by the treaty of Poorunder, but the other share thereof which the India Company possessed for several years before that treaty; and that among the reasons assigned by Mr. David Anderson for totally stripping the Presidency of Bombay of all their possessions on the Malabar coast, he has declared, "that, from the general tenor of the rest of the treaty, the settlement of Bombay would be in future put on such a footing that it might well become a question whether the possession of an inconsiderable territory without forts would not be attended with more loss than advantage, as it must necessarily occasion considerable expense, must require troops for its defence, and might probably in the end lead, as Sindia apprehended, to a renewal of war."

That the said Warren Hastings, having in this manner put an end to a war commenced by him without provocation, and continued by him without necessity, and having for that purpose made so many sacrifices to the Mahrattas in points of essential interest to the India Company, did consent and agree to other articles utterly dishonorable to the British name and character, having sacrificed or abandoned every one of the native princes who by his solicitations and promises had been engaged to take part with us in the war,—and that he did so without necessity: since it appears that Sindia, the Mahratta chief who concluded the treaty, in every part of his conduct manifested a hearty desire of establishing a peace with us; and that this was the disposition of all the parties in the Mahratta confederacy, who were only kept together by a general dread of their common enemy, the English, and who only waited for a cessation of hostilities with us to return to their habitual and permanent enmity against each other. That the Governor-General and Council, in their letter of 31st August, 1781, made the following declaration to the Court of Directors. "The Mahrattas have demanded the sacrifice of the person of Ragonaut Row, the surrender of the fort and territories of Ahmedabad, and of the fortress of Gualior, which are not ours to give, and which we could not wrest from the proprietors without the greatest violation of public faith. No state of affairs, in our opinions, could warrant our acquiescence to such requisition; and we are morally certain, that, had we yielded to them, such a consciousness of the state of our affairs would have been implied as would have produced an effect the very reverse from that for which it was intended, by raising the presumption of the enemy to exact yet more ignominious terms, or perhaps their refusal to accept of any; nor, in our opinion, would they have failed to excite in others the same belief, and the consequent decision of all parties against us, as the natural consequences of our decline." That the said Hastings himself, in his instructions to Mr. David Anderson, after authorizing him to restore all that we had conquered during the war, expressly "excepted Ahmedabad, and the territory conquered for Futty Sing Gwicowar." That, nevertheless, the said Hastings, in the peace concluded by him, has yielded to every one of the conditions reprobated in the preceding declarations as ignominious and incompatible with public faith.

That the said Warren Hastings did abandon the Ranna of Gohud in the manner already charged; and that the said Ranna has not only lost the fort of Gualior, but all his own country, and is himself a prisoner. That the said Hastings did not interpose to obtain any terms in favor of the Nabob of Bopaul, who was with great reason desirous of concealing from the Mahrattas the attachment he had borne to the English government:[21 - Anderson's letter of 26th January, 1782.] the said Nabob having a just dread of the danger of being exposed to the resentment of the Mahrattas, and no dependence on the faith and protection of the English. That by the ninth article of the treaty with Futty Sing it was stipulated, that, when a negotiation for peace should take place, his interest should be primarily considered; and that Mr. David Anderson, the minister and representative of the Governor-General and Council, did declare to Sindia, that it was indispensably incumbent on us to support Futty Sing's rights: that, nevertheless, every acquisition made for or by the said Futty Sing during the war, particularly the fort and territories of Ahmedabad, were given up by the said Hastings; that Futty Sing was replaced under the subjection of the Peshwa, (whose resentment he had provoked by taking part with us in the war,) and under an obligation to pay a tribute, not specified, to the Peshwa, and to perform such services and to be subject to such obedience as had long been established and customary; and that, no limit being fixed to such tribute or services, the said Futty Sing has been left wholly at the mercy of the Mahrattas.

That, with respect to Ragoba, the said Hastings, in his instructions to Mr. Anderson, dated 4th of November, 1781, contented himself with saying, "We cannot totally abandon the interests of Ragonaut Row. Endeavor to obtain for him an adequate provision." That Mr. Anderson declared to Mahdajee Sindia,[22 - Anderson's letter of 24th February, 1782.] "that, as we had given Ragoba protection as an independent prince, and not brought him into our settlement as a prisoner, we could not in honor pretend to impose the smallest restraint on his will, and he must be at liberty to go wherever he pleased; that it must rest with Sindia himself to prevail on him to reside in his country: all that we could do was to agree, after a reasonable time, to withdraw our protection from him, and not to insist on the payment of the stipend to him, as Sindia had proposed, unless on the condition of his residing in some part of Sindia's territories."

That, notwithstanding all the preceding declarations, and in violation of the public faith repeatedly pledged to Ragoba, he was totally abandoned by the said Hastings in the treaty, no provision whatever being made even for his subsistence, but on a condition to which he could not submit without the certain loss of his liberty and probable hazard of his life, namely, that he should voluntarily and of his own accord repair to Sindia, and quietly reside with him. That such treacherous desertion of the said Ragoba is not capable of being justified by any plea of necessity: but that in fact no such necessity existed; since it appears that the Nizam, who of all the contracting parties in the confederacy was personally most hostile to Ragoba, did himself propose that Ragoba, might have an option given him of residing within the Company's territories.

That the plan of negotiating a peace with the Mahrattas by application to Sindia, and through his mediation, was earnestly recommended to the said Hastings by the Presidency of Bombay so early as in February, 1779, who stated clearly to him the reasons why such application ought to be made to Sindia in preference to any other of the Mahratta chiefs, and why it would probably be successful; the truth and justice of which reasons were fully evinced in the issue, when the said Hastings, after incurring, by two years' delay, all the losses and distresses of a calamitous war, did actually pursue that very plan with much less effect or advantage than might have been obtained at the time the advice was given. That he neglected the advice of the Presidency of Bombay, and retarded the peace, as well as made its conditions worse, from an obstinate attachment to his project of an alliance offensive and defensive with the Rajah of Berar, the object of which was rather a new war than a termination of the war then existing against the Peshwa.

That the said Hastings did further embarrass and retard the conclusion of a peace by employing different ministers at the courts of the several confederate powers, whom he severally empowered to treat and negotiate a peace. That these ministers, not acting in concert, not knowing the extent of each other's commissions, and having no instructions to communicate their respective proceedings to each other, did in effect counteract their several negotiations. That this want of concert and of simplicity, and the mystery and intricacy in the mode of conducting the negotiation on our part, was complained of by our ministers as embarrassing and disconcerting to us, while it was advantageous to the adverse party, who were thereby furnished with opportunity and pretence for delay, when it suited their purpose, and enabled to play off one set of negotiators against another; that it also created jealousy and distrust in the various contending parties, with whom we were treating at the same time, and to whom we were obliged to make contradictory professions, while it betrayed and exposed to them all our own eagerness and impatience for peace, raising thereby the general claims and pretensions of the enemy. That, while Dalhousie Watherston, Esquire, was treating at Poonah, and David Anderson, Esquire, in Sindia's camp, with separate powers applied to the same object, the minister at Poonah informed the said Watherston, that he had received proposals for peace from the Nabob of Arcot with the approbation of Sir Eyre Coote; that he had returned other proposals to the said Nabob of Arcot, who had assured him, the minister, that those proposals would be acceded to, and that Mr. Macpherson would set out for Bengal, after which orders should be immediately dispatched from the Honorable the Governor-General and Council to the effect he wished; that the said Nabob "had promised to obtain and forward to him the expected orders from Bengal in fifteen days, and that he was therefore every instant in expectation of their arrival,—and observed, that, when General Goddard proposed to send a confidential person to Poonah, he conceived that those orders must have actually reached him": that therefore the treaty formally concluded by David Anderson was in effect and substance the same with that offered and in reality concluded by the Nabob of Arcot, with the exception only of Salsette, which the Nabob of Arcot had agreed to restore to the Mahrattas.

That the intention of the said Warren Hastings, in pressing for a peace with the Mahrattas on terms so dishonorable and by measures so rash and ill-concerted, was not to restore and establish a general peace throughout India, but to engage the India Company in a new war against Hyder Ali, and to make the Mahrattas parties therein. That the eagerness and passion with which the said Hastings pursued this object laid him open to the Mahrattas, who depended thereon for obtaining whatever they should demand from us. That, in order to carry the point of an offensive alliance against Hyder Ali, the said Hastings exposed the negotiation for peace with the Mahrattas to many difficulties and delays. That the Mahrattas were bound by a clear and recent engagement, which Hyder had never violated in any article, to make no peace with us which should not include him; that they pleaded the sacred nature of this obligation in answer to all our requisitions on this head, while the said Hastings, still importunate for his favorite point, suggested to them various means of reconciling a substantial breach of their engagement with a formal observance of it, and taught them how they might at once be parties in a peace with Hyder Ali and in an offensive alliance for immediate hostility against him. That these lessons of public duplicity and artifice, and these devices of ostensible faith and real treachery, could have no effect but to degrade the national character, and to inspire the Mahrattas themselves, with whom we were in treaty, with a distrust in our sincerity and good faith. That the object of this fraudulent policy (viz., the utter destruction of Hyder Ali, and a partition of his dominions) was neither wise in itself, or authorized by the orders and instructions of the Company to their servants; that it was incompatible with the treaty of peace, in which Hyder Ali was included, and contrary to the repeated and best-understood injunctions of the Company,—being, in the first place, a bargain for a new war, and, in the next, aiming at an extension of our territory by conquest. That the best and soundest political opinions on the relations of these states have always represented our great security against the power of the Mahrattas to depend on its being balanced by that of Hyder Ali; and the Mysore country is so placed as a barrier between the Carnatic and the Mahrattas as to make it our interest rather to strengthen and repair that barrier than to level and destroy it. That the said treaty of partition does express itself to be eventual with regard to the making and keeping of peace; but through the whole course of the said Hastings's proceeding he did endeavor to prevent any peace with the Sultan or Nabob of Mysore, Tippoo Sahib, and did for a long time endeavor to frustrate all the methods which could have rendered the said treaty of conquest and partition wholly unnecessary.

That the Mahrattas having taken no effectual step to oblige Hyder Ali to make good the conditions for which they had engaged in his behalf, and the war continuing to be carried on in the Carnatic by Tippoo Sultan, son and successor of Hyder Ali, the Presidency of Fort St. George undertook, upon their own authority, to open a negotiation with the said Tippoo: which measure, though indispensably necessary, the said Hastings utterly disapproved and discountenanced, expressly denying that there was any ground or motive for entering into any direct or separate treaty with Tippoo, and not consenting to or authorizing any negotiation for such treaty, until after a cessation of hostilities had been brought about with him by the Presidency of Fort St. George, in August, 1783, and the ministers of Tippoo had been received and treated with by that Presidency, and commissioners, in return, actually sent by the said Presidency to the court of Poonah: which late and reluctant consent and authority were extorted from him, the said Hastings, in consequence of the acknowledgment of his agent at the court of Mahdajee Sindia, upon whom the said Warren Hastings had depended for enforcing the clauses of the Mahratta treaty, of the precariousness of such dependence, and of the necessity of that direct and separate treaty with Tippoo, so long and so lately reprobated by the said Warren Hastings, notwithstanding the information and entreaties of the Presidency of Fort St. George, as well as the known distresses and critical situation of the Company's affairs. That, though the said Warren Hastings did at length give instructions for negotiating and making peace with Tippoo, expressly adding, that those instructions extended to all the points which occurred to him or them as capable of being agitated or gained upon the occasion,—though the said instructions were sent after the said commissioners by the Presidency of Fort St. George, with directions to obey them,—though not only the said instructions were obeyed, but advantages gained which did not occur to the said Warren Hastings,—though the said peace formed a contrast with the Mahratta peace, in neither ceding any territory possessed by the Company before the war, or delivering up any dependant or ally to the vengeance of his adversaries, but providing for the restoration of all the countries that had been taken from the Company and their allies,—though the Supreme Council of Calcutta, forming the legal government of Bengal in the absence of the said Warren Hastings, ratified the said treaty,—yet the said Warren Hastings, then absent from the seat of government, and out of the province of Bengal, and forming no legal or integral part of the government during such absence, did, after such ratification, usurp the power of acting as a part of such government (as if actually sitting in Council with the other members of the same) in the consideration and unqualified censure of the terms of the said peace.

That the Nabob of Arcot, with whom the said Hastings did keep up an unwarrantable clandestine correspondence, without any communication with the Presidency of Madras, wrote a letter of complaint, dated the 27th of March, 1784, against the Presidency of that place, without any communication thereof to the said Presidency, the said complaint being addressed to the said Warren Hastings, the substance of which complaint was, that he, the Nabob, had not been made a party to the late treaty; and although his interest had been sufficiently provided for in the said treaty, the said Warren Hastings did sign a declaration, on the 23d of May, at Lucknow, forming the basis of a new article, and making a new party to the treaty, after it had been by all parties (the Supreme Council of Calcutta included) completed and ratified, and did transmit the said new stipulation to the Presidency at Calcutta, solely for the purposes and at the instigation of the Nabob of Arcot; and the said declaration was made without any previous communication with the Presidency aforesaid, and in consequence thereof orders were sent by the Council at Calcutta to the Presidency of Fort St. George, under the severest threats in case of disobedience: which orders, whatever were their purport, would, as an undue assumption of and participation in the government, from which he was absent, become a high misdemeanor; but, being to the purport of opening the said treaty after its solemn ratification, and proposing a new clause and a new party to the same, was also an aggravation of such misdemeanor, as it tended to convey to the Indian powers an idea of the unsteadiness of the councils and determinations of the British government, and to take away all reliance on its engagements, and as, above all, it exposed the affairs of the nation and the Company to the hazard of seeing renewed all the calamities of war, from whence by the conclusion of the treaty they had emerged, and upon a pretence so weak as that of proposing the Nabob of Arcot to be a party to the same,—though he had not been made a party by the said Warren Hastings in the Mahratta treaty, which professed to be for the relief of the Carnatic,—though he was not a party to the former treaty with Hyder, also relative to the Carnatic,—though it was not certain, if the treaty were once opened, and that even Tippoo should then consent to that Nabob's being a party, whether he, the said Nabob, would agree to the clauses of the same, and consequently whether the said treaty, once opened, could afterwards be concluded: an uncertainty of which he, the said Hastings, should have learned to be aware, having already once been disappointed by the said Nabob's refusing to accede to a treaty which he, the said Warren Hastings, made for him with the Dutch, about a year before.

That the said Warren Hastings,—having broken a solemn and honorable treaty of peace by an unjust and unprovoked war,—having neglected to conclude that war when he might have done it without loss of honor to the nation,—having plotted and contrived, as far as depended on him, to engage the India Company in another war as soon as the former should be concluded,—and having at last put an end to a most unjust war against the Mahrattas by a most ignominious peace with them, in which he sacrificed objects essential to the interests, and submitted to conditions utterly incompatible with the honor of this nation, and with his own declared sense of the dishonorable nature of those conditions,—and having endeavored to open anew the treaty concluded with Tippoo Sultan through the means of the Presidency of Fort St. George, upon principles of justice and honor, and which established peace in India, and thereby exposing the British possessions there to the renewal of the dangers and calamities of war,—has by these several acts been guilty of sundry high crimes and misdemeanors.

XXI.—CORRESPONDENCE

That, by an act of the 13th year of his present Majesty, intituled, "An act for establishing certain regulations for the better management of the affairs of the East India Company, as well in India as in Europe, the Governor-General and Council are required and directed to pay due obedience to all such orders as they shall receive from the Court of Directors of the said United Company, and to correspond from time to time, and constantly and diligently transmit to the said Court an exact particular of all advices or intelligence and of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge, relating to the government, commerce, revenues, or interest of the said United Company."

That, in consequence of the above-recited act, the Court of Directors, in their general instructions of the 29th March, 1774, to the Governor-General and Council, did direct, "that the correspondence with the princes or country powers in India should be carried on through the Governor-General only; but that all letters to be sent by him should be first approved in Council; and that he should lay before the Council, at their next meeting, all letters received by him in the course of such correspondence, for their information."

And the Governor-General and Council were therein further ordered, "that, in transacting the business of their department, they should enter with the utmost perspicuity and exactness all their proceedings whatsoever, and all dissents, if such should at any time be made by any member of their board, together with all letters sent or received in the course of their correspondence; and that broken sets of such proceedings, to the latest period possible, be transmitted to them [the Court of Directors], a complete set at the end of every year, and a duplicate by the next conveyance."

That, in defiance of the said orders, and in breach of the above-recited act of Parliament, the said Warren Hastings has, in sundry instances, concealed from his Council the correspondence carried on between him and the princes or country powers in India, and neglected to communicate the advices and intelligence he from time to time received from the British Residents at the different courts in India to the other members of the government, and, without their knowledge, counsel, or participation, has dispatched orders on matters of the utmost consequence to the interests of the Company.