The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Volume 30 of 55

The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Volume 30 of 55
Antonio Alvarez de Abreu

Diego Aduarte

Antonio Alvarez de Abreu, Diego Aduarte

The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, Volume 30 of 55 / Explorations by early navigators, descriptions of the islands and their peoples, their history and records of the catholic missions, as related in contemporaneous books and manuscripts, showing the political, economic, commercial and religious conditions of those islands from their earliest relations with European nations to the close of the nineteenth century, Volume XXX, 1640

Preface

The present volume contains no record of events in the year 1640; but its two documents are retrospective from that date. The first, an historical survey of Philippine commerce with Nueva España, from its beginning until 1640, is taken from the Extracto historial (Madrid, 1736), a work devoted to that subject and compiled by order of the Spanish government. The second is Aduarte’s noted history of the Dominican missions in the Philippines; although much of it is briefly synopsized, its great length permits us only to begin it here, two more volumes being necessary to complete it.

Valuable information regarding the trade between the Philippines and Nueva España is furnished by the Extracto historial (Madrid, 1736), from which we take such matter as pertains to that commerce up to 1640. A brief summary of royal ordinances thereon is followed by a memorial sent (1640) to the royal visitor for Mexico, Juan Palafox y Mendoza, by Juan Grau y Monfalcón, agent at the Spanish court for the Philippine Islands. As Palafox is commissioned to investigate the condition, needs, and commerce of the islands, Grau sends him this memorial by way of information thereon, and as a brief for the islands in their controversy over the grievous restrictions placed on their commerce with Nueva España (which is mainly their export thither of Chinese silk fabrics). Grau’s argument is carefully divided and subdivided; it is not always ingenuous, and sometimes he overshoots his mark, or uses the same premises for different and at times incongruous results; but it is on the whole a forcible presentation of the difficulties and embarrassments under which that commerce is laboring, and even the colony striving for existence. He constantly urges the great importance of the Philippines to the Spanish crown, not only as a center of missionary effort in the Orient, but for the defense of the Moluccas and the spice trade, the maintenance of Eastern India, and the diversion from that region and from the American coasts of the Dutch enemy, on whom the Philippine colony is a continual and effective check; all these considerations are discussed at length. He lauds the bravery, loyalty, and piety of the Spaniards in those islands, and their great services to the crown. He computes the expenditures necessary to sustain the Philippine colony, and the revenues which it yields, and shows that its actual expense is but moderate, and far less than is supposed. From even this should properly be deducted the expenses of sustaining Moluco, a burden which falls on the Philippines, although the Spice Islands and their trade are the property of Portugal; such computation leaves but 26,000 pesos annually as the actual cost of maintaining the Philippines, Grau proposes two plans for securing this end: one, to pay all the expenses of the islands directly from the royal treasury; the other, to grant them a sufficient amount of commerce – the latter being the most expedient and desirable method. Granting this, it remains to consider the character, amount, and form of such commerce; Grau expatiates on the third of these in especial, recounting the annoyances and injuries inflicted at Acapulco on Philippine merchants and their goods.

Grau notices the accusations that have been made against the Philippine commerce, of infractions of the ordinances regulating it; while not denying these, he claims that they are not more extensive or serious than those that are committed in the India trade, and do not deserve the severity which has been employed against them. In behalf of the islands, Grau asks for an increase in the amount of trade permitted to them; for the restrictions on their commerce have greatly reduced their wealth, on which heavier burdens are constantly laid by the necessity of defending themselves from so many and so powerful enemies. The population of Manila is also much larger than when the trade was first limited, and needs more for its support; moreover, much of the amount permitted is granted to convents and other institutions, and to certain privileged persons, and various deductions are made from its total, thus diminishing its actual value. Grau argues that a sufficient increase in the trade of the islands would put a stop to illegal shipments of goods; and that the exporters cannot make any reasonable profits unless they are more liberally treated. He suggests that they be allowed to export goods freely, a limitation being placed only on the returns of silver therefor; and urges that the products of the islands be free from all restrictions, and not included in the amount permitted – which latter should apply only to Chinese goods – for which he adduces various forcible arguments. Discussing then the commerce between Nueva España and Peru, he shows that the suspension of this trade during 1635–40 has been very injurious to the Philippines, for various reasons; it has also hurt both Peru and Mexico, especially by checking the latter’s silk industry, which found a market in Peru. He defends the Peruvian merchants from the accusations made against them of transgressing the trade permission that had been accorded to them, and urges that, for the sake of all the western colonies, this permission be restored to Peru.

This memorial by Grau is followed by several royal decrees (dated February 14, 1640) addressed to Palafox; these are mainly “informatory,” and lay before that official the representations made by the citizens of the islands regarding their distressed condition – ordering him to investigate the affairs of Philipinas carefully and thoroughly, and report thereon to the home government. In later volumes of this series will be presented a considerable part of the Extracto historial – a work which, as we understand, has not before been Englished – on account of the importance attached not only to the book as an official report, but to the commerce of the Philippines as a factor in the history and development of that Spanish colony in the Far East.

Aduarte’s Historia de la provincia del Sancto Rosario (Manila, 1640) is here presented for the first time in English dress – partly in full translation and partly in synopsis, because this work, besides being voluminous, contains much about Japan and other countries, and other matter outside our scope. The earlier chapters (i–ix) of book i, here briefly summarized, describe the foundation of the province and the voyage of the first Dominican missionaries to Manila; also the unsuccessful effort at the same time to open a mission in China. In chapter x is described their entrance into Manila, their affectionate reception by all, and their establishment there as a religious community. The new arrivals are initiated into missionary labor at Bataan, and soon afterward are placed in charge of the Pangasinan natives, and of the Chinese at Manila. With the aid of Bishop Salazar, the Dominicans secure a piece of land for their convent and church; and they receive many gifts and alms from pious citizens. They labor for the good of the Spanish residents of Manila, and soon effect a great change in their morals and religious life. They prosper, and are able to erect a new and handsome stone church and the other buildings necessary for their establishment; but the noted fire of 1603 destroys all this great work. It is afterward rebuilt, even more solidly than before, and all by the alms of the faithful. Chapters xii-xv are devoted to an account of an image of our Lady of the Rosary possessed by this Dominican convent, and of the miracles wrought through its agency. Some of the friars had complained of the severity of their mode of life and of the rules imposed upon them; but all finally agree thereto, with great self-forgetfulness and devotion. Aduarte proceeds to recount the great advantages arising to the province from this procedure, and the holiness displayed by the Dominican religious in Luzón – statements confirmed by various letters written to Spain by trustworthy persons, not only within but without that order.

Chapter xix is devoted to an account of the Dominicans’ first mission-field, that of Bataán, and their labors therein. This field had been transiently occupied by other missionaries, but was so hard and barren that none of them had persevered in its cultivation. But the Dominicans “licked their fingers over the hardships,” and devote themselves most heroically to the care of these poor souls, and to learning their language – a difficult task for old men. One of them, Pedro de Bolaños, is overcome by the labors and privations of this sort of life, and is compelled to return to Manila, where he finally dies; and the others suffer much from illness. As soon as the fathers learn the language of those natives, they acquire great influence over the natives, especially through the confessional. They greatly abate drunkenness, the worst vice of the Indians, by “sending to Coventry” every intoxicated person; and they persuade the heathen to abandon their idols and superstitious practices, and even (perhaps the greatest triumph of all) to set free many slaves, and restore what they had taken from others in usury and by other unjust means. All this is accomplished within one year; and Bataán acquires a wide reputation for the religious and peaceful life which its natives lead. Various marvelous works are wrought for the fathers by divine power; “on the other hand, the devil played some tricks on them.” They have to encounter witches and devils, but the Lord gives them the victory over these evil beings.

Pangasinan is another mission-field assigned to the Dominicans, which also had been barren of gospel fruit through the obstinate hostility of its natives to the Christian faith. At first, they try to drive away the Dominicans also, but the holy lives of those fathers work a miracle in their hard hearts, and convert them to the faith. This is told in a letter from Bishop Benavides to the pope, written in 1598. He relates their hardships, patience, and devotion, in the face of the hatred and hostility of the natives – so bitter that the missionaries are entreated, not only by Spanish officers but by Bishop Salazar, to leave Pangasinan. But they refuse to go, and finally their persistent and unwearied kindness to the Indians, and their consistent Christian characters, soften those hard hearts; and, after three years of patient waiting, the fathers gather a rich harvest of souls. Those Indians are excellent Christians, and show most edifying devotion and piety, a statement thoroughly confirmed by later reports. The early persecution of the missionaries is explained by the fact that after their arrival the oracles of the native idols became silent, and by false accusations which the devil and his emissaries concoct against the religious. The conversions and pious acts of two prominent chiefs are related, as well as various miracles which occur in this mission.

The leading events and persons of the next mission (1588–89) are described. Amid the greatest difficulties and dangers, those religious make the perilous voyage to Manila. The first provincial chapter-meeting is held in that city, on June 12, 1588; on this occasion the new province is organized, and officers regularly elected. Some progress is made this year in Pangasinan; but some of the natives are obstinately hostile, and the missionaries are often ill-treated, and sometimes in danger of death. Their acts of charity to the Indians, and especially their success in curing some sick persons, gradually win the affection of the natives; and the fathers are able to do much to improve the condition of those people – above all, in furnishing them hospitals and medical care for the sick, thus saving many lives.

Soon after reaching the islands the Dominicans also undertake to minister to the Chinese who come to Manila. In this field, as among the Indians, they obtain a foothold by their generous and unwearied care for the sick; and soon they erect a hospital for the care of poor Chinese sick persons, which rapidly increases in size and in the aid bestowed upon it, and where nearly all the patients are converted before they leave it. One of their converts devotes himself to the service of the hospital for many years, and greatly aids the fathers in charge of it. New buildings are erected, and the number of converts is greatly increased. The village of Binondo is enlarged, and a large and beautiful church is erected, for this Chinese Christian population. The pious works of several of these converts are related.

The harvest of souls continues to increase, and in 1589 a small but helpful reënforcement of missionaries arrives at the islands. A full account is given of their labors in Pangasinan and Bataán, the marvels wrought for them, the renunciation of idols by the heathen, the devotion and piety displayed by the converts. Fathers Castro and Benavides go to China (1590) to attempt the establishment of a mission there; but their enterprise is a failure, on account of the Chinese hostility to foreigners. Juan Cobo, acting provincial during Castro’s absence, visits the missions and makes some arrangements for their more advantageous management. Excellent crops for several years, and the advice and aid of the missionaries, increase the temporal prosperity of the Indians; and they become more friendly to the religious, and more inclined to receive religious instruction.

Gomez Perez Dasmariñas arrives at Manila in 1590, as governor of the islands. Dissensions soon arise between him and Bishop Salazar, and the latter departs for Spain (in June, 1591), accompanied by Benavides. The governor is afterward slain by his own Chinese oarsmen. In April, 1592, Fray Alonso Ximenes is chosen provincial; the various missions are apportioned, and certain ordinances for their conduct and the better government of the province are enacted. Fray Juan de Castro and Fray Juan Cobo die soon afterward, of whom Aduarte presents full biographical accounts. A special assembly of the religious is convened in December, 1594, at which additional rules for their conduct are adopted. They are also asked to send religious to Nueva Segovia, for which mission two fathers are allotted. Aduarte describes that province, and its conquest (1581) by the Spaniards, to prevent it from becoming a Japanese possession. The Indians of that province are so warlike that for a long time the Spaniards can keep but a precarious hold upon it; and the friars find that they can accomplish nothing there with either Spaniards or Indians. The Dominicans, therefore, enter (1595) upon a hard and sterile field; but a considerable reënforcement of missionaries opportunely arrive to aid them, although many die while en route from España. Aduarte recounts the superstitious beliefs and observances current among the Cagayán Indians, notions which shape or modify nearly all of their social customs; they are, from his standpoint, slaves to the devil in all things. The Dominican missionaries, now eight in number, plan and begin the spiritual conquest of Cagayán. For nearly a year they endure, on account of the hostility of the natives, great sufferings from hunger, exposure, and apparently vain efforts; but gradually they subdue the natives by their unwearied self-denial, patience, and love. Their first-fruits consist in eight converted chiefs, who are baptized at Easter (1597), and these are the beginning of a rich harvest – at first, mainly of children baptized before they die from the prevalent epidemic of smallpox. Gradually, they are able to build churches in the respective villages, and to introduce among the Indians a civilized and Christian mode of life. At the time of Aduarte’s writing (ca. 1637), those people have become very fond of their religious, and ask for them to come to teach them – even changing their own residences, when necessary for their obtaining religious instruction. The supply of missionaries for that region is very inadequate, and should be promptly increased.

The Editors

    July, 1905.

Commerce between the Philippines and Nueva España

[From Extracto historial.[1 - The present document is taken from the Extracto historial, a work compiled (Madrid, 1736) by order of the Spanish government, for its information and guidance in the discussions then pending in the royal Council of the Indias upon the subject of the trade in Chinese silks between the Philippine Islands and Nueva España. The book is an historical résumé of that commerce, and of legislation thereon, from its beginning to 1736; it is composed mainly of important documents – decrees, memorials, etc. – from the original sources, and is divided into ten tiempos, or periods, of which the second (which covers the time from 1603 to 1640) is here presented, and the others will receive due attention in later volumes.The title-page of the Extracto (of which a facsimile precedes the present document) reads thus in English: “Historical summary of the measures now under discussion in the royal and supreme Council of the Indias, at the instance of the city of Manila and the Philipinas Islands, in regard to the form in which the commerce and trade in Chinese fabrics with Nueva España shall be conducted and continued. And for the better understanding of the subject, the important events in that commerce are noted (distinguishing and separating the periods of time), from the discovery of the Philipinas Islands and the concession of commerce to them, with whatever has occurred up to the present in the operation and at the instance of the commerce of España and its tribunal [consulado]. Compiled and arranged by order of the king and the advice of the above-named Council, and at his Majesty’s expense, by an official of the [India] House, from the papers and documents furnished by the office of the Secretary for Nueva España, and [including] other special memoirs, which the said official has here set down for the greater completeness of the work, and to throw more light on the subject. At Madrid: in the printing-house of Juan de Ariztia, in the year 1736.”The official there mentioned was Don Antonio Alvarez de Abreu; at the beginning of the work he mentions in a prefatory article the reasons for its compilation, and the plan he has followed; he claims to have reproduced accurately the documents presented therein, and to have regarded the interests of both sides in the controversy then being waged over the Philippine commerce. One hundred copies of the Extracto were printed.]]

Period I

Of what has been ordained by royal decrees, now compiled, in regard to the commerce of Philipinas

1–15. [This “period” consists of a very brief summary of the laws regarding the above commerce, issued from 1593 to 1635; this matter, in fuller form, has been already given in VOLS. XVII of this series, pp. 27–50, and XXV, pp. 48–73, with which this document should be read.]

Period II

Of the debates on this commerce which occurred in the royal Council of the Indias up to the year 1640, and the commissions which on that account were entrusted to Señor Don Juan de Palafox, who, being an official of the [India] House, went as bishop of Puebla de los Angeles

Although in the collection of documents which was furnished to us by the Council, for the compilation of this Extracto, nothing appears relative to the controversies which occurred during the greater part of the last century in regard to the commerce of Philipinas, in order that the long silence on this matter – from the earliest decrees up to the year 1684, of which an account is given us by the papers in the Secretary’s office (with which “Period III” begins, and which the Extracto will follow) – may not seem irreparable, it has seemed to us desirable to form the present “Period” from a printed quarto book which was placed in the hands of Señor Palafox (who is now in Nueva España) by the deputy of those islands, and has reached us among other interesting documents. In this book are enumerated, for the purpose of furnishing information to that prelate – who was charged by the royal orders to inform [the government] regarding that affair [of the commerce] – the arguments which during the years 1638–40 were presented in behalf of the maintenance of the commerce of Philipinas, and the enlargement of the amount of trade allowed to that colony. We have not been able by any search to obtain the “Memorial” of one hundred and thirty-six sections which is said, in this printed book, to have been presented to the Council on this subject, in behalf of the city of Manila; but the insertion of the present document will not be unwelcome – not only because it contains substantially the same arguments which in following years up to the present time have been adduced, and which, it may reasonably be believed, those same islands will reproduce in the future whenever this subject is discussed; but because at the same time it presents certain information which is of no little value for better understanding the importance of that remote domain.

Justification of the maintenance of the Philipinas Islands and their commerce

To the very illustrious and reverend Señor Don Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, member of his Majesty’s Council, in the royal Council of the Indias, and bishop of Puebla de los Angeles: by Don Juan Grau y Monfalcón, procurator-general of the Philipinas Islands, agent for the principality of Catuluña, and syndic of the city of Barcelona.

Very illustrious and reverend sir:

Although I wrote for the city of Manila, the capital of the Philipinas islands, a memorial of one hundred and thirty-six sections – at the examination and discussion of which in the Council your illustrious Lordship was present – in regard to eighty-five petitions, to which can be reduced all the more important matters which may be presented concerning those islands and their trade-route and their maintenance; and that memorial with its petitions your illustrious Lordship is carrying with you, as it is printed, so that it seems as if there were no need of further information – and even these were superfluous to one who is so well informed on all the matters which he has in his keeping, and is so quick to understand those which may come before him: nevertheless, in order that I may to some extent relieve and set free your illustrious Lordship from the burdens imposed upon your memory, as I know the number and importance of the commissions that you must execute and the matters that you must decide in Nueva España (all which will be successfully accomplished, as we are assured by your wide experience in affairs), I have determined to comprise in this single treatise the matters which concern the city of Manila, and which it can present to you. It relates to the four leading points which were entrusted by his Majesty and the royal Council of the Indias, by royal decrees, to the judicious decision and accurate information of your Lordship, as follows:

First, to what extent and in what manner shall the commerce of those islands be tarried on?

Second, whether it will be expedient to increase and extend the permission which they at present enjoy, both in the export of merchandise and in the returns of money.

Third, whether in the amount of merchandise allowed to them shall be included the products of the islands, or only those of China shall be understood.

Fourth, whether the commerce which Perù was accustomed to hold with Nueva España shall be resumed, on account of the loss which results to the Philipinas and Nueva España from its suspension.

Point first

As for the first decree, which is so general as to include all, for treating of the commerce of the islands, which is essential to their preservation: this point, which in the memorial that I have cited is argued at length, can be reduced to an argument of three infallible propositions, of which, when two are proved, the third cannot be denied; and they are in this form.

The Philipinas Islands are absolutely necessary: first, to increase the preaching of the gospel; second, to maintain the authority, grandeur, and reputation of this crown; third, to defend the Moluco Islands and their trade; fourth, to support Eastern India; fifth, to relieve the Western Indias from their enemies; sixth, to aid the two crowns of Castilla and Portugal[2 - Thus in the original; but in the following expansion of these points eight of them are enumerated, indicating an oversight on the part of the compiler. The sixth is there stated as the renown and profit accruing to the crown from the victories gained by its Philippine subjects; the seventh, the aid given by them to both crowns; the eighth, their protection of Chinese commerce.] in breaking down the power of the Dutch; seventh, to protect for both crowns the commerce of China. In order to support the islands, the commerce with Nueva España is requisite and necessary; for by no other means can their defense, or means for supporting it, be provided. It immediately follows that it is also requisite and necessary to grant this commerce to the islands, or, by abandoning them, to lose all the advantages which result from their preservation, as here represented.

The first proposition of this argument consists of eight fundamental reasons, which are stated therein; but it seems as if they ought to be proved, in order that their force and cogency may be fully understood. Accordingly, I will run through them as briefly as possible.

The first one is the increase of the preaching and promulgation of the holy gospel. This was the principal object which the Catholic sovereigns of Castilla had in carrying on the discovery of the Western Indias, and in colonizing and supporting them – and, consequently, in doing the same for all the islands adjacent to them, among the number of which are the Philipinas; and although the richness of those provinces greatly aided their efforts, this was a secondary object with the sovereigns, and a fulfilment of what is promised in the gospel, that we must seek first the kingdom of God, and that all the rest which the world possesses and esteems shall be gathered and added to us. Therefore, since their intention was the conversion of all the infidels who inhabit that opposite hemisphere, He who became flesh in order to redeem them chose that this undertaking should gain, as a secondary result, the infinite riches which the Indias have given and are giving to España. Such a reason is not lacking in the Philipinas Islands. Their first discovery and settlement were solely for extending the Catholic faith; for then it was not known that those islands would be rich – as indeed they are not of themselves – nor that there could be any further result than the conversion of their natives to the gospel law, and the opening of a gate by which the preaching of the gospel could be carried to other provinces and kingdoms of Asia. That enterprise was prosecuted very successfully, as is publicly known; and it is now very evident that all those islands are today in the bosom of the Church – for they contain an archbishopric and three episcopal sees, and very many convents and hospitals; and there may be seen the Christian religion as pure, as valued, and as venerated as it is in España. And this rouses all the more admiration because the location of the colony is so remote, and so surrounded by heathens, Moors, and heretics; and that, in spite of all, the power and revenues of this crown are able to maintain it. But for this result, which was the main one, what was the second, and in what was seen fulfilled the promise of the gospel? It was, that God has placed in those seas a firm column, on which He could found, and by which they could support themselves, Eastern India, the Molucas Islands, their commerce, and that of China; and which shall prove for the enemies of this crown – heretics, Moors, and heathens – a check upon their advance, a resistance to their intentions, and a strong rock on which they shall be broken, or at least their success may be checked and their machinations prevented. Such are the Philipinas Islands, and this rank they acquired after the preaching of the gospel entered them; and it seems as if it were a providence of Heaven to make them so necessary from the human standpoint, in order that the divine influences might not be lacking in them. For if sometimes the attainment of the first result might not be sufficient for maintaining them (which the piety of the kings of Castilla renders incredible), that of the second result would suffice, because even the divine needs to be maintained in the world by human protection. This is an axiom which, in lands newly converted, is generally accepted in the Indias; and it has been thoroughly proved by experience that the gospel is more effective among the barbarians when it is under the royal banners and standards than when it goes without them. Accordingly, it pleased God to ordain that these standards should be necessary in the Philipinas, in order that the preaching of the gospel, which was the motive for their going thither, might be established in their shelter. It is therefore established by a well-grounded proposition that, even if no more is looked for than this aim of converting the heathen, it is now impossible to give up the preservation of the Philipinas, as being so important a part of the Catholic church. And if the kings of Castilla, in order not to permit liberty of conscience in Flandes, have during more than seventy years maintained in those states (and, through them, in all Europa) the most tedious and costly war that any monarchy in the world has waged: how can it be denied that by abandoning so vast a number of Catholics as there are in those islands, who have been instructed by the Christian zeal of Spaniards, there will, if we leave them now, be introduced among them liberty of conscience? not to mention a mingling of schismatic heretics, Moors, Jews, and heathens of various sects, as is seen in Bantan (which is the Oriental Ginebra [i. e., Geneva]), and in all other places where the Dutch find entrance; and they would soon enter those islands [if we abandon them]. Even if they caused great expenses to this crown (which they do not), they ought to be supported and preserved.

The second reason is, that in these islands are involved the authority, grandeur, and reputation of this crown. [My statement in regard to] the authority is proved by various methods, which may be found in the memorial that I have cited – of which I will only notice here the power which is exercised by the governor who rules the islands in the name of his Majesty. So great is this that it may be affirmed with truth that in all his kingdoms and seigniories (although the viceroyalties are classed as superior to that government) the king does not appoint to an office of greater authority. If this is not evident, let it be noticed how many crowned kings render homage to that governor, and recognize him as their superior; how they respect him and fear his arms; how they desire his friendship, and, if they violate it, receive punishment. The king of Ternate died a prisoner in Manila; and he of Sian made, by force of arms, satisfaction for a reprisal which he had committed. Those of Siao and Tidore are our subjects, and that of Camboxa is our ally. The ruler of Great China is our friend, and the emperor of Japòn was such until the Dutch alienated him; and although the failure of the Japanese trade causes us loss, we have not feared to declare that ruler our enemy – as are those of Champa, Sian, and Mindanao; and, more than all, the Dutch, who keep those seas so infested. And it ought to be considered that the governor of Philipinas sends ambassadors to all those kings, with gifts to present to them, and receives those that they send to him in return; he makes peace and declares war, and does whatever seems to him expedient; and all this on his own responsibility, without waiting for a decision of the matter from España, because the excessive distance renders him the entire master in these acts. This is a preëminence of so great authority that no governor or viceroy in Europe exercises it. The grandeur which this monarchy preserves in those islands is widely known. In its material aspect, that domain extends through a circuit of 1,400 leguas, in which are included the two archipelagos of San Lazaro and Moluco: the latter composed of five especially important islands, which their own kings govern, with more than seventy others adjacent; the latter, of those which are properly called Philipinas, forty in number – some of them larger than all España, some as large as this country, and others somewhat smaller. This does not mention the islands that are small and uninhabited, which are without number. Among all these is [foremost] the island of Luzon, in which is the distinguished and ever loyal city of Manila, which is the precious stone of this setting, and which alone is enough to prove the grandeur of España – by its location, its splendor, its buildings, its sky, and its soil. In its citizens are resplendent the religious faith, the loyalty, and the courage which gave origin to that colony. Since Manila is, as some say, the antipodes of Sevilla, it seems as if it tried to imitate that city in its characteristics, and in being a military center and an emporium of commerce for that hemisphere. If one considers higher things, the power of the islands cannot be reduced to the region just mentioned. Manila may be compared to the city of Goa, the capital of Eastern India; and it is she who reduces to subjection all the coasts from the Straits of Sincapura to Japòn, and the islands of the Ladrones and the Papuas; for her fleets sail through all those seas with the never conquered and always victorious royal standards of España. Her ships are admitted into many maritime kingdoms of Asia, and into numberless islands adjacent to them; they make voyages so long that no others equal to these are known. They go to China and Japòn, and by the Southern Sea to Nueva España; and by way of the Northern Sea – coasting all the Oriental kingdoms, emerging [from the China Sea] through Sincapura, and doubling the great Stormy Cape, that of Buena Esperanza – they have reached the bar of San Lucar, with these two voyages making almost the entire circuit of the world. And if commerce is regarded as the greatest splendor of kingdoms (as it certainly is), this greatness is not lacking to the Philipinas; for they have so rich a commerce that, if they could enjoy it free, there is no city known to the world that would surpass, or even equal, Manila. That in that colony resides and is preserved the reputation of this crown, is evident, if it be noted that the maintenance of that reputation by the arms of España in Fuente-Rabia, in Salsas, in Italia, in Flandes, in Alemania, and in other parts of Europa is not to be wondered at; for if España is the heart which inspires strength in the mystical body of this monarchy, it is not much that the members which are nearest and so closely connected should share most effectively in this influx of energy. And if his Majesty (whom God preserve!) is the soul or vital breath of this heart, it cannot be denied that the closer proximity will cause the greater effect. Besides, the great number of the troops who go out from the adjoining [European] states prevents the enemy from seizing any one of those states; but the greatest cause of reputation for this crown is that, at a distance of three thousand leguas from the royal person and España, three thousand three hundred and thirty-six Spaniards, all of them occupied in those islands in war and in peace, on sea and on land, [accomplish what they do]. It is the citizens of Manila who are the substance of that diamond, where the adjoining states are all enemies – barbarians, heretics, Moors, and heathens. Those Spaniards are without hope of succor in emergencies, without safety for the unfortunate in the retreat, and even without the reward due them for their achievements; they are always inferior in numbers, and continually attacked by Dutch, Mindanaos, Japanese, Jaos, and other peoples. They are always in anxiety about the Chinese, or Sangleys, who number more than 30,000 in Manila; and about the natives, of whom there are more than 80,000. In that land of many islands they maintain fortified posts, and on the sea armed fleets of galleons, galleys, and champans – one for the defense of Manila, another for conveying troops and supplies to Terrenate, and another for the fort on the island of Hermosa. In this last island and in those of Moluco, our military posts confront the Dutch; our people are continually fighting on sea and on land, while they wage on the frontier a fierce war with the most wary people that is known, and with tribes who are as cruel as they can be. Yet, although their soldiers are so few, they meet innumerable obligations, acquit themselves of all, and cause the Spanish name to emerge from all gloriously, and the standards of the king our lord victoriously. Therefore, it is the Philipinas Islands that preserve the reputation of this crown with the most valor and the least reward, with the greatest hazard, and with most glory.

The third fundamental reason is, that the Philipinas defend the islands of Moluco, and the commerce in the cloves that are obtained from them. The importance of these islands is everywhere known, because in all the world there are no other islands nor any other region in which grows this spice or drug, so highly valued. For their discovery alone Hernando de Magallanes made, by order of the emperor Carlos Fifth, that celebrated voyage in which he found the strait to which he gave his name, and passed through it into the Southern Sea; and, although he was slain while making his claims, his ship sailed around the world. The lordship of those islands caused troublesome hostilities between the Castilians and Portuguese, which were ended by this crown giving them to that of Portugal, in fulfilment of a contract; for it seemed (and indeed was evident) that Castilla would have much difficulty in maintaining them when they were so separated from all its kingdoms and states, while Portugal, by possessing Eastern India, was less distant from and could better support them. The course of time showed that even India was very remote from them; for when the Dutch power entered the Orient and established a military post in Bantan[3 - According to Crawfurd (Dict. Ind. Islands, p. 38) this is the form, in the native languages, of the name that Europeans write Bantam, applied to the extreme western province of Java, and to an important seaport town in its northwest extremity. Most of the inhabitants of this province are Sundas, but along the coasts there is considerable intermixture with Javanese and other Malayan peoples. The port of Bantan was an important commercial center long before the arrival there of Europeans.]– a port nearer to Moluco, and more advantageously located than was India – it was so obviously impossible to defend them that in the end they were lost to us, the enemy getting possession of them all and of their commerce. But as the Philipinas were by that time quite populous, and so near to the Molucas that they were superior to Bantan [as a trading post], the task of restoring the Molucas [to Spanish control] was laid upon the governor, Don Diego de Acuña – who with his courage and energy, and the convenience of being so near, regained them and restored them to this crown. When both Castilla and Portugal recognized the great expense that India would have to incur in maintaining the Molucas, and that even with excessive expenditures it would be impossible to do so, on account of the injury being nearer than the remedy, and the enemy than the succor, those islands were, by the mutual agreement of the two crowns, united to the government of the Philipinas as regards their defense and support. The clove-trade was left to the Portuguese, because it was so important that, if it were taken from them, India would perish, or become greatly weakened. It is thus sufficiently proved that the Philipinas contributed to the restoration of all the forts in the Orient; and that in their preservation was and still is involved that of the Molucas, and consequently of all India. Thus they have been maintained since the year 1603, defending them by force of arms against the Dutch, who never cease their endeavors to expel the Castilians from those islands; this has been the cause of many naval encounters and battles, in which the arms of España have always remained victorious. Nevertheless, since the military force of Philipinas is small, the territory that they must defend large, and the aid which is given to them for this purpose very limited, it has not been possible to prevent the treachery and persistence of the Dutch from having some effect; nor to put a stop to their sharing in the clove trade at some forts which they keep in the Molucas, though at the cost of many men, armed vessels, and expenses. From all of these islands are produced each year 2,816,000 libras of cloves, of which the Dutch secure 1,098,000 libras, and the Portuguese and Castilians 1,718,000 – and this latter supply is due to the protection of the Philipinas; while it is computed that the cloves which the Dutch carry away amount to three times as much as it will cost them to be absolute lords of the Molucas, even with the large garrisons and armed fleets which they keep and maintain for purchasing the spice and transporting it to Bantan. From this it obviously follows that without the Philipinas the Molucas would be lost, and their commerce and trade in cloves would cease – from which would follow two pernicious results, which would cause the loss of whatever his Majesty possesses in the Orient. One is, that India would be greatly weakened, for lack of that commerce; for if that country languishes on account of not having all of that trade, it may well be understood that she will perish if it be taken from her. The other is, that the Dutch in that case would have the entire benefit of the trade, and without much expense; for if [Holanda] with less than half the trade – and that at the cost of so many garrisons and fleets – gains such profits that they are enough to maintain whatever she has in India; if she were to secure all the cloves and, on account of the less cost, thus gain a profit of more than a thousand per cent upon her investments, while the gross amount would be doubled: it is very plain that India would not remain safe, the Western Indias would be more effectively harassed, the rebel states in Flandes would be strengthened, the coasts of España would experience their invasions, and everywhere the treasure that could be obtained from the Molucas alone would cause most injurious effects – as may be seen, with more detailed arguments, in the memorial that I have cited in behalf of the Philipinas, to which [colony] we owe the only compensation [that we receive] for all these losses.

The fourth reason is almost the sequence of what has been said in the third, although it is more general, since it takes notice that the Dutch fleets have entered the Orient with so strong a force that they have often placed India in risk of being lost to us; for if they were aided by the Moorish and heathen kings and the rulers of Persa and Mogòr[4 - i. e., Hindostan (see VOL. XVII, p. 252). The grave accent is here used in the word Mogòr, simply as following the usage of the Extracto, which throughout prints the grave instead of the acute accent.]– and sometimes the Dutch are leagued with the English, who also navigate those seas – their invasion would be irresistible. What has prevented this danger has been the diversion furnished by the Philipinas – not only by diminishing their trade and profits in Moluco (as has been seen), in China, and in other regions, but by compelling them to divide their forces, and to maintain in some places very large ones. India is divided into two parts – [one], from the Cape of Buena Esperanza to the Straits of Sincapura; the other, from the straits to China and Japòn. The first is defended by the Portuguese fleets of India, which seldom go thither through the straits; the second, by the Castilians of Philipinas, who never come here by way of the straits. For both these, it is necessary that the Dutch send thither and maintain squadrons; and therefore it is proved, at this very beginning, that if the fleets of this crown are deficient in either of those regions, and the enemy can transfer all of his naval force to the one that remains [without defense] because there is no diversion [of his forces] in the other, it will be difficult if not impossible to defend [the one to which he goes] – an argument which admits no debate in the naval as well as in the military world. From this it follows that if now the Philipinas fail us Eastern India will remain without aid, and consequently in evident danger of being lost [to us]. This is further confirmed by the fact that, of the two parts into which India is divided, the enemy expends much more of his energy in the second than in the first. In the latter he is content with factories and barter, without keeping any fortified posts; in the former, he maintains the forts of Malayo, Toloco, Tacubo, Malaca, Tacome, Marieco, Motir, Nofagia, Tafacen, Tabelole, Bermevelt, Tabori, Gilolo, Amboino, Lagu, Maruco, Mozovia, Belgio, Bantan, and Hermosa Island. In these nineteen presidios there were, in the year 1616, 3,000 soldiers; 193 pieces of bronze artillery and 310 of iron, and 300 stone-mortars [pedreros]; and thirty war galleons. And all this is solely to defend themselves from the Philipinas, and to attack the islands so that the armed fleets of India shall not sail to that region – or, if they should go thither, it would be easy to stop them at the Strait of Sincapura. If then, the Philipinas were unable to act, and the Dutch should abandon those nineteen forts (which now are many more), as being no longer necessary to them, they would proceed to the coasts of India, and their galleons to those seas. If even when their energies are diverted, their forces divided, and their gains diminished as they are now, they cause so much anxiety, what would it be if, with little if any opposition, their forces united, and their profits increased, they should harass India? It is easy to see that they would occasion that region the utmost distress, and that consequently the Philipinas are an absolutely necessary defense for it.

The fifth reason has the same ground as the fourth; for, on account of the diversion of forces and the expense which the enemy now encounters in the Orient and in the forts of Moluco, he is compelled to refrain from annoying the Western Indias, and must devote less attention, military force, and money to that object. And since what he spends or fails to gain in India enables the Philipinas to oppose or to embarrass him, it follows that if he there shall gain more and spend less, he will here take possession of both [the Indias]. And if the Indias, even with so effective a diversion [of the enemy’s force as they have now], need the Windward Fleet which is being built there, and for which a subsidy of 600,000 ducados is granted annually: in order to dispense with the garrisons, fleets, and expenditures in India everything would have to be increased, so that in the Indias more expense would be incurred for their defense than is consumed in the Philipinas.

The sixth is a reason of honor and profit, for these two admirable results follow from the victories which the inhabitants of Philipinas have gained over the Dutch: honor, on account of the glory which the Catholic arms acquire in those seas, which gains for them the esteem of the Japanese, Chinese, Sianese, Mindanaos, and innumerable other peoples, who serve as spectators in the theatre for such exploits; and profit, since, if the enemy’s forces are weakened it follows that, besides those that he loses in being conquered, he is compelled to expend still greater ones in order to keep his foothold. This is the most notable reason for maintaining powerful squadrons on the sea, in order that if the pirate undertakes to plunder successfully, he will have to do it with so great a force that either he will abandon the prize because he cannot hold it, or he will let it alone because the profits do not make it worth his while. Of the victories which the Spaniards have gained in those seas there are extant histories and accounts; and in the large memorial some of these are mentioned.

The seventh is, that [by the islands] are aided the two crowns of Castilla and Portugal, who are so united and in so fraternal relations in the Orient, each possessing its share of the two parts into which that region is, as we have said, divided. If we are to base our opinion on experience, the facts are evident in the restoration of Moluco; for in the time of Governor Don Juan de Sylva the forces of both crowns were joined, and it is regarded as certain that, if death had not intercepted his designs, he would have driven from those seas the arms of Holanda and of Inglaterra, and awakened fear and dread in many kings who were awaiting the result of so powerful a combination; and, even though success is not always so immediate, it suffices that it should be possible to make the enemy fear, and to lead them to believe that what has occurred sometimes may occur often.

The eighth reason is to protect and preserve the commerce of China for both crowns. For this argument it is taken for granted that this commerce is one of the most beneficial and lucrative of those in the entire Orient; and we can say that there is no other in all the world that equals it. The Oriental traffic of ancient times, which the Romans so highly valued, originated in China and in the drugs, fabrics, and curiosities of that country – although, as they were ignorant of its real origin, they called it the India trade, since they received it from that country. In the larger memorial I have already discoursed upon this at length. Now all the nations in those [Oriental] kingdoms take part in this commerce, but it is conducted most extensively and steadily by the Portuguese of India and the Castilians of Manila; we shall soon relate how important it is to the latter. Of the Portuguese it suffices to say that they possess in China the city of Macan, and the privilege of entering that of Canton; and the commerce of these two cities they maintain through the Strait of Sincapura, though always in danger from the Dutch. But as the profits are so great, they sail by that route; it adds much to their safety that they cross through the seas of Philipinas, and that Macan can find succor in Manila. But if this should be lacking, Macan could not remain many years without ruin, nor could India enjoy the commerce with China, which is one of those which most benefit her; and if the Chinese trade is cut off from India and Manila, the Dutch alone will be strong enough to carry it on. Although they are at present shut out from it by the robberies that they have committed on the Sangleys, they would not find it difficult to bring the latter to friendship with them; for it is already known that when money is lacking in Philipinas the Sangleys carry their merchandise to the Dutch. Therefore, on the preservation of those islands depends that of the Chinese trade.

These eight fundamental reasons are sufficient to prove the importance and necessity that exist for maintaining, preserving, and favoring those islands; for if they were lost the resulting damage would be great and excessive beyond any possible comparison or proportion to what the islands now cost us. And because there is seen in this an error of misapprehension, I will make a statement regarding it that is worthy of much attention and notice. This is, that it costs the royal exchequer more to support the island of San Martin[5 - St. Martin, one of the Antilles, was a resort for French pirates and Dutch smugglers until 1638, when it was captured by the Spaniards. It was afterward recovered from them, and in 1648 was formally divided between the French and Dutch – a status that still prevails.]– which is of no use, and has no more effect than to remove an obstacle to the navigation of the Indias, and take away a landing-place from the pirates (who already have numberless others) – than to maintain the Philipinas Islands, which have the utility and effectiveness which I have stated.

For the proof of this, I avail myself of a summary of the detailed statements in the larger memorial, regarding the cost of the Philipinas. For the officials of justice, who govern them, 37,077 pesos; for the entire ecclesiastical estate, 37,277 pesos. In maintaining friendly relations with neighboring kings, 1,500 pesos. In the administration of the royal exchequer, 11,550 pesos. For the land forces at Manila, and in the military posts of all the islands, 229,696 pesos. For wars on land, and the forts in Moluco, 97,128 pesos. For naval war, shipbuilding, and navy-yards, 283,184 pesos. For supplies and provisions for all the soldiers and seamen, 153,302 pesos. These sums amount to 850,734 pesos, which is the expenditure made each year for the islands – not omitting to reckon wages and salaries, scanty though they be. This, therefore, is all the charge for their cost which can be made.

On the credit side of the account, the tributes from the crown encomiendas are worth each year 53,715 pesos; and the two reals which are paid to the king by each Indian in the private encomiendas amount to 21,107 pesos. The licenses which are given to the Sangleys come to 112,000 pesos; and the tributes from these Sangleys, to 8,250. The fifth and the tenth of gold, 750 pesos. The ecclesiastical tithes, which are collected by the royal exchequer for the support of the prelates and clergy, 2,750 pesos. The freight charges in his Majesty’s ships, 350 pesos. The court fines, 1,000 pesos. The customs duties, 38,000 pesos. The mesada and half-annats, 6,000. From these ten sources the income amounts to 243,922 pesos; to this must be added the imposts, freight dues, and customs duties which are collected in Nueva España on the merchandise that comes from the islands – all which amount to 300,000 pesos, and this is income that results and proceeds from the islands; accordingly, by a decree of February 19, 1606, it is commanded that these charges, adding to their amount each year, be remitted to Manila, and that so much less be sent from the royal exchequer of Mexico. And if all these goods are sold and traded in Nueva España once, or two or more times, and pay the customary charges of alcabala,[6 - The alcabala, an excise duty collected on all sales of commodities, was derived from the Moors, and was more or less imposed in Spain from the year 1342 on. It was introduced in the American colonies in 1574, and for more than two centuries was a rich source of income for the Spanish crown and a heavy tax on the colonists. The rate was at first two per cent, but afterward this was doubled and trebled; and it was levied on every transfer of goods, taxing property over and over again. See Bancroft’s Mexico, iii, pp. 658, 659; and Recopilación leyes de Indias, lib. viii, tit. xiii, and lib. ix, tit. xlv, ley lxvi.] if the rate of two [per cent] which they usually pay was moderated to 30,000 pesos in the larger memorial, the rate on the said [sales] will certainly amount to 60,000 pesos. With this, the islands now have 593,922 pesos to their credit; so that their [actual] expense cannot be estimated at more than 256,812 pesos – [and that] without counting the proceeds of the Crusade, those from intestate property, or the monopoly of playing-cards.

Another item ought to be placed with these, which is the expense for the islands of Moluco. These were possessions of the crown of Portugal, which consumed in supporting and defending them great sums of ducados and many soldiers; but finally it lost them, and the Dutch gained them. By agreement of the two crowns, Governor Don Pedro de Acuña regained possession of them (as I have related); and as it was evident that the crown of Portugal could not defend them on account of the great expense required therefor, those islands were committed, in the year 1607, to the governor of Philipinas. In this must be considered several things. First, that these islands of Moluco do not belong to those which are called Philipinas, nor are they included in that group. Second, that at present they are the property of the Portuguese crown, but are in possession of the Castilian crown for the purpose of protecting, maintaining, and defending them; on this account, the commerce in cloves is left to India, as it was before. Third, that the Philipinas and the citizens of Manila do not obtain or possess any advantage or benefit from Moluco, or anything else besides the continual trouble of succoring and provisioning its forts; for the clove-trade belongs to the Portuguese, and there is no other commerce in those islands. Fourth, that since the day when the governor of Philipinas and the crown of Castile took charge of Moluco, the crown of Portugal has saved more than 400,000 pesos, the cost which it would have incurred in maintaining Moluco, estimated on the basis of what it now costs Castilla for that – although Manila, which is the place where provision is made for those islands, is so near them. Fifth, that for these reasons it is evident and plain that what is spent for the islands of Moluco should not be charged to the Philipinas; nor even should the crown of Castilla pay it, but rather that of Portugal, which is the proprietary owner of Moluco, and has the benefit of the clove-trade. Consequently, whatever is received from that trade must be placed to the credit and acquittance of the Philipinas, against the amount charged to them. Sixth, and last, notice the [items of] the annual expenses of the Moluco Islands: for salaries, 97,128 pesos; provisions, considering the total number of people, will average 30,000 pesos a year; for the ecclesiastical ministrations and the management of the royal treasury, the expense will reach 4,000 pesos; and for naval affairs and shipyards, 100,000 pesos – since in order to send every year the usual supplies, and to furnish extraordinary aid when occasion demands, the armed ships are necessary which are always kept at Manila. Thus the cost of the islands of Moluco comes to more than 230,000 pesos each year; deducting this from the 256,000 which remain charged to the Philipinas, only 26,000 pesos. This is an amount unworthy of consideration, even if the islands were of no more use than to augment the grandeur of this crown; but granting that they possess the advantages that I have mentioned, the loss, cost, and expense is nothing; and it remains abundantly proved how necessary, just, expedient, and requisite it is to maintain them.