The Mind and the Brain

See a very interesting article by E. Goblot, "La Finalité sans Intelligence," Revue de Métaphysique, July 1900.

40

See [Note 1] (#x1_x_1_i74) on p. 3 (#x1_pgepubid00018).

41

For reference, see [Note 18] (#x3_x_3_i4) on p. 73 (#x2_x_2_i102). —Ed.

42

i.e. rendering actual.—Ed.

43

It is, perhaps, needless to point out that by "spiritualism" M. Binet does not mean the doctrine of the spirit-rappers, whom he, like other scientific writers, designates as "spiritists," but the creed of all those who believe in disembodied spirits or existences.—Ed.

44

I do not insist on the difference between my conception and the spiritualistic conception; my distinction between consciousness and matter does not correspond, it is evident, to that of "facts of consciousness" and "physical facts" which spiritualism sets up.

45

Archives de Psychologie, vol. iv. No. 14, Nov. 1904, p. 132 (article on Panpsychism).

46

I can quote two observations in support of this. M. Brieux, to whom I was relating this part of my argument, stopped me, saying, "You have guessed right; I represent to myself thought issuing from brain in the form of an electric gleam." Dr. Simon also informed me, during the reading of my manuscript, that he saw "thought floating over the brain like an ignis fatuus."

47

I borrow this quotation from Renouvier, Le Personnellisme, p. 263.

48

Matière et Mémoire, p. 3. The author has returned to this point more at length in a communication to the Congrès de Philosophie de Génève, in 1904. See Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, Nov. 1904, communication from H. Bergson entitled "Le Paralogisme psycho-physiologique." Here is a passage from this article which expresses the same idea: "To say that the image of the surrounding world issues from this image (from the cerebral movement), or that it expresses itself by this image, or that it arises as soon as this image is suggested, or that one gives it to one's self by giving one's self this image, would be to contradict one's self; since these two images, the outer world and the intra-cerebral movement, have been supposed to be of the same nature, and the second image is, by the hypothesis, an infinitesimal part of the field of representation, while the first fills the whole of it."

49

Matière et Mémoire, p. 31

50

The équivoque perpetrated by Bain and Spencer consists in supposing that the consciousness bears solely on differences. This is going too far. I confine myself to admitting that, if sensation is not changed from time to time, the consciousness becomes weaker and disappears.

51

See [Note 43] (#x5_x_5_i81) on p. 191. (#x5_pgepubid00064)