The Life of Jefferson Davis

There were phases of the situation not to be lightly appreciated by so thoughtful a statesman as President Davis, which did not encourage that sanguine conviction, so extravagantly indulged in by many popular leaders, of an overwhelming and immediate triumph of the Southern cause. The immense disparity of physical resources, as was abundantly shown by the lessons of history, could be neutralized by a wise public administration, by superior valor, and by that high sense of public virtue, in its original Roman sense of fortitude, endurance, and willing sacrifice in the cause of country, which is the last and sure defense of a nation’s liberties. Nor were those important advantages of the South, to the value of which historical precedents have so conclusively testified – a conscious rectitude of purpose – a supreme conviction that theirs was the better cause, and that, besides, it was a war for home and family, to be fought mainly upon their own soil – to be overlooked in an intelligent estimate of the relative strength of the belligerents.

It was not a failure to recognize these great advantages which forbade wise and reflective Southern statesmen to indulge in those grotesque exhibitions of braggadocio, with which demagogues amused excited crowds at railway stations and upon street-corners. There was an element of weakness in the South, which, looking to the contingencies of the future, and remembering the incertitude of war, might prove the source of serious danger. This was the absence of that unity in the South, to which all her statesmen had looked forward, whenever actual battle should be joined between the defenders and assailants of Southern liberties. To see a “United South,” had been for years the dream of Calhoun’s noble intellect. Davis, with equal energy and ability, had striven for such united action by the South as would command peace and security in the Union, or independence beyond its limits. But now the battle was joined, and the dream was not to be realized.

Kentucky was hopelessly divided, and though, from the overwhelming majority of her people in sympathy with the South, were to come thousands of gallant soldiers, the Confederacy was to be denied the powerful aid which the brave heart and mighty resources of united Kentucky should have thrown into the scale. Missouri, in consequence of her geographical position, peculiarly assailable by the North-western States, and by divisions among her population, was similarly situated; while Maryland, a gallant and patriotic State, not less than South Carolina devoted to the independence of the South, was securely shackled at the first demonstration, by her people, of sympathy with their invaded countrymen.

But not only was there a failure to realize united action by those States, which, by geographical contiguity, no less than by identity of political institutions, constituted what was designated as The South. There was by no means a thoroughly harmonious sentiment among the people of those States which had joined the Southern alliance. This was conspicuously the case in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee.[30 - “East Tennessee” was a perpetual “fire in the rear” to the Confederacy.] Though apparently insignificant in the midst of the general enthusiasm which prevailed in the early months of the war, these and other instances of local disaffection were to prove, at more than one critical period, fruitful of embarrassment. Intelligence of Confederate disasters was always the signal for exhibitions of that covert disloyalty which Confederate success compelled to concealment. Always ready to assist the invaders of their country, the so-called “Union men” of the South were valuable auxiliaries to the Federal armies as spies, and as secret enemies to the cause of the patriots; but they were not more hurtful and insidious in these capacities than as the nucleus around which crystallized, under the direction of disappointed demagogues, the various elements of discontent which were subsequently developed.

Yet in both sections was the outward seeming at least of an undivided war sentiment. The Union party of the South, as it had previously existed – a powerful political organization, embracing a majority of the people of the Border States – did not more immediately disappear, as the certainty of war was developed, than did the party of peace at the North. The Northern Democracy did not, for a moment, strive to breast the popular current, but its leaders, the life-long allies of the South, committed, by a thousand declarations to the cause of States’ Rights, eagerly vied with the Republican leaders in threats of vengeance against the South. The Dickinsons, Everetts, Cochranes, Logans, and Butlers – hitherto the professed friends and advocates of the South – with that pliant accommodation to circumstances, so befitting the instincts of the demagogue, in their harangues to howling mobs, proclaimed themselves the advocates of a ruthless and indiscriminate warfare upon a people who had been driven, by intolerable wrongs, into patriotic resistance.

We have already described the attitude and condition of the Confederate Government at Montgomery previous to the attack upon Fort Sumter. The honorable exertions of President Davis, cordially approved by Congress and the people, to avoid a collision of arms, were disappointed, and events had now verified his life-long conviction, that the exercise of their sovereignty, by the States, would be attended by a war involving their existence. Sustained by an unlimited popular confidence, with a comparatively perfected organization, and with every possible preparation that the difficulties of its situation would permit, the Government met, with commendable composure, the shock of arms which its chief had foreseen to be inevitable.

The proclamation of President Lincoln, declaring war upon the Confederate States, was promptly responded to by President Davis, in official announcements, appropriately recognizing the condition of public affairs, and inviting energetic preparations for immediate hostilities. He at once called upon the various States for quotas of volunteers for the public defense. By public proclamation, he invited applications for privateering service, in which armed vessels might assist in the public defense on the high seas; under letters of marque and reprisal granted by Congress.[31 - President Davis appreciated the immense value to the South of privateering. The Federal Government employed all the naval force at their command to blockade the South, recalled the squadrons stationed in foreign waters, and made extensive purchases of vessels for purposes of war. The South, of course, had no navy, since there had been no time to prepare or purchase one within the brief space between the organization of the Confederate Government and the beginning of hostilities. Under these circumstances there remained only the resort to private armed ships, under letters of marque, to assault the floating commerce of the enemy, and, to some extent, neutralize the blockade. Doubting the constitutional power of the executive in the premises, he, with characteristic regard for law, determined not to commission privateers until duly authorized by the legislation of Congress. The authority to issue commissions, and letters of marque and general reprisal, to privateers, was given by act of Congress, passed 6th of May.]

In every instance, and by all classes of citizens, an enthusiastic response was given to the demands of the Government. Individuals and corporations entered into a generous and patriotic rivalry in the tender of aid to the cause. Wealthy citizens donated large sums of money or supplies, while railroad and transportation companies tendered valuable assistance in the conveyance of troops and stores. An enthusiastic desire to enter the public service was manifested in every community. Men decrepit from age, or infirm from disease, were importunate in demanding any service suitable to their condition. Volunteering progressed so actively that a few weeks only sufficed to show that the Confederacy – for the present at least – would not want soldiers. In all the States the responses to the call for volunteers exceeded the quotas.

Congress assembled in special session, in obedience to a proclamation of the President, on the 29th of April. The message was an eminently characteristic document, and made a profound impression both in Europe and the United States. Its calm and clear statements were in marked contrast with the wild elements of war convulsing the country. Europe was not less amazed and delighted with its dignity and force, than was the North impressed with the earnest terms in which the purpose of resistance was announced. He reviewed and established the doctrine of secession, detailed the facts showing the bad faith of the Northern government about Fort Sumter, and the necessity for its capture; spoke in terms of keen, yet dignified satire of Lincoln’s proclamation, which attempted to treat seven sovereign States united in a confederacy, and holding five millions of people and a half million of square miles of territory, as “combinations,” which he proposed to suppress by a posse comitatus of seventy-five thousand men; congratulated the Congress on the probable accession of other slave States; informed them that the State Department had sent three commissioners to England, France, Russia and Belgium, to seek the recognition of the Confederate States; advised legislation for the employment of privateers for measures of defense, and for perfecting the government organization; and concluded with these impressive words: “We feel that our cause is just and holy; we protest solemnly in the face of mankind that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor and independence; we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no concession of any kind from the States with whom we were lately confederated. All we seek is to be let alone; that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, this we must resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be materially beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with firm reliance on that divine power which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue the struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government.”

The geographical position of Virginia clearly indicated that State as the Flanders of the war. Within her boundaries was necessarily to be located the first line of Confederate defense, and also to be found more than one favorable point d’appui for the invading forces. To the aid of important geographical and physical considerations, moral and political necessities were superadded, to urge a prompt and vigorous assistance to Virginia, in the heroic effort which she was preparing for her deliverance. With the eye of the soldier and the appreciation of the statesman, President Davis urged the immediate removal of the seat of government to the neighborhood of the seat of war. On the 20th of May the seat of the Confederate Government was transferred from Montgomery to Richmond, the capital of Virginia, and within a few days afterward Mr. Davis reached the latter city.[32 - A recent work (Richmond During the War) thus mentions the arrival of Mr. Davis in Richmond:“He was received with an outburst of enthusiasm. A suite of handsome apartments had been provided for him at the Spotswood Hotel, until arrangements could be made for supplying him with more elegant and suitable accommodations. Over the hotel, and from the various windows of the guests, waved numerous Confederate flags, and the rooms destined for his use were gorgeously draped in the Confederate colors. In honor of his arrival, almost every house in the city was decorated with the ‘Stars and Bars.’“An elegant residence for the use of Mr. Davis was soon procured. It was situated in the western part of the city, on a hill, overlooking a landscape of romantic beauty. This establishment was luxuriantly furnished, and there Mr. and Mrs. Davis dispensed the elegant hospitalities for which they were ever distinguished. Mrs. Davis is a tall, commanding figure, with dark hair, eyes and complexion, and strongly-marked expression, which lies chiefly in the mouth. With firmly-set yet flexible lips, there is indicated much energy of purpose and will, but beautifully softened by the usually sad expression of her dark, earnest eyes. Her manners are kind, graceful, easy, and affable, and her receptions were characterized by the dignity and suavity which should very properly distinguish the drawing room entertainments of the Chief Magistrate of a Republic.”]

The transfer of the Confederate capital to Richmond was an event affecting the direction, character, and destinies of the war to such an extent as entitles it to be considered one of its salient incidents. As a measure of policy, it has been variously viewed, and has involved some interesting discussion of military and strategic considerations. In the progress of events during the war, its wisdom was generally recognized, and in the calmer judgment of the present there is scarcely a dissenting voice to the prevailing opinion that it was a master-stroke of political sagacity and military forecast.

High military authority has been quoted in support of the opinion opposed to locating the Confederate capital at Richmond. Ingeniously enough it was alleged that such a step involved fighting on the exterior of the circle instead of the centre, and that thus the great advantage to the party conducting operations upon an interior line would be surrendered. It was also tolerably certain that the North would aim, in its invasion, at the Confederate capital as the vital objective point of its campaigns; and to transfer the capital to a point so far north as Richmond, greatly diminished the enemy’s difficulties – first, as to space; and secondly, by shortening his line of transportation and supply.

But these views were the conclusions of a purely strategic judgment, overlooking entirely moral and political considerations involved, nor are they by any means exhaustive of the argument as to the military aspects of the situation. The courageous and unselfish action of Virginia deserved a response of similar spirit from the Confederacy. Virginia had voluntarily become the outpost of the South, and her people needed the presence among them of that authority which was to wield her great resources, organize her energies, and give counsel to her courage. Her people invited the Government to join them and make the battle for the common deliverance of the South around their homesteads. To accept this invitation was a step no less characteristic of President Davis than was his prompt, decisive action in the crisis at Buena Vista. It had the combined advantage of bold defiance and prudent calculation. This bold courting of the issue by the infant power, at the very outset of hostilities, was the foundation of that brilliant prestige which marked its earlier history. To an adversary intoxicated with an overweening sense of numerical superiority, and a brutal reliance upon his superior strength, this defiant planting of the standard in front of his first line was a significant warning of the difficulties of the task which he had undertaken.

President Davis has never seen reason to regret the transfer of the Government to Richmond. It bound Virginia, by indissoluble ties to the fortunes of the Confederacy, and was the beginning of an affection for himself, among her citizens, which it was their pride to exhibit in the face of calamities common to him and to themselves. Not even in his own gallant State of Mississippi are the genius, virtues, and fame of Jefferson Davis cherished with a more tender association than in Virginia.

A brief résumé of events will now assist to a clear understanding of the situation of affairs when President Davis reached Richmond in the latter part of May. Virginia, a week previously, had, by formal vote of her people, ratified the ordinance of secession adopted by her convention. When the convention passed the ordinance of secession on the 17th of April, the State authorities, with commendable discretion, prepared to make important seizures of arms, stores, etc., the property of the Federal Government within the limits of the State. Governor Letcher – well known for his steadfast devotion to the Union, and for his honorable zeal to preserve it – in this trying crisis of the State, was nobly faithful to his Virginian instincts, and mindful of the honorable part which devolved upon Virginia’s Governor.

The capture of two places of special importance was sought by expeditions arranged with secrecy and ingenuity, but resulting, in both instances, in only partial success. These places were Gosport Navy-yard – famous for its dry-dock, shops, ammunition, arms, timber, rope-walks, and other appurtenances of an extensive naval establishment – and Harper’s Ferry, on the Potomac, with its extensive armory and arsenal, large collection of arms, and valuable machinery. At the latter place, the Federal commander, by an unworthy subterfuge, obtained a delay in the attack which the Virginians were about to make, and took advantage of a parley, to attempt the destruction, by fire, of the buildings and machinery. Much valuable property was destroyed, but the State secured machinery, which was afterward turned to most important account, and many excellent arms for her rapidly gathering volunteers. The attempted destruction, by the Federals, at Gosport, was imperfectly executed. Among the prizes captured here was the steam frigate Merrimac, nearly finished, but greatly damaged by fire. Within a very few months this vessel was destined to a performance, conspicuous for all time in the annals of naval warfare.

The authorities of North Carolina – a State which had clung with unsurpassed fidelity to the Federal Union – acted with a vigor which well befitted a community conspicuous, in the first American revolution, for the fidelity of its patriotism. Slow to reach her conclusions, North Carolina was fully up to the demands of the occasion, in her preparation for a struggle, during which her revolutionary fame was to be excelled by a second dedication of her blood and energies to the cause of liberty. On the 21st of May, North Carolina, by unanimous vote of her convention, adopted an ordinance of secession. Her brave Governor (Ellis) whose services were too soon lost to his State and country, had previously caused the seizure of Forts Macon and Caswell, and the arsenal at Fayetteville, with nearly sixty thousand arms, of which half were of the most approved construction.

On the 19th of April occurred a collision between citizens of Baltimore and Massachusetts soldiers, en route to the Federal capital, followed by such a stringent policy as made clearly hopeless the open coöperation of Maryland, unless by successful invasion of the Confederate forces.

Missouri, under the guidance of Jackson, Price, and other able and resolute leaders, was preparing a heroic resistance, but under difficulties greater than were experienced in any other Southern State, against the domination established upon her soil.

When President Davis reached Richmond he found Virginia in an advanced state of preparation. Thirty thousand troops were in camps of instruction, or upon duty at Norfolk, upon the peninsula of James and York Rivers, and at different points upon the northern boundary of the State. In supreme command was General Robert E. Lee, the friend and former classmate of the President at West Point; and, under him, Colonel John B. Magruder, also his associate at West Point, and other officers of promise and ability, seeking service in defense of their native State and the South. As the several States acceded to the Confederacy, their troops, arms, stores, etc., were turned over to the Confederate authorities, and officers were assigned rank in the Confederate service by a rule, regulated by the rank which they had held in the Federal army.

In accordance with this rule, General Lee was third on the list of full generals appointed by President Davis – General Cooper being first, and General Albert Sydney Johnston being second. General Lee had been first commissioned, after the tender of his resignation in the Federal service, a Major-General of Virginia forces. Until he was commissioned full general, by President Davis, in June, 1861, he continued to act as the general commanding the Virginia forces, and was invested also with the direction of the Confederate troops which were arriving daily from the States south. His authority was as follows:

    “Montgomery, May 10, 1861.

“To Major-General R. E. Lee: To prevent confusion, you will assume control of the forces of the Confederate States in Virginia, and assign them to such duties as you may indicate, until further orders; for which this will be your authority.

    “L. P. Walker, Secretary of War.”

It would be impossible to overestimate the services of General Lee in the preparation of the Virginia troops for the field, and in preparing the general defense of the State by the location and disposition of the Confederate forces as they arrived in Virginia. His distinguished services afterwards are hardly better evidence of his genius as a soldier, than the results of his arduous labor at this trying period, and in a position of comparative obscurity. President Davis fully indicated his confidence in the counsels of Lee by his constant retention of him at his side. The South has probably not yet appreciated the extent to which the genius of Lee, in coöperation with that of Davis, aided in those earlier achievements of the war, which secured the immediate preservation of the Confederacy, and earned so flattering a reputation for others.

With the establishment of the Confederate authority in Virginia, reinforcements from other States were constantly added to her own levies, and by the middle of June, more than fifty thousand men were in arms for her defense. As yet, collisions between the opposing forces had been rare, and totally indecisive. A force of raw volunteers, unorganized and imperfectly armed, was surprised in Western Virginia, by a movement of considerable vigor on the part of the Federal commander, and the patriots, under Colonel Porterfield, compelled to retreat. At Great Bethel, near Fortress Monroe, a few hundred Virginians and North Carolinians, under Colonel Magruder, handsomely repulsed a large column of Federal troops, attempting to advance up the peninsula. In the then uneducated popular idea of military operations, the fight at Bethel was magnified to an extent greatly beyond its real importance. It had, nevertheless, a timely significance, in its evidence of the spirit of the Confederate soldiery. President Davis was pleased to recognize this fact in a congratulatory letter to Governor Ellis, commending the conduct of the North Carolinians who were engaged in the fight.

These minor affairs were preliminary incidents to the thrilling events, upon a more extended scale of operations, and upon a more important theatre, which were to make memorable the approaching midsummer. Pending the preparations, active and extensive on both sides, for the coming grand encounter, there was a marked pause in military operations, attended by an agreeable subsidence of the feverish excitement of which war is so productive. The struggle for the mastery in Virginia, which it was plain would decide the present fate of the Southern movement, was destined also to decide, in a large measure, the extent and duration of the war. Viewed in its historical significance, it becomes chiefly important as a stage of the revolution indicating a new departure, and an altered direction of events. Preparation was now to be displaced by action. Skirmishes were to be followed by heavy engagements, and the high prestige of the South was now to be subjected to its first test, in that long series of cruel encounters, between valor and endurance on one side, and mere weight of numbers on the other.

Preliminary to the narrative of these important events, appropriately arises one phase of that historical question which involves the statesmanship, the forecast, and the general fitness of Jefferson Davis in the position which he now occupied, and under the circumstances by which he was surrounded.

It would be a superfluous and unprofitable task to consider in detail the numerous allegations, trivial and serious, made against President Davis by his assailants, in support of their professed belief in his responsibility for the failure of the Confederate cause. When facts are perverted, history distorted, and prejudice, rather than truth, is the governing influence, such allegations will be sufficiently numerous, even though they be not well sustained. Nor yet is it maintained that President Davis committed no errors in the long and trying term of his administration. It is very certain that no such defense, asserting his infallibility, would be approved by him. But the real historical significance of the question of Mr. Davis’ capacity for his office may be reduced to very simple dimensions. Conceding him to be mortal, we concede that he is fallible. Then the question arises, Were his errors sufficiently numerous and serious, unaided by other and greater causes, to have occasioned the failure of the South in the late war? Again, conceding still more liberally to his assailants, were those errors the chief causes of a failure, which might have been avoided, despite all other adverse influences, disadvantages, and obstacles, if a different administrative policy had prevailed?

The subject now has no value, save in its historical sense, and in that sense its value must be determined from the stand-point just indicated. At least it is in that aspect that we propose to consider it, whenever its discussion shall be appropriate in these pages. The consideration will be modified by many collateral questions which must incidentally arise. It may be necessary to ask if no other Southern leader, entrusted with great responsibilities, and enjoying uninterrupted popular favor, during and since the war, committed mistakes quite as serious and frequent as did the President, in proportion to the multiplicity of his cares? It may be appropriate, too, to consider the influence that these mistakes of others exerted upon those final disasters for which he alone is held responsible. These questions we propose to consider, each in its appropriate place, and with becoming candor. If we shall not meet the arguments and allegations employed against Mr. Davis with a spirit more ingenuous than has seemed to actuate his assailants, our success must be poor, indeed.

Those who profess to consider President Davis wanting in the necessary qualifications for his position, dwell with especial emphasis upon what they are pleased to characterize his failure in the early months of the war, to foresee its character, duration and magnitude, and the consequent imperfect preparation of the Confederate Government. It is asserted that he was utterly blind to all the indications of a long and obstinate struggle, urged upon his attention by a more sagacious statesmanship than his own; that he was persistent and arrogant in his prophecies of a struggle, short, brilliant, and overwhelming in favor of the South, even after the war had commenced; and that before the bombardment of Sumter he was no less positive in his convictions that there would be no war; that he was, in short, stupidly unreasoning and inactive, deaf alike to entreaties, arguments, and facts.

If, indeed, it could be established that during the era of secession (the interval between November, 1860, and April, 1861), Mr. Davis had cherished expectations of peaceable separation, and that during that portion of his presidential term embraced before the assault upon Sumter, relying upon this prospect of peace, he had failed to prepare for war, then, indeed, would his responsibility be great; but it would be shared by every contemporary statesman of the South, almost, if not quite, without an exception. History may palliate the amazing infatuation of the Southern masses at this period, but surely its verdict must be a contemptuous condemnation of that vaunted statesmanship which scouted war as the result of secession, as an impossibility, and its anticipation as the product of timidity. But President Davis is not driven to the extremity of seeking so poor a refuge as the common and universal blindness and weakness of that critical period. Recognizing the justice of that test which demands of the true statesman a prescience beyond the average vision, it is believed that his defense may be made easy and triumphant.

Candid investigation will demonstrate the fact that Davis, among Southern statesmen, was an almost solitary exception in his rejection of the dominant sentiment of the times. The remarkable consistency of his public life is in no respect better sustained than in his oft-repeated apprehensions of eventual war between the sections. His dread of disunion arose from his dread of civil war, and the latter he always urged to be the necessary consequence of the former. Striving to save the Union upon a just and constitutional basis, he yet habitually admonished the South of the inevitable result of disunion, and coupled his admonitions with earnest exhortations of thorough preparation for the most serious emergency in its history. His speeches, addresses, and letters, furnish irrefutable testimony of his apprehension of civil war as an inevitable concomitant of disunion. Not one line, or one sentence, written or uttered by him in the entire period of his public career, can be so construed as to indicate a different conviction. Believing that he foresaw the impending conflict, he strove with indefatigable energy and incomparable ability, in company with Calhoun, in 1850, to place the South in a position which would then have rescued her liberties. If the warning voice of the South, proclaiming the inexorable decree of disunion, unless her constitutional rights were fully and forever secured, had then been disregarded, at least her resistance must have been more effectual than it could become by postponement. In innumerable passages of rare eloquence, he has left an imperishable record of patriotic devotion to a constitutional union, and touching proofs of the emotion with which he contemplated the evils which were to follow its destruction. The words of his farewell address to the Senate, (“putting our trust in God, and in our firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate the right as best we may”) do not more clearly indicate the calm determination with which he would meet the peril, than his appreciation of its serious nature.

When it is alleged that the inadequate preparation of the South, during the period which we have characterized as the era of secession, enters as a most important feature in the explanation of her failure, a proposition is boldly asserted, which is, at least, debatable; but its discussion does not devolve upon us.[33 - We intentionally waive the discussion of this question as to the extent of the preparation made by the States, severally, for actual war. It is not incumbent upon us here to examine the action of the individual States. We do not desire to be understood, however, as assenting to the proposition that all the States were inadequately prepared. It is a singular commentary upon the wisdom and sagacity of the leaders of secession in its earlier stages (by the various States), that Virginia and North Carolina were each better able to arm their troops than were some of the Cotton States. The latter may have made as much preparation as was possible under the circumstances. When Mr. Davis reached Mississippi, after his withdrawal from the Senate, the Legislature had appropriated $150,000 for military purposes. As Major-General commanding the forces of the State, he was consulted as to additional appropriations. He immediately recommended an appropriation of three millions of dollars. It is needless to say that such a recommendation, at that period, was deemed little less than extravagant folly.] Mr. Davis is assuredly not to be held justly accountable for what the various States failed to do while he was at his post of duty in the Senate, and in no manner controlling their action. No responsibility can attach to him beyond the action of the Confederate Government, save in the case of his own State, and whatever preparation Mississippi made was at his instance. By what law of justice or logic can Mr. Davis be made accountable for the inadequate preparation of Georgia, (assuming that Georgia was unprepared, or had omitted any preparation that was possible under the circumstances), which then had the full benefit of the counsels of reputed statesmen like Messrs. Toombs, Stephens, and Brown? or of South Carolina, under the counsels of Messrs. Rhett and Orr, and the Charleston Mercury? Of Alabama, led by the brilliant genius of Mr. Yancey? Yet, upon the aggregate resources and means of defense of these and the other States must depend the safety of the Confederacy. While Mr. Davis was yet in Washington, striving against hope to avert the dreaded issue, many of the States, under the guidance of their leading men, were passing ordinances of secession. Assuredly, then, he is not to be censured for any lack of preparation at this period. Yet no very close examination of the record is necessary to establish the fact, that those who have since been most forward in denying the prevision of statesmanship to Davis, were then, by their own showing, precipitating their several States into secession, totally unprepared for a war, the very possibility of which they derided.

The responsibility of Mr. Davis can date only from his inauguration as President of the Confederate States, on February 18, 1861. Between that date and the actual breaking out of war was an interval of less than two months. Within this period the results accomplished were certainly all that could have been anticipated, and all that ever were accomplished by any government yet in its infancy, within the same space of time. The organization of the Government had been perfected, efforts made to secure intercourse with foreign nations, and the civil administration completed in all important features. With the aid of that master genius for organization, General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General of the Confederate army, the basis of a military organization, upon which the most splendid armies of modern history were speedily created, was prepared; troops were called into the field; and the Confederacy, in proportion to its means, was actually placed, in two months, upon a war footing, not inferior to that of the enemy at the outbreak of hostilities.

The unprejudiced Northern or European reader, whose admiration has been freely expressed for the valor and endurance of the South, and for the skillful use of its comparatively limited resources, may well be amazed at the censures of Mr. Davis, from Southern sources.

But what was his error after assumption of the Presidency? More important still, what is the evidence? So far as we have been able to gather the evidence, it consists in the fact that President Davis did not urge the indiscriminate purchase of arms in Europe, or wherever else they might have been obtained. The intelligent foreign reader can only be amazed that, upon this single fact – for it is the only fact alleged – rests the charge that President Davis did not make adequate preparation for war. The answer is very simple, and indisputable. First, the Confederate Government, from the date of its organization, endeavored constantly to purchase serviceable arms wherever they could be obtained. Second, the Confederate Government had given extensive orders to Northern manufactories (because they were nearest) at Chickopee and elsewhere, some of which were filled and the arms received, while, in other cases, they were seized by the Federal authorities after the commencement of hostilities while en route South. Third, there were very few serviceable arms to be purchased in Europe; and in support of this assertion we have only to recall the enormous swindles practised on the Federal Government in its purchase of arms in Europe at this period. Arms were offered, in some instances, to the Government, and rejected, because President Davis, while Secretary of War, had become acquainted with their worthlessness; and thus, while certain speculations were disappointed, the means of the Government were not squandered. An examination of the records will demonstrate the fact that the Confederate Ordnance Bureau, under Colonel Gorgas, was conducted with signal judgment and ability. From the beginning to the end, it was managed with a success which entitles it to be considered probably the most ably conducted bureau of the Government.

But not only do the recorded events of the period vindicate Mr. Davis from the accusations of a tardy and delinquent policy in providing for the threatened emergency of war; they are fully conclusive as to the energetic provision made when hostilities were opened. Nothing can be more emphatic in its enunciation of a bold, vigorous policy than President Davis’ message to the Confederate Congress, assembled by special convocation, on the 29th of April:[34 - It should be observed that Mr. Lincoln did not call upon the Federal Congress to assemble until July 4th, two months after the meeting of the Confederate Congress.] “There are now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, nineteen thousand men, and sixteen thousand are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, an army of one hundred thousand men.” Surely we must look elsewhere than to such an announcement as this, for evidence in support of this pretended absence of foresight, and inappreciation of the extent and character of the approaching struggle. This, be it remembered, was in Davis’ first response to the Federal declaration of war, only two weeks after the fall of Sumter, and when President Lincoln had, as yet, called for but seventy-five thousand men. This was the spirit in which President Davis began the contest, and the results which immediately followed, in months of brilliant and consecutive triumphs, demonstrated the ample provision made for the emergency.[35 - In this connection, we quote from a remarkably faithful and careful chronicle of events during a portion of the war: “On the morning of the 29th of May, President Davis arrived in Richmond… He found the military preparations in a state requiring instant energy, and, within a few hours after his arrival, he telegraphed and wrote messages to every State in the South, urging that troops should be sent forward with increased speed.” —Howison’s History of the War.]

In marked contrast with this vigorous policy were the silly vaporings of demagogues, prating of Southern invincibility against a world in arms, protesting that the North, under no circumstances, could be induced to fight, and scouting a longer duration of a war with “Yankees,” than six months at the farthest. That such was the dominant conviction at Montgomery, no contemporary authority will deny. An eminent Virginian, a commissioner from his own State to the Confederate Congress, was amazed to hear laughed at as an excellent joke, his congratulations to that body, upon the wise determination to locate the seat of government at Richmond, in close proximity to the seat of war. The grave legislators at Montgomery, at least, had not yet comprehended that there was to be war.

But perhaps we are in fault, in thus offering the evidence of uncontradicted facts and obvious conclusions, where only vague inferences and unsupported allegations are urged to the contrary. There are graver questions yet to be encountered, far better justifying difference of opinion, and affording better ground for discussion of the philosophy of the Southern failure. Censure of those who have had the conduct of a ruined cause is as inevitable as the criticism which ever waits upon history; but it is not, therefore, always just. A great soldier,[36 - General Von Molkte, who planned the Prussian campaign in Bohemia.] who has but recently contributed a chapter to history, thrilling in interest and inestimable in importance, when congratulated since upon his brilliant triumphs, touchingly replied: “How would it have been if success – this unexampled success – had not crowned our undertaking? Would not this undeserved exaltation have been so much unreasonable criticism and undeserved blame?”

To a certain class of Southern critics, we commend the magnanimous sentiment of an illustrious fellow-countryman,[37 - General Jubal A. Early.] now mourning, in exile, the afflictions of his country: “As for myself, I have not undertaken to speculate as to the causes of our failure, as I have seen abundant reason for it in the tremendous odds brought against us. Having had some means of judging, I will, however, say that, in my opinion, both President Davis and General Lee, in their respective spheres, did all for the success of our cause which it was possible for mortal men to do; and it is a great privilege and comfort for me so to believe, and to have been able to bring with me, into exile, a profound love and veneration for those great men.”

CHAPTER X

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WAR IN 1861 – THE TWO GOVERNMENTS MORE DIRECTLY CONNECTED WITH RESULTS IN THE FIELD THAN AT SUBSEQUENT PERIODS – MR. DAVIS’ CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE CONFEDERACY – THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS, IN THE MAIN, THE DEFENSIVE POLICY OF THE VIRGINIAN AUTHORITIES – FEDERAL PREPARATIONS – GENERAL SCOTT – DEFENSIVE PLANS OF THE CONFEDERATES – DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR FORCES – THE CONFEDERATE CAMPAIGN OF 1861 JUSTIFIED – DISTRIBUTION OF THE FEDERAL FORCES – PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN – GENERALS PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON – JUNCTION OF BEAUREGARD AND JOHNSTON – MANASSAS – PRESIDENT DAVIS ON THE BATTLE-FIELD – HIS DISPATCH – HIS RETURN TO RICHMOND – A SPEECH NEVER PUBLISHED BEFORE – REFLECTIONS UPON THE RESULTS OF MANASSAS – MR. DAVIS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ABSENCE OF PURSUIT – STONEWALL JACKSON’S VIEWS – DAVIS IN FAVOR OF PURSUIT OF THE FEDERALS – MISREPRESENTATIONS – MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN VARIOUS QUARTERS – THE “TRENT AFFAIR” – RESULTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR

Whatever crudities may appear in the general plans of warfare, adopted by the American belligerents in 1861, when tested by the maxims which have obtained in other wars, waged upon different theatres of action, and for different purposes, at least there was not wanting a palpable and definitive shape. With remarkable rapidity and precision, the military situation was adjusted to the attainment of certain general objects, which continued, during the successive stages of the war, to be pursued, with varying fortune, by the respective contestants.

The incipient campaign of the war was peculiarly regulated and determined by the paramount aims which had impelled the respective parties to arms. Of necessity, the campaign, on the part of the North, must be offensive, while the South, in a defensive attitude, must prepare to parry the blows of her assailant. The pretext of the North was to assert the “national authority” over what it was pleased to term “rebellious” territory. The animus of the South was to repel an invasion which menaced her liberties and firesides. Whatever advantages may have belonged to the position of the South were not overlooked by those who were charged with her defense; and it may safely be claimed, in view of the immediate and overwhelming result in her favor, that whatever compensation, for obvious disadvantages, she had anticipated from the resources of skillful leadership, was fairly rendered.

The two Governments, at Washington and at Richmond, were then more directly chargeable with the actual results in the field than at subsequent periods. The army had then become less independent of the Government. Its organic structure was undeveloped, and it had not yet become identified with those commanders whose history was hereafter to be so interwoven with its own. In a general sense, it may be remarked, that the connection of President Davis with all the campaigns of the Confederate army, was that which the country designed it should be, when, in consequence of his military aptitude and experience, it placed him in charge of the public administration. Moreover, it was consistent with that inevitable responsibility which attached to the office of chief executive. Ignorant and intemperate partisans have labored to prove his responsibility for those casualties of war, which are utterly beyond human calculations, and to trace to his influence disasters of the battle-field, with which he could by no possibility have been connected. As is usual in such cases, these criticisms are made with a total forgetfulness of the unintentional tribute, which is accorded to Mr. Davis, in ascribing to him the chief responsibility for a military administration, which the world declares to have had few parallels in its history.

When President Davis reached Richmond, from Montgomery, the military situation had already assumed a well-defined shape. The plans of defense, adopted by the Virginian authorities, mainly under the direction of General Lee, and carried into partial execution before the alliance with the Confederacy had been formally consummated, were adhered to by the Confederate Government. President Davis, as we have seen, fully impressed with the demands of the exigency, immediately upon his arrival, addressed himself, with characteristic vigor and promptitude, to such measures as would secure a successful campaign. In the meantime, the preparations of the Federal Government were equally vigorous, and by no means indefinite in their aims.

Whatever may be the comparative merits, when placed in antithetical juxtaposition, of the plans of campaign adopted by the two Governments in 1861, or whatever may be alleged of the blunders and mishaps of the Federal scheme of warfare, there could be no question of the full comprehension of the necessities of the situation by the veteran commander of the Federal armies. We are not called upon here to give an opinion of General Scott in his personal or political relations, but that combination of sagacious military minds, upon which devolved the defense of Southern liberties, was not likely to commit the error of a disparaging estimate of his abilities.

General Scott, far in advance of the prevailing opinion at the North, dreamed of no holiday enterprise. He well knew that Southern valor, directed by leaders whose names were identified with the proudest prestige of America, and enlisted in the defense of principles which were the dearest convictions and traditions of the Southern heart, was not to be crushed in a “three-months’” wrestle of arms. Accordingly, his preparations were for war in its broadest and most terrible sense; a war between powerful nationalities; a war in which, though sustained by inexhaustible resources and popular enthusiasm, he had yet to contend with a race essentially military in its instincts, earnest in conviction, led by men whose capacities he had amply tested, and aided by defensive position, vast extent of territory, and by those numerous obstacles in the way of conquest, which must have been apparent to the eye of an experienced soldier.

The attitude of the Confederate Government was necessarily defensive. History would be searched in vain for examples justifying an invasion by a people entirely agricultural in habits and resources, weak in numbers, and with a government not yet organized three months, of a powerful manufacturing and commercial nation, of dense population, and great wealth and resources. Without supplies, equipment and transportation, and without the time or opportunity to obtain them, successful invasion of the North, however attractive to the popular imagination, was clearly impossible. Viewed from the more educated stand-point, furnished by the later developments of the war, the crude ideas, from which arose the popular aspiration of at once “carrying the war into Africa,” are ludicrous in the extreme. Indeed, there can be little doubt that the defensive, subjected to such modifications as the casualties of war render proper and necessary in all plans, whether offensive or defensive, was at all times the true policy of the South. Certain it is, that, upon two occasions, essaying the offensive under the most favorable circumstances, and under their greatest commander, the Confederates were overtaken by disaster. There can be no just criterion, furnished by European wars, by which to test the Confederate military policy in the main. Parallels between the American civil war and those waged by Frederick the Great and Napoleon are inadmissable. Not only were circumstances entirely dissimilar, but able military critics have indicated physical peculiarities, forbidding the unexceptional application to American warfare, of maxims which, elsewhere, are undisputed.