The Life of Jefferson Davis

But President Davis never designed that General Beauregard should be without a command. With that just appreciation of the real merits of his generals, apart from the cheap applause or unmerited censure of the crowd, which distinguished most of his selections, he placed General Beauregard in charge of the coast defenses, where his reputation was certainly much enhanced. In this oft-repeated and unfounded charge of “injustice” and “persecution,” in the case of General Joseph E. Johnston, as in that of General Beauregard, there is no specification, more awkwardly sustained, than that which denies the abundant opportunity enjoyed by each of those officers, for the display of the superior genius asserted for them by their admirers. The slightest acquaintance with the history of the war will verify this statement.

51

Much crimination and recrimination followed the fall of New Orleans. It is, at least, safe to say, that public opinion in the South was much divided, as to where the burden of censure for this dire and unexpected calamity should properly rest. The intelligence of the capture of the city was an appalling surprise, not only to the public in Richmond, but to the Government. President Davis declared that the event was totally unexpected by him. The fall of New Orleans was one of those instances, in which the Confederates had decided for them, in a most unsatisfactory manner, the long disputed question as to the efficiency of shore batteries against vessels of war. Precedents established, when sailing vessels were used in warfare, were overthrown by the experience of steam vessels, especially when iron-plated. Commodore Farragut, with perfect success and comparative ease, passed the forts below New Orleans, after the chief of the naval force had despaired of their reduction.

52

These revelations of the designs of McClellan are derived from the admirable work of Mr. Swinton – the “History of the Army of the Potomac” – perhaps the ablest and most impartial contribution yet made to the history of the late war.

It is noteworthy that General Grant attempted nearly the same approach to Richmond and was signally foiled – a fact which he promptly recognized, by his change of plan, after his bloody repulse at Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864.

53

This dispatch was in substance: “Halt the army where it is.”

54

The incidents of this trying period, when Richmond was doubly threatened by the hosts of McClellan, and the gunboats in the river, are “mementoes of heroism,” proudly illustrating the unconquerable spirit of that devoted city and its rulers. We give the resolution passed by the Legislature on the occasion referred to – May 14, 1862:

“Resolved by the General Assembly, That this General Assembly expresses its desire that the capital of the State be defended to the last extremity, if such defense is in accordance with the views of the President of the Confederate States; and that the President be assured, that whatever destruction or loss of property, of the State, or individuals shall hereby result, will be cheerfully submitted to.”

Two days after, at a public meeting of the citizens of Richmond, Governor Letcher said, that under no circumstances would he approve the surrender of the city, and avowed his readiness to endure bombardment, if necessary. In the same stout spirit spoke Mayor Mayo:

“I say now – and I will abide by it – when the citizens of Richmond demand of me to surrender the capital of Virginia, and of the Confederacy, to the enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the mayoralty. And when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up the city, I hope I may have physical courage and strength enough left to shoulder a musket and go into the ranks.”

55

It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations, similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not therefore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston’s ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely and intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to his aggressive qualities, though in this respect, results were not in his favor.

56

Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this circumstance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing the army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted, was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The President, in company with General Magruder and other officers, was at a farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to open. General Lee, apprised of the President’s whereabouts, sent a courier to warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped without injury, just as the Federal battery opened fire.

57

A serious disadvantage suffered by General Lee was the capture of his plan of battle by General McClellan. Completely informed as to his adversary’s movements, and with ninety thousand men against thirty-three thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confederate army. The means by which the enemy obtained this important paper was a subject of much gossip in the Confederacy.

58

A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended neutrality of England was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary. Said he: “The impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Majesty’s Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more powerful of the two contending parties.”

59

General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own as ten to three. Mr. Swinton states Hooker’s force at one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred guns. Lee’s effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand.

The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely indispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to meet the formidable Federal force in the neighborhood of Suffolk. An impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet’s detention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President eventually ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond.

60

“Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness, and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all duties… He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and holding the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even though the character of his campaigning imposed on them more hardships than on any other troops in the service. Good soldiers care not for their individual sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these General Jackson never lacked… ‘For glory he lived long enough,’ continued Mr. Davis, with much emotion; ‘and if this result had to come, it was the Divine mercy that removed him. He fell like the eagle, his own feather on the shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his death, the Confederacy lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being that the final summons could have reached no soldier more prepared to accept it joyfully.’” —Craven’s Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 180, 181.

61

Chiefly conscripts.

62

It has been generally assumed that General Lee committed grave errors at Gettysburg. The following explanation by Lee shows the extreme caution with which such a judgment should be pronounced: “It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy’s main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the first day, and in view of the valuable results which would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.”

Mr. Swinton, who derived his information from General Longstreet, makes a statement which throws much light upon the theory with which this campaign was undertaken: “Indeed, in entering upon the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him.” —Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.

63

Major John Esten Cooke justly says: “Gettysburg was the Waterloo – Cemetery Hill the Mount St. Jean of the war… Not without good reason is the anniversary of this great battle celebrated at the North with addresses and rejoicings – with crowds, and brass bands, and congratulations. The American Waterloo is worth making that noise over; and the monument proposed there is a natural conception.”

64

General Johnston, whether willingly or unwillingly, it is not necessary for us to inquire, was the favorite of the anti-administration faction. His name and opinions were, upon all occasions, quoted to aid in the disparagement of the administration. This faction was as blind in its zealotry in favor of Johnston, as in its prejudice against Davis. The motive of this zealous championship of Johnston was, however, to offset the well-known confidence of General Lee in the President.

65

The President ordered a Court of Inquiry for investigation of the facts of the campaign in Mississippi. General Pemberton requested that the most searching inquiry should be made, and that the court be allowed to invite all attainable testimony against him.

66

It is noteworthy that when trial vindicated the confidence of Mr. Davis in an officer, of whose capacity the critics were doubtful (as was the case in numberless instances), they made no acknowledgment of error. For example, the President was accused of the most unworthy nepotism in his appointment of General “Dick” Taylor, who was a brother of Mr. Davis’ first wife. Yet that appointment was insisted upon by Stonewall Jackson, in whose army Taylor commanded a brigade. The President made Taylor a Brigadier, because he thought him competent; and afterward a Major-General, because Jackson knew him to be worthy of it. Did Taylor’s subsequent career vindicate the President or the critics?

The case of the brave and efficient Early was another instance in which Mr. Davis was at variance with the newspaper and congressional censors, and in which, as usual, the President was sustained by Lee. It is needless to multiply examples.

67

One of the worst of these proceedings of the enemy, was the execution of Captains Corbin and McGraw. On hearing of their fate, the Confederate Government inquired of the Federal authorities the reason of their actions. The response was, that they were executed as spies. The record of their trial was then demanded. In answer to this request, the Federal Government furnished a copy of the charges and specifications against them, and of the sentence of the court which condemned them, but none of the evidence.

From the papers thus furnished, it appears that it was not true that they had been accused or tried as spies – that the sole charge against these unfortunate gentlemen was, that they had recruited soldiers for the Confederacy in Kentucky, a State embraced in our political system and represented regularly in the Confederate Congress by Senators and Representatives. Nor was the evidence of this charge supplied. Not a scintilla of proof appeared that these men were spies. The sole pretext for their execution was the technical one that these officers were recruiting in one of the States claimed by the enemy, as one of the United States, a principle which applies equally to Virginia or South Carolina, and which would, if carried out, sentence to the gallows every officer and private we had in our service.

68

General D. H. Hill has given a most manly exhibition of feeling toward Mr. Davis, in an article published, some months since, in his magazine. We quote from General Hill, who alludes, at length, to the alleged rancor of Mr. Davis toward his opponents. General Hill prefaces his remarks with the declaration, that he “has never been among the personal friends of Mr. Davis;” that he was “at no time an admirer of his executive abilities;” and further declares himself to have been the recipient of an “unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable wrong,” at the hands of Mr. Davis. Says this gallant soldier:

“It was said of Mr. Davis that he could see no good in his enemies and no evil in his friends. I know of one instance, at least, of incorrectness of the former statement. I was present when a discussion took place in regard to the suppression of a newspaper because of the disloyal character of its articles, which were producing desertion in the army, and disaffection among the people at home. The editor had been converted to Unionism by the battle of Gettysburg and fall of Vicksburg, and, like all newborn proselytes, was fiery in his zeal. A cabinet officer present said: ‘This man is not more disloyal than – ’ (naming a well-known editor, whose assaults upon Mr. Davis at this time were very virulent.) ‘I don’t see how one paper can be suppressed without suppressing the other.’ To this a gentleman replied: ‘You are unjust. Mr. – , though an enemy of the President, yet shows by his abuse of the Yankees that he has no love for them. The other editor betrays hatred of the President and of his own people.’ Mr. Davis immediately assented to this, saying: ‘You have exactly described the difference between the two men.’… But it is not true that he could see no good in his enemies, and that he pursued them with rancorous hate. I do not doubt that in the comparison with his supposed friends, they were in his estimation both intellectually weak and morally perverse. But, apart from this, he could be just and appreciative of their merits. I saw him several times during the session of a Confederate Congress in which he had been harshly assailed. Once he alluded incidentally to his troubles, but without the least resentment in language or manner. I think that there was no instance of the suppression of a newspaper, though several editors were notoriously disloyal to the Confederate cause, and still more of them intensely hostile to the Confederate President. Like Washington, Mr. Davis held ‘error to be the portion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that public character, to be the prerogative of a freeman.’”

69

At the beginning of the war, the South had only fifty millions of coin, and had a paper circulation of about the same amount.

70

My limited space has prevented the extended account of the Confederate Commissary Department, which was originally designed. The history of its commissariat is an important chapter in the history of the Confederacy. President Davis was much abused for his retention of Colonel Northrop, who has been charged, both during and since the war, with incompetency, corruption, and every conceivable abuse of his office. The amount of truth, in the charge of corruption against Colonel Northrop, may be estimated, when we state a fact known almost universally in Richmond, that few persons suffered the privations of the war more severely than he. Hundreds of the most respectable gentlemen in the South willingly testify to the unimpeachable patriotism and purity of Colonel Northrop. Equally false was the statement that Mr. Davis gratified merely his personal partiality in appointing Commissary-General a man who had given no previous evidence of fitness. Colonel Northrop, when in the regular Federal army, had seen extensive service in that department, where he was detailed, after having been disabled. His services were amply testified to by his superiors, who regarded him as having peculiar qualifications for the duties of the commissariat. Of these facts Mr. Davis had personal knowledge, though, when he placed Colonel Northrop at the head of the Confederate commissariat, they had not met for more than twenty years.