Pax mundi

In olden time, a small high-spirited people might with success fight against a greater and more powerful neighbour. In consequence of the weak organization, the feeble spirit of cohesion and the slightly developed art of war, it was then possible.

Now this condition is changed. As a rule we find that the military strength of a State is in direct proportion to its population and material wealth.

The consequence is that the smaller States have virtually ceased to be belligerent powers. Such examples as Germany's proceeding against Denmark in 1864, and England's against Egypt in 1882, or in general, when the stronger State only needs to consider how large a portion of its forces must be employed to accomplish its object, are not to be considered as wars, but as military executions.

As to our own country (Sweden), it certainly has, together with Norway, an advantage in its situation above other small powers. But it concerns us that we utilize this advantage with wisdom and at the right time. This is not to be done by turning Sweden into a military State, because even if we did so to the greatest possible extent, we should, if left to ourselves, not even so be in a condition to defend ourselves against our powerful neighbours.

In proportion as a nation exhausts its resources by military preparations, its ability lessens to cope with an over-powering enemy.

In our day, not only are great and well-disciplined hosts required for carrying on war, but great material riches are equally indispensable. The relation between a nation of four or five millions, and one of forty or fifty millions, is like that between the dwarfs and the giants.

It is easily understood that patriotic feelings may bewilder the judgment, and that our nation, with its brilliant war memories, can only with difficulty perceive this simple truth, and with reluctance accommodate itself to the changed condition which modern times have created.

Let us, however, realize that we are standing at the parting of the ways; that we have before us the alternative, on the one hand, of a barren and ruinous militarism; on the other, the seeking of our defence in a neutrality guaranteed by the united powers; making it possible for us to get our defence adjusted, without any very great difficulty, and settled upon a footing so satisfactory.

The first-named alternative would, in our naturally poor land, excessively depress our natural vitality, and in a great degree prevent our progress as a cultured people keeping pace with greater and wealthier nations. The second would put us into a position to confine our military burdens within reasonable limits, and to expend the powers and resources of prosperity thus relieved, in means of promoting business, trade, science, and well-being of all kinds.

The clear-sighted friend of his country, who sees the population in ever-swelling numbers leaving their homes for a foreign shore, seeking a new fatherland, will surely not hesitate in his choice.

It will perhaps be said that such a choice does not now lie before us. There are two opinions about that. But in one thing we may all unite, namely, that a settled neutrality for Sweden is a thing to be aimed at. Here almost every interest of the fatherland converges.

But if such a neutralization is considered by many not a sufficient peace-protection under all circumstances, yet no one with reason can deny that it does form a security for our country against foreign powers.

Accepting this conclusion as correct, it follows that we should find some practicable means of realizing it; and if hindrances do meet us, we shall, on nearer inspection, find that they are not great, but with hearty goodwill and perseverance may be overcome.

This is my conviction.

In drawing attention to the subjoined, I would further bring to mind that the seat of war in Europe is limited in the proportion in which the number of neutralized States grows, a condition of things which may little by little in an essential degree impede or prevent the outbreak of war; that the peculiar situation of Sweden (greatly superior, for example, to Belgium or Switzerland) must naturally facilitate its neutralization; that, lastly, the neutrality proposed does not stand in the way of arranging our own defence, but that rather, in case Parliament rejects his Majesty's army bill, adapts itself powerfully to contribute to a right solution of the Defence question; and so much the more, as all suspicion that that old vexed question aims perhaps at something more and other than defence of the country would thereby disappear.

For this reason – and since we cannot expect that other powers should take the first step and offer us what we do not ask for – I respectfully propose: —

That Parliament shall in writing express to the king its desire that it might please his Majesty to initiate, amongst the states with which Sweden has diplomatic relations, negotiations for bringing about a permanent guaranteed[42 - The word "guaranteed" was inserted in the motion contrary to the opinion of the committee] neutrality of Sweden, in harmony with the principles of modern international law.

K.P. Arnoldson.

Stockholm, February, 1883.

This motion was supported by —

S.A. Hedlund,

Will. Farup,

J. Andersson, Tenhuset,

J.E. Ericsson, Alberta,

Per Persson,

F.F. Borg,

J. Jonassen, Gullahs,

C.J. Sven's,

A. Th. Waylen's,

P.M. Larson, LA,

P.G. Peterson,

Arvid Gumœlius,

J. Jonassen,

Eric Olsson,

J.A. Ericsson,

Lars Nilsson,

C.G. Otterborg.

19

Taken from the following communication:

At a meeting, March 31st, 1883, of the Association of members of the Storting, a document was presented, being a motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97, respecting the Neutralization of Sweden; which document was sent to the president of the meeting by a Swedish M.P.

In consequence of this the following declaration and resolution was voted unanimously: Recognising that the neutralization of a single country is in the interest of universal peace; that being secured from foreign attack by stronger nations, gives ability to use its own resources and develop its institutions, including its defence, according to its special requirements; that the condition and situation of our country give equal opportunity for working for this object, and facilities for its attainment; and that the action taken in the Swedish Rigsdag upon the question, seriously calls our attention to it on the ground of the constitutional relation between the kingdoms and their union in war and in peace; a committee is requested to take into consideration, how the question may be subjected to further attention.

A. QUAM, Secretary of the Association.

20

Protocol of the Second Chamber, № 33, April 28th, 1883.

21

See on the dealing with the question in Parliament, "Riksdagstrycket" 1883. Motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97, pp. 1-8; First Chamber, protocol No. 33, pp. 3-4, etc., etc.

22

Mr. Arnoldson's speech ran thus: —

"The second speaker on the Right propounded certain difficulties, amongst others, one referring to Sweden's union with Norway. Since Sweden and Norway have the same foreign policy, and the initiative in this question comes from Sweden, the Union King ought certainly to be able to act freely in the common interest of the two kingdoms. In any case, it is probable, as Mr. Hedlund remarked, that if the Riksdag takes the first step it will not be long before the Storting comes to meet us. It was chiefly on the ground of courtesy that I did not undertake to speak for Norway too in the Riksdag. We know that the Norse – and it does them honour – are tenacious of their right of deciding for themselves. I do not think it would be seemly for the mover of such a resolution as this to make himself their spokesman in the Swedish Riksdag – not to mention the positive incorrectness of the proceeding. This is why I limited the matter to Sweden in my proposition."

23