"These orders were received by General Jackson at Nashville, on the night of the 12th January, 1818, and he instantly took measures to carry them into effect.
"In the mean time, however, he had received copies of the orders to General Gaines, to take possession of Amelia Island, and to enter Florida, but halt and report to the department, in case the Indians sheltered themselves under a Spanish fort. Approving the policy of the former, and perceiving in the latter, dangers to the army, and injury to the country, on the 6th of January he addressed a confidential letter to the President, frankly disclosing his views on both subjects. The following is a copy of that letter, viz.: —
"Nashville, 6th Jan., 1818.
"Sir: – a few days since, i received a letter from the Secretary of War, of the 17th ult., with inclosures. Your order of the 19th ult. through him to Brevet Major General Gaines to enter the territory of Spain, and chastise the ruthless savages who have been depredating on the property and lives of our citizens, will meet not only the approbation of your country, but the approbation of heaven. Will you however permit me to suggest the catastrophe that might arise by General Gaines's compliance with the last clause of your order? Suppose the case that the Indians are beaten: they take refuge either in Pensacola or St. Augustine, which open their gates to them: to profit by his victory, General Gaines pursues the fugitives, and has to halt before the garrison until he can communicate with his government. In the mean time the militia grow restless, and he is left to defend himself by the regulars. The enemy, with the aid of their Spanish friends, and Woodbine's British partisans, or, if you please with Aurey's force, attacks him. What may not be the result? Defeat and massacre. Permit me to remark that the arms of the United States must be carried to any point within the limits of East Florida, where an enemy is permitted and protected, or disgrace attends.
"The Executive Government have ordered, and, as I conceive, very properly, Amelia Island to be taken possession of. This order ought to be carried into execution at all hazards, and simultaneously the whole of East Florida seized, and held as an indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of our citizens. This done, it puts all opposition down, secures our citizens a complete indemnity, and saves us from a war with Great Britain, or some of the continental powers combined with Spain. This can be done without implicating the government. Let it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea), that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished.
"The order being given for the possession of Amelia Island, it ought to be executed, or our enemies, internal and external, will use it to the disadvantage of the government. If our troops enter the territory of Spain in pursuit of our Indian enemy, all opposition that they meet with must be put down, or we will be involved in danger and disgrace.
"I have the honor, &c.
"ANDREW JACKSON.
"James Monroe, President U. S.
"The course recommended by General Jackson in this letter relative to the occupation of the Floridas accords with the policy which dictated the secret act of Congress. He recommended no more than the President had a right to do. In consequence of the occupation of Amelia Island by the officers of the Colombian and Mexican governments, and the attempt to occupy the whole province, the President had a right, under the act of Congress, to order General Jackson to take possession of it in the name of the United States. He would have been the more justifiable in doing so, because the inhabitants of the province, the Indian subjects of the King of Spain, whom he was bound not only by the laws of nations, but by treaty to restrain, were in open war with the United States.
"Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, was the first man who read this letter after its reception at Washington. In a letter from Mr. Monroe to General Jackson, dated 21st December, 1818, published in the Calhoun correspondence, page 44, is the following account of the reception, opening and perusal of this letter, viz.: 'Your letter of January 6th, was received while I was seriously indisposed. Observing that it was from you, I handed it to Mr. Calhoun to read, after reading one or two lines only myself. The order to you to take command in that quarter had before been issued. He remarked after perusing the letter, that it was a confidential one relating to Florida, which I must answer.'
"In accordance with the advice of Mr. Calhoun, and availing himself of the suggestion contained in the letter, Mr. Monroe sent for Mr. John Rhea (then a member of Congress), showed him the confidential letter, and requested him to answer it. In conformity with this request Mr. Rhea did answer the letter, and informed General Jackson that the President had shown him the confidential letter, and requested him to state that he approved of its suggestions. This answer was received by the general on the second night he remained at Big Creek, which is four miles in advance of Hartford, Georgia, and before his arrival at Fort Scott, to take command of the troops in that quarter.
"General Jackson had already received orders, vesting him with discretionary powers in relation to the measures necessary to put an end to the war. He had informed the President in his confidential letter, that in his judgment it was necessary to seize and occupy the whole of Florida. This suggestion had been considered by Mr. Calhoun and the President, and approved. From this confidential correspondence before he entered Florida, it was understood on both sides, that under the order received by him he would occupy the whole province, if an occasion to do so should present itself; as Mr. Calhoun wrote to Governor Bibb, he was 'authorized to conduct the war as he thought best;' and how he 'thought best' to conduct it was then made known to the Executive, and approved, before he struck a blow.
"In the approval given by Mr. Monroe upon the advice of Mr. Calhoun to the suggestions of General Jackson, he acted in strict obedience to the laws of his country. By the secret act of Congress, the President was authorized, under circumstances then existing, to seize and occupy all Florida. Orders had been given which were sufficiently general in their terms to cover that object. The confidential correspondence, and private understanding, made them, so far as regarded the parties, as effectually orders to take and occupy the Province of Florida as if that object had been declared on their face.
"Under these circumstances General Jackson entered Florida with a perfect right, according to international law, and the constitution and laws of his country, to take possession of the whole territory. He was clothed with all the power of the President, and authorized 'to conduct the war as he thought best.' He had orders as general and comprehensive as words could make them: he had the confidential approbation of the President to his confidential recommendation to seize Florida: and he entered the province with the full knowledge that not only justice and policy but the laws of his country, and the orders of the President as publicly and privately explained and understood, would justify him in expelling every Spanish garrison, and extending the jurisdiction of the United States over every inch of its territory.
"'Nevertheless, General Jackson, from his knowledge of the situation of affairs in Florida, expected to find a justification for himself in the conduct of the Spanish authorities. On the contrary, had he found on entering the province that the agents and officers of Spain, instead of instigating, encouraging and supplying the Indians, had used all the means in their power to prevent and put an end to hostilities, he would not have incurred the responsibility of seizing their fortresses and expelling them from the country. But he wrote to the President, and entered upon the campaign with other expectations, and in these he was not disappointed.
"As he approached St. Marks it was ascertained that it was a place of rendezvous and a source of supply for the Indians. Their councils had been held within its walls: its storehouses were appropriated to their use: they had there obtained supplies of ammunition: there they had found a market for their plunder: and in the commandant's family resided Alexander Arbuthnot, the chief instigator of the war. Moreover, the negroes and Indians under Ambrister threatened to drive out the feeble Spanish garrison and take entire possession of the fort, as a means of protection for themselves and annoyance to the United States. In these circumstances General Jackson found enough to justify him in assuming the responsibility of seizing and occupying that post with an American garrison.
"The Indians had been dispersed, and St. Marks occupied. No facts had as yet appeared which would justify General Jackson in assuming the responsibility of occupying the other Spanish posts in Florida. He considered the war as at an end, and was about to discharge a considerable portion of his force, when he was informed that a portion of the hostile Indians had been received, fed and supplied by the Spanish authorities in Pensacola. He therefore directed his march upon that point. On his advance he received a letter from the governor, denouncing his entry into Florida as a violent outrage on the rights of Spain, requiring his immediate retreat from the Territory, and threatening in case of refusal to use force to expel him. This declaration of hostilities on the part of the Spanish authorities, instead of removing, tended to increase the necessity for the General's advance, because it was manifest to both parties that if the American army then left Florida, the Indians, under the belief that there they would always find a safe retreat, would commence their bloody incursions upon our frontiers with redoubled fury; and General Jackson was warned that if he left any portion of his army to restrain the Indians, and retired with his main force, the Spaniards would be openly united with the Indians to expel the whole, and thus it became as necessary in order to terminate the war to destroy or capture the Spanish force at Pensacola as the Indians themselves. In this attitude of the Spanish governor, and in the fact that the hostile Indians were received, fed, clothed, furnished with munitions of war, and that their plunder was purchased in Pensacola, General Jackson found a justification for seizing that post also, and holding it in the name of the United States.
"St. Augustine was still in the hands of the Spaniards, and no act of the authorities or people of that place was known to General Jackson previous to his return to Tennessee, which would sustain him in assuming the responsibility of occupying that city. However, about the 7th of August, 1818, he received information that the Indians were there also received and supplied. On that day, therefore, he issued an order to General Gaines, directing him to collect the evidences of these facts, and if they were well founded, to take possession of that place. The following is an extract from that order:
"'I have noted with attention Major Twiggs' letter marked No. 5. I contemplated that the agents of Spain or the officers of Fort St. Augustine would excite the Indians to hostility and furnish them with the means. It will be necessary to obtain evidence substantiating this fact, and that the hostile Indians have been fed and furnished from the garrison of St. Augustine. This being obtained, should you deem your force sufficient, you will proceed to take and garrison with American troops, Fort St. Augustine, and hold the garrison prisoners until you hear from the President of the United States, or transport them to Cuba, as in your judgment under existing circumstances you may think best.'
"An order had some time before been given to the officer of ordnance at Charleston, to have in readiness a battery train, and to him General Gaines was referred.
"The order to take St. Augustine has often been adduced as evidence of General Jackson's determination to do as he pleased, without regard to the orders or wishes of his government. Though justifiable on the ground of self-defence, it would never have been issued but for the confidential orders given to General Gaines and Colonel Bankhead, to take possession of Amelia Island forcibly, if not yielded peaceably, and when possessed, to retain and fortify it; and the secret understanding which existed between him and the government, in consequence of which he never doubted that he was acting in compliance with the wishes, and in accordance with the orders and expectations of the President and Secretary of War.
"To show more conclusively the impressions under which General Jackson acted, reference should be had to the fact that, after the capture of the Spanish forts, he instructed Captain Gadsden to prepare and report a plan for the permanent defence of Florida, which was agreeable to the confidential orders to General Gaines and Col. Bankhead before referred to. Of this he informed the Secretary of War in a dispatch dated 2d June, 1818, of which the following is an extract: —
"'Captain Gadsden is instructed to prepare and report on the necessary defences as far as the military reconnoissances he has taken will permit, accompanied with plans of existing works; what additions or improvements are necessary, and what new works should, in his opinion, be erected to give permanent security to this important territorial addition to our republic. As soon as the report is prepared, Captain Gadsden will receive orders to repair to Washington City with some other documents which I may wish to confide to his charge.'
"This plan was completed and forwarded to Mr. Calhoun on the 10th of the succeeding August, by Captain Gadsden himself, with a letter from General Jackson, urging the necessity not only of retaining possession of St. Marks, but Pensacola. The following is a part of that letter:
"'Captain Gadsden will also deliver you his report made in pursuance of my order, accompanied with the plans of the fortifications thought necessary for the defence of the Floridas, in connection with the line of defence on our Southern frontier.
"'This was done under the belief that the government will never jeopardize the safety of the Union, or the security of our frontier, by surrendering those posts, and the possession of the Floridas, unless upon a sure guaranty agreeable to the stipulations of the articles of capitulation, that will insure permanent peace, tranquillity and security to our Southern frontier. It is believed that Spain can never furnish this guaranty. As long as there are Indians in Florida, and it is possessed by Spain, they will be excited to war, and the indiscriminate murder of our citizens, by foreign agents combined with the officers of Spain. The duplicity and conduct of Spain for the last six years fully prove this. It was on a belief that the Floridas would be held that my order was given to Captain Gadsden to make the report he has done.'
"Again: 'By Captain Gadsden you will receive some letters lately inclosed to me, detailing the information that the Spaniards at Fort St. Augustine are again exciting the Indians to war against us, and a copy of my order to General Gaines on this subject. It is what I expected, and proves the justice and sound policy of not only holding the posts we are now in possession of, but of possessing ourselves of St. Augustine. This, and this alone can give us peace and security on "our Southern frontier."'
"It is thus clearly shown that in taking possession of St. Marks and Pensacola, and giving orders to take St. Augustine, I was acting within the letter as well as spirit of my orders, and in accordance with the secret understanding between the government and myself, and under a full persuasion that these fortresses would never again be permitted by our government to pass under the dominion of Spain. From the time of writing my confidential letter of the 6th of January to the date of this dispatch, the 10th of August, 1818, I never had an intimation that the wishes of the government had changed, or that less was expected of me, if the occasion should prove favorable, than the occupation of the whole of Florida. On the contrary, either by their direct approval of my measures, or their silence, the President and Mr. Calhoun gave me reason to suppose that I was to be sustained, and that the Floridas after being occupied were to be held for the benefit of the United States. Upon receiving my orders on the 11th of January, I took instant measures to bring into the field a sufficient force to accomplish all the objects suggested in my confidential letter of the 6th, of which I informed the War Department, and Mr. Calhoun in his reply dated 29th January, 1818, after the receipt of my confidential letter, and a full knowledge and approbation of my views says: —
"'The measures you have taken to bring an efficient force into the field are approbated, and a confident hope is entertained that a speedy and successful termination of the Indian war will follow your exertions.'
"Having received further details of my preparations, not only to terminate the Seminole war, but, as the President and his Secretary well knew, to occupy Florida also, Mr. Calhoun on the 6th February, writes as follows: —
"'I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th ult., and to acquaint you with the entire approbation of the President of all the measures you have adopted to terminate the rupture with the Indians.'
"On the 13th of May following, with a full knowledge that I intended if a favorable occasion presented itself to occupy Florida, and that the design had the approbation of the President, Mr. Calhoun wrote to Governor Bibb, of Alabama, the letter already alluded to, concluding as follows: —
"'General Jackson is vested with full powers to conduct the war in the manner he may deem best.'
"On the 25th of March, 1818, I informed Mr. Calhoun that I intended to occupy St. Marks, and on the 8th of April I informed him that it was done.
"Not a whisper of disapprobation or of doubt reached me from the government.
"On the 5th May I wrote to Mr. Calhoun that I was about to move upon Pensacola with a view of occupying that place.
"Again, no reply was ever given disapproving or discountenancing this movement.
"On the 2d of June I informed Mr. Calhoun that I had on the 24th May entered Pensacola, and on the 28th had received the surrender of the Barrancas.
"Again no reply was given to this letter expressing any disapproval of these acts.
"In fine, from the receipt of the President's reply to my confidential letter of 6th January, 1818, through Mr. Rhea, until the receipt of the President's private letter, dated 19th July, 1818, I received no instructions or intimations from the government public or private that my operations in Florida were other than such as the President and Secretary of War expected and approved. I had not a doubt that I had acted in every respect in strict accordance with their views, and that without publicly avowing that they had authorized my measures they were ready at all times and under all circumstances to sustain me; and that as there were sound reasons and justifiable cause for taking possession of Florida, they would in pursuance of their private understanding with me retain it as indemnity for the spoliations committed by Spanish subjects on our citizens, and as security for the peace of our Southern frontier. I was willing to rest my vindication for taking the posts on the hostile conduct of their officers and garrisons, bearing all the responsibility myself: but I expected my government would find in their claims upon Spain, and the danger to which our frontier would again be exposed, sufficient reasons for not again delivering them into the possession of Spain.
"It was late in August before I received official information of the decision of the government to restore the posts, and about the same time I saw it stated in the Georgia Journal that the cabinet had been divided in relation to the course pursued by me in Florida; and also an extract of a letter in a Nashville paper, alleging that a movement had been made in the cabinet against me which was attributed to Mr. Crawford, in which extract it is expressly stated that I had been triumphantly vindicated by Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Adams. Being convinced that the course I had pursued was justified by considerations of public policy, by the laws of nations, by the state of things to which I have referred, and by the instructions, intimations, and acquiescence of the government, and believing that the latter had been communicated to all the members of the cabinet, I considered that such a movement by Mr. Crawford was founded on considerations foreign to the public interests, and personally inimical to me; and therefore, after these public and explicit intimations of what had occurred in the cabinet, I was prepared to, and did believe that Mr. Crawford was bent on my destruction, and was the author of the movement in the cabinet to which they referred. I the more readily entertained this belief in relation to him (in which I am rejoiced to avail myself of this public occasion to say I did him injustice) because it was impossible that I should suspect that any proposition to punish or censure me could come from either the President or Mr. Calhoun, as I well knew that I had expressed to the President my opinion that Florida ought to be taken, and had offered to take it if he would give me an intimation through Mr. Rhea that it was desirable to do so, which intimation was given; that they had given me orders broad enough to sanction all that was done; that Mr. Calhoun had expressly interpreted those orders vesting me 'with full power to conduct the war as he (I) might think best;' that they had expressly approved of all my preparations, and in silence witnessed all my operations. Under these circumstances it was impossible for me to believe, whatever change might have taken place in their views of public policy, that either the President or Mr. Calhoun could have originated or countenanced any proposition tending to cast censure upon me, much less to produce my arrest, trial, and punishment.
"If these facts and statements could have left room for a doubt in relation to Mr. Calhoun's approval of my conduct and of his friendship for me, I had other evidence of a nature perfectly conclusive. In August, 1818, Colonel A. P. Hayne, Inspector General of the Southern Division, who had served in this campaign, came to Washington to settle his accounts, and resign his staff appointment in the army. He was the fellow-citizen and friend of Mr. Calhoun and held constant personal interviews with him for some weeks in settling his accounts. On the 24th September he addressed a letter to me, stating that he had closed his public accounts entirely to his satisfaction, and in relation to public affairs among other things remarks: —
"'The course the administration has thought proper to adopt is to me inexplicable. They retain St. Marks, and in the same breath give up Pensacola. Who can comprehend this? The American nation possesses discernment, and will judge for themselves. Indeed, sir, I fear that Mr. Monroe has on the present occasion yielded to the opinion of those about him. I cannot believe that it is the result of his own honest convictions. Mr. Calhoun certainly thinks with you altogether, although after the decision of the cabinet, he must of course nominally support what has been done.' And in another letter, dated 21st January, 1819, he says: 'Since I last saw you I have travelled through West and East Tennessee, through Kentucky, through Ohio, through the western and eastern part of Pennsylvania, and the whole of Virginia – have been much in Baltimore and Philadelphia, and the united voice of the people of those States and towns (and I have taken great pains to inform myself) approve of your conduct in every respect. And the people of the United States at large entertain precisely the same opinion with the people of those States. So does the administration, to wit: Mr. Monroe, Mr. Calhoun, and Mr. Adams. Mr. Monroe is your friend. He has identified you with himself. After the most mature reflection and deliberation upon all of your operations, he has covered your conduct. But I am candid to confess that he did not adopt this line of conduct (in my mind) as soon as he ought to have done. Mr. Adams has done honor to his country and himself.'
"Colonel Hayne is a man of honor, and did not intend to deceive; I had no doubt, and have none now, that he derived his impressions from conversations with Mr. Calhoun himself; nor have I any doubt that Mr. Calhoun purposely conveyed those impressions that they might be communicated to me. Without other evidence than this letter, how could I have understood Mr. Calhoun otherwise than as approving my whole conduct, and as having defended me in the cabinet? How could I have understood any seeming dissent in his official communications otherwise than as arising from his obligation to give a 'nominal support' to the decision of the cabinet which in reality he disapproved?
"The reply to my confidential letter, the approval of my preparations, the silence of Mr. Calhoun during the campaign, the enmity of Mr. Crawford, the language of the newspapers, the letters of Colonel Hayne, and other letters of similar import from other gentlemen who were on familiar terms with the Secretary of War, left no doubt on my mind that Mr. Calhoun approved of my conduct in the Seminole war 'altogether;' had defended me against an attack of Mr. Crawford in the cabinet, and was, throughout the struggle in Congress so deeply involving my character and fame, my devoted and zealous friend. This impression was confirmed by the personal kindness of Mr. Calhoun towards me, during my visit to this city, pending the proceedings of Congress relative to the Seminole war, and on every after occasion. Nor was such conduct confined to me alone, for however inconsistent with his proposition in the cabinet, that I should 'be punished in some form,' or in the language of Mr. Adams, as to what passed there 'that General Jackson should be brought to trial,' in several conversations with Colonel Richard M. Johnson, while he was preparing the counter report of the Military Committee of the House of Representatives, Mr. Calhoun always spoke of me with respect and kindness, and approved of my course.
"So strong was my faith in Mr. Calhoun's friendship that the appointment of Mr. Lacock, shortly after he had made his report upon the Seminole war in the Senate, to an important office, although inexplicable to me, did not shake it.
"I was informed by Mr. Rankin (member of the House of Representatives from Mississippi), and others in 1823 and 1824, once in the presence of Colonel Thomas H. Williams (of Mississippi) of the Senate, that I had blamed Mr. Crawford unjustly and that Mr. Calhoun was the instigator of the attacks made upon me: yet in consequence of the facts and circumstances already recapitulated tending to prove Mr. Calhoun's approval of my course, I could not give the assertion the least credit.
"Again in 1825 Mr. Cobb told me that I blamed Mr. Crawford wrongfully both for the attempt to injure me in the cabinet, and for having an agency in framing the resolutions which he (Mr. Cobb) offered in Congress censuring my conduct in the Seminole war. He stated on the contrary that Mr. Crawford was opposed to those resolutions and always asserted that 'General Jackson had a sufficient defence whenever he chose to make it, and that the attempt to censure him would do him good, and recoil upon its authors;' yet it was impossible for me to believe that Mr. Calhoun had been my enemy; on the contrary I did not doubt that he had been my devoted friend, not only through all those difficulties, but in the contest for the Presidency which ended in the election of Mr. Adams.
"In the Spring of 1828 the impression of Mr. Calhoun's rectitude and fidelity towards me was confirmed by an incident which occurred during the progress of an effort to reconcile all misunderstanding between him and Mr. Crawford and myself. Colonel James A. Hamilton of New-York inquired of Mr. Calhoun himself, at Washington, 'whether at any meeting of Mr. Monroe's cabinet the propriety of arresting General Jackson for any thing done during the Seminole war had been at any time discussed?' Mr. Calhoun replied, 'Never: such a measure was not thought of, much less discussed. The only point before the cabinet was the answer to be given to the Spanish government.' In consequence of this conversation Colonel Hamilton wrote to Major Lewis, a member of the Nashville committee, that 'the Vice-President, who you know was the member of the cabinet best acquainted with the subject, told me General Jackson's arrest was never thought of, much less discussed.' Information of this statement renewed and strengthened the impression relative to the friendship of Mr. Calhoun, which I had entertained from the time of the Seminole war.