Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

"Many reasons oppose the final action of Congress upon this subject at the present time. We are exhausted with the tedium, if not with the labors of a six months' session. Our hearts and minds must be at home, though our bodies are here. Mentally and bodily we are unable to give the attention and consideration to this question, which the magnitude of its principles, the extent and variety of its details, demand from us. Other subjects of more immediate and pressing interest must be thrown aside, to make way for it. The reduction of the price of the public lands, for which the new States have been petitioning for so many years, and the modification of the tariff, the continuance of which seems to be weakening the cement which binds this Union together, must be postponed, and possibly lost for the session, if we go on with the bank question. Why has the tariff been dropped in the Senate? Every one recollects the haste with which that subject was taken up in this chamber; how it was pushed to a certain point; and how suddenly and gently it has given way to the bank bill! Is there any union of interest – any conjunction of forces – any combined plan of action – any alliance, offensive or defensive, between the United States Bank and the American system? Certainly they enter the field together, one here, the other yonder (pointing to the House of Representatives), and leaving a clear stage to each other, they press at once upon both wings, and announce a perfect non-interference, if not mutual aid, in the double victory which is to be achieved. Why have the two bills reported by the Committee on Manufactures, and for taking up which notices have been given: why are they so suddenly, so easily, so gently, abandoned? Why is the land bill, reported by the same committee, and a pledge given to call it up when the Committee on Public Lands had made their counter report, also suffered to sleep on the table? The counter report is made; it is printed; it lies on every table; why not go on with the lands, when the settlement of the question of the amount of revenue to be derived from that source precedes the tariff question, and must be settled before we can know how much revenue should be raised from imports.

"An unfinished investigation presented another reason for delaying the final action of Congress on this subject. The House of Representatives had appointed a committee to investigate the affairs of the bank; they had proceeded to the limit of the time allotted them – had reported adversely to the bank – and especially against the renewal of the charter at this session; and had argued the necessity of further examinations. Would the Senate proceed while this unfinished investigation was depending in the other end of the building? Would they act so as to limit the investigation to the few weeks which were allowed to the committee, when we have from four to six years on hand within which to make it? The reports of this committee, to the amount of some 15,000 copies had been ordered to be printed by the two Houses, to be distributed among the people. For what purpose? Certainly that the people might read them – make up their minds upon their contents – and communicate their sentiments to their representatives. But these reports are not yet distributed; they are not yet read by the people; and why order this distribution without waiting for its effect, when there is so much time on hand? Why treat the people with this mockery of a pretended consultation – this illusive reference to their judgment – while proceeding to act before they can read what we have sent to them? Nay, more; the very documents upon which the reports are founded are yet unprinted! The Senate is actually pushed into this discussion without having seen the evidence which has been collected by the investigating committee, and which the Senate itself has ordered to be printed for the information of its members.

"The decision of this question does not belong to this Congress, but to the Congress to be elected under the new census of 1830. It looked to him like usurpation for this Congress to seize upon a question of this magnitude, which required no decision until the new and full representation of the people shall come in; and which, if decided now, though prematurely and by usurpation, is irrevocable, although it cannot take effect until 1836; – that is to say, until three years after the new and full representation would be in power. What Congress is this? It is the apportionment of 1820, formed on a population of ten millions. It is just going out of existence. A new Congress, apportioned upon a representation of thirteen millions, is already provided for by law; and after the 4th of March next – within nine months from this day – will be in power, and entitled to the seats in which we sit. That Congress will contain thirty members more than the present one. Three millions of people – a number equal to that which made the revolution – are now unrepresented, who will be then represented. The West alone – that section of the Union which suffers most from the depredations of the bank – loses twenty votes! In that section alone a million of people lose their voice in the decision of this great question. And why? What excuse? What necessity? What plea for this sudden haste which interrupts an unfinished investigation – sets aside the immediate business of the people – and usurps the rights of our successors? No plea in the world, except that a gigantic moneyed institution refuses to wait, and must have her imperial wishes immediately gratified. If a charter was to be granted, it should be done with as little invasion of the rights of posterity – with as little encroachment upon the privileges of our successors – as possible. Once in ten years, and that at the commencement of each full representation under a new census, would be the most appropriate time; and then charters should be for ten, and not twenty years.

"Mr. B. had nothing to do with motives. He neither preferred accusations, nor pronounced absolutions: but it was impossible to shut his eyes upon facts, and to close up his reason against the induction of inevitable inferences. The presidental election was at hand; – it would come in four months; – and here was a question which, in the opinion of all, must affect that election – in the opinion of some, may decide it – which is pressed on for decision four years before it is necessary to decide it, and six years before it ought to be decided. Why this sudden pressure? Is it to throw the bank bill into the hands of the President, to solve, by a practical reference, the disputed problem of the executive veto, and to place the President under a cross fire from the opposite banks of the Potomac River? He [Mr. B.] knew nothing about that veto, but he knew something of human nature, and something of the rights of the people under our representative form of government; and he would be free to say that a veto which would stop the encroachment of a minority of Congress upon the rights of its successors – which would arrest a frightful act of legislative usurpation – which would retrieve for the people the right of deliberation, and of action – which would arrest the overwhelming progress of a gigantic moneyed institution – which would prevent Ohio from being deprived of five votes, Indiana from losing four, Tennessee four, Illinois two, Alabama two, Kentucky, Mississippi and Missouri one each – which would lose six votes to New-York and two to Pennsylvania; a veto, in short, which would protect the rights of three millions of people, now unrepresented in Congress, would be an act of constitutional justice to the people, which ought to raise the President, and certainly would raise him, to a higher degree of favor in the estimation of every republican citizen of the community than he now enjoyed. By passing on the charter now, Congress would lose all check and control over the institution for the four years it had yet to run. The pendency of the question was a rod over its head for these four years; to decide the question now, is to free it from all restraint, and turn it loose to play what part it pleased in all our affairs – elections, State, federal, presidential.

"Mr. B. turned to the example of England, and begged the republican Senate of the United States to take a lesson from the monarchial parliament of Great Britain. We copied their evil ways; why not their good ones? We copied our bank charter from theirs; why not imitate them in their improvements upon their own work? At first the bank had a monopoly resulting from an exclusive privilege: that is now denied. Formerly the charter was renewed several years before it was out: it now has less than a year to run, and is not yet rechartered."

A motion was made by Mr. Moore of Alabama, declaratory of the right of the States to admit, or deny the establishment of branches of the mother bank within their limits, and to tax their loans and issues, if she chose to admit them: and in support of that motion Mr. Benton made this speech:

"The amendment offered by the senator from Alabama [Mr. Moore] was declaratory of the rights of the States, both to refuse admission of these branch banks into their limits, and to tax them, like other property, if admitted: if this amendment was struck out, it was tantamount to a legislative declaration that no such rights existed, and would operate as a confirmation of the decision of the Supreme Court to that effect. It is to no purpose to say that the rejection of the amendment will leave the charter silent upon the subject; and the rights of the States, whatsoever they may be, will remain in full force. That is the state of the existing charter. It is silent upon the subject of State taxation; and in that silence the Supreme Court has spoken, and nullified the rights of the States. That court has decided that the Bank of the United States is independent of State legislation! consequently, that she may send branches into the States in defiance of their laws, and keep them there without the payment of tax. This is the decision; and the decision of the court is the law of the land; so that, if no declaratory clause is put into the charter, it cannot be said that the new charter will be silent, as the old one was. The voice of the Supreme Court is now heard in that silence, proclaiming the supremacy of the bank, and the degradation of the States; and, unless we interpose now to countervail that voice by a legislative declaration, it will be impossible for the States to resit it, except by measures which no one wishes to contemplate.

"Mr. B. regretted that he had not seen in the papers any report of the argument of the senator from Virginia [Mr. Tazewell] in vindication of the right of the States to tax these branches. It was an argument brief, powerful, and conclusive – lucid as a sunbeam, direct as an arrow, and mortal as the stroke of fate to the adversary speakers. Since the delivery of that argument, they had sat in dumb show, silent as the grave, mute as the dead, and presenting to our imaginations the realization of the Abbé Sieyes's famous conception of a dumb legislature. Before the States surrendered a portion of their sovereignity to create this federal government, they possessed the unlimited power of taxation; in the act of the surrender, which is the constitution, they abridged this unlimited right but in two particulars – exports and imports – which they agreed no longer to tax, and therefore retained the taxing power entire over all other subjects. This was the substance of the argument which dumbfounded the adversary; and the distinction which was attempted to be set up between tangible and intangible, visible and invisible, objects of taxation; between franchises and privileges on one side, and material substances on the other, was so completely blasted and annihilated by one additional stroke of lightning, that the fathers of the distinction really believed that they had never made it! and sung their palinodes in the face of the House.

"The argument that these branches are necessary to enable the federal government to carry on its fiscal operations, and, therefore, ought to be independent of State legislation, is answered and expunged by a matter of fact, namely, that Congress itself has determined otherwise, and that in the very charter of the bank. The charter limits the right of the federal government to the establishment of a single branch, and that one in the District of Columbia! The branch at this place, and the parent bank at Philadelphia, are all that the federal government has stipulated for. All beyond that, is left to the bank itself; to establish branches in the States or not, as it suited its own interest; or to employ State banks, with the approbation of the Secretary of the Treasury, to do the business of the branches for the United States. Congress is contented with State banks to do the business of the branches in the States; and, therefore, authorizes the very case which gentlemen apprehend and so loudly deprecate, that New-York may refuse her assent to the continuance of the branches within her limits, and send the public deposits to the State banks. This is what the charter contemplates. Look at the charter; see the fourteenth article of the constitution of the bank; it makes it optionary with the directors of the bank to establish branches in such States as they shall think fit, with the alternative of using State banks as their substitutes in States in which they do not choose to establish branches. This brings the establishment of branches to a private affair, a mere question of profit and loss to the bank itself; and cuts up by the roots the whole argument of the necessity of these branches to the fiscal operations of the federal government. The establishment of branches in the States is, then, a private concern, and presents this question: Shall non-residents and aliens – even alien enemies, for such they may be – have a right to carry on the trade of banking within the limits of the States, without their consent, without liability to taxation, and without amenability to State legislation? The suggestion that the United States owns an interest in this bank, is of no avail. If she owned it all, it would still be subject to taxation, like all other property is which she holds in the States. The lands which she had obtained from individuals in satisfaction of debts, were all subject to taxation; the public lands which she held by grants from the States, or purchases from foreign powers, were only exempted from taxation by virtue of compacts, and the payment of five per centum on the proceeds of the sales for that exemption."

The motion of Mr. Moore was rejected, and by the usual majority.

Mr. Benton then moved to strike out so much of the bill as gave to the bank exclusive privileges, and to insert a provision making the stockholders liable for the debts of the institution; and in support of his motion quoted the case of the three Scottish banks which had no exclusive privilege, and in which the stockholders were liable, and the superior excellence of which over the Bank of England was admitted and declared by English statesmen. He said:

"The three Scottish banks had held each other in check, had proceeded moderately in all their operations, conducted their business regularly and prudently, and always kept themselves in a condition to face their creditors; while the single English bank, having no check from rival institutions, ran riot in the wantonness of its own unbridled power, deluging the country, when it pleased, with paper, and filling it with speculation and extravagance; drawing in again when it pleased, and filling it with bankruptcy and pauperism; often transcending its limits, and twice stopping payment, and once for a period of twenty years. There can be no question of the incomparable superiority of the Scottish banking system over the English banking system, even in a monarchy; and this has been officially announced to the Bank of England by the British ministry, as far back as the year 1826, with the authentic declaration that the English system of banking must be assimilated to the Scottish system, and that her exclusive privilege could never be renewed. This was done in a correspondence between the Earl of Liverpool, first Lord of the Treasury, and Mr. Robinson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on one side, and the Governor and Deputy Governor of the Bank of England on the other. In their letter of the 18th January, 1826, the two ministers, adverting to the fact of the stoppage of payment, and repeated convulsions of the Bank of England, while the Scottish banks had been wholly free from such calamities, declared their conviction that there existed an unsound and delusive system of banking in England, and a sound and solid system in Scotland! And they gave the official assurance of the British government, that neither His Majesty's ministers, nor parliament, would ever agree to renew the charter of the Bank of England with their exclusive privileges! Exclusive privileges, they said, were out of fashion! Nor is it renewed to this day, though the charter is within nine months of its expiration!

"In the peculiar excellence of the Scottish plan, lies a few plain and obvious principles, closely related to republican ideas. First. No exclusive privileges. Secondly. Three independent banks to check and control each other, and diffuse their benefits, instead of one to do as it pleased, and monopolize the moneyed power. Thirdly. The liability of each stockholder for the amount of his stock, on the failure of the bank to redeem its notes in specie. Fourthly. The payment of a moderate interest to depositors. Upon these few plain principles, all of them founded in republican notions, equal rights, and equal justice, the Scottish banks have advanced themselves to the first rank in Europe, have eclipsed the Bank of England, and caused it to be condemned in its own country, and have made themselves the model of all future banking institutions in Great Britain. And now, it would be a curious political phenomenon, and might give rise to some interesting speculations on the advance of free principles in England, and their decline in America, if the Scottish republican plan of banking should be rejected here, while preferred there; and the British monarchial plan, which is condemned there, should be perpetuated here! and this double incongruity committed without necessity, without excuse, without giving the people time to consider, and to communicate their sentiments to their constituents, when there is four, if not six years, for them to consider the subject before final decision is required!"

The clause for continuing the exclusive privilege of the bank, was warmly contested in the Senate, and arguments against it drawn from the nature of our government, as well as from the example of the British parliament, which had granted the monopoly to the Bank of England in her previous charters, and denied it on the last renewal. It owed its origin in England to the high tory times of Queen Anne, and its extinction to the liberal spirit of the present century. Mr. Benton was the chief speaker on this point; and —

"Pointed out the clauses in the charter which granted the exclusive privilege, and imposed the restriction, which it was the object of his motion to abolish; and read a part of the 21st section, which enacted that no other bank should be established by any future law of the United States, during the continuance of that charter, and which pledged the faith of the United States to the observance of the monopoly thereby created. He said the privilege of banking, here granted, was an exclusive privilege, a monopoly, and an invasion of the rights of all future Congresses, as well as of the rights of all citizens of the Union, for the term the charter had to run, and which might be considered perpetual; as this was the last time that the people could ever make head against the new political power which raised itself in the form of the bank to overbalance every other power in the government. This exclusive privilege is contrary to the genius of our government, which is a government of equal rights, and not of exclusive privileges; and it is clearly unauthorized by the constitution, which only admits of exclusive privileges in two solitary, specified cases, and each of these founded upon a natural right, the case of authors and inventors; to whom Congress is authorized to grant, for a limited time, the exclusive privilege of selling their own writings and discoveries. But in the case of this charter there is no natural right, and it may be well said there is no limited time; and the monopoly is far more glaring and indefensible now than when first granted; for then the charter was not granted to any particular set of individuals, but lay open to all to subscribe to it; but now it is to be continued to a particular set, and many of them foreigners, and all of whom, or their assignees, had already enjoyed the privilege for twenty years. If this company succeeds now in getting their monopoly continued for fifteen years, they will so intrench themselves in wealth and power, that they will be enabled to perpetuate their charter, and transmit it as a private inheritance to their posterity. Our government delights in rotation of office; all officers, from the highest to the lowest, are amenable to that principle; no one is suffered to remain in power thirty-five years; and why should one company have the command of the moneyed power of America for that long period? Can it be the wish of any person to establish an oligarchy with unbounded wealth and perpetual existence, to lay the foundation for a nobility and monarchy in this America!

"The restriction upon future Congresses is at war with every principle of constitutional right and legislative equality. If the constitution has given to one Congress the right to charter banks, it has given it to every one. If this Congress has a right to establish a bank, every other Congress has. The power to tie the hands of our successors is nowhere given to us; what we can do our successors can; a legislative body is always equal to itself. To make, and to amend; to do, and to undo; is the prerogative of each. But here the attempt is to do what we ourselves cannot amend – what our successors cannot amend – and what our successors are forbidden to imitate, or to do in any form. This shows the danger of assuming implied powers. If the power to establish a national bank had been expressly granted, then the exercise of that power, being once exerted, would be exhausted, and no further legislation would remain to be done; but this power is now assumed upon construction, after having been twice rejected, in the convention which framed the constitution, and is, therefore, without limitation as to number or character. Mr. Madison was express in his opinions in the year 1791, that, if there was one bank chartered, there ought to be several! The genius of the British monarchy, he said, favored the concentration of wealth and power. In America the genius of the government required the diffusion of wealth and power. The establishment of branches did not satisfy the principle of diffusion. Several independent banks alone could do it. The branches, instead of lessening the wealth and power of the single institution, greatly increased both, by giving to the great central parent bank an organization and ramification which pervaded the whole Union, drawing wealth from every part, and subjecting every part to the operations, political and pecuniary, of the central institution. But this restriction ties up the hands of Congress from granting other charters. Behave as it may – plunge into all elections – convulse the country with expansions and contractions of paper currency – fail in its ability to help the merchants to pay their bonds – stop payment, and leave the government no option but to receive its dishonored notes in revenue payments – and still it would be secure of its monopoly; the hands of all future Congresses would be tied up; and no rival or additional banks could be established, to hold it in check, or to supply its place.

"Is this the Congress to do these things? Is this the Congress to impose restrictions upon the power of their successors? Is this the Congress to tie the hands of all Congresses till the year 1851? In nine months this Congress is defunct! A new and full representation of the people will come into power. Thirty additional members will be in the House of Representatives; three millions of additional people will be represented. The renewed charter is not to take effect till three years after this full representation is in power! And are we to forestall and anticipate them? Take their proper business out of their hands – snatch the sceptre of legislation from them – do an act which we cannot amend – which they cannot amend – which is irrevocable and intangible; and, to crown this act of usurpation, deliberately set about tying the hands, and imposing a restriction upon a Congress equal to us in constitutional power, superior to us in representative numbers, and better entitled to act upon the subject, because the present charter is not to expire, nor the new one to take effect, until three years after the new Congress shall be in power! It is in vain to say that this reasoning would apply to other legislative measures, and require the postponement of the land bill and the tariff bill. Both these bills require immediate decision, and therein differ from the bank bill, which requires no decision for three years to come. But the difference is greater still; for the land bill and tariff bill are ordinary acts of legislation, open to amendment, or repeal, by ourselves and successors; but the charter is to be irrevocable, unamendable, binding upon all Congresses till the year 1851. This is rank usurpation; and if perpetrated by Congress, and afterwards arrested by an Executive veto, the President will become the true representative of the people, the faithful defender of their rights, and the defender of the rights of the new Congress which will assemble under the new census.

"Mr. B. concluded his remarks by showing the origin, and also the extinction, of the doctrine in England. A tory parliament in the reign of Queen Anne had first granted an exclusive privilege to the Bank of England, and imposed a restriction upon the right of future parliaments to establish another bank; and the ministry of 1826 had condemned this doctrine, and proscribed its continuance in England. The charter granted to the old Bank of the United States and to the existing bank had copied those obnoxious clauses; but now that they were condemned in England as too unjust and odious for that monarchial country, they ought certainly to be discarded in this republic, where equal rights was the vital principle and ruling feature of all our institutions."

All the amendments proposed by the opponents of the bank being inexorably voted down, after a debate which, with some cessations, continued from January to June, the final vote was taken, several senators first taking occasion to show they had no interest in the institution. Mr. Benton had seen the names of some members in the list of stockholders; and early in the debate had required that the rule of parliamentary law should be read; which excludes the interested member from voting, and expunges his vote if he does, and his interest is afterwards discovered. Mr. Dallas said that he had sold his stock in the institution as soon as it was known that the question of the recharter would come before him: Mr. Silsbee said that he had disposed of his interest before the question came before Congress: Mr. Webster said that the insertion of his name in the list of stockholders was a mistake in a clerk of the bank. The vote was then taken on the passage of the bill, and Stood: YEAS: Messrs. Bell, of New Hampshire; Buckner, of Missouri; Chambers, of Maryland; Clay, of Kentucky; Clayton, of Delaware; Dallas of Pennsylvania; Ewing, of Ohio; Foot, of Connecticut; Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey; Hendricks, of Indiana; Holmes, of Maine; Josiah S. Johnston, of Louisiana; Knight, of Rhode Island; Naudain, of Delaware; Poindexter, of Mississippi; Prentiss, of Vermont; Robbins, of Rhode Island; Robinson, of Illinois; Ruggles, of Ohio; Seymour, of Vermont; Silsbee, of Massachusetts; Smith (Gen. Samuel), of Maryland; Sprague, of Maine; Tipton, of Indiana; Tomlinson, of Connecticut; Waggaman, of Louisiana; Webster, of Massachusetts; and Wilkins, of Pennsylvania: 28. Nays: Messrs. Benton, of Missouri; Bibb, of Kentucky; Brown, of North Carolina; Dickerson, of New Jersey; Dudley, of New-York; Ellis, of Mississippi; Forsyth, of Georgia; Grundy, of Tennessee; Hayne, of South Carolina; Hill, of New Hampshire; Kane, of Illinois; King, of Alabama; Mangum, of North Carolina; Marcy, of New-York; Miller, of South Carolina; Moore, of Alabama; Tazewell, of Virginia; Troup, of Georgia; Tyler, of Virginia; Hugh L. White, of Tennessee: 20.

CHAPTER LXVII.

BANK OF THE UNITED STATES – BILL FOR THE RENEWED CHARTER PASSED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

The bill which had passed the Senate, after a long and arduous contest, quickly passed the House, with little or no contest at all. The session was near its end; members were wearied; the result foreseen by every body – that the bill would pass – the veto be applied – and the whole question of charter or no charter go before the people in the question of the presidential election. Some attempts were made by the adversaries of the bill to amend it, by offering amendments, similar to those which had been offered in the Senate; but with the same result in one House as in the other. They were all voted down by an inexorable majority; and it was evident that the contest was political, and relied upon by one party to bring them into power; and deprecated by the other as the flagrant prostitution of a great moneyed corporation to partisan and election purposes. The question was soon put; and decided by the following votes:

Yeas. – Messrs. Adams, C. Allan, H. Allen, Allison, Appleton, Armstrong, Arnold, Ashley, Babcock, Banks, N. Barber, J. S. Barbour, Barringer, Barstow, I. C. Bates, Briggs, Bucher, Bullard, Burd, Burges, Choate, Collier, L. Condict, S. Condit, E. Cooke, B. Cooke, Cooper, Corwin, Coulter, Craig, Crane, Crawford, Creighton, Daniel, J. Davis, Dearborn, Denny, Dewart, Doddridge, Drayton, Ellsworth, G. Evans, J. Evans, E. Everett, H. Everett, Ford, Gilmore, Grennell, Hodges, Heister, Horn, Hughes, Huntington, Ihrie, Ingersoll, Irvin, Isacks, Jenifer, Kendall, H. King, Kerr, Letcher, Mann, Marshall, Maxwell, McCoy, McDuffie, McKennan, Mercer, Milligan, Newton, Pearce, Pendleton, Pitcher, Potts, Randolph, J. Reed, Root, Russel, Semmes, W. B. Shepard, A. H. Shepperd, Slade, Smith, Southard, Spence, Stanberry, Stephens, Stewart, Storrs, Sutherland, Taylor, P. Thomas, Tompkins, Tracy, Vance, Verplanck, Vinton, Washington, Watmough, E. Whittlesey, F. Whittlesey, E. D. White, Wickliffe, Williams, Young – 106.

Nays. – Messrs. Adair, Alexander, Anderson, Archer, J. Bates, Beardsley, Bell, Bergen, Bethune, James Blair, John Blair, Bouck, Bouldin, Branch, Cambreleng, Carr, Chandler, Chinn, Claiborne, Clay, Clayton, Coke, Conner, W. R. Davis, Dayan, Doubleday, Felder, Fitzgerald, Foster, Gaither, Gordon, Griffin, T. H. Hall, W. Hall, Hammons, Harper, Hawes, Hawkins, Hoffman, Hogan, Holland, Howard, Hubbard, Jarvis, Cave Johnson, Kavanagh, Kennon, A. King, J. King, Lamar, Leavitt, Lecompte, Lewis, Lyon, Mardis, Mason, McCarty, McIntire, McKay, Mitchell, Newnan, Nuckolls, Patton, Pierson, Polk, E. C. Reed, Rencher, Roane, Soule, Speight, Standifer, F. Thomas, W. Thompson, J. Thomson, Ward, Wardwell, Wayne, Weeks, Wheeler, C. P. White, Wilde, Worthington. – 84.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

THE VETO

The act which had passed the two Houses for the renewal of the bank charter, was presented to the President on the 4th day of July, and returned by him to the House in which it originated, on the 10th, with his objections. His first objection was to the exclusive privileges which it granted to corporators who had already enjoyed them, the great value of these privileges, and the inadequacy of the sum to be paid for them. He said:

"Every monopoly, and all exclusive privileges, are granted at the expense of the public, which ought to receive a fair equivalent. The many millions which this act proposes to bestow on the stockholders of the existing bank, must come directly or indirectly out of the earnings of the American people. It is due to them, therefore, if their government sell monopolies and exclusive privileges, that they should at least exact for them as much as they are worth in open market. The value of the monopoly in this case may be correctly ascertained. The twenty-eight millions of stock would probably be at an advance of fifty per cent., and command, in market, at least forty-two millions of dollars, subject to the payment of the present loans. The present value of the monopoly, therefore, is seventeen millions of dollars, and this the act proposes to sell for three millions, payable in fifteen annual instalments of $200,000 each.

"It is not conceivable how the present stockholders can have any claim to the special favor of the government. The present corporation has enjoyed its monopoly during the period stipulated in the original contract. If we must have such a corporation, why should not the government sell out the whole stock, and thus secure to the people the full market value of the privileges granted? Why should not Congress create and sell the twenty-eight millions of stock, incorporating the purchasers with all the powers and privileges secured in this act, and putting the premium upon the sales into the treasury?

"But this act does not permit competition in the purchase of this monopoly. It seems to be predicated on the erroneous idea that the present stockholders have a prescriptive right, not only to the favor, but to the bounty of the government. It appears that more than a fourth part of the stock is held by foreigners, and the residue is held by a few hundred of our citizens, chiefly of the richest class. For their benefit does this act exclude the whole American people from competition in the purchase of this monopoly, and dispose of it for many millions less than it is worth. This seems the less excusable, because some of our citizens, not now stockholders, petitioned that the door of competition might be opened, and offered to take a charter on terms much more favorable to the government and country.

"But this proposition, although made by men whose aggregate wealth is believed to be equal to all the private stock in the existing bank, has been set aside, and the bounty of our government is proposed to be again bestowed on the few who have been fortunate enough to secure the stock, and at this moment wield the power of the existing institution. I cannot perceive the justice or policy of this course. If our government must sell monopolies, it would seem to be its duty to take nothing less than their full value; and if gratuities must be made once in fifteen or twenty years, let them not be bestowed on the subjects of a foreign government, nor upon a designated or favored class of men in our own country. It is but justice and good policy, as far as the nature of the case will admit, to confine our favors to our own fellow-citizens, and let each in his turn enjoy an opportunity to profit by our bounty. In the bearings of the act before me upon these points, I find ample reasons why it should not become a law."

The President objected to the constitutionality of the bank, and argued against the force of precedents in this case, and against the applicability and the decision of the Supreme Court in its favor. That decision was in the case of the Maryland branch, and sustained it upon an argument which carries error, in point of fact, upon its face. The ground of the decision was, that the bank was "necessary" to the successful conducting of the "fiscal operations" of the government; and that Congress was the judge of that necessity. Upon this ground the Maryland branch, and every branch except the one in the District of Columbia, was without the constitutional warrant which the court required. Congress had given no judgment in favor of its necessity – but the contrary – a judgment against it: for after providing for the mother bank at Philadelphia, and one branch at Washington City, the establishment of all other branches was referred to the judgment of the bank itself, or to circumstances over which Congress had no control, as the request of a State legislature founded upon a subscription of 2000 shares within the State – with a dispensation in favor of substituting local banks in places where the Secretary of the Treasury, and the directors of the national bank should agree. All this was contained in the fourteenth fundamental article of the constitution of the corporation – which says:

"The directors of said corporation shall establish a competent office of discount and deposit in the District of Columbia, whenever any law of the United States shall require such an establishment: also one such office of discount and deposit in any State in which two thousand shares shall have been subscribed or may be held, whenever, upon application of the legislature of such State, Congress may, by law, require the same: Provided, the directors aforesaid shall not be bound to establish such office before the whole of the capital of the bank shall be paid up. And it shall be lawful for the directors of the corporation to establish offices of discount and deposit where they think fit, within the United States or the territories thereof, and to commit the management of the said, and the business thereof, respectively to such persons, and under such regulations, as they shall deem proper, not being contrary to the laws or the constitution of the bank. Or, instead of establishing such offices, it shall be lawful for the directors of the said corporation, from time to time, to employ any other bank or banks, to be first approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, at any place or places that they may deem safe and proper, to manage and transact the business proposed aforesaid, other than for the purposes of discount; to be managed and transacted by such offices, under such agreements, and subject to such regulations as they shall deem just and proper."

These are the words of the fourteenth fundamental article of the constitution of the bank, and the conduct of the corporation in establishing its branches was in accordance with this article. They placed them where they pleased – at first, governed wholly by the question of profit and loss to itself – afterwards, and when it was seen that the renewed charter was to be resisted by the members from some States, governed by the political consideration of creating an interest to defeat the election, or control the action of the dissenting members. Thus it was in my own case. A branch in St. Louis was refused to the application of the business community – established afterwards to govern me. And thus, it is seen the Supreme Court was in error – that the judgment of Congress in favor of the "necessity" of branches only extended to one in the District of Columbia; and as for the bank itself, the argument in its favor and upon which the Supreme Court made its decision, was an argument which made the constitutionality of a measure dependent, not upon the words of the constitution, but upon the opinion of Congress for the time being upon the question of the "necessity" of a particular measure – a question subject to receive different decisions from Congress at different times – which actually received different decisions in 1791, 1811, and 1816: and, we may now add the decision of experience since 1836 – during which term we have had no national bank; and the fiscal business of the government, as well as the commercial and trading business of the country, has been carried on with a degree of success never equalled in the time of the existence of the national bank. I, therefore, believe that the President was well warranted in challenging both the validity of the decision of the Supreme Court, and the obligatory force of precedents: which he did, as follows:

"It is maintained by the advocates of the bank, that its constitutionality, in all its features, ought to be considered as settled by precedent, and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I cannot assent. Mere precedence is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power, except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress, in 1791, decided in favor of a bank; another, in 1811, decided against it. One Congress, in 1815, decided against a bank; another, in 1816, decided in its favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the precedents drawn from that source were equal. If we report to the States, the expressions of legislative, judicial, and executive opinions against the bank have been, probably, to those in its favor, as four to one. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me.

"If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the co-ordinate authorities of this government. The Congress, the Executive, and the court, must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the constitution, swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President, to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval, as it is of the supreme judges, when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges; and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress, or the Executive, when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.

"But in the case relied upon, the Supreme Court have not decided that all the features of this corporation are compatible with the constitution. It is true that the court have said that the law incorporating the bank is a constitutional exercise of power by Congress. But taking into view the whole opinion of the court, and the reasoning by which they have come to that conclusion, I understand them to have decided that, inasmuch as a bank is an appropriate means for carrying into effect the enumerated powers of the general government, therefore the law incorporating it is in accordance with that provision of the constitution which declares that Congress shall have power 'to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying those powers into execution.' Having satisfied themselves that the word 'necessary,' in the constitution, means 'needful,' 'requisite,' 'essential,' 'conducive to,' and that 'a bank' is a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument in the prosecution of the government's 'fiscal operations,' they conclude that to 'use one must be within the discretion of Congress;' and that 'the act to incorporate the Bank of the United States, is a law made in pursuance of the constitution.' 'But,' say they, 'where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground.'

"The principle, here affirmed, is, that the 'degree of its necessity,' involving all the details of a banking institution, is a question exclusively for legislative consideration. A bank is constitutional; but it is the province of the legislature to determine whether this or that particular power, privilege, or exemption, is 'necessary and proper' to enable the bank to discharge its duties to the government; and from their decision there is no appeal to the courts of justice. Under the decision of the Supreme Court, therefore, it is the exclusive province of Congress and the President to decide whether the particular features of this act are 'necessary and proper,' in order to enable the bank to perform, conveniently and efficiently, the public duties assigned to it as a fiscal agent, and therefore constitutional; or unnecessary and improper, and therefore unconstitutional."

With regard to the misconduct of the institution, both in conducting its business and in resisting investigation, the message spoke the general sentiment of the disinterested country when it said:

"Suspicions are entertained, and charges are made, of gross abuses and violations of its charter. An investigation unwillingly conceded, and so restricted in time as necessarily to make it incomplete and unsatisfactory, discloses enough to excite suspicion and alarm. In the practices of the principal bank, partially unveiled in the absence of important witnesses, and in numerous charges confidently made, and as yet wholly uninvestigated, there was enough to induce a majority of the committee of investigation, a committee which was selected from the most able and honorable members of the House of Representatives, to recommend a suspension of further action upon the bill, and a prosecution of the inquiry. As the charter had yet four years to run, and as a renewal now was not necessary to the successful prosecution of its business, it was to have been expected that the bank itself, conscious of its purity, and proud of its character, would have withdrawn its application for the present, and demanded the severest scrutiny into all its transactions. In their declining to do so, there seems to be an additional reason why the functionaries of the government should proceed with less haste, and more caution, in the renewal of their monopoly."

The appearance of the veto message was the signal for the delivery of the great speeches of the advocates of the bank. Thus far they had held back, refraining from general debate, and limiting themselves to brief answers to current objections. Now they came forth in all their strength, in speeches elaborate and studied, and covering the whole ground of constitutionality and expediency; and delivered with unusual warmth and vehemence. Mr. Webster, Mr. Clay, Mr. Clayton of Delaware, and Mr. Ewing of Ohio, thus entered the lists for the bank. And why these speeches, at this time, when it was certain that speaking would have no effect in overcoming the veto – that the constitutional majority of two thirds of each House to carry it, so far from being attainable, would but little exceed a bare majority? The reason was told by the speakers themselves – fully told, as an appeal to the people – as a transfer of the question to the political arena – to the election fields, and especially to the presidential election, then impending, and within four months of its consummation – and a refusal on the part of the corporation to submit to the decision of the constituted authorities. This was plainly told by Mr. Webster in the opening of his argument; frightful distress was predicted: and the change of the chief magistrate was presented as the only means of averting an immense calamity on one hand, or of securing an immense benefit on the other. He said:

"It is now certain that, without a change in our public councils, this bank will not be continued, nor will any other be established, which, according to the general sense and language of mankind, can be entitled to the name. In three years and nine months from the present moment, the charter of the bank expires; within that period, therefore, it must wind up its concerns. It must call in its debts, withdraw its bills from circulation, and cease from all its ordinary operations. All this is to be done in three years and nine months; because, although there is a provision in the charter rendering it lawful to use the corporate name for two years after the expiration of the charter, yet this is allowed only for the purpose of suits, and for the sale of the estate belonging to the bank, and for no other purpose whatever. The whole active business of the bank, its custody of public deposits, its transfers of public moneys, its dealing in exchange, all its loans and discounts, and all its issues of bills for circulation, must cease and determine on or before the 3d day of March, 1836; and, within the same period, its debts must be collected, as no new contract can be made with it, as a corporation, for the renewal of loans, or discount of notes or bills, after that time."

Mr. Senator White of Tennessee, seizing upon this open entrance into the political arena by the bank, thanked Mr. Webster for his candor, and summoned the people to the combat of the great moneyed power, now openly at the head of a great political party, and carrying the fortunes of that party in the question of its own continued existence. He said:

"I thank the senator for the candid avowal that unless the President will sign such a charter as will suit the directors, they intend to interfere in the election, and endeavor to displace him. With the same candor I state that, after this declaration, this charter shall never be renewed with my consent.

"Let us look at this matter as it is. Immediately before the election, the directors apply for a charter, which they think the President at any other time will not sign, for the express purpose of compelling him to sign contrary to his judgment, or of encountering all their hostility in the canvass, and at the polls. Suppose this attempt to have succeeded, and the President, through fear of his election, had signed this charter, although he conscientiously believes it will be destructive of the liberty of the people who have elected him to preside over them, and preserve their liberties, so far as in his power. What next? Why, whenever the charter is likely to expire hereafter, they will come, as they do now, on the eve of the election, and compel the chief magistrate to sign such a charter as they may dictate, on pain of being turned out and disgraced. Would it not be far better to gratify this moneyed aristocracy, to the whole extent at once, and renew their charter for ever? The temptation to a periodical interference in our elections would then be taken away.

"Sir, if, under these circumstances, the charter is renewed, the elective franchise is destroyed, and the liberties and prosperity of the people are delivered over to this moneyed institution, to be disposed of at their discretion. Against this I enter my solemn protest."

The distress to be brought upon the country by the sudden winding up of the bank, the sudden calling in of all its debts, the sudden withdrawal of all its capital, was pathetically dwelt upon by all the speakers, and the alarming picture thus presented by Mr. Clayton:

"I ask, what is to be done for the country? All thinking men must now admit that, as the present bank must close its concerns in less than four years, the pecuniary distress, the commercial embarrassments, consequent upon its destruction, must exceed any thing which has ever been known in our history, unless some other bank can be established to relieve us. Eight and a half millions of the bank capital, belonging to foreigners, must be drawn from us to Europe. Seven millions of the capital must be paid to the government, not to be loaned again, but to remain, as the President proposes, deposited in a branch of the treasury, to check the issues of the local banks. The immense available resources of the present institution, amounting, as appears by the report in the other House, to $82,057,483, are to be used for banking no longer, and nearly fifty millions of dollars in notes discounted, on personal and other security, must be paid to the bank. The State banks must pay over all their debts to the expiring institution, and curtail their discounts to do so, or resort, for the relief of their debtors, to the old plan of emitting more paper, to be bought up by speculators at a heavy discount."

This was an alarming picture to present, and especially as the corporation had it in its power to create the distress which it foretold – a consummation frightfully realized three years later – but a picture equally unjustifiable and gratuitous. Two years was the extent of the time, after the expiration of its charter, that the corporation had accepted in its charter for winding up its business; and there were now four years to run before these two years would commence. The section 21, of the charter, provided for the contingency thus:

"And notwithstanding the expiration of the term for which the said corporation is created, it shall be lawful to use the corporate name, style and capacity, for the purpose of suits for the final settlement and liquidation of the affairs and accounts of the corporation, and for the sale and disposition of their estate real, personal and mixed: but not for any other purpose, or in any other manner whatever, nor for a period exceeding two years after the expiration of said term of incorporation."