Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

The act was passed soon after this masterly report was made, followed by similar acts in most of the States; and has been attended every where with the beneficial effect resulting from the suppression of any false and vicious principle in legislation. It is a false and vicious principle in the system of credit to admit a calculation for the chance of payment, founded on the sympathy and alarms of third parties, or on the degradation and incarceration of the debtor himself. Such a principle is morally wrong, and practically unjust; and there is no excuse for it in the plea of fraud. The idea of fraud does not enter into the contract at its original formation; and if occurring afterwards, and the debtor undertakes to defraud his creditor, there is a code of law made for the case; and every case should rest upon its own circumstances. As an element of credit, imprisonment for debt is condemned by morality, by humanity, and by the science of political economy; and its abolition has worked well in reducing the elements of credit to their legitimate derivation in the personal character, visible means, and present securities of the contracting debtor. And, if in that way, it has diminished in any degree the wide circle of credit, that is an additional advantage gained to the good order of society and to the solidity of the social edifice. And thus, as in so many other instances, American legislation has ameliorated the law derived from our English ancestors, and given an example which British legislation may some day follow. – In addition to the honor of seeing this humane act passed during his administration, General Jackson had the further and higher honor of having twice recommended it to the favorable consideration of Congress.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

SALE OF UNITED STATES STOCK IN THE NATIONAL BANK

The President in his annual message had recommended the sale of this stock, and all other stock held by the United States in corporate companies, with the view to disconnecting the government from such corporations, and from all pursuits properly belonging to individuals. And he made the recommendation upon the political principle which condemns the partnership of the government with a corporation; and upon the economical principle which condemns the national pursuit of any branch of industry and leaves the profit, or loss of all such pursuits to individual enterprise; and upon the belief, in this instance, that the partnership was unsafe – that the firm would fail – and the stockholders lose their investment. In conformity to this recommendation, a bill was brought into the House of Representatives to sell the public stock held in the Bank of the United States, being seven millions of dollars in amount, and consisting of a national stock bearing five per centum interest. The bill was met at the threshold by the parliamentary motion which implies the unworthiness of the subject to be considered; namely, the motion to reject the bill at the first reading. That reading is never for consideration, but for information only; and, although debatable, carries the implication of unfitness for debate, and of some flagrant enormity which requires rejection, without the honor of the usual forms of legislation. That motion was made by a friend of the bank, and seconded by the member (Mr. Watmough) supposed to be familiar with the wishes of the bank directory. The speakers on each side gave vent to expressions which showed that they felt the indignity that was offered to the bill, one side in promoting – the other in opposing the motion. Mr. Wickliffe, the mover, said: "He was impelled, by a sense of duty to his constituents and to his country, to do in this case, what he had never done before – to move the rejection of a bill at its first reading. There are cases in which courtesy should yield to the demands of justice and public duty; and this, in my humble opinion, is one of them. It is a bill fraught with ruin to all private interests, except the interest of the stockjobbers of Wall-street." Mr. Watmough expressed his indignation and amazement at the appearance of such a bill, and even fell upon the committee which reported it with so much personality as drew a call to order from the Speaker of the House. "He expressed his sincere regret at the necessity which compelled him to intrude upon the House, and to express his opinion on the bill, and his indignation against this persecution of a national institution. He was at a loss to say which feeling predominated in his bosom – amazement, at the want of financial skill in the supporters of the bill – or detestation of the unrelenting spirit of the administration persecution on that floor of an institution admitted by the wisest and the best men of the times to be absolutely essential to the existence and safety of this Union, and almost to that of the constitution itself which formed its basis. He said, he was amazed that such a bill, at such a crisis, could emanate from any committee of this House; but his amazement was diminished when he recalled to mind the source from which it came. It came from the Committee of Ways and Means, and was under the parental care of the gentleman from Tennessee. Need he say more?"

Now, the member thus referred to, and who, after being pointed out as the guardian of the bill required nothing more to be said, was Mr. Polk, afterwards President of the United States. But parliamentary law is no respecter of persons, and would consider the indecorum and outrage of the allusion equally reprehensible in the case of the youngest and least considerable member; and the language is noted here to show the indignities to which members were subjected in the House for presuming to take any step concerning the bank which militated against that corporation. The sale of the government stock was no injury to the capital of the bank: it was no extinction of seven millions of capital but a mere transfer of that amount to private stockholders – such transfer as took place daily among the private stockholders. The only injury could be to the market price of the stock in the possible decline involved in the withdrawal of a large stockholder; but that was a damage, in the eye of the law and of morality, without injury; that is, without injustice – the stockholder having a right to do so without the assignment of reasons to be judged of by the corporation; and consequently a right to sell out and withdraw when he judged his money to be unsafe, or unprofitably placed, and susceptible of a better investment.

Mr. Polk remarked upon the unusual but not unexpected opposition to the bill; and said if the House was now forced to a decision, it would be done without opportunity for deliberation. He vindicated the bill from any necessary connection with the bank – with its eulogy or censure. This eulogy or censure had no necessary connection with a proposition to sell the government stock. It was a plain business proceeding. The bill authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to sell the stock upon such terms as he should deem best for the government. It was an isolated proposition. It proposed to disenthral the government from a partnership with this incorporated company. It proposed to get rid of the interest which the government had in this moneyed monopoly; and to do so by a sale of the government stocks, and on terms not below the market price. He was not disposed to depreciate the value of the article which he wished to sell. He was willing to rest upon the right to sell. The friends of the bank themselves raised the question of solvency, it would seem, that they might have an opportunity, to eulogize the institution under the forms of a defence. This was not the time for such a discussion – for an inquiry into the conduct and condition of the bank.

The argument and the right were with the supporters of the bill; but they signified nothing against the firm majority, which not only stood by the corporation in its trials, but supported it in its wishes. The bill was immediately rejected, and by a summary process which inflicted a new indignity. It was voted down under the operation of the "previous question," which, cutting off all debate, and all amendments, consigns a measure to instant and silent decision – like the "mort sans phrase" (death without talk) of the Abbé Sièyes, at the condemnation of Louis the Sixteenth. But the vote was not very triumphant – one of the leanest majorities, in fact, which the bank had received: one hundred and two to ninety-one.

The negative votes were:

"Messrs. Adair, Alexander, R. Allen, Anderson, Angel, Archer, Barnwell, James Bates, Beardsley Bell, Bergen, Bethune, James Blair, John Blair, Boon, Bouck, Bouldin, John Brodhead, John C. Brodhead, Cambreleng, Chandler, Chinn, Claiborne, Clay, Clayton, Coke, Connor, Davenport, Dayan, Doubleday, Draper, Felder, Ford, Foster, Gaither, Gilmore, Gordon, Griffin, Thomas H. Hall, William Hall, Harper, Hawkins, Hoffman, Holland, Horn, Howard, Hubbard, Isacks, Jarvis, Jewett, Richard M. Johnson, Cave Johnson, Kavanagh, Kennon, Adam King, John King, Lamar, Lansing, Leavitt, Lecompte, Lewis, Lyon, Mann, Mardis, Mason, McCarty, Wm. McCoy, McIntire, McKay, Mitchell, Newnan, Nuckolls, Patton, Pierson, Plummer, Polk, Edward C. Reed, Roane, Soule, Speight, Standifer, John Thompson, Verplanck, Ward, Wardwell, Wayne, Weeks, Campbell, P. White, Worthington. – 91."

Such was the result of this attempt, on the part of the government, to exercise the most ordinary right of a stockholder to sell its shares: opposed, insulted, defeated; and by the power of the bank in Congress, of whose members subsequent investigations showed above fifty to be borrowers from the institution; and many to be on the list of its retained attorneys. But this was not the first time the government had been so treated. The same thing had happened once before, and about in the same way; but without the same excuse of persecution and enmity to the corporation; for, it was before the time of General Jackson's Presidency; to wit, in the year 1827, and under the Presidency of Mr. Quincy Adams. Mr. Philip P. Barbour, representative from Virginia, moved an inquiry, at that time, into the expediency of selling the United States stock in the bank: the consideration of the resolution was delayed a week, the time necessary for a communication with Philadelphia. At the end of the week, the resolution was taken up, and summarily rejected. Mr. Barbour had placed his proposition wholly upon the ground of a public advantage in selling its stock, unconnected with any reason disparaging to the bank, and in a way to avoid, as he believed, any opposition. He said:

"The House were aware that the government holds, at this time, stock of the Bank of the United States, to the amount of seven millions of dollars, which stock was at present worth in market about twenty-three and one half per cent. advance above its par value. If the whole of this stock should now be sold by the government, it would net a profit of one million and six hundred thousand dollars above the nominal amount of the stock. Such being the case, he thought it deserved the serious consideration of the House, whether it would not be a prudent and proper measure now to sell out that stock. It had been said, Mr. B. observed, by one of the best writers on political economy, with whom he was acquainted, that the pecuniary affairs of nations bore a close analogy to those of private households: in both, their prosperity mainly depended on a vigilant and effective management of their resources. There is, said Mr. B., an amount of between seventeen and eighteen millions of the stock of the United States now redeemable, and an amount of nine millions more, which will be redeemable next year. If the interest paid by the United States on this debt is compared with the dividend it receives on its stock in the Bank of the United States, it will be found that a small advantage would be gained by the sale of the latter, in this respect; since the dividends on bank stock are received semi-annually, while the interest of the United States' securities is paid quarterly; this, however, he waived as a matter of comparatively small moment. It must be obvious, he said, that the addition of one million six hundred thousand dollars to the available funds of the United States will produce the extinguishment of an equivalent amount of the public debt, and consequently relieve the interest payable thereon, by which a saving would accrue of about one hundred thousand dollars per annum."

This was what Mr. Barbour said, at the time of offering the resolution. When it came up for consideration, a week after, he found his motion not only opposed, but his motives impeached, and the most sinister designs imputed to himself – to him! a Virginian country gentleman, honest and modest; ignorant of all indirection; upright and open; a stranger to all guile; and with the simplicity and integrity of a child. He deeply felt this impeachment of motives, certainly the first time in his life that an indecent imputation had ever fallen upon him; and he feelingly deprecated the intensity of the outrage. He said:

"We shall have fallen on evil times, indeed, if a member of this House might not, in the integrity of his heart, rise in his place, and offer for consideration a measure which he believed to be for the public weal, without having all that he said and did imputed to some hidden motive, and referred to some secret purpose which was never presented to the public eye."

His proposition was put to the vote, and received eight votes besides his own. They were: Messrs. Mark Alexander, John Floyd, John Roane, and himself, from Virginia; Thomas H. Hall, and Daniel Turner, of North Carolina; Tomlinson Foot of Connecticut; Joseph Lecompte, and Henry Daniel, of Kentucky. And this was the result of that first attempt to sell the United States stock in a bank chartered by itself and bearing its name. And now, why resuscitate these buried recollections? I answer: for the benefit of posterity! that they may have the benefit of our experience without the humiliation of having undergone it, and know what kind of a master seeks to rule over them if another national bank shall ever seek incorporation at their hands.

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

NULLIFICATION ORDINANCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA

It has been seen that the whole question of the American system, and especially its prominent feature of a high protective tariff, was put in issue in the presidential canvass of 1832; and that the long session of Congress of that year was occupied by the friends of this system in bringing forward to the best advantage all its points, and staking its fate upon the issue of the election. That issue was against the system; and the Congress elections taking place contemporaneously with the presidential were of the same character. The fate of the American system was sealed. Its domination in federal legislation was to cease. This was acknowledged on all hands; and it was naturally expected that all the States, dissatisfied with that system, would be satisfied with the view of its speedy and regular extinction, under the legislation of the approaching session of Congress; and that expectation was only disappointed in a single State – that of South Carolina. She had held aloof from the presidential election – throwing away her vote upon citizens who were not candidates – and doing nothing to aid the election of General Jackson, with whose success her interests and wishes were apparently identified. Instead of quieting her apprehensions, and moderating her passion for violent remedies, the success of the election seemed to inflame them; and the 24th of November, just a fortnight after the election which decided the fate of the tariff, she issued her ordinance of nullification against it, taking into her own hands the sudden and violent redress which she prescribed for herself. That ordinance makes an era in the history of our Union, which requires to be studied in order to understand the events of the times, and the history of subsequent events. It was in these words:

"ORDINANCE

"An ordinance to nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws laying duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities.

"Whereas the Congress of the United States, by various acts, purporting to be acts laying duties and imposts on foreign imports, but in reality intended for the protection of domestic manufactures, and the giving of bounties to classes and individuals engaged in particular employments, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of other classes and individuals, and by wholly exempting from taxation certain foreign commodities, such as are not produced or manufactured in the United States, to afford a pretext for imposing higher and excessive duties on articles similar to those intended to be protected, hath exceeded its just powers under the constitution, which confers on it no authority to afford such protection, and hath violated the true meaning and intent of the constitution, which provides for equality in imposing the burdens of taxation upon the several States and portions of the confederacy: And whereas the said Congress, exceeding its just power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose of effecting and accomplishing the specific objects and purposes which the constitution of the United States authorizes it to effect and accomplish, hath raised and collected unnecessary revenue for objects unauthorized by the constitution.

"We, therefore, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and, more especially, an act entitled 'An act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the nineteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight, and also an act entitled 'An act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports,' approved on the fourteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, are unauthorized by the constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens; and all promises, contracts, and obligations, made or entered into, or to be made or entered into, with purpose to secure the duties imposed by the said acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall be hereafter had in affirmance thereof, are and shall be held utterly null and void.

"And it is further ordained, that it shall not be lawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said acts within the limits of this State; but it shall be the duty of the legislature to adopt such measures and pass such acts as may be necessary to give full effect to this ordinance, and to prevent the enforcement and arrest the operation of the said acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States within the limits of this State, from and after the 1st day of February next, and the duty of all other constituted authorities, and of all persons residing or being within the limits of this State, and they are hereby required and enjoined to obey and give effect to this ordinance, and such acts and measures of the legislature as may be passed or adopted in obedience thereto.

"And it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of this State, wherein shall be drawn in question the authority of this ordinance, or the validity of such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed for the purpose of giving effect thereto, or the validity of the aforesaid acts of Congress, imposing duties, shall any appeal be taken or allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose; and if any such appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the courts of this State shall proceed to execute and enforce their judgments, according to the laws and usages of the State, without reference to such attempted appeal, and the person or persons attempting to take such appeal may be dealt with as for a contempt of the court.

"And it is further ordained, that all persons now holding any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military, under this State (members of the legislature excepted), shall, within such time, and in such manner as the legislature shall prescribe, take an oath well and truly to obey, execute, and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed in pursuance thereof, according to the true intent and meaning of the same; and on the neglect or omission of any such person or persons so to do, his or their office or offices shall be forthwith vacated, and shall be filled up as if such person or persons were dead or had resigned; and no person hereafter elected to any office of honor, profit, or trust, civil or military (members of the legislature excepted), shall, until the legislature shall otherwise provide and direct, enter on the execution of his office, or be in any respect competent to discharge the duties thereof, until he shall, in like manner, have taken a similar oath; and no juror shall be empannelled in any of the courts of this State, in any cause in which shall be in question this ordinance, or any act of the legislature passed in pursuance thereof, unless he shall first, in addition to the usual oath, have taken an oath that he will well and truly obey, execute, and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed to carry the same into operation and effect, according to the true intent and meaning thereof.

"And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end that it may be fully understood by the government of the United States, and the people of the co-States, that we are determined to maintain this our ordinance and declaration, at every hazard, do further declare that we will not submit to the application of force, on the part of the federal government, to reduce this State to obedience; but that we will consider the passage, by Congress, of any act authorizing the employment of a military or naval force against the State of South Carolina, her constitutional authorities or citizens; or any act abolishing or closing the ports of this State, or any of them, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress and egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act on the part of the federal government, to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the acts hereby declared to be null and void, otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of this State wilt thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do.

"Done in convention at Columbia, the twenty-fourth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty-two, and in the fifty-seventh year of the declaration of the independence of the United States of America."

This ordinance placed the State in the attitude of open, forcible resistance to the laws of the United States, to take effect on the first day of February next ensuing – a period within which it was hardly possible for the existing Congress, even if so disposed, to ameliorate obnoxious laws; and a period a month earlier than the commencement of the legal existence of the new Congress, on which all reliance was placed. And, in the mean time, if any attempt should be made in any way to enforce the obnoxious laws except through her own tribunals sworn against them, the fact of such attempt was to terminate the continuance of South Carolina in the Union – to absolve her from all connection with the federal government – and to establish her as a separate government, not only unconnected with the United States, but unconnected with any one State. This ordinance, signed by more than a hundred citizens of the greatest respectability, was officially communicated to the President of the United States; and a case presented to him to test his patriotism, his courage, and his fidelity to his inauguration oath – an oath taken in the presence of God and man, of Heaven and earth, "to take care that the laws of the Union were faithfully executed." That President was Jackson; and the event soon proved, what in fact no one doubted, that he was not false to his duty, his country, and his oath. Without calling on Congress for extraordinary powers, he merely adverted in his annual message to the attitude of the State, and proceeded to meet the exigency by the exercise of the powers he already possessed.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

PROCLAMATION AGAINST NULLIFICATION

The ordinance of nullification reached President Jackson in the first days of December, and on the tenth of that month the proclamation was issued, of which the following are the essential and leading parts:

"Whereas a convention assembled in the State of South Carolina have passed an ordinance, by which they declare 'that the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within the United States, and more especially' two acts for the same purposes, passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, 'are unauthorized by the constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law,' nor binding on the citizens of that State, or its officers: and by the said ordinance, it is further declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the State or of the United States to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the same State, and that it is the duty of the legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinance:

"And whereas, by the said ordinance, it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity decided in the courts of said State, wherein shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that purpose, and that any person attempting to take such appeal shall be punished as for a contempt of court:

"And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they will consider the passage of any act, by Congress, abolishing or closing the ports of the said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the federal government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of the said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent States may of right do:

"And whereas the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union – that Union which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence – that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy constitution, has brought us, by the favor of Heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equalled in the history of nations: To preserve this bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow-citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this my proclamation, stating my views of the constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the convention.

"Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be, invested, for preserving the peace of the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of the United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that any thing will be yielded to reasoning and remonstrance, perhaps demanded, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.

"The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional and too oppressive to be endured, but on the strange position that any one State may not only declare an act of Congress void, but prohibit its execution; that they may do this consistently with the constitution; that the true construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as constitutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the constitution; but it is evident, that to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For as, by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why it is not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an unconstitutional act passed by Congress – one to the judiciary, the other to the people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision in theory, and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is superfluous, when our social compact, in express terms, declares that the laws of the United States, its constitution, and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land; and, for greater caution, adds 'that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' And it may be asserted without fear of refutation, that no federative government could exist without a similar provision. Look for a moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected any where; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat, that an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal.

"If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunately none of those States discovered that they had the right now claimed by South Carolina. The war, into which we were forced to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace, instead of victory and honor, if the States who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our constitution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that State will unfortunately fall the evils of reducing it to practice.

"If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation had it been proposed to form a feature in our government.

"In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other. Leagues were formed for common defence, and, before the declaration of independence, we were known in our aggregate character as the United Colonies of America. That decisive and important step was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts, and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would collectively form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming that Union is found an article which declares that 'every State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions which, by that confederation, should be submitted to them.'

"Under the confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.

"But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither prosperity at home, nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy constitution was formed, but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevail. It was formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is 'to form a more perfect Union.' Now, is it possible that even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the constitution and laws of the United States over those of the States – can it be conceived that an instrument made for the purpose of 'forming a more perfect Union' than that of the confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our country, as to substitute for that confederation a form of government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man of plain, unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.

"The constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States, and that such laws, the constitution and treaties shall be paramount to the State constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the case may be brought before a court of the United States: by appeal, when a State tribunal shall decide against this provision of the constitution. The ordinance declares there shall be no appeal; makes the State law paramount to the constitution and laws of the United States; forces judges and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions; and even makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United States, or of that State, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the revenue laws within its limits.

"Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be unconstitutional, repealed by the authority of a small majority of the voters of a single State. Here is a provision of the constitution which is solemnly abrogated by the same authority.

"On such expositions and reasonings, the ordinance grounds not only an assertion of the right to annul the laws of which it complains, but to enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt is made to execute them.

"This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the constitution, which, they say, is a compact between sovereign States, who have preserved their whole sovereignty, and, therefore, are subject to no superior; that, because they made the compact, they can break it when, in their opinion, it has been departed from, by the other States. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists State pride, and finds advocates in the honest prejudices of those who have not studied the nature of our government sufficiently to see the radical error on which it rests.

"The people of the United States formed the constitution, acting through the State legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they ratified those provisions; but, the terms used in its construction show it to be a government in which the people of all the States collectively are represented. We are one people in the choice of the President and Vice-President. Here the States have no other agency than to direct the mode in which the votes shall be given. Candidates having the majority of all the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of States may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The people, then, and not the States, are represented in the executive branch.

"In the House of Representatives, there is this difference: that the people of one State do not, as in the case of President and Vice-President, all vote for the same officers. The people of all the States do not vote for all the members, each State electing only its own representatives. But this creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are all representatives of the United States, not representatives of the particular State from which they come. They are paid by the United States, not by the State, nor are they accountable to it for any act done in the performance of their legislative functions; and however they may in practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of their particular constituents, when they come in conflict with any other partial or local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as representatives of the United States, to promote the general good.

"The constitution of the United States, then, forms a government, not a league; and whether it be formed by compact between the States, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States – they retained all the power they did not grant. But each State, having expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute, jointly with the other States, a single nation, cannot, from that period, possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation; because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connection with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of oppression; but, to call it a constitutional right, is confounding the meaning of terms; and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure.

"Fellow-citizens of my native State, let me not only admonish you, as the First Magistrate of our common country, not to incur the penalty of its laws, but use the influence that a father would over his children whom he saw rushing to certain ruin. In that paternal language, with that paternal feeling, let me tell you, my countrymen, that you are deluded by men who are either deceived themselves, or wish to deceive you. Mark under what pretences you have been led on to the brink of insurrection and treason, on which you stand! First, a diminution of the value of your staple commodity, lowered by over production in other quarters, and the consequent diminution in the value of your lands, were the sole effect of the tariff laws.

"The effect of those laws was confessedly injurious, but the evil was greatly exaggerated by the unfounded theory you were taught to believe, that its burdens were in proportion to your exports, not to your consumption of imported articles. Your pride was roused by the assertion that a submission to those laws was a state of vassalage, and that resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit, to the oppositions our fathers offered to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told this opposition might be peaceably, might be constitutionally made; that you might enjoy all the advantages of the Union, and bear none of its burdens. Eloquent appeals to your passions, to your State pride, to your native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to prepare you for the period when the mask, which concealed the hideous features of disunion, should be taken off. It fell, and you were made to look with complacency on objects which, not long since, you would have regarded with horror. Look back to the arts which have brought you to this state; look forward to the consequences to which it must inevitably lead! Look back to what was first told you as an inducement to enter into this dangerous course. The great political truth was repeated to you, that you had the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably unconstitutional and intolerably oppressive; it was added that the right to nullify a law rested on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable remedy! This character which was given to it, made you receive with too much confidence the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality of the law, and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow-citizens, that, by the admission of your leaders, the unconstitutionality must be palpable, or it will not justify either resistance or nullification! What is the meaning of the word palpable, in the sense in which it is here used? That which is apparent to every one; that which no man of ordinary intellect will fail to perceive. Is the unconstitutionality of these laws of that description? Let those among your leaders who once approved and advocated the principle of protective duties, answer the question; and let them choose whether they will be considered as incapable, then, of perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common understanding, or as imposing upon your confidence, and endeavoring to mislead you now. In either case they are unsafe guides in the perilous path they urge you to tread. Ponder well on this circumstance, and you will know how to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you. They are not champions of liberty emulating the fame of our revolutionary fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contending, as they repeat to you, against worse than colonial vassalage.