Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

PUBLIC LANDS: – DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS

Mr. Clay renewed, at this session, 1832-'33, the bill which he had brought in the session before, and which had passed the Senate, to divide the net proceeds of the sales of public lands among the States, to be applied to such purposes as the legislatures of the respective States should think proper. His principal arguments, in favor of the bill, were: first, the aid which the distribution would give to the States, in developing their resources and promoting their prosperity; secondly, the advantage to the federal government, in settling the question of the mode of disposing of the public lands. He explained his bill, which, at first, contained a specification of the objects to which the States should apply the dividends they received, which was struck out, in the progress of the bill, and stated its provisions to be:

"To set apart, for the benefit of the new States, twelve and a half per cent., out of the aggregate proceeds, in addition to the five per cent., which was now allowed to them by compact, before any division took place among the States generally. It was thus proposed to assign, in the first place, seventeen and a half per cent. to the new States, and then to divide the whole of the residue among the twenty-four States. And, in order to do away any inequality among the new States, grants are specifically made by the bill to those who had not received, heretofore, as much lands as the rest of the new States, from the general government, so as to put all the new States on an equal footing. This twelve and a half per cent., to the new States, to be at their disposal, for either education or internal improvement, and the residue to be at the disposition of the States, subject to no other limitation than this: that it shall be at their option to apply the amount received either to the purposes of education, or the colonization of free people of color, or for internal improvements, or in debts which may have been contracted for internal improvements. And, with respect to the duration of this scheme of distribution proposed by the bill, it is limited to five years, unless hostilities shall occur between the United States and any foreign power; in which event, the proceeds are to be applied to the carrying on such war, with vigor and effect, against any common enemy with whom we may be brought in contact. After the conclusion of peace, and after the discharge of the debt created by any such war, the aggregate funds to return to that peaceful destination to which it was the intention of the bill that they should now be directed, that is, to the improvement of the moral and physical condition of the country, and the promotion of the public happiness and prosperity."

He then spoke of the advantages of settling the question of the manner of disposing of the public lands, and said:

"The first remark which seemed to him to be called for, in reference to this subject, was as to the expediency, he would say the necessity, of its immediate settlement. On this point, he was happy to believe that there was a unanimous concurrence of opinion in that body. However they might differ as to the terms on which the distribution of these lands should be made, they all agreed that it was a question which ought to be promptly and finally, he hoped amicably, adjusted. No time more favorable than the present moment could be selected for the settlement of this question. The last session was much less favorable for the accomplishment of this object; and the reasons were sufficiently obvious, without any waste of time in their specification. If the question were not now settled, but if it were to be made the subject of an annual discussion, mixing itself up with all the measures of legislation, it would be felt in its influence upon all, would produce great dissensions both in and out of the House, and affect extensively all the great and important objects which might be before that body. They had had, in the several States, some experience on that subject; and, without going into any details on the subject, he would merely state that it was known, that, for a long period, the small amount of the public domain possessed by some of the States, in comparison with the quantity possessed by the general government, had been a cause of great agitation in the public mind, and had greatly influenced the course of legislation. Persons coming from the quarter of the State in which the public land was situated, united in sympathy and interest, constituted always a body who acted together, to promote their common object, either by donations to settlers, or reduction in the price of the public lands, or the relief of those who are debtors for the public domain; and were always ready, as men always will be, to second all those measures which look towards the accomplishment of the main object which they have in view. So, if this question were not now settled, it would be a source of inexpressible difficulty hereafter, influencing all the great interests of the country, in Congress, affecting great events without, and perhaps adding another to those unhappy causes of division, which unfortunately exist at this moment."

In his arguments in support of his bill, Mr. Clay looked to the lands as a source of revenue to the States or the federal government, from their sale, and not from their settlement and cultivation, and the revenue to be derived from the wealth and population to which their settlement would give rise; and, concluding with an encomium on his bill under the aspect of revenue from sales, he said:

"He could not conceive a more happy disposition of the proceeds of the public lands, than that which was provided by this bill. It was supposed that five years would be neither too long nor too short a period for a fair experiment. In case a war should break out, we may withdraw from its peaceful destination a sum of from two and a half to three and a half millions of dollars per annum, and apply it to a vigorous prosecution of the war – a sum which would pay the interest on sixty millions of dollars, which might be required to sustain the war, and a sum which is constantly and progressively increasing. It proposes, now that the general government has no use for the money, now that the surplus treasure is really a source of vexatious embarrassment to us, and gives rise to a succession of projects, to supply for a short time a fund to the States which want our assistance, to advance to them that which we do not want, and which they will apply to great beneficial national purposes; and, should war take place, to divert it to the vigorous support of the war; and, when it ceases, to apply it again to its peaceful purposes. And thus we may grow, from time to time, with a fund which will endure for centuries, and which will augment with the growth of the nation, aiding the States in seasons of peace, and sustaining the general government in periods of war."

Mr. Calhoun deprecated this distribution of the land money as being dangerous in itself and unconstitutional, and as leading to the distribution of other revenue – in which he was prophetic. He said:

"He could not yield his assent to the mode which this bill proposed to settle the agitated question of the public lands. In addition to several objections of a minor character, he had an insuperable objection to the leading principle of the bill, which proposed to distribute the proceeds of the lands among the States. He believed it to be both dangerous and unconstitutional. He could not assent to the principle, that Congress had a right to denationalize the public funds. He agreed that the objection was not so decided in case of the proceeds of lands, as in that of revenue collected from taxes or duties. The senator from Ohio had adduced evidence from the deed of cession, which certainly countenanced the idea that the proceeds of the lands might be subject to the distribution proposed in the bill; but he was far from being satisfied that the argument was solid or conclusive. If the principle of distribution could be confined to the proceeds of the lands, he would acknowledge that his objection to the principle would be weakened.

"He dreaded the force of precedent, and he foresaw that the time would come when the example of the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands would be urged as a reason for distributing the revenue derived from other sources. Nor would the argument be devoid of plausibility. If we, of the Atlantic States, insist that the revenue of the West, derived from lands, should be equally distributed among all the States, we must not be surprised if the interior States should, in like manner, insist to distribute the proceeds of the customs, the great source of revenue in the Atlantic States. Should such a movement be successful, it must be obvious to every one, who is the least acquainted with the workings of the human heart, and the nature of government, that nothing would more certainly endanger the existence of the Union. The revenue is the power of the State, and to distribute its revenue is to dissolve its power into its original elements."

Attempts were made to postpone the bill to the next session, which failed; and it passed the Senate by a vote of 24 to 20.

Yeas. – Messrs. Bell, Chambers, Clay, Clayton, Dallas, Dickerson, Dudley, Ewing, Foot, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, Holmes, Johnston, Knight, Poindexter, Prentiss, Robbins, Ruggles, Seymour, Silsbee, Sprague, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Wilkins – 24.

Nays. – Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buckner, Calhoun, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King, Mangum, Miller, Moore, Rives, Robinson, Smith, Tipton, Tyler, White, Wright – 20.

The bill went to the House and received amendments, which did not obtain the concurrence of the Senate until midnight of the first of March, which, being the short session, was within twenty-four hours of the constitutional termination of the Congress, which was limited to the 3d – which falling this year on Sunday, the Congress would adjourn at midnight of the 2nd. Further efforts were made to postpone it, and upon the ground that, in a bill of that magnitude and novelty, the President was entitled to the full ten days for the consideration of it which the constitution allowed him, and he would have but half a day; for if passed that night it could only reach him in the forenoon of the next day – leaving him but half a day for his consideration of the measure, where the constitution allowed him ten; and that half day engrossed with all crowded business of an expiring session. The next evening, the President attended, as usual, in a room adjoining the Senate chamber, to be at hand to sign bills and make nominations. It was some hours in the night when the President sent for me, and withdrawing into the recess of a window, told me that he had a veto message ready on the land bill, but doubted about sending it in, lest there should not be a full Senate; and intimated his apprehension that Mr. Calhoun and some of his friends might be absent, and endanger the bill: and wished to consult me upon that point. I told him I would go and reconnoitre the chamber, and adjacent rooms; did so – found that Mr. Calhoun and his immediate friends were absent – returned and informed him, when he said he would keep the bill until the next session, and then return it with a fully considered message – his present one being brief, and not such as to show his views fully. I told him I thought he ought to do so – that such a measure ought not to be passed in the last hours of a session, in a thin Senate, and upon an imperfect view of his objections; and that the public good required it to be held up. It was so; and during the long vacation of nine months which intervened before the next session, the opposition presses and orators kept the country filled with denunciations of the enormity of his conduct in "pocketing" the hill – as if it had been a case of "flat burglary," instead of being the exercise of a constitutional right, rendered most just and proper under the extraordinary circumstances which had attended the passage, and intended return of the bill. At the commencement of the ensuing session he returned the bill, with his well-considered objections, in an ample message, which, after going over a full history of the derivation of the lands, came to the following conclusions:

"1. That one of the fundamental principles, on which the confederation of the United States was originally based, was, that the waste lands of the West, within their limits, should be the common property of the United States.

"2. That those lands were ceded to the United States by the States which claimed them, and the cessions were accepted, on the express condition that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of the States, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other purpose whatsoever.

"3. That, in execution of these solemn compacts, the Congress of the United States did, under the confederation, proceed to sell these lands, and put the avails into the common treasury; and, under the new constitution, did repeatedly pledge them for the payment of the public debt of the United States, by which pledge each State was expected to profit in proportion to the general charge to be made upon it for that object.

"These are the first principles of this whole subject, which, I think, cannot be contested by any one who examines the proceedings of the revolutionary Congress, the sessions of the several States, and the acts of Congress, under the new constitution. Keeping them deeply impressed upon the mind, let us proceed to examine how far the objects of the cessions have been completed, and see whether those compacts are not still obligatory upon the United States.

"The debt, for which these lands were pledged by Congress, may be considered as paid, and they are consequently released from that lien. But that pledge formed no part of the compacts with the States, or of the conditions upon which the cessions were made. It was a contract between new parties – between the United States and their creditors. Upon payment of the debt, the compacts remain in full force, and the obligation of the United States to dispose of the lands for the common benefit, is neither destroyed nor impaired. As they cannot now be executed in that mode, the only legitimate question which can arise is, in what other way are these lands to be hereafter disposed of for the common benefit of the several States, 'according to their respective and usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure?' The cessions of Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, in express terms, and all the rest impliedly, not only provide thus specifically the proportion, according to which each State shall profit by the proceeds of the land sales, but they proceed to declare that they shall be 'faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever.' This is the fundamental law of the land, at this moment, growing out of compacts which are older than the constitution, and formed the corner stone on which the Union itself was erected.

"In the practice of the government, the proceeds of the public lands have not been set apart as a separate fund for the payment of the public debt, but have been, and are now, paid into the treasury, where they constitute a part of the aggregate of revenue, upon which the government draws, as well for its current expenditures as for payment of the public debt. In this manner, they have heretofore, and do now, lessen the general charge upon the people of the several States, in the exact proportions stipulated in the compacts.

"These general charges have been composed, not only of the public debt and the usual expenditures attending the civil and military administrations of the government, but of the amounts paid to the States, with which these compacts were formed; the amounts paid the Indians for their right of possession; the amounts paid for the purchase of Louisiana and Florida; and the amounts paid surveyors, registers, receivers, clerks, &c., employed in preparing for market, and selling, the western domain. From the origin of the land system, down to the 30th September, 1832, the amount expended for all these purposes has been about $49,701,280 and the amount received from the sales, deducting payments on account of roads, &c., about $38,386,624. The revenue arising from the public lands, therefore, has not been sufficient to meet the general charges on the treasury, which have grown out of them, by about $11,314,656. Yet, in having been applied to lessen those charges, the conditions of the compacts have been thus far fulfilled, and each State has profited according to its usual proportion in the general charge and expenditure. The annual proceeds of land sales have increased, and the charges have diminished; so that, at a reduced price, those lands would now defray all current charges growing out of them, and save the treasury from further advances on their account. Their original intent and object, therefore, would be accomplished, as fully as it has hitherto been, by reducing the price, and hereafter, as heretofore, bringing the proceeds into the treasury. Indeed, as this is the only mode in which the objects of the original compact can be attained, it may be considered, for all practical purposes, that it is one of their requirements.

"The bill before me begins with an entire subversion of every one of the compacts by which the United States became possessed of their western domain, and treats the subject as if they never had existence, and as if the United States were the original and unconditional owners of all the public lands. The first section directs —

"'That, from and after the 31st day of December, 1832, there shall be allowed and paid to each of the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, Missouri, Mississippi, and Louisiana, over and above what each of the said States is entitled to by the terms of the compacts entered into between them, respectively, upon their admission into the Union and the United States, the sum of twelve and a half per centum upon the net amount of the sales of the public lands, which, subsequent to the day aforesaid, shall be made within the several limits of the said States; which said sum of twelve and a half per centum shall be applied to some object or objects of internal improvement or education, within the said States, under the direction of their several legislatures.'

"This twelve and a half per centum is to be taken out of the net proceeds of the land sales, before any apportionment is made; and the same seven States, which are first to receive this proportion, are also to receive their due proportion of the residue, according to the ratio of general distribution.

"Now, waiving all considerations of equity or policy, in regard to this provision, what more need be said to demonstrate its objectionable character, than that it is in direct and undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the States, before a single cession was made; that it abrogates the condition upon which some of the States came into the Union; and that it sets at nought the terms of cession spread upon the face of every grant under which the title to that portion of the public land is held by the federal government?

"In the apportionment of the remaining seven eighths of the proceeds, this bill, in a manner equally undisguised, violates the conditions upon which the United States acquired title to the ceded lands. Abandoning altogether the ratio of distribution, according to the general charge and expenditure provided by the compacts, it adopts that of the federal representative population. Virginia, and other States, which ceded their lands upon the express condition that they should receive a benefit from their sales, in proportion to their part of the general charge, are, by the bill, allowed only a portion of seven eighths of their proceeds, and that not in the proportion of general charge and expenditure, but in the ratio of their federal representative population.

"The constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it 'shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State,' it virtually provides that these compacts, and the rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative power, which shall only make all 'needful rules and regulations' for carrying them into effect. All beyond this, would seem to be an assumption of undelegated power.

"These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to pay for that Union, without which, they plainly saw, it could not be preserved. It was not for territory or State power that our revolutionary fathers took up arms; it was for individual liberty, and the right of self-government. The expulsion, from the continent, of British armies and British power was to them a barren conquest, if, through the collisions of the redeemed States, the individual rights for which they fought should become the prey of petty military tyrannies established at home. To avert such consequences, and throw around liberty the shield of union, States, whose relative strength, at the time, gave them a preponderating power, magnanimously sacrificed domains which would have made them the rivals of empires, only stipulating that they should be disposed of for the common benefit of themselves and the other confederated States. This enlightened policy produced union, and has secured liberty. It has made our waste lands to swarm with a busy people, and added many powerful States to our confederation. As well for the fruits which these noble works of our ancestors have produced, as for the devotedness in which they originated, we should hesitate before we demolish them.

"But there are other principles asserted in the bill, which would have impelled me to withhold my signature, had I not seen in it a violation of the compacts by which the United States acquired title to a large portion of the public lands. It reasserts the principle contained in the bill authorizing a subscription to the stock of the Maysville, Washington, Paris, and Lexington Turnpike Road Company, from which I was compelled to withhold my consent, for reasons contained in my message of the 27th May 1830, to the House of Representatives. The leading principle, then asserted, was, that Congress possesses no constitutional power to appropriate any part of the moneys of the United States for objects of a local character within the States. That principle, I cannot be mistaken in supposing, has received the unequivocal sanction of the American people, and all subsequent reflection has but satisfied me more thoroughly that the interests of our people, and the purity of our government, if not its existence, depend on its observance. The public lands are the common property of the United States, and the moneys arising from their sales are a part of the public revenue. This bill proposes to raise from, and appropriate a portion of, this public revenue to certain States, providing expressly that it shall 'be applied to objects of internal improvement or education within those States,' and then proceeds to appropriate the balance to all the States, with the declaration that it shall be applied 'to such purposes as the legislatures of the said respective States shall deem proper.' The former appropriation is expressly for internal improvements or education, without qualification as to the kind of improvements, and, therefore, in express violation of the principle maintained in my objections to the turnpike road bill, above referred to. The latter appropriation is more broad, and gives the money to be applied to any local purpose whatsoever. It will not be denied, that, under the provisions of the bill, a portion of the money might have been applied to making the very road to which the bill of 1830 had reference, and must, of course, come within the scope of the same principle. If the money of the United States cannot be applied to local purposes through its own agents, as little can it be permitted to be thus expended through the agency of the State governments.

"It has been supposed that, with all the reductions in our revenue which could be speedily effected by Congress, without injury to the substantial interests of the country, there might be, for some years to come, a surplus of moneys in the treasury; and that there was, in principle, no objection to returning them to the people by whom they were paid. As the literal accomplishment of such an object is obviously impracticable, it was thought admissible, as the nearest approximation to it, to hand them over to the State governments, the more immediate representatives of the people, to be by them applied to the benefit of those to whom they properly belonged. The principle and the object was, to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue which might have been paid by them under a system which could not at once be abandoned; but even this resource, which at one time seemed to be almost the only alternative to save the general government from grasping unlimited power over internal improvements, was suggested with doubts of its constitutionality.

"But this bill assumes a new principle. Its object is not to return to the people an unavoidable surplus of revenue paid in by them, but to create a surplus for distribution among the States. It seizes the entire proceeds of one source of revenue, and sets them apart as a surplus, making it necessary to raise the money for supporting the government, and meeting the general charges, from other sources. It even throws the entire land system upon the customs for its support, and makes the public lands a perpetual charge upon the treasury. It does not return to the people moneys accidentally or unavoidably paid by them to the government by which they are not wanted; but compels the people to pay moneys into the treasury for the mere purpose of creating a surplus for distribution to their State governments. If this principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive to what consequences it may lead. Already this bill, by throwing the land system on the revenues from imports for support, virtually distributes among the States a part of those revenues. The proportion may be increased from time to time, without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the State governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if a sufficient supply should be obtained by some States and not by others, the deficient States might complain, and, to put an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming any new principle, need go but one step further, and put the salaries of all the State governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill.

"It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the States, will all political power be substantially concentrated. The State governments, if governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendaries and instruments of the central power.

"I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their State governments, and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control. They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their State governments, thus amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately deprive us of the blessings now derived from our happy union.

"However willing I might be that any unavoidable surplus in the treasury should be returned to the people through their State governments, I cannot assent to the principle that a surplus may be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as, in effect, assuming the right not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury among the States without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every State government and institution, as well as for making every local improvement, however trivial, I cannot give it my assent.

"It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old States or the new from the system of distribution which this bill proposes, if it were otherwise unobjectionable. It requires no argument to prove, that if three millions of dollars a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the treasury by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old States will receive annually a sum of money from the treasury, but they will pay in a larger sum, together with the expenses of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of seven eights of the proceeds of land sales which they are to receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole. Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss in the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true because it may not at first be palpable. Their receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The governments of the States will receive seven dollars, for which the people of the States will pay eight. The large sums received will be palpable to the senses; the small sums paid, it requires thought to identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were given them from the public treasury, for which they were at the same time required to pay in taxes, direct or indirect, eight hundred.

"I deceive myself greatly if the new States would find their interests promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their true policy consists in the rapid settling and improvement of the waste lands within their limits. As a means of hastening those events, they have long been looking to a reduction in the price of public lands upon the final payment of the national debt. The effect of the proposed system would be to prevent that reduction. It is true, the bill reserves to Congress the power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details, as now arranged, would probably be forever to prevent its exercise.

"With the just men who inhabit the new States, it is a sufficient reason to reject this system, that it is in violation of the fundamental laws of the republic and its constitution. But if it were a mere question of interest or expediency, they would still reject it. They would not sell their bright prospect of increasing wealth and growing power at such a price. They would not place a sum of money to be paid into their treasuries, in competition with the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of their population. They would not consider a small or large annual sum to be paid to their governments, and immediately expended, as an equivalent for that enduring wealth which is composed of flocks and herds, and cultivated farms. No temptation will allure them from that object of abiding interest, the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory in peace and their defence in war.

"On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the public lands shall cease, as soon as practicable, to be a source of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey, and sale. Although these expenses have not been met by the proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will be hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By meeting in the treasury so much of the general charge as arises from that source, they will be hereafter, as they have been heretofore, disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, according to the compacts of cession. I do not doubt that it is the real interest of each and all the States in the Union, and particularly of the new States, that the price of these lands shall be reduced and graduated; and that, after they have been offered for a certain number of years, the refuse, remaining unsold, shall be abandoned to the States, and the machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It cannot be supposed the compacts intended that the United States should retain forever a title to lands within the States, which are of no value; and no doubt is entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the States.

"This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle, violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already has the price of those lands been reduced from two dollars per acre to one dollar and a quarter; and upon the will of Congress, it depends whether there shall be a further reduction. While the burdens of the East are diminishing by the reduction of the duties upon imports, it seems but equal justice that the chief burden of the West should be lightened in an equal degree at least. It would be just to the old States and the new, conciliate every interest, disarm the subject of all its dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity of our happy Union."

Statement respecting the revenue derived from the public lands, accompanying the President's Message to the Senate, December 4th, 1833, stating his reasons for not approving the Land Bill:

Statement of the amount of money which has been paid by the United States for the title to the public lands, including the payments made under the Louisiana and Florida treaties; the compact with Georgia; the settlement with the Yazoo claimants; the contracts with the Indian tribes; and the expenditures for compensation to commissioners, clerks, surveyors, and other officers, employed by the United States for the management and sale of the Western domain; the gross amount of money received into the treasury, as the proceeds of public lands, to the 30th of September, 1832; also, the net amount, after deducting five per cent., expended on account of roads within, and leading to the Western States, &c., and sums refunded on account of errors in the entries of public lands.

Payment on account of the purchase of Louisiana:

Payment on account of the purchase of Florida:

T. L. Smith, Reg

Treasury Department, }

Register's Office, March 1, 1833. }

Such was this ample and well-considered message, one of the wisest and most patriotic ever delivered by any President, and presenting General Jackson under the aspect of an immense elevation over the ordinary arts of men who run a popular career, and become candidates for popular votes. Such arts require addresses to popular interests, the conciliation of the interested passions, the gratification of cupidity, the favoring of the masses in the distribution of money or property as well as the enrichment of classes in undue advantages. General Jackson exhibits himself as equally elevated above all these arts – as far above seducing the masses with agrarian laws as above enriching the few with the plundering legislation of banks and tariffs; and the people felt this elevation, and did honor to themselves in the manner in which they appreciated it. Far from losing his popularity, he increased it, by every act of disdain which he exhibited for the ordinary arts of conciliating popular favor. His veto message, on this occasion was an exemplification of all the high qualities of the public man. He sat out with showing that these lands, so far as they were divided from the States, were granted as a common fund, to be disposed of for the benefit of all the States, according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever; and that by the principles of our government and sound policy, those acquired from foreign governments could only be disposed of in the same manner. In addition to these great reasons of principle and policy, the message clearly points out the mischief which any scheme of distribution will inflict upon the new States in preventing reductions in the price of the public lands – in preventing donations to settlers – and in preventing the cession of the unsalable lands to the States in which they lie; and recurs to his early messages in support of the policy, now that the public debt was paid, of looking to settlement and population as the chief objects to be derived from these lands, and for that purpose that they be sold to settlers at cost.

CHAPTER XCI.

COMMENCEMENT OF THE TWENTY-THIRD CONGRESS. – THE MEMBERS, AND PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

On the second day of December, 1833, commenced the first session of the Twenty-third Congress, commonly called the Panic session – one of the most eventful and exciting which the country had ever seen, and abounding with high talent. The following is the list of members: