Thirty Years' View (Vol. I of 2)

Having thus shown the proceedings of the Senate to have been extra-judicial and the mere fulmination of a censure, such as might come from a "mass meeting," and finding no warrant in any right or duty of the body, and intended for nothing but to operate upon him personally, he then showed that senators from three States had voted contrary to the sense of their respective State legislatures. On this point he said:

"There are also some other circumstances connected with the discussion and passage of the resolution, to which I feel it to be, not only my right, but my duty to refer. It appears by the journal of the Senate, that among the twenty-six senators who voted for the resolution on its final passage, and who had supported it in debate, in its original form, were one of the senators from the State of Maine, the two senators from New Jersey, and one of the senators from Ohio. It also appears by the same journal, and by the files of the Senate, that the legislatures of these States had severally expressed their opinions in respect to the Executive proceedings drawn in question before the Senate.

"It is thus seen that four senators have declared by their votes that the President, in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the revenue, had been guilty of the impeachable offence of 'assuming upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both,' whilst the legislatures of their respective States had deliberately approved those very proceedings, as consistent with the constitution, and demanded by the public good. If these four votes had been given in accordance with the sentiments of the legislatures, as above expressed, there would have been but twenty-four votes out of forty-six for censuring the President, and the unprecedented record of his conviction could not have been placed upon the journals of the Senate.

"In thus referring to the resolutions and instructions of State legislatures, I disclaim and repudiate all authority or design to interfere with the responsibility due from members of the Senate to their own consciences, their constituents and their country. The facts now stated belong to the history of these proceedings, and are important to the just development of the principles and interests involved in them, as well as to the proper vindication of the Executive department, and with that view, and that view only, are they here made the topic of remark."

The President then entered his solemn protest against the Senate's proceedings in these words:

"With this view, and for the reasons which have been stated, I do hereby solemnly protest against the aforementioned proceedings of the Senate, as unauthorized by the constitution; contrary to its spirit and to several of its express provisions; subversive of that distribution of the powers of government which it has ordained and established; destructive of the checks and safeguards by which those powers were intended, on the one hand, to be controlled, and, on the other, to be protected; and calculated, by their immediate and collateral effects, by their character and tendency, to concentrate in the hands of a body not directly amenable to the people, a degree of influence and power dangerous to their liberties, and fatal to the constitution of their choice."

And it concluded with an affecting appeal to his private history for the patriotism and integrity of his life, and the illustration of his conduct in relation to the bank, and showed his reliance on God and the People to sustain him; and looked with confidence to the place which justice would assign him on the page of history. This moving peroration was in these words:

"The resolution of the Senate contains an imputation upon my private as well as upon my public character; and as it must stand for ever on their journals, I cannot close this substitute for that defence which I have not been allowed to present in the ordinary form, without remarking, that I have lived in vain, if it be necessary to enter into a formal vindication of my character and purposes from such an imputation. In vain do I bear upon my person, enduring memorials of that contest in which American liberty was purchased; in vain have I since perilled property, fame, and life, in defence of the rights and privileges so dearly bought: in vain am I now, without a personal aspiration, or the hope of individual advantage, encountering responsibilities and dangers, from which, by mere inactivity in relation to a single point, I might have been exempt – if any serious doubts can be entertained as to the purity of my purposes and motives. If I had been ambitious, I should have sought an alliance with that powerful institution, which even now aspires to no divided empire. If I had been venal, I should have sold myself to its designs. Had I preferred personal comfort and official ease to the performance of my arduous duty, I should have ceased to molest it. In the history of conquerors and usurpers, never, in the fire of youth, nor in the vigor of manhood, could I find an attraction to lure me from the path of duty; and now, I shall scarcely find an inducement to commence the career of ambition, when gray hairs and a decaying frame, instead of inviting to toil and battle, call me to the contemplation of other worlds, where conquerors cease to be honored, and usurpers expiate their crimes. The only ambition I can feel, is to acquit myself to Him to whom I must soon render an account of my stewardship, to serve my fellow-men, and live respected and honored in the history of my country. No; the ambition which leads me on, is an anxious desire and a fixed determination, to return to the people, unimpaired, the sacred trust they have confided to my charge – to heal the wounds of the constitution and preserve it from further violation; to persuade my countrymen, so far as I may, that it is not in a splendid government, supported by powerful monopolies and aristocratical establishments, that they will find happiness, or their liberties protected, but in a plain system, void of pomp – protecting all, and granting favors to none – dispensing its blessings like the dews of heaven, unseen and unfelt, save in the freshness and beauty they contribute to produce. It is such a government that the genius of our people requires – such a one only under which our States may remain for ages to come, united, prosperous, and free. If the Almighty Being who has hitherto sustained and protected me, will but vouchsafe to make my feeble powers instrumental to such a result, I shall anticipate with pleasure the place to be assigned me in the history of my country, and die contented with the belief, that I have contributed in some small degree, to increase the value and prolong the duration of American liberty.

"To the end that the resolution of the Senate may not be hereafter drawn into precedent, with the authority of silent acquiescence on the part of the Executive department; and to the end, also, that my motives and views in the Executive proceeding denounced in that resolution may be known to my fellow-citizens, to the world, and to all posterity, I respectfully request that this message and protest may be entered at length on the journals of the Senate."

No sooner was this Protest read in the Senate than it gave rise to a scene of the greatest excitement. Mr. Poindexter, of Mississippi, immediately assailed it as a breach of the privileges of the Senate, and unfit to be received by the body. He said: "I will not dignify this paper by considering it in the light of an Executive message: it is no such thing. I regard it simply as a paper, with the signature of Andrew Jackson; and, should the Senate refuse to receive it, it will not be the first paper with the same signature which has been refused a hearing in this body, on the ground of the abusive and vituperative language which it contained. This effort to denounce and overawe the deliberations of the Senate may properly be regarded as capping the climax of that systematic plan of operations which had for several years been in progress, designed to bring this body into disrepute among the people, and thereby remove the only existing barrier to the arbitrary encroachments and usurpations of Executive power: " – and he moved that the paper, as he called it, should not be received. Mr. Benton deemed this a proper occasion to give notice of his intention to move a strong measure which he contemplated – an expunging resolution against the sentence of the Senate: – a determination to which he had come from his own convictions of right, and which he now announced without consultation with any of his friends. He deemed this movement too bold to be submitted to a council of friends – too daring to expect their concurrence; – and believed it was better to proceed without their knowledge, than against their decision. He, therefore, delivered his notice ex abruptu, accompanied by an earnest invective against the conduct of the Senate; and committed himself irrevocably to the prosecution of the "expunging resolution" until he should succeed in the effort, or terminate his political life: He said:

"The public mind was now to be occupied with a question of the very first moment and importance, and identical in all its features with the great question growing out of the famous resolutions of the English House of Commons in the case of the Middlesex election in the year 1768; and which engrossed the attention of the British empire for fourteen years before it was settled. That question was one in which the House of Commons was judged, and condemned, for adopting a resolution which was held by the subjects of the British crown to be a violation of their constitution, and a subversion of the rights of Englishmen: the question now before the Senate, and which will go before the American people, grows out of a resolution in which he (Mr. B.) believed that the constitution had been violated – the privileges of the House of Representatives invaded – and the rights of an American citizen, in the person of the President, subverted. The resolution of the House of Commons, after fourteen years of annual motions, was expunged from the Journal of the House; and he pledged himself to the American people to commence a similar series of motions with respect to this resolution of the Senate. He had made up his mind to do so without consultation with any human being, and without deigning to calculate the chances or the time of success. He rested under the firm conviction that the resolution of the Senate, which had drawn from the President the calm, temperate, and dignified protest, which had been read at the table, was a resolution which ought to be expunged from the Journal of the Senate; and if any thing was necessary to stimulate his sense of duty in making a motion to that effect, and in encouraging others after he was gone, in following up that motion to success, it would be found in the history and termination of the similar motion which was made in the English House of Commons to which he had referred. That motion was renewed for fourteen years – from 1768 to 1782 – before it was successful. For the first seven years, the lofty and indignant majority did not condescend to reply to the motion. They sunk it under a dead vote as often as presented. The second seven years they replied; and at the end of the term, and on the assembling of a new Parliament, the veteran motion was carried by more than two to one; and the gratifying spectacle was beheld of a public expurgation, in the face of the assembled Commons of England, of the obnoxious resolution from the Journal of the House. The elections in England were septennial, and it took two terms of seven years, or two general elections, to bring the sense of the kingdom to bear upon their representatives. The elections of the Senate were sexennial, with intercalary exits and entrances, and it might take a less, or a longer period, he would not presume to say which, to bring the sense of the American people to bear upon an act of the American Senate. Of that, he would make no calculation; but the final success of the motion in the English House of Commons, after fourteen years' perseverance, was a sufficient encouragement for him to begin, and doubtless would encourage others to continue, until the good work should be crowned with success; and the only atonement made which it was in the Senate's power to make, to the violated majesty of the constitution, the invaded privileges of the House of Representatives and the subverted rights of an American citizen.

"In bringing this great question before the American people, Mr. B. should consider himself as addressing the calm intelligence of an enlightened community. He believed the body of the American people to be the most enlightened community upon earth; and, without the least disparagement to the present Senate, he must be permitted to believe that many such Senates might be drawn from the ranks of the people, and still leave no dearth of intelligence behind. To such a community – in an appeal, on a great question of constitutional law, to the understandings of such a people – declamation, passion, epithets, opprobrious language, would stand for nothing. They would float, harmless and unheeded, through the empty air, and strike in vain upon the ear of a sober and dispassionate tribunal. Indignation, real or affected; wrath, however hot; fury, however enraged; asseverations, however violent; denunciation, however furious; will avail nothing. Facts – inexorable facts – are all that will be attended to; reason, calm and self-possessed, is all that will be listened to. An intelligent tribunal will exact the respect of an address to their understandings; and he that wishes to be heard in this great question, or being heard, would wish to be heeded, will have occasion to be clear and correct in his facts; close and perspicuous in his application of law; fair and candid in his conclusions and inferences; temperate and decorous in his language; and scrupulously free from every taint of vengeance and malice. Solemnly impressed with the truth of all these convictions, it was the intention of himself (Mr. B.), whatever the example or the provocation might be – never to forget his place, his subject, his audience, and his object – never to forget that he was speaking in the American Senate, on a question of violated constitution and outraged individual right, to an audience comprehending the whole body of the American people, and for the purpose of obtaining a righteous decision from the calm and sober judgment of a high-minded, intelligent, and patriotic community.

"The question immediately before the Senate was one of minor consequence; it might be called a question of small import, except for the effect which the decision might have upon the Senate itself. In that point of view, it might be a question of some moment; for, without reference to individuals, it was essential to the cause of free governments, that every department of the government, the Senate inclusive, should so act as to preserve to itself the respect and the confidence of the country. The immediate question was, upon the rejection of the President's message. It was moved to reject it – to reject it, not after it was considered, but before it was considered! and thus to tell the American people that their President shall not be heard – should not be allowed to plead his defence – in the presence of the body that condemned him – neither before the condemnation, nor after it! This is the motion: and certainly no enemy to the Senate could wish it to miscarry. The President, in the conclusion of his message, has respectfully requested that his defence might be entered upon the Journal of the Senate – upon that same Journal which contains the record of his conviction. This is the request of the President. Will the Senate deny it? Will they refuse this act of sheer justice and common decency? Will they go further, and not only refuse to place it on the Journal, but refuse even to suffer it to remain in the Senate? Will they refuse to permit it to remain on file, but send it back, or throw it out of doors, without condescending to reply to it? For that is the exact import of the motion now made! Will senators exhaust their minds, and their bodies also, in loading this very communication with epithets, and then say that it shall not be received? Will they receive memorials, resolutions, essays, from all that choose to abuse the President, and not receive a word of defence from him? Will they continue the spectacle which had been presented here for three months – a daily presentation of attacks upon the President from all that choose to attack him, young and old, boys and men – attacks echoing the very sound of this resolution, and which are not only received and filed here, but printed, which, possibly, the twenty-six could not unite here, nor go to trial upon any where! He remarked, in the third place, upon the effect produced in the character of the resolution, and affirmed that it was nothing. He said that the same charge ran through all three. They all three imputed to the President a violation of the constitution and laws of the country – of that constitution which he was sworn to support, and of those laws which he was not only bound to observe himself, but to cause to be faithfully observed by all others.

"A violation of the constitution and of the laws, Mr. B. said, were not abstractions and metaphysical subtleties. They must relate to persons or things. The violations cannot rest in the air; they must affix themselves to men or to property; they must connect themselves with the transactions of real life. They cannot be ideal and contemplative. In omitting the specifications relative to the dismission of one Secretary of the Treasury, and the appointment of another, what other specifications were adopted or substituted? Certainly none! What others were mentally intended? Surely none! What others were suggested? Certainly none! The general charge then rests upon the same specification; and so completely is this the fact, that no supporter of the resolutions has thought it necessary to make the least alteration in his speeches which supported the original resolution, or to say a single additional word in favor of the altered resolution as finally passed. The omission of the specification is then an omission of form and not of substance; it is a change of words and not of things; and the substitution of a derogation of the laws and constitution, for dangerous to the liberties of the people, is a still more flagrant instance of change of words without change of things. It is tautologous and nonsensical. It adds nothing to the general charge, and takes nothing from it. It neither explains it nor qualifies it. In the technical sense it is absurd; for it is not the case of a statute in derogation of the common law, to wit, repealing a part of it; in the common parlance understanding, it is ridiculous, for the President is not even charged with defaming the constitution and the laws; and, if he was so charged, it would present a curious trial of scandalum magnatum for the American Senate to engage in. No! said Mr. B., this derogation clause is an expletion! It is put in to fill up! The regular impeaching clause of dangerous to the liberties of the people, had to be taken out. There was danger, not in the people certainly, but to the character of the resolution, if it staid in. It identified that resolution as an impeachment, and, therefore, constituted a piece of internal evidence which it was necessary to withdraw; but in withdrawing which, the character of the resolution was not altered. The charge for violating the laws and the constitution still stood; and the substituted clause was nothing but a stopper to a vacuum – additional sound without additional sense, to fill up a blank and round off a sentence.

"After showing the impeaching character of the Senate's resolution, from its own internal evidence, Mr. B. had recourse to another description of evidence, scarcely inferior to the resolutions themselves, in the authentic interpretations of their meaning. He alluded to the speeches made in support of them, and which had resounded in this chamber for three months, and were now circulating all over the country in every variety of newspaper and pamphlet form. These speeches were made by the friends of the resolution to procure its adoption here, and to justify its adoption before the country. Let the country then read, let the people read, what has been sent to them for the purpose of justifying these resolutions which they are now to try! They will find them to be in the character of prosecution pleadings against an accused man, on his trial for the commission of great crimes! Let them look over these speeches, and mark the passages; they will find language ransacked, history rummaged, to find words sufficiently strong, and examples sufficiently odious, to paint and exemplify the enormity of the crime of which the President was alleged to be guilty. After reading these passages, let any one doubt, if he can, as to the character of the resolution which was adopted. Let him doubt, if he can, of the impeachable nature of the offence which was charged upon the President. Let him doubt, if he can, that every Senator who voted for that resolution, voted the President to be guilty of an impeachable offence – an offence, for the trial of which this Senate is the appointed tribunal – an offence which it will be the immediate duty of the House of Representatives to bring before the Senate, in a formal impeachment, unless they disbelieve in the truth and justice of the resolution which has been adopted.

"Mr. B. said there were three characters in which the Senate could act; and every time it acted it necessarily did so in one or the other of these characters. It possessed executive, legislative, and judicial characters. As a part of the executive, it acted on treaties and nominations to office; as a part of the legislative, it assisted in making laws; as a judicial tribunal, it decided impeachments. Now, in which of these characters did the Senate act when it adopted the resolution in question? Not in its executive character, it will be admitted; not in its legislative character, it will be proved: for the resolution was, in its nature, wholly foreign to legislation. It was directed, not to the formation of a law, but to the condemnation of the President. It was to condemn him for dismissing one Secretary, because he would not do a thing, and appointing another that he might do it; and certainly this was not matter for legislation; for Mr. Duane could not be restored by law, nor Mr. Taney be put out by law. It was to convict the President of violating the constitution and the laws; and surely these infractions are not to be amended by laws, but avenged by trial and punishment. The very nature of the resolution proves it to be foreign to all legislation; its form proves the same thing; for it is not joint, to require the action of the House of Representatives, and thus ripen into law; nor is it followed by an instruction to a committee to report a bill in conformity to it. No such instruction could even now be added without committing an absurdity of the most ridiculous character. There was another resolution, with which this must not be confounded, and upon which an instruction to a committee might have been bottomed; it was the resolution which declared the Secretary's reasons for removing the deposits to be insufficient and unsatisfactory; but no such instruction has been bottomed even upon that resolution; so that it is evident that no legislation of any kind was intended to follow either resolution, even that to which legislation might have been appropriate, much less that to which it would have been an absurdity. Four months have elapsed since the resolutions were brought in. In all that time, there has been no attempt to found a legislative act upon either of them; and it is too late now to assume that the one which, in its nature and in its form, is wholly foreign to legislation, is a legislative act, and adopted by the Senate in its legislative character. No! This resolution is judicial; it is a judgment pronounced upon an imputed offence; it is the declared sense of a majority of the Senate, of the guilt of the President of a high crime and misdemeanor. It is, in substance, an impeachment – an impeachment in violation of all the forms prescribed by the constitution – in violation of the privileges of the House of Representatives – in subversion of the rights of the accused, and the record of which ought to be expunged from the Journal of the Senate.

"Mr. B. said the selection of a tribunal for the trial of impeachments was felt, by the convention which framed the constitution, as one of the most delicate and difficult tasks which they had to perform. Those great men were well read in history, both ancient and modern, and knew that the impeaching power – the usual mode for trying political men for political offences – was often an engine for the gratification of factious and ambitious feelings. An impeachment was well known to be the beaten road for running down a hated or successful political rival. After great deliberation – after weighing all the tribunals, even that of the Supreme Court – the Senate of the United States was fixed upon as the body which, from its constitution, would be the most impartial, neutral, and equitable, that could be selected, and, with the check of a previous inquisition, and presentment of charges by the House of Representatives, would be the safest tribunal to which could be confided a power so great in itself, and so susceptible of being abused. The Senate was selected; and to show that he had not overstated the difficulties of the convention in making the selection, he would take leave to read a passage from a work which was canonical on this subject, and from an article in that work which was written by the gentleman whose authority would have most weight on this occasion. He spoke of the Federalist, and of the article written by General Hamilton on the impeaching power:

"'A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained, in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men; or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may, with peculiar propriety, be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest, on one side or on the other; and, in such cases, there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction; and, on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

"'The division of the powers of impeachment between the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of trying, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches.'

"Mr. B. said there was much matter for elucidation of the present object of discussion in the extract which he had read. Its definition of an impeachable offence covered the identical charge which was contained in the resolution adopted by the Senate against the President. The offence charged upon him possessed every feature of the impeachment defined by General Hamilton. It imputes misconduct to a public man, for the abuse and violation of a public trust. The discussion of the charge has agitated the passions of the whole community; it has divided the people into parties, some friendly, some inimical, to the accused; it has connected itself with the pre-existing parties, enlisting the whole of the opposition parties under one banner, and calling forth all their animosities – all their partialities – all their influence – all their interest; and, what was not foreseen by General Hamilton, it has called forth the tremendous moneyed power, and the pervading organization of a great moneyed power, wielding a mass of forty millions of money, and sixty millions of debt; wielding the whole in aid and support of this charge upon the President, and working the double battery of seduction, on one hand, and oppression on the other, to put down the man against whom it is directed! This is what General Hamilton did not foresee; but the next feature in the picture he did foresee, and most accurately describe, as it is now seen by us all. He said that the decision of these impeachments would often be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by the guilt or innocence of the accused. How prophetic! Look to the memorials, resolutions, and petitions, sent in here to criminate the President, so clearly marked by a party line, that when an exception occurs, it is made the special subject of public remark. Look at the vote in the Senate, upon the adoption of the resolution, also as clearly defined by a party line as any party question can ever be expected to be.

"To guard the most conspicuous characters from being persecuted – Mr. B. said he was using the language of General Hamilton – to guard the most conspicuous characters from being persecuted by the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction – the convention had placed the power of trying impeachments, not in the Supreme Court, not even in a body of select judges chosen for the occasion, but in the Senate of the United States, and not even in them without an intervening check to the abuse of that power, by associating the House of Representatives, and forbidding the Senate to proceed against any officer until that grand inquest of the nation should demand his trial. How far fortunate, or otherwise, the convention may have been in the selection of its tribunal for the trial of impeachments, it was not for him, Mr. B., to say. It was not for him to say how far the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be under scrutiny, may be found, or has been found, in this body. But he must take leave to say, that if a public man may be virtually impeached – actually condemned by the Senate of an impeachable offence, without the intervention of the House of Representatives, then has the constitution failed at one of its most vital points and a ready means found for doing a thing which had filled other countries with persecution, faction, and violence, and which it was intended should never be done here.

"Mr. B. called upon the Senate to recollect what was the feature in the famous court of the Star Chamber, which rendered that court the most odious that ever sat in England. It was not the mass of its enormities – great as they were – for the regular tribunals which yet existed, exceeded that court, both in the mass and in the atrocity of their crimes and oppressions. The regular courts in the compass of a single reign – that of James the Second; a single judge, in a single riding – Jeffries, on the Western Circuit – surpassed all the enormities of the Star Chamber, in the whole course of its existence. What then rendered that court so intolerably odious to the English people? Sir, said Mr. B., it was because that court had no grand jury – because it proceeded without presentment, without indictment – upon information alone – and thus got at its victims without the intervention, without the restraint, of an accusing body. This is the feature which sunk the Star Chamber in England. It is the feature which no criminal tribunal in this America is allowed to possess. The most inconsiderable offender, in any State of the Union, must be charged by a grand jury before he can be tried by the court. In this Senate, sitting as a high court of impeachment, a charge must first be presented by the House of Representatives, sitting as the grand inquest of the nation. But if the Senate can proceed, without the intervention of this grand inquest, wherein is it to differ from the Star Chamber, except in the mere execution of its decrees? And what other execution is now required for delinquent public men, than the force of public opinion? No! said Mr. B., we live in an age when public opinion over public men, is omnipotent and irreversible! – when public sentiment annihilates a public man more effectually than the scaffold. To this new and omnipotent tribunal, all the public men of Europe and America are now happily subject. The fiat of public opinion has superseded the axe of the executioner. Struck by that opinion, kings and emperors in Europe, and the highest functionaries among ourselves, fall powerless from the political stage, and wander, while their bodies live, as shadows and phantoms over the land. Should he give examples? It might be invidious; yet all would recollect an eminent example of a citizen, once sitting at the head of this Senate, afterwards falling under a judicial prosecution, from which he escaped untouched by the sword of the law, yet that eminent citizen was more utterly annihilated by public opinion, than any execution of a capital sentence could ever have accomplished upon his name.

"What occasion then has the Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, for the power of execution? The only effect of a regular impeachment now, is to remove from office, and disqualification for office. An irregular impeachment will be tantamount to removal and disqualification, if the justice of the sentence is confided in by the people. If this condemnation of the President had been pronounced in the first term of his administration, and the people had believed in the truth and justice of the sentence, certainly President Jackson would not have been elected a second time; and every object that a political rival, or a political party, could have wished from his removal from office, and disqualification for office, would have been accomplished. Disqualification for office – loss of public favor – political death – is now the object of political rivalship; and all this can be accomplished by an informal, as well as by a formal impeachment, if the sentence is only confided in by the people. If the people believed that the President has violated the constitution and the laws, he ceases to be the object of their respect and their confidence; he loses their favor; he dies a political death; and that this might be the object of the resolution, Mr. B. would leave to the determination of those who should read the speeches which were delivered in support of the measure, and which would constitute a public and lasting monument of the temper in which the resolution was presented, and the object intended to be accomplished by it.

"It was in vain to say there could be no object, at this time, in annihilating the political influence of President Jackson, and killing him off as a public man, with a senatorial conviction for violating the laws and constitution of the country. Such an assertion, if ventured upon by any one, would stand contradicted by facts, of which Europe and America are witnesses. Does he not stand between the country and the bank? Is he not proclaimed the sole obstacle to the recharter of the bank; and in its recharter is there not wrapped up the destinies of a political party, now panting for power? Remove this sole obstacle – annihilate its influence – kill off President Jackson with a sentence of condemnation for a high crime and misdemeanor, and the charter of the bank will be renewed, and in its renewal, a political party, now thundering at the gates of the capitol, will leap into power. Here then is an object for desiring the extinction of the political influence of President Jackson! An object large enough to be seen by all America! and attractive enough to enlist the combined interest of a great moneyed power, and of a great political party."

Thus spoke Mr. Benton; but the debate on the protest went on; and the motion of Mr. Poindexter, digested into four different propositions, after undergoing repeated modifications upon consultations among its friends, and after much acrimony on both sides, was adopted by the fixed majority of twenty-seven. In voting that the protest was a breach of the privileges of the Senate, that body virtually affirmed the impeachment character of the condemnatory resolutions, and involved itself in the predicament of voting an impeachable matter without observing a single rule for the conduct of impeachments. The protest placed it in a dilemma. It averred the Senate's judgment to be without authority – without any warrant in the constitution – any right in the body to pronounce it. To receive that protest, and enter it on the journal, was to record a strong evidence against themselves; to reject it as a breach of privilege was to claim for their proceeding the immunity of a regular and constitutional act; and as the proceeding was on criminal matter, amounting to a high crime and misdemeanor, on which matter the Senate could only act in its judicial capacity; therefore it had to claim the immunity that would belong to it in that capacity; and assume a violation of privilege. Certainly if the Senate had tried an impeachment in due form, the protest, impeaching its justice, might have been a breach of privilege; but the Senate had no privilege to vote an impeachable matter without a regular impeachment; and therefore it was no breach of privilege to impugn the act which they had no privilege to commit.

CHAPTER CIV.

MR. WEBSTER'S PLAN OF RELIEF

It has already been seen that Mr. Webster took no direct part in promoting the adoption of the resolutions against General Jackson. He had no private grief to incite him against the President; and, as first drawn up, it would have been impossible for him, honored with the titles of "expounder and defender of the constitution," to have supported the resolve: bearing plainly on its face impeachable matter. After several modifications, he voted for it; but, from the beginning, he had his own plan in view, which was entirely different from an attack on the President; and solely looked to the advantage of the bank, and the relief of the distress, in a practical and parliamentary mode of legislation. He looked to a renewal of the bank charter for a short term, and with such modifications as would tend to disarm opposition, and to conciliate favor for it. The term of the renewal was only to be for six years: a length of time well chosen; because, from the shortness of the period, it would have an attraction for all that class of members – always more or less numerous in every assembly – who, in every difficulty, are disposed to temporize and compromise; while, to the bank, in carrying its existence beyond the presidential term of General Jackson, it felt secure in the future acquisition of a full term. Besides the attraction in the short period, Mr. Webster proposed another amelioration, calculated to have serious effect; it was to give up the exclusive or monopoly feature in the charter – leaving to Congress to grant any other charter, in the mean time, to a new company, if it pleased. The objectionable branch bank currency of petty drafts was also given up. Besides this, and as an understanding that the corporation would not attempt to obtain a further existence beyond the six years, the directors were to be at liberty to begin to return the capital to the stockholders at any time within the period of three years, before the expiration of the six renewed years. The deposits were not to be restored until after the first day of July; and, as an agreeable concession to the enemies of small paper currency the bank was to issue, or use, no note under the amount of twenty dollars. He had drawn up a bill with these provisions, and asked leave to bring it in; and, asking the leave, made a very plausible business speech in its favor: the best perhaps that could have been devised. In addition to his own weight, and the recommendations in the bill, it was understood to be the preference of Mr. Biddle himself – his own choice of remedies in the difficulties which surrounded his institution. But he met opposition from quarters not to be expected: from Mr. Clay, who went for the full term of twenty years; and Mr. Calhoun, who went for twelve. It was difficult to comprehend why these two gentlemen should wish to procure for the bank more than it asked, and which it was manifestly impossible for it to gain. Mr. Webster's bill was the only one that stood the least chance of getting through the two Houses; and on that point he had private assurances of support from friends of the administration, if all the friends of the bank stood firm. In favoring this charter for twelve years, Mr. Calhoun felt that an explanation of his conduct was due to the public, as he was well known to have been opposed to the renewed charter, when so vehemently attempted, in 1832; and also against banks generally. His explanation was, that he considered it a currency question, and a question between the national and local banks; and that the renewed charter was to operate against them; and, in winding itself up, was to cease for ever, having first established a safe currency. His frequent expression was, that his plan was to "unbank the banks: " a process not very intelligibly explained at the time, and on which he should be allowed to speak for himself. Some passages are, therefore, given from his speech:

"After a full survey of the whole subject, I can see no means of extricating the country from its present danger, and to arrest its further increase, but a bank, the agency of which, in some form; or under some authority, is indispensable. The country has been brought into the present diseased state of the currency by banks, and must be extricated by their agency. We must, in a word, use a bank to unbank the banks, to the extent that may be necessary to restore a safe and stable currency – just as we apply snow to a frozen limb, in order to restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to suppress the banking system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a part of their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To suppress them at once, would, if it were possible, work a greater revolution: a greater change in the relative condition of the various classes of the community than would the conquest of the country by a savage enemy. What, then, must be done? I answer, a new and safe system must gradually grow up under, and replace, the old; imitating, in this respect, the beautiful process which we sometimes see, of a wounded or diseased part in a living organic body, gradually superseded by the healing process of nature.

"How is this to be effected? How is a bank to be used as the means of correcting the excess of the banking system? And what bank is to be selected as the agent to effect this salutary change? I know, said Mr. C., that a diversity of opinion will be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected, among those who agree on every other point, and who, in particular, agree on the necessity of using some bank as the means of effecting the object intended; one preferring a simple recharter of the existing bank – another, the charter of a new bank of the United States – a third, a new bank ingrafted upon the old – and a fourth, the use of the State banks, as the agent. I wish, said Mr. C., to leave all these as open questions, to be carefully surveyed and compared with each other, calmly and dispassionately, without prejudice or party feeling; and that to be selected which, on the whole, shall appear to be best – the most safe; the most efficient; the most prompt in application, and the least liable to constitutional objection. It would, however, be wanting in candor on my part, not to declare that my impression is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted upon the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of the case, to combine the greatest advantages, and to be liable to the fewest objections; but this impression is not so firmly fixed as to be inconsistent with a calm review of the whole ground, or to prevent my yielding to the conviction of reason, should the result of such review prove that any other is preferable. Among its peculiar recommendations, may be ranked the consideration, that, while it would afford the means of a prompt and effectual application for mitigating and finally removing the existing distress, it would, at the same time, open to the whole community a fair opportunity of participation in the advantages of the institution, be they what they may.

"Let us then suppose (in order to illustrate and not to indicate a preference) that the present bank be selected as the agent to effect the intended object. What provisions will be necessary? I will suggest those that have occurred to me, mainly, however, with a view of exciting the reflection of those much more familiar with banking operations than myself, and who, of course, are more competent to form a correct judgment on their practical effect.

"Let, then, the bank charter be renewed for twelve years after the expiration of the present term, with such modifications and limitations as may be judged proper, and that after that period, it shall issue no notes under ten dollars; that government shall not receive in its dues any sum less than ten dollars, except in the legal coins of the United States; that it shall not receive in its dues the notes of any bank that issues notes of a denomination less than five dollars; and that the United States Bank shall not receive in payment, or on deposit, the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable in dues of the government; nor the notes of any bank which may receive the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable by the government. At the expiration of six years from the commencement of the renewed charter, let the bank be prohibited from issuing any note under twenty dollars, and let no sum under that amount be received in the dues of the government, except in specie; and let the value of gold be raised at least equal to that of silver, to take effect immediately, so that the country may be replenished with the coin, the lightest and the most portable in proportion to its value, to take the place of the receding bank notes. It is unnecessary for me to state, that at present, the standard value of gold is several per cent. less than that of silver, the necessary effect of which has been to expel gold entirely from our circulation, and thus to deprive us of a coin so well calculated for the circulation of a country so great in extent, and having so vast an intercourse, commercial, social, and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an additional recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of late, become an important product of three considerable States of the Union, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia – to the industry of which, the measure proposed would give a strong impulse, and which in turn would greatly increase the quantity produced.

"Such are the means which have occurred to me. There are members of this body far more competent to judge of their practical operation than myself, and as my object is simply to suggest them for their reflection, and for that of others who are more familiar with this part of the subject, I will not at present enter into an inquiry as to their efficiency, with a view of determining whether they are fully adequate to effect the object in view or not. There are doubtless others of a similar description, and perhaps more efficacious, that may occur to the experienced, which I would freely embrace, as my object is to adopt the best and most efficient. And it may be hoped that, if on experience it should be found that neither these provisions nor any other in the power of Congress, are fully adequate to effect the important reform which I have proposed, the co-operation of the States may be afforded, at least to the extent of suppressing the circulation of notes under five dollars, where such are permitted to be issued under their authority."

The ultimate object proposed to be accomplished by Mr. Calhoun in this process of "unbanking the banks," was to arrive eventually and by slow degrees, at a metallic currency, and the revival of gold. This had been my object, and so declared in the Senate, from the time of the first opposition to the United States Bank. He had talked his plan over to myself and others: we had talked over ours to him. There was a point at which we all agreed – the restoration of a metallic currency; but differed about the means – he expecting to attain it slowly and eventually, through the process which he mentioned; and we immediately, through the revival of the gold currency, the extinction of the Bank of the United States, the establishment of an independent treasury, and the exclusion of all paper money from the federal receipts and payments. Laying hold of the point on which we agreed, (and which was also the known policy of the President), Mr. Calhoun appealed to Mr. Silas Wright and myself and other friends of the administration, to support his plan. He said:

"If I understand their views, as expressed by the senator from Missouri, behind me (Mr. Benton) – the senator from New-York (Mr. Wright); and other distinguished members of the party, and the views of the President, as expressed in reported conversations, I see not how they can reject the measure (to wit: his plan). They profess to be the advocates of a metallic currency. I propose to restore it by the most effectual measures that can be devised, gradually and slowly, and to the extent that experience may show that it can be done consistently with due regard to the public interest. Further, no one can desire to go."

The reference here made by Mr. Calhoun to the views of the senator from Missouri was to conversations held between them; in which each freely communicated his own plan. Mr. Benton had not then brought forward his proposition for the revival of the gold currency; but did so, (in a speech which he had studied), the moment Mr. Calhoun concluded. That was a thing understood between them. Mr. Calhoun had signified his wish to speak first; to which Mr. Benton readily assented: and both took the opportunity presented by Mr. Webster's motion, and the presentation of his plan, to present their own respectively. Mr. Benton presented his the moment Mr. Calhoun sat down, in a much considered speech, which will be given in the next chapter; and which was the first of his formal speeches in favor of reviving the gold currency. In the mean time, Mr. Webster's plan lingered on the motion for leave to bring in his bill. That leave was not granted. Things took a strange turn. The friends of the bank refused in a body to give Mr. Webster the leave asked: the enemies of the bank were in favor of giving him the leave – chiefly, perhaps, because his friends refused it. In this state of contrariety among his friends, Mr. Webster moved to lay his own motion on the table; and Mr. Forsyth, to show that this balk came from his own side of the chamber, asked the yeas and nays; which were granted and were as follows:

"Yeas. – Messrs Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, Hendricks, King of Georgia, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Waggaman, Webster.

"Nays. – Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hill, Kane, King of Alabama, Morris, Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright."

The excuse for the movement – for this unexpected termination to Mr. Webster's motion – was that the Senate might proceed with Mr. Clay's resolution against General Jackson, and come to a conclusion upon it. It was now time for that conclusion. It was near the last of March, and the Virginia elections came on in April: but the real cause for Mr. Webster's motion was the settled opposition of his political friends to his plan; and that was proved by its subsequent fate. In his motion to lay his application on the table, he treated it as a temporary disposition of it – the application to be renewed it some future time: which it never was.

CHAPTER CV.

REVIVAL OF THE GOLD CURRENCY – MR. BENTON'S SPEECH

Mr. Benton said it was now six years since he had begun to oppose the renewal of the charter of this bank, but he had not, until the present moment, found a suitable occasion for showing the people the kind of currency which they were entitled to possess, and probably would possess, on the dissolution of the Bank of the United States. This was a view of the subject which many wished to see, and which he felt bound to give; and which he should proceed to present, with all the brevity and perspicuity of which he was master.

1. In the first place, he was one of those who believed that the government of the United States was intended to be a hard money government: that it was the intention, and the declaration of the constitution of the United States, that the federal currency should consist of gold and silver; and that there is no power in Congress to issue, or to authorize any company of individuals to issue, any species of federal paper currency whatsoever.

Every clause in the constitution, said Mr. B., which bears upon the subject of money – every early statute of Congress which interprets the meaning of these clauses – and every historic recollection which refers to them, go hand in hand, in giving to that instrument the meaning which this proposition ascribes to it. The power granted to Congress to coin money is an authority to stamp metallic money, and is not an authority for emitting slips of paper containing promises to pay money. The authority granted to Congress to regulate the value of coin, is an authority to regulate the value of the metallic money, not of paper. The prohibition upon the States against making any thing but gold and silver a legal tender, is a moral prohibition, founded in virtue and honesty, and is just as binding upon the federal government as upon the State governments; and that without a written prohibition; for the difference in the nature of the two governments is such, that the States may do all things which they are not forbid to do; and the federal government can do nothing which it is not authorized by the constitution to do. The power to punish the crime of counterfeiting is limited to the current coin of the United States, and to the securities of the United States; and cannot be extended to the offence of forging paper money, but by that unjustifiable power of construction which founds an implication upon an implication, and hangs one implied power upon another. The word currency is not in the constitution, nor any word which can be made to cover a circulation of bank notes. Gold and silver is the only thing recognized for money. It is the money, and the only money, of the constitution; and every historic recollection, as well as every phrase in the constitution, and every early statute on the subject of money, confirms that idea. People were sick of paper money about the time that this constitution was formed. The Congress of the confederation, in the time of the Revolution, had issued a currency of paper money. It had run the full career of that currency. The wreck of two hundred millions of paper dollars lay upon the land. The framers of that constitution worked in the midst of that wreck. They saw the havoc which paper money had made upon the fortunes of individuals, and the morals of the public. They determined to have no more federal paper money. They created a hard money government; they intended the new government to recognize nothing for money but gold and silver; and every word admitted into the constitution, upon the subject of money, defines and establishes that sacred intention.

Legislative enactment, continued Mr. B., came quickly to the aid of constitutional intention and historic recollection. The fifth statute passed at the first session of the first Congress that ever sat under the present constitution, was full and explicit on this head. It defined the kind of money which the federal treasury should receive. The enactments of the statute are remarkable for their brevity and comprehension, as well as for their clear interpretation of the constitution; and deserve to be repeated and remembered. They are: That the fees and duties payable to the federal government shall be received in gold and silver coin only; the gold coins of France, Spain, Portugal, and England, and all other gold coins of equal fineness, at eighty-nine cents for every pennyweight; the Mexican dollar at one hundred cents; the crown of France at one hundred and eleven cents; and all other silver coins of equal fineness, at one hundred and eleven cents per ounce. This statute was passed the 30th day of July, 1789 – just one month after Congress had commenced the work of legislation. It shows the sense of the Congress composed of the men, in great part, who had framed the constitution, and who, by using the word only, clearly expressed their intention that gold and silver alone was to constitute the currency of the new government.

In support of this construction of the constitution, Mr. B. referred to the phrase so often used by our most aged and eminent statesmen, that this was intended to be a hard money government. Yes, said Mr. B., the framers of the constitution were hard money men; but the chief expounder and executor of that constitution was not a hard money man, but a paper system man! a man devoted to the paper system of England, with all the firmness of conviction, and all the fervor of enthusiasm. God forbid, said Mr. B., that I should do injustice to Gen. Hamilton – that I should say, or insinuate, aught to derogate from the just fame of that great man! He has many titles to the gratitude and admiration of his countrymen, and the heart could not be American which could dishonor or disparage his memory. But his ideas of government did not receive the sanction of general approbation; and of all his political tenets, his attachment to the paper system was most strongly opposed at the time, and has produced the most lasting and deplorable results upon the country. In the year 1791, this great man, then Secretary of the Treasury, brought forward his celebrated plan for the support of public credit – that plan which unfolded the entire scheme of the paper system, and immediately developed the great political line between the federalists and the republicans. The establishment of a national bank was the leading and predominant feature of that plan; and the original report of the Secretary, in favor of establishing the bank, contained this fatal and deplorable recommendation:

"The bills and notes of the bank, originally made payable, or which shall have become payable, on demand, in gold and silver coin, shall be receivable in all payments to the United States."

This fatal recommendation became a clause in the charter of the bank. It was transferred from the report of the Secretary to the pages of the statute book; and from that moment the moneyed character of the federal government stood changed and reversed. Federal bank notes took the place of hard money; and the whole edifice of the new government slid, at once, from the solid rock of gold and silver money, on which its framers had placed it, into the troubled and tempestuous ocean of a paper currency.

Mr. B. said it was no answer to this most serious charge of having changed the moneyed character of the federal government, and of the whole Union, to say that the notes of the Bank of the United States are not made a legal tender between man and man. There was no necessity, he said, for a statute law to that effect; it was sufficient that they were made a legal tender to the federal government; the law of necessity, far superior to that of the statute book, would do the rest. A law of tender was not necessary; a forced, incidental tender, resulted as an inevitable consequence from the credit and circulation which the federal government gave them. Whatever was received at the custom-houses, at the land-offices, at the post-offices, at the marshals' and district attorneys' offices, and in all the various dues to the federal government, must be received and will be received by the people. It becomes the actual and practical currency of the land. People must take it, or get nothing; and thus the federal government, establishing a paper currency for itself, establishes it also for the States and for the people; and every body must use it from necessity, whether compelled by law or not.

Mr. B. said it was not to be supposed that the objection which he now took to the unconstitutionality of the clause which made the notes of the federal bank a legal tender to the federal government, was an objection which could be overlooked, or disregarded, by the adversaries of the bank in 1791. It was not overlooked, or disregarded; on the contrary, it was denounced, and combated, as in itself a separate and distinct breach of the constitution, going the whole length of emitting paper money; and the more odious and reprehensible because a privileged company was to have the monopoly of the emission. The genius of Hamilton was put in requisition to answer this objection; and the best answer which that great man could give it, was a confession of the omnipotence of the objection, and the total impossibility of doing it away. His answer surrendered the whole question of a currency. It sunk the notes of the bank, which were then to be tendered to the federal government, to the condition of supplies furnished to the government, and to be consumed by it. The answer took refuge under the natural power, independent of all constitutions, for the tax receiver to receive his taxes in what articles he pleased. To do justice to General Hamilton, and to detect and expose the true character of this bank paper, Mr. B. read a clause from Gen. Hamilton's reply to the cabinet opinions of Mr. Jefferson, and the Attorney General Randolph, when President Washington had the charter of the first bank under advisement with his Secretaries. It was the clause in which General Hamilton replied to the objection to the constitutionality of making the notes of the bank receivable in payment of public dues. "To designate or appoint the money or thing in which taxes are to be paid, is not only a proper, but a necessary exercise of the power of collecting them. Accordingly, Congress, in the law concerning the collection of the duties, imposts, and tonnage, has provided that they shall be payable in gold and silver. But, while it was an indispensable part of the work to say in what they should be paid, the choice of the specific thing was a mere matter of discretion. The payment might have been required in the commodities themselves. Taxes in kind, however ill judged, are not without precedents, even in the United States; or it might have been in the paper money of the several States; or in the bills of the Bank of North America, New-York, and Massachusetts, all, or either of them; it might have been in bills issued under the authority of the United States. No part of this, it is presumed, can be disputed. The appointment of the money or thing in which the taxes are to be paid, is an incident of the power of collection. And among the expedients which may be adopted, is that of bills issued under the authority of the United States." Mr. B. would read no further, although the argument of General Hamilton extended through several pages. The nature of the argument is fully disclosed in what is read. It surrenders the whole question of a paper currency. Neither the power to furnish a currency, or to regulate currency, is pretended to be claimed. The notes of the new bank are put upon the footing, not of money, but of commodities – things – articles in kind – which the tax receiver may accept from the tax payer; and which are to be used and consumed by the tax receiver, and not to be returned to the people, much less to be diffused over the country in place of money. This is the original idea and conception of these notes. It is the idea under which they obtained the legal capacity of receivability in payment of public dues; and from this humble conception, this degraded assimilation to corn and grain, to clothes and provisions, they have, by virtue of that clause in the charter, crept up to the character of money – become the real, practical currency of the land – driven the currency of the constitution from the land – and so depraved the public intellect as now to be called for as money, and proclaimed to be indispensable to the country, when the author of the bank could not rank it higher than an expedient for paying a tax.