REMOVAL OF THE CREEK INDIANS FROM GEORGIA
By an agreement with the State of Georgia in the year 1802, the United States became bound, in consideration of the cession of the western territory, now constituting the States of Alabama and Mississippi, to extinguish the remainder of the Indian title within her limits, and to remove the Indians from the State; of which large and valuable portions were then occupied by the Creeks and Cherokees. No time was limited for the fulfilment of this obligation, and near a quarter of a century had passed away without seeing its full execution. At length Georgia, seeing no end to this delay, became impatient, and justly so, the long delay being equivalent to a breach of the agreement; for, although no time was limited for its execution, yet a reasonable time was naturally understood, and that incessant and faithful endeavors should be made by the United States to comply with her undertaking. In the years 1824-'25 this had become a serious question between the United States and Georgia – the compact being but partly complied with – and Mr. Monroe, in the last year of his Administration, and among its last acts, had the satisfaction to conclude a treaty with the Creek Indians for a cession of all their claims in the State, and their removal from it. This was the treaty of the Indian Springs, negotiated the 12th of February, 1825, the famous chief, Gen. Wm. McIntosh, and some fifty other chiefs signing it in the presence of Mr. Crowell, the United States Indian agent. It ceded all the Creek country in Georgia, and also several millions of acres in the State of Alabama. Complaints followed it to Washington as having been concluded by McIntosh without the authority of the nation. The ratification of the treaty was opposed, but finally carried, and by the strong vote of 34 to 4. Disappointed in their opposition to the treaty at Washington, the discontented party became violent at home, killed McIntosh and another chief, declared forcible resistance to the execution of the treaty, and prepared to resist. Georgia, on her part, determined to execute it by taking possession of the ceded territory. The Government of the United States felt itself bound to interfere. The new President, Mr. Adams, became impressed with the conviction that the treaty had been made without due authority, and that its execution ought not to be enforced; and sent Gen. Gaines with federal troops to the confines of Georgia. All Georgia was in a flame at this view of force, and the neighboring States sympathized with her. In the mean time the President, anxious to avoid violence, and to obtain justice for Georgia, treated further; and assembling the head men and chiefs of the Creeks at Washington City, concluded a new treaty with them (January, 1826); by which the treaty of Indian Springs was annulled, and a substitute for it negotiated, ceding all the Creek lands in Georgia, but none in Alabama. This treaty, with a message detailing all the difficulties of the question, was immediately communicated by the President to the Senate, and by it referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs, of which I was chairman. The committee reported against the ratification of the treaty, earnestly deprecated a collision of arms between the federal government and a State, and recommended further negotiations – a thing the more easy as the Creek chiefs were still at Washington. The objections to the new treaty were:
1. That it annulled the McIntosh treaty; thereby implying its illegality, and apparently justifying the fate of its authors.
2. Because it did not cede the whole of the Creek lands in Georgia.
3. Because it ceded none in Alabama.
Further negotiations according to the recommendation of the Senate, were had by the President; and on the 31st of March of the same year, a supplemental article was concluded, by which all the Creek lands in Georgia were ceded to her; and the Creeks within her borders bound to emigrate to a new home beyond the Mississippi. The vote in the Senate on ratifying this new treaty, and its supplemental article, was full and emphatic – thirty to seven: and the seven negatives all Southern senators favorable to the object, but dissatisfied with the clause which annulled the McIntosh treaty and implied a censure upon its authors. Northern senators voted in a body to do this great act of justice to Georgia, restrained by no unworthy feeling against the growth and prosperity of a slave State. And thus was carried into effect, after a delay of a quarter of a century, and after great and just complaint on the part of Georgia, the compact between that State and the United States of 1802. Georgia was paid at last for her great cession of territory, and obtained the removal of an Indian community out of her limits, and the use and dominion of all her soil for settlement and jurisdiction. It was an incalculable advantage to her, and sought in vain under three successive Southern Presidents – Jefferson, Madison, Monroe – (who could only obtain part concessions from the Indians) – and now accomplished under a Northern President, with the full concurrence and support of the Northern delegations in Congress: for the Northern representatives in the House voted the appropriations to carry the treaty into effect as readily as the senators had voted the ratification of the treaty itself. Candid men, friends to the harmony and stability of this Union, should remember these things when they hear the Northern States, on account of the conduct of some societies and individuals, charged with unjust and criminal designs towards the South.
An incident which attended the negotiation of the supplemental article to the treaty of January deserves to be commemorated, as an instance of the frauds which may attend Indian negotiations, and for which there is so little chance of detection by either of the injured parties, – by the Indians themselves, or by the federal government. When the President sent in the treaty of January, and after its rejection by the Senate became certain, thereby leaving the federal government and Georgia upon the point of collision, I urged upon Mr. James Barbour, the Secretary at War (of whose department the Indian Office was then a branch) the necessity of a supplemental article ceding all the Creek lands in Georgia; and assured him that, with that additional article, the treaty would be ratified, and the question settled. The Secretary was very willing to do all this, but said it was impossible, – that the chiefs would not agree to it. I recommended to him to make them some presents, so as to overcome their opposition; which he most innocently declined, because it would savor of bribery. In the mean time it had been communicated, to me, that the treaty already made was itself the work of great bribery; the sum of $160,000 out of $247,000, which it stipulated to the Creek nation, as a first payment, being a fund for private distribution among the chiefs who negotiated it. Having received this information, I felt quite sure that the fear of the rejection of the treaty, and the consequent loss of these $160,000, to the negotiating chiefs, would insure their assent to the supplemental article without the inducement of further presents. I had an interview with the leading chiefs, and made known to them the inevitable fact that the Senate would reject the treaty as it stood, but would ratify it with a supplemental article ceding all their lands in Georgia. With this information they agreed to the additional article: and then the whole was ratified, as I have already stated. But a further work remained behind. It was to balk the fraud of the corrupt distribution of $160,000 among a few chiefs; and that was to be done in the appropriation bill, and by a clause directing the whole treaty money to be paid to the nation instead of the chiefs. The case was communicated to the Senate in secret session, and a committee of conference appointed (Messrs. Benton, Van Buren, and Berrien) to agree with the House committee upon the proper clause to be put into the appropriation bill. It was also communicated to the Secretary at War. He sent in a report from Mr. McKinney, the Indian bureau clerk, and actual negotiator of the treaty, admitting the fact of the intended private distribution; which, in fact, could not be denied, as I held an original paper showing the names of all the intended recipients, with the sum allowed to each, beginning at $20,000 and ranging down to $5000: and that it was done with his cognizance.
Some extracts from speeches delivered on that occasion will well finish this view of a transaction which at one time threatened violence between a State and the federal government, and in which a great fraud in an Indian treaty Was detected and frustrated.
EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECHES IN THE SENATE AND IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
"Mr. Van Buren said he should state the circumstances of this case, and the views of the committee of conference. A treaty was made in this city, in which it was stipulated on the part of the United States, that $247,000, together with an annuity of $20,000 a year, and other considerations, should be paid to the Creeks, as a consideration for the extinguishment of their title to lands in the State of Georgia, which the United States, under the cession of 1802, were under obligations to extinguish. The bill from the other House to carry this treaty into effect, directed that the money should be paid and distributed among the chiefs and warriors. That bill came to the Senate, and a confidential communication was made to the Senate, from which it appeared that strong suspicions were entertained that a design existed on the part of the chiefs who made the treaty, to practise a fraud on the Creek nation, by dividing the money amongst themselves and associates. An amendment was proposed by the Senate, which provided for the payment of those moneys in the usual way, and the distribution of them in the usual manner, and in the usual proportion to which the Indians were entitled. That amendment was sent to the other House, who, unadvised as to the facts which were known to the Senate, refused to concur in it, and asked a conference. The conferees, on the part of the Senate, communicated their suspicions to the conferees on the part of the House, and asked them to unite in an application to the Department of War, for information on the subject. This was accordingly done, and the documents sent, in answer, were a letter from the Secretary of War, and a report by Mr. McKenney. From that report it appeared clear and satisfactory, that a design thus existed on the part of the Indians, by whom the treaty was negotiated, to distribute of the $247,000 to be paid for the cession by the United States, $159,750 among themselves, and a few favorite chiefs at home, and three Cherokee chiefs who had no interest in the property. Ridge and Vann were to receive by the original treaty $5000 each. By this agreement of the distribution of the money each was to receive $15,000 more, making $20,000 for each. Ridge, the father of Ridge who is here, was to receive $10,000. The other $100,000 was to be distributed, $5000, and, in some instances, $10,000 to the chiefs who negotiated the treaty here, varying from one to ten thousand dollars each.
"Mr. V. B. said, in his judgment, the character of the government was involved in this subject, and it would require, under the circumstances of this case, that they should take every step they could rightfully take to exculpate themselves from having, in any degree or form, concurred in this fraud. The sentiment of the American people where he resided was, and had been, highly excited on this subject; they had applauded, in the most ardent manner, the zeal manifested by the government to preserve themselves pure in their negotiations with the Indians; and though he was satisfied – though he deemed it impossible to suppose for a moment that government could have countenanced the practice of this fraud, yet there were circumstances in the case which required exculpation. Between the negotiation of the treaty and the negotiation of the supplementary article on which the treaty was finally adopted, all these circumstances were communicated to the Department of War by the two Cherokees. Mr. V. B. said it was not his purpose, because the necessity of the case did not require it, to say what the Secretary of War ought to have done, or to censure what he did do, when the information was given to him. He had known him many years, and there was not an honester man, or a man more devoted to his country, than that gentleman was. Mr. V. B. said it was not for him to have said what should have been the course of the President of the United States, if the information had been given to him on the subject. It could not fail to make a mortifying and most injurious impression on the minds of the people of this country, to find that no means whatever were taken for the suppression of this fraud. There was, and there ought to be, an excitement on the subject in the public mind."
"Mr. Benton said, that after the explanation of the views of the committee of conference which had been given by the senator from New-York (Mr. Van Buren), he would limit himself to a statement of facts on two or three points, on which references had been made to his personal knowledge.
"The Secretary of War had referred to him, in his letter to the committee, as knowing the fact that the Secretary had refused to give private gratuities to the Creek chiefs to promote the success of the negotiation. The reference was correct. Mr. B. had himself recommended the Secretary to do so; it was, however, about forty days after the treaty had been signed. He referred to a paper which fixed the date to the 9th or 10th of March, and the treaty had been signed in the month of January preceding. It was done at the time that Mr. B. had offered his services to procure the supplemental article to be adopted. The Secretary entirely condemned the practice of giving these gratuities. Mr. B. said he had recommended it as the only way of treating with barbarians; that, if not gratified in this way, the chiefs would prolong the negotiation, at a great daily expense to the government, until they got their gratuity in one way or other, or defeated the treaty altogether. He considered the practice to be sanctioned by the usage of the United States: he believed it to be common in all barbarous nations, and in many that were civilized; and referred to the article in the federal constitution against receiving "presents" from foreign powers, as a proof that the convention thought such a restriction to be necessary, even among ourselves.
"The time at which Mr. B. had offered his services to aid this negotiation, had appeared to him to be eminently critical, and big with consequences which he was anxious to avert. It was after this committee had resolved to report against the new treaty, and before they had made the report to the Senate. The decision, whatsoever it might be, and the consequent discussions, criminations, and recriminations, were calculated to bring on a violent struggle in the Senate itself; between the Senate and the Executive; perhaps between the two Houses (for a reference of the subject to both would have taken place); and between one or more States and the federal government. Mr. B. had concurred in the report against the new treaty, because it divested Georgia of vested rights; and, though objectionable in many other respects, he was willing, for the sake of peace, to ratify it, provided the vested rights of Georgia were not invaded. The supplemental article had relieved him upon this point. He thought that Georgia had no further cause of dissatisfaction with the treaty; it was Alabama that was injured by the loss of some millions of acres, which she had acquired under the treaty of 1825, and lost under that of 1826. Her case commanded his regrets and sympathy. She had lost the right of jurisdiction over a considerable extent of territory; and the advantages of settling, cultivating, and taxing the same, were postponed; but, he hoped, not indefinitely. But these were consequential advantages, resulting from an act which the government was not bound to do; and, though the loss of them was an injury, yet this injury could not be considered as a violation of vested rights; but the circumstance certainly increased the strength of her claim to the total extinction of the Indian titles within her limits and, he trusted, would have its due effect upon the Government of the United States.
"The third and last point on which Mr. B. thought references to his name had made it proper for him to give a statement, related to the circumstance which had induced the Senate to make the amendment which had become the subject of the conference between the two Houses. He had himself come to the knowledge of that circumstance in the last days of April, some weeks after the supplemental article had been ratified. He had deemed it to be his duty to communicate it to the Senate, and do it in a way that would avoid a groundless agitation of the public feeling, or unjust reflections upon any individual, white or red, if, peradventure, his information should turn out to have been untrue. He therefore communicated it to the Senate in secret session; and the effect of the information was immediately manifested in the unanimous determination of the Senate to adopt the amendment which was now under consideration. He deemed the amendment, or one that would effect the same object, to be called for by the circumstances of the case, and the relative state of the parties. It was apparent that a few chiefs were to have an undue proportion of the money – they had realized what he had foretold to the Secretary; and it was certain that the knowledge of this, whenever it should be found out by the nation, would occasion disturbances, and, perhaps, bloodshed. He thought that the United States should prevent these consequences, by preventing the cause of them, and, for this purpose, he would concur in any amendment that would effect a fair distribution of the money, or any distribution that was agreeable to the nation in open counsel."
Mr. Berrien: "You have arrived at the last scene in the present act of the great political drama of the Creek controversy. In its progress, you have seen two of the sovereign States of the American Confederation – especially, you have seen one of those States, which has always been faithful and forward in the discharge of her duties to this Union, driven to the wall, by the combined force of the administration and its allies consisting of a portion of the Creek nation, and certain Cherokee diplomatists. Hitherto, in the discussions before the Senate on this subject, I have imposed a restraint upon my own feelings under the influence of motives which have now ceased to operate. It was my first duty to obtain an acknowledgment, on this floor, of the rights of Georgia, repressing, for that purpose, even the story of her wrongs. It was my first duty, sir, and I have sacrificed to it every other consideration. As a motive to forbearance it no longer exists. The rights of Georgia have been prostrated.
"Sir, in the progress of that controversy, which has grown out of the treaty of the Indian Springs, the people of Georgia have been grossly and wantonly calumniated, and the acts of the administration have assisted to give currency to these calumnies. Her chief magistrate has been traduced. The solemn act of her legislature has been set at naught by a rescript of the federal Executive. A military force has been quartered on her borders to coerce her to submission; and without a trial, without the privilege of being heard, without the semblance of evidence, she has been deprived of rights secured to her by the solemn stipulations of treaty.
"When, in obedience to the will of the legislature of Georgia, her chief magistrate had communicated to the President his determination to survey the ceded territory, his right to do so was admitted. It was declared by the President that the act would be 'wholly' on the responsibility of the government of Georgia, and that 'the Government of the United States would not be in any manner responsible for any consequences which might result from the measure.' When his willingness to encounter this responsibility was announced, it was met by the declaration that the President would 'not permit the survey to be made,' and he was referred to a major-general of the army of the United States, and one thousand regulars.
"The murder of McIntosh – the defamation of the chief magistrate of Georgia – the menace of military force to coerce her to submission – were followed by the traduction of two of her cherished citizens, employed as the agents of the General Government in negotiating the treaty – gentlemen whose integrity will not shrink from a comparison with that of the proudest and loftiest of their accusers. Then the sympathies of the people of the Union were excited in behalf of 'the children of the forest,' who were represented as indignantly spurning the gold, which was offered to entice them from the graves of their fathers, and resolutely determined never to abandon them. The incidents of the plot being thus prepared, the affair hastens to its consummation. A new treaty is negotiated here —a pure and spotless treaty. The rights of Georgia and of Alabama are sacrificed; the United States obtain a part of the lands, and pay double the amount stipulated by the old treaty; and those poor and noble, and unsophisticated sons of the forest, having succeeded in imposing on the simplicity of this government, next concert, under its eye, and with its knowledge, the means of defrauding their own constituents, the chiefs and warriors of the Creek nation.
"For their agency in exciting the Creeks to resist the former treaty, and in deluding this government to annul it, three Cherokees – Ridge, Vann, and the father of the former– are to receive forty thousand dollars of the money stipulated to be paid by the United States to the chiefs of the Creek nation; and the government, when informed of the projected fraud, deems itself powerless to avert it. Nay, when apprised by your amendment, that you had also detected it, that government does not hesitate to interpose, by one of its high functionaries, to resist your proceeding, by a singular fatuity, thus giving its countenance and support to the commission of the fraud. Sir, I speak of what has passed before your eyes even in this hall.
"One fifth of the whole purchase money is to be given to three Cherokees. Ten thousand dollars reward one of the heroes of Fort Mims – a boon which it so well becomes us to bestow. A few chosen favorites divide among themselves upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, leaving a pittance for distribution among the great body of the chiefs and warriors of the nation.
"But the administration, though it condemns the fraud, thinks that we have no power to prevent its consummation. What, sir, have we no power to see that our own treaty is carried into effect? Have we no interest in doing so? Have we no power? We have stipulated for the payment of two hundred and forty-seven thousand dollars to the chiefs of the Creek nation, to be distributed among the chiefs and warriors of that nation. Is not the distribution part of the contract as well as the payment? We know that a few of those chiefs, in fraudulent violation of the rights secured by that treaty, are about to appropriate this money to themselves. Are we powerless to prevent it? Nay, must we, too, suffer ourselves to be made the conscious instruments of its consummation? We have made a bargain with a savage tribe which you choose to dignify with the name of a treaty concerning whom we legislate with their consent, or without it, as it seems good in our eyes. We know that some ten or twenty of them are about to cheat the remainder. We have the means in our hands, without which their corrupt purpose cannot be effected. Have we not the right to see that our own bargain is honestly fulfilled? Consistently with common honesty, can we put the consideration money of the contract into the hands of those who we know are about to defraud the people who trusted them? Sir, the proposition is absurd.
"Mr. Forsyth (of the House of Representatives) said: A stupendous fraud, it seems, was intended by the delegation who had formed, with the Secretary of War, the new contract. The chiefs composing the Creek diplomatic train, assisted by their Cherokee secretaries of legation, had combined to put into their own pockets, and those of a few select friends, somewhere about three fourths of the first payment to be made for the second cession of the lands lying in Georgia. The facts connected with this transaction, although concealed from the Senate when the second contract was before them for ratification, and from the House when the appropriation bill to carry it into effect was under consideration, were perfectly understood at the War Department by the Secretary, and by his clerk, who is called the head of the Indian Bureau (Mr. Thomas L. McKinney). The Senate having, by some strange fortune, discovered the intended fraud, after the ratification of the contract, and before they acted on the appropriation bill, wished, by an amendment to the bill, to prevent the success of the profitable scheme of villany. The House, entirely ignorant of the facts, and not suspecting the motive of the amendment, had rejected it, insisted upon their disagreement to it, and a committee of the two Houses, as usual, had conferred on the subject. Now, that the facts are ascertained by the separate reports of the Committees, there can be no difference of opinion on the great point of defeating the intended treachery of the delegation and secretaries to the Creek tribe. The only matter which can bear discussion, is, how shall the treachery be punished? – how shall the Creek tribe be protected from the abominable designs of their worthless and unprincipled agents? Will the amendment proposed by the committee reach their object? The plan is, to pay the money to the chiefs, to be divided among the chiefs and warriors, under the direction of the Secretary of War, in a full council of the nation, convened for the purpose. Suppose the council in solemn session, the money before them, and the division about to be made, under the direction of the Secretary of War – may not the chiefs and their secretaries claim the money, as promised to them under the treaty, and how will the Secretary or his agent resist the claim? They assented – the House will perceive that the only difficulty was the amount of the bribe. The Secretary was willing to go as high as five thousand dollars, but could not stretch to ten thousand dollars. Notwithstanding the assent of the Cherokees, and the declaration of the Secretary, that five thousand dollars each was the extent that they could be allowed, Ridge and Vann, after the treaty was signed, and before it was acted on by the Senate, or submitted to that body, brought a paper, the precious list of the price of each traitor, for the inspection and information of the head of the bureau and the head of the department; and what answer did they receive from both? The head of the bureau said it was their own affair. The Secretary said he presumed it was their own affair. But I ask this House, if the engagement for the five thousand dollars, and the list of the sums to be distributed, may not be claimed as part of this new contract? If these persons have not a right to claim, in the face of the tribe, these sums, as promised to them by their Great Father? Ay, sir; and, if they are powerful enough in the tribe, they will enforce their claim. Under what pretext will your Secretary of War direct a different disposition or division of the money, after his often repeated declaration, 'it is their own affair' – the affair of the delegation? Yes, sir, so happily has this business been managed at the seat of government, under the Executive eye, that this division which the negotiators proposed to make of the spoil, may be termed a part of the consideration of the contract. It must be confessed that these exquisite ambassadors were quite liberal to themselves, their secretaries, and particular friends: one hundred and fifty-nine thousand seven hundred dollars, to be divided among some twenty persons, is pretty well! What name shall we give to this division of money among them? To call it a bribe, would shock the delicacy of the War Department, and possibly offend those gentle spirited politicians, who resemble Cowper's preachers, 'who could not mention hell to ears polite.' The transcendent criminality of this design cannot be well understood, without recalling to recollection the dark and bloody scenes of the year past. The chief McIntosh, distinguished at all times by his courage and devotion to the whites, deriving his name of the White Warrior, from his mixed parentage, had formed, with his party, the treaty of the Indian Springs. He was denounced for it. His midnight sleep was broken by the crackling flames of his dwelling burning over his head. Escaping from the flames, he was shot down by a party acting under the orders of the persons who accused him of betraying, for his own selfish purposes, the interest of the tribe. Those who condemned that chief, the incendiaries and the murderers, are the negotiators of this new contract; the one hundred and fifty-nine thousand dollars, is to be the fruit of their victory over the assassinated chief. What evidence of fraud, and selfishness, and treachery, has red or white malice been able to exhibit against the dead warrior? A reservation of land for him, in the contract of 1821, was sold by him to the United States, for twenty-five thousand dollars; a price he could have obtained from individuals, if his title had been deemed secure. This sale of property given to him by the tribe, was the foundation of the calumnies that have been heaped upon his memory, and the cause which, in the eyes of our administration newspaper editors, scribblers, and reviewers, justified his execution. Now, sir, the executioners are to be rewarded by pillaging the public Treasury. I look with some curiosity for the indignant denunciations of this accidentally discovered treachery. Perhaps it will be discovered that all this new business of the Creeks is 'their own affair,' with which the white editors and reviewers have nothing to do. Fortunately, Mr. F. said, Congress had something to do with this affair. We owe a justice to the tribe. This amendment, he feared, would not do justice. The power of Congress should be exerted, not only to keep the money out of the hands of these wretches, but to secure a faithful and equal distribution of it among the whole Creek nation. The whole tribe hold the land; their title by occupancy resides in all; all are rightfully claimants to equal portions of the price of their removal from it. The country is not aware how the Indian annuities are distributed, or the moneys paid to the tribes disposed of. They are divided according to the discretion of the Indian government, completely aristocratical – all the powers vested in a few chiefs. Mr. F. had it from authority he could not doubt, that the Creek annuities had, for years past, been divided in very unequal proportions, not among the twenty thousand souls of which the tribe was believed to be composed, but among about one thousand five hundred chiefs and warriors.
"Mr. Forsyth expressed his hope that the House would reject the report of the committee. Before taking his seat, he asked the indulgence of the House, while he made a few comments on this list of worthies, and the prices to be paid to each. At the head of the list stands Mr. Ridge, with the sum of $15,000 opposite to his elevated name. This man is no Creek, but a Cherokee, educated among the whites, allied to them by marriage – has received lessons in Christianity, morality, and sentiment – perfectly civilized, according to the rules and customs of Cornwall. This negotiation, of which he has been, either as actor or instrument, the principal manager is an admirable proof of the benefits he has derived from his residence among a moral and religious people. Vann, another Cherokee, half savage and half civilized, succeeds him with $15,000 bounty. A few inches below comes another Ridge, the major, father to the secretary – a gallant old fellow, who did some service against the hostile Creeks, during the late war, for which he deserved and received acknowledgments – but what claims he had to this Creek money, Mr. F. could not comprehend. Probably his name was used merely to cover another gratuity for the son, whose modesty would not permit him to take more than $15,000 in his own name. These Cherokees were together to receive $40,000 of Creek money, and the Secretary of War is of opinion it is quite consistent with the contract, which provides for the distribution of it among the chiefs and warriors of the Creeks. Look, sir, at the distinction made for these exquisites. Yopothle Yoholo, whose word General Gaines would take against the congregated world, is set down for but $10,000. The Little Prince but $10,000. Even Menawee, distinguished as he is as the leader of the party who murdered McIntosh and Etome Tustunnuggee – as one of the accursed band who butchered three hundred men, women, and children, at Fort Mims – has but $10,000. A distinguished Red Stick, in these days, when kindness to Indians is shown in proportion to their opposition to the policy of the General Government, might have expected better treatment – only ten thousand dollars to our enemy in war and in peace! But, sir, I will not detain the House longer. I should hold myself criminal if I had exposed these things unnecessarily or uselessly. That patriotism only is lovely which, imitating the filial piety of the sons of the Patriarch, seeks, with averted face, to cover the nakedness of the country from the eye of a vulgar and invidious curiosity. But the commands of public duty must be obeyed; let those who have imposed this duty upon us answer for it to the people."
"Mr. Tatnall, of Geo. (H. R.) He was as confident as his colleagues could be, that the foulest fraud had been projected by some of the individuals calling themselves a part of the Creek delegation, and that it was known to the department of war before the ratification of the treaty, and was not communicated by that department to the Senate, either before or during the pendency of the consideration of the treaty by that body. Mr. T. said he would not, however, for the reasons just mentioned, dwell on this ground, but would proceed to state, that he was in favor of the amendment offered by the committee of conference, (and therein he differed from his colleague), which, whilst it would effectually prevent the commission of the fraud intended, would, also, avoid a violation of the terms of 'the new treaty,' as it was styled. He stated, that the list which he held in his hand was, itself, conclusive evidence of a corrupt intention to divide the greater part of the money among the few persons named in it. In this list, different sums were written opposite the names of different individuals, such, for instance, as the following: 'John Ridge, $15,000 – Joseph Vann, 15,000' (both Cherokees, and not Creeks, and, therefore, not entitled to one cent). The next, a long and barbarous Indian name, which I shall not attempt to pronounce. '$10,000' – next, John Stedham, '$10,000,' &c. This list, as it appears in the documents received from the Secretary of War, was presented to the war department by Ridge and Vann."
CHAPTER XXV.
THE PANAMA MISSION
The history of this mission, or attempted mission (for it never took effect, though eventually sanctioned by both Houses of Congress), deserves a place in this inside view of the working of our government. Though long since sunk into oblivion, and its name almost forgotten, it was a master subject on the political theatre during its day; and gave rise to questions of national, and of constitutional law, and of national policy, the importance of which survive the occasion from which they sprung; and the solution of which (as then solved), may be some guide to future action, if similar questions again occur. Besides the grave questions to which the subject gave rise, the subject itself became one of unusual and painful excitement. It agitated the people, made a violent debate in the two Houses of Congress, inflamed the passions of parties and individuals, raised a tempest before which Congress bent, made bad feeling between the President and the Senate; and led to the duel between Mr. Randolph and Mr. Clay. It was an administration measure, and pressed by all the means known to an administration. It was evidently relied upon as a means of acting upon the people – as a popular movement, which might have the effect of turning the tide which was then running high against Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay on account of the election in the House of Representatives, and the broad doctrines of the inaugural address, and of the first annual message; and it was doubtless well imagined for that purpose. It was an American movement, and republican. It was the assembly of the American states of Spanish origin, counselling for their mutual safety and independence; and presenting the natural wish for the United States to place herself at their head, as the eldest sister of the new republics, and the one whose example and institutions the others had followed. The monarchies of Europe had formed a "Holy Alliance," to check the progress of liberty: it seemed just that the republics of the New World should confederate against the dangers of despotism. The subject had a charm in it; and the name and place of meeting recalled classic and cherished recollections. It was on an isthmus – the Isthmus of Panama – which connected the two Americas, the Grecian republics had their isthmus – that of Corinth – where their deputies assembled. All the advantages in the presentation of the question were on the side of the administration. It addressed itself to the imagination – to the passions – to the prejudices; – and could only be met by the cold and sober suggestions of reason and judgment. It had the prestige of name and subject, and was half victor before the contest began; and it required bold men to make head against it.
The debate began in the Senate, upon the nomination of ministers; and as the Senate sat with closed doors, their objections were not heard, while numerous presses, and popular speakers, excited the public mind in favor of the measure, and inflamed it against the Senate for delaying its sanction. It was a plan conceived by the new Spanish American republics, and prepared as a sort of amphictyonic council for the settlement of questions among themselves; and, to which, in a manner which had much the appearance of our own procuring, we had received an invitation to send deputies. The invitation was most seductively exhibited in all the administration presses; and captivated all young and ardent imaginations. The people were roused: the majority in both Houses of Congress gave way (many against their convictions, as they frankly told me), while the project itself – our participation in it – was utterly condemned by the principles of our constitution, and by the policy which forbade "entangling alliances," and the proposed congress itself was not even a diplomatic body to which ministers could be sent under the law of nations. To counteract the effect of this outside current, the Senate, on the motion of Mr. Van Buren, adopted a resolve to debate the question with open doors, "unless, in the opinion of the President, the publication of documents necessary to be referred to in debate should be prejudicial to existing negotiations: " and a copy of the resolve was sent to Mr. Adams for his opinion on that point. He declined to give it, and left it to the Senate to decide for itself, "the question of an unexampled departure from its own usages, and upon the motives of which not being himself informed, he did not feel himself competent to decide." This reference to the motives of the members, and the usages of the Senate, with its clear implication of the badness of one, and the violation of the other, gave great offence in the Senate, and even led to a proposition (made by Mr. Rowan of Kentucky), not to act on the nominations until the information requested should be given. In the end the Senate relinquished the idea of a public debate, and contented itself with its publication after it was over. Mr. John Sergeant of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Richard Clark Anderson of Kentucky, were the ministers nominated; and, the question turning wholly upon the mission itself, and not upon the persons nominated (to whose fitness there was no objection), they were confirmed by a close vote – 24 to 20. The negatives were: Messrs. Benton, Berrien, Branch, Chandler, Cobb (Thomas W. of Georgia), Dickerson, Eaton, Findlay, Hayne, Holmes of Maine, Kane, King of Alabama, Macon, Randolph, Tazewell, Rowan, Van Buren, White of Tennessee, Williams of Mississippi, Woodbury. The Vice-President, Mr. Calhoun, presiding in the Senate, had no vote, the constitutional contingency to authorize it not having occurred: but he was full and free in the expression of his opinion against the mission.
It was very nearly a party vote, the democracy as a party, being against it: but of those of the party who voted for it, the design of this history (which is to show the working of the government) requires it to be told that there was afterwards, either to themselves or relatives, some large dispensations of executive patronage. Their votes may have been conscientious; but in that case, it would have been better to have vindicated the disinterestedness of the act, by the total refusal of executive favor. Mr. Adams commenced right, by asking the advice of the Senate, before he instituted the mission; but the manner in which the object was pursued, made it a matter of opposition to the administration to refuse it, and greatly impaired the harmony which ought to exist between the President and the Senate. After all, the whole conception of the Panama congress was an abortion. It died out of itself, without ever having been once held – not even by the states which had conceived it. It was incongruous and impracticable, even for them, – more apt to engender disputes among themselves than to harmonize action against Spain, – and utterly foreign to us, and dangerous to our peace and institutions. The basis of the agreement for the congress, was the existing state of war between all the new states and the mother country – Spanish pride and policy being slow to acknowledge the independence of revolted colonies, no matter how independent in fact; – and the wish to establish concert among themselves, in the mode of treating her commerce, and that of such of her American possessions (Cuba, Porto Rico), as had not thrown off their subjection. We were at peace with Spain, and could not go into any such council without compromising our neutrality, and impairing the integrity of our national character. Besides the difficulties it would involve with Spain, there was one subject specified in the treaties for discussion and settlement in that congress, namely, the considerations of future relations with the government of Haiti, which would have been a firebrand in the southern half of our Union, – not to be handled or touched by our government any where. The publication of the secret debates in the Senate on the nomination of the ministers, and the public discussion in the House of Representatives on the appropriation clauses, to carry the mission into effect, succeeded, after some time, in dissipating all the illusions which had fascinated the public mind – turned the current against the administration – made the project a new head of objection to its authors; and in a short time it would have been impossible to obtain any consideration for it, either in Congress or before the people. It is now entirely forgotten, but deserves to be remembered in this View of the working of the government, to show the questions of policy, of national and constitutional law which were discussed – the excitement which can be got up without foundation, and against reason – how public men can bend before a storm – how all the departments of the government can go wrong: – and how the true conservative power in our country is in the people, in their judgment and reason, and in steady appeals to their intelligence and patriotism.
Mr. Adams communicated the objects of the proposed congress, so far as the United States could engage in them, in a special message to the Senate; in which, disclaiming all part in any deliberations of a belligerent character, or design to contract alliances, or to engage in any project importing hostility to any other nation, he enumerated, as the measures in which we could well take part, 1. The establishment of liberal principles of commercial intercourse, which he supposed could be best done in an assembly of all the American states together. 2. The consentaneous adoption of principles of maritime neutrality. 3. The doctrine that free ships make free goods. 4. An agreement that the "Monroe doctrine," as it is called, should be adopted by the congress, each state to guard, by its own means, its own territory from future European colonization. The enunciation of this doctrine, so different from what it has of late been supposed to be, as binding the United States to guard all the territory of the New World from European colonization, makes it proper to give this passage from Mr. Adams's message in his own words. They are these: "An agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting, that each will guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders, may be found advisable. This was, more than two years since, announced by my predecessor to the world, as a principle resulting from the emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so developed to the new southern nations, that they may feel it as an essential appendage to their independence." These were the words of Mr. Adams, who had been a member of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, and filling the department from which the doctrine would emanate; written at a time when the enunciation of it was still fresh, and when he himself, in a communication to the American Senate, was laying it down for the adoption of all the American nations in a general congress of their deputies. The circumstances of the communication render it incredible that Mr. Adams could be deceived in his understanding; and, according to him, this "Monroe doctrine" (according to which it has been of late believed that the United States were to stand guard over the two Americas, and repulse all intrusive colonists from their shores), was entirely confined to our own borders: that it was only proposed to get the other states of the New World to agree that, each for itself, and by its own means, should guard its own territories: and, consequently, that the United States, so far from extending gratuitous protection to the territories of other states, would neither give, nor receive, aid in any such enterprise, but that each should use its own means, within its own borders, for its own exemption from European colonial intrusion. 5. A fifth object proposed by Mr. Adams, in which he supposed our participation in the business of the Panama congress might be rightfully and beneficially admitted, related to the advancement of religious liberty: and as this was a point at which the message encountered much censure, I will give it in its own words. They are these "There is yet another subject upon which, with out entering into any treaty, the moral influence of the United States may, perhaps, be exerted with beneficial influence at such meeting – the advancement of religious liberty. Some of the southern nations are, even yet, so far under the dominion of prejudice, that they have incorporated, with their political constitutions, an exclusive Church, without toleration of any other than the dominant sect. The abandonment of this last badge of religious bigotry and oppression, may be pressed more effectually by the united exertions of those who concur in the principles of freedom of conscience, upon those who are yet to be convinced of their justice and wisdom, than by the solitary efforts of a minister to any one of their separate governments." 6. The sixth and last object named by Mr. Adams was, to give proofs of our good will to all the new southern republics, by accepting their invitation to join them in the congress which they proposed of American nations. The President enumerated no others of the objects to which the discussions of the congress might be directed; but in the papers which he communicated with the invitations he had received, many others were mentioned, one of which was, "the basis on which the relations with Haiti should be placed;" and the other, "to consider and settle the future relations with Cuba and Porto Rico."
The message was referred to the Senate's Committee on Foreign Affairs, consisting of Mr. Macon, Mr. Tazewell, and Mr. Gaillard of South Carolina, Mr. Mills of Massachusetts, and Mr. Hugh L. White of Tennessee. The committee reported adversely to the President's recommendation, and replied to the message, point by point. It is an elaborate document, of great ability and research, and well expressed the democratic doctrines of that day. It was presented by Mr. Macon, the chairman of the committee, and was drawn, by Mr. Tazewell, and was the report of which Mr. Macon, when complimented upon it, was accustomed to answer, "Yes: it is a good report. Tazewell wrote it." But it was his also; for no power could have made him present it, without declaring the fact, if he had not approved it. The general principle of the report was that of good will and friendship to all the young republics, and the cultivation of social, commercial and political relations with each one individually; but no entangling connection, and no internal interference with any one. On the suggestion of advancing religious freedom, the committee remark:
"In the opinion of this committee, there is no proposition, concerning which the people of the United States are now and ever have been more unanimous, than that which denies, not merely the expediency, but the right of intermeddling with the internal affairs of other states; and especially of seeking to alter any provision they may have thought proper to adopt as a fundamental law, or may have incorporated with their political constitutions. And if there be any such subject more sacred and delicate than another, as to which the United States ought never to intermeddle, even by obtrusive advice, it is that which concerns religious liberty. The most cruel and devastating wars have been produced by such interferences; the blood of man has been poured out in torrents; and, from the days of the crusades to the present hour, no benefit has resulted to the human family, from discussions carried on by nations upon such subjects. Among the variety even of Christian nations which now inhabit the earth, rare indeed are the examples to be found of states who have not established an exclusive church; and to far the greater number of these toleration is yet unknown. In none of the communications which have taken place, is the most distant allusion made to this delicate subject, by any of the ministers who have given this invitation; and the committee feel very confident in the opinion, that, if ever an intimation shall be made to the sovereignties they represent, that it was the purpose of the United States to discuss at the proposed congress, their plans of internal civil polity, or any thing touching the supposed interests of their religious establishments, the invitation given would soon be withdrawn."
On the subject of the "Monroe doctrine," the report shows that, one of the new republics (Colombia) proposed that this doctrine should be enforced "by the joint and united efforts of all the states to be represented in the congress, who should be bound by a solemn convention to secure this end. It was in answer to this proposition that the President in his message showed the extent of that doctrine to be limited to our own territories, and that all that we could do, would be to enter into agreement that each should guard, by its own means, against the establishment of any foreign colony within its borders. Even such an agreement the committee deemed unadvisable, and that there was no more reason for making it a treaty stipulation than there was for reducing to such stipulations any other of the "high, just, and universally admitted rights of all nations." The favorable commercial treaties which the President expected to obtain, the committee believed would be more readily obtained from each nation separately (in which opinion their foresight has been justified by the event); and that each treaty would be the more easily kept in proportion to the smaller number of parties to it. The ameliorations of the laws of nations which the President proposed, in the adoption of principles of maritime neutrality, and that free ships should make free goods, and the restriction of paper blockades, were deemed by the committee objects beyond the enforcement of the American states alone; and the enforcement of which, if agreed to, might bring the chief burthen of enforcement upon the United States; and the committee doubted the policy of undertaking, by negotiation with these nations, to settle abstract propositions, as parts of public law. On the subject of Cuba and Porto Rico, the report declared that the United States could never regard with indifference their actual condition, or future destiny; – but deprecated any joint action in relation to them, or any action to which they themselves were not parties; and it totally discountenanced any joint discussion or action in relation to the future of Haïti. To the whole of the new republics, the report expressed the belief that, the retention of our present unconnected and friendly position towards them, would be most for their own benefit, and enable the United States to act most effectually for them in the case of needing our good offices. It said:
"While the United States retain the position which they have hitherto occupied, and manifest a constant determination not to mingle their interests with those of the other states of America, they may continue to employ the influence which they possess, and have already happily exerted, with the nations of Europe, in favor of these new republics. But, if ever the United States permit themselves to be associated with these nations in any general congress, assembled for the discussion of common plans, in the way affecting European interests, they will, by such an act, not only deprive themselves of the ability they now possess, of rendering useful assistance to the other American states, but also produce other effects, prejudicial to their own interests. Then, the powers of Europe, who have hitherto confided in the sagacity, vigilance, and impartiality of the United States, to watch, detect, announce, and restrain any disposition that the heat of the existing contest might excite in the new states of America, to extend their empires beyond their own limits, and who have, therefore, considered their possessions and commerce in America safe, while so guarded, would no longer feel this confidence."
The advantage of pursuing our old policy, and maintaining friendly relations with all powers, "entangling alliances with none," was forcibly presented in a brief and striking paragraph:
"And the United States, who have grown up in happiness, to their present prosperity, by a strict observance of their old well-known course of policy, and by manifesting entire good will and most profound respect for all other nations, must prepare to embark their future destinies upon an unknown and turbulent ocean, directed by little experience, and destined for no certain haven. In such a voyage the dissimilitude existing between themselves and their associates, in interest, character, language, religion, manners, customs, habits, laws, and almost every other particular: and the rivalship these discrepancies must surely produce amongst them, would generate discords, which, if they did not destroy all hope of its successful termination, would make even success itself the ultimate cause of new and direful conflicts between themselves. Such has been the issue of all such enterprises in past time; and we have therefore strong reasons to expect in the future, similar results from similar causes."
The committee dissented from the President on the point of his right to institute the mission without the previous advice and consent of the Senate. The President averred his right to do so: but deemed it advisable, under all the circumstances, to waive the right, and ask the advice. The committee averred the right of the Senate to decide directly upon the expedience of this new mission; grounding the right upon its originality, and holding that when a new mission is to be instituted it is the creation of an office, not the filling of a vacancy; and that the Senate have a right to decide upon the expediency of the office itself.
I spoke myself on this question, and to all the points which it presented, and on the subject of relations with Haiti (on which a uniform rule was to be determined on, or a rule with modifications, according to the proposition of Colombia) I held that our policy was fixed, and could be neither altered, nor discussed in any foreign assembly; and especially in the one proposed; all the other parties to which had already placed the two races (black and white) on the basis of political equality. I said:
"Our policy towards Haïti, the old San Domingo, has been fixed for three and thirty years. We trade with her, but no diplomatic relations have been established between us. We purchase coffee from her, and pay her for it; but we interchange no consuls or ministers. We receive no mulatto consuls, or black ambassadors from her. And why? Because the peace of eleven States in this Union will not permit the fruits of a successful negro insurrection to be exhibited among them. It will not permit black consuls and ambassadors to establish themselves in our cities, and to parade through our country, and give to their fellow blacks in the United States, proof in hand of the honors which await them, for a like successful effort on their part. It will not permit the fact to be seen, and told, that for the murder of their masters and mistresses, they are to find friends among the white people of these United States. No, this is a question which has been determined HERE for three and thirty years; one which has never been open for discussion, at home or abroad, neither under the Presidency of Gen. Washington, of the first Mr. Adams, of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, or Mr. Monroe. It is one which cannot be discussed in this chamber on this day; and shall we go to Panama to discuss it? I take it in the mildest supposed character of this Congress – shall we go there to advise and consult in council about it? Who are to advise and sit in judgment upon it? Five nations who have already put the black man upon an equality with the white, not only in their constitutions but in real life: five nations who have at this moment (at least some of them) black generals in their armies and mulatto senators in their congresses!"
No question, in its day, excited more heat and intemperate discussion, or more feeling between a President and Senate, than this proposed mission to the congress of American nations at Panama; and no heated question ever cooled off, and died out so suddenly and completely. And now the chief benefit to be derived from its retrospect – and that indeed is a real one – is a view of the firmness with which was then maintained by a minority, the old policy of the United States, to avoid entangling alliances and interference with the affairs of other nations; – and the exposition of the Monroe doctrine, from one so competent to give it as Mr. Adams.
CHAPTER XXVI.
DUEL BETWEEN MR. CLAY AND MR. RANDOLPH
It was Saturday, the first day of April, towards noon, the Senate not being that day in session, that Mr. Randolph came to my room at Brown's Hotel, and (without explaining the reason of the question) asked me if I was a blood-relation of Mrs. Clay? I answered that I was, and he immediately replied that that put an end to a request which he had wished to make of me; and then went on to tell me that he had just received a challenge from Mr. Clay, had accepted it, was ready to go out, and would apply to Col. Tatnall to be his second. Before leaving, he told me he would make my bosom the depository of a secret which he should commit to no other person: it was, that he did not intend to fire at Mr. Clay. He told it to me because he wanted a witness of his intention, and did not mean to tell it to his second or any body else; and enjoined inviolable secrecy until the duel was over. This was the first notice I had of the affair. The circumstances of the delivery of the challenge I had from Gen. Jesup, Mr. Clay's second, and they were so perfectly characteristic of Mr. Randolph that I give them in detail, and in the General's own words:
"I was unable to see Mr. Randolph until the morning of the 1st of April, when I called on him for the purpose of delivering the note. Previous to presenting it however, I thought it proper to ascertain from Mr. Randolph himself whether the information which Mr. Clay had received – that he considered himself personally accountable for the attack on him – was correct. I accordingly informed Mr. Randolph that I was the bearer of a message from Mr. Clay, in consequence of an attack which he had made upon his private as well as public character in the Senate; that I was aware no one had the right to question him out of the Senate for any thing said in debate, unless he chose voluntarily to waive his privileges as a member of that body. Mr. Randolph replied, that the constitution did protect him, but he would never shield himself under such a subterfuge as the pleading of his privilege as a senator from Virginia; that he did hold himself accountable to Mr. Clay; but he said that gentleman had first two pledges to redeem: one that he had bound himself to fight any member of the House of Representatives, who should acknowledge himself the author of a certain publication in a Philadelphia paper; and the other that he stood pledged to establish certain facts in regard to a great man, whom he would not name; but, he added he could receive no verbal message from Mr. Clay – that any message from him must be in writing. I replied that I was not authorized by Mr. Clay to enter into or receive any verbal explanations – that the inquiries I had made were for my own satisfaction and upon my own responsibility – that the only message of which I was the bearer was in writing. I then presented the note, and remarked that I knew nothing of Mr. Clay's pledges; but that if they existed as he (Mr. Randolph) understood them, and he was aware of them when he made the attack complained of, he could not avail himself of them – that by making the attack I thought he had waived them himself. He said he had not the remotest intention of taking advantage of the pledges referred to; that he had mentioned them merely to remind me that he was waiving his privilege, not only as a senator from Virginia, but as a private gentleman; that he was ready to respond to Mr. Clay, and would be obliged to me if I would bear his note in reply; and that he would in the course of the day look out for a friend. I declined being the bearer of his note, but informed him my only reason for declining was, that I thought he owed it to himself to consult his friends before taking so important a step. He seized my hand, saying, 'You are right, sir. I thank you for the suggestion: but as you do not take my note, you must not be impatient if you should not hear from me to-day. I now think of only two friends, and there are circumstances connected with one of them which may deprive me of his services, and the other is in bad health – he was sick yesterday, and may not be out to-day.' I assured him that any reasonable time which he might find necessary to take would be satisfactory. I took leave of him; and it is due to his memory to say that his bearing was, throughout the interview, that of a high-toned, chivalrous gentleman of the old school."
These were the circumstances of the delivery of the challenge, and the only thing necessary to give them their character is to recollect that, with this prompt acceptance and positive refusal to explain, and this extra cut about the two pledges, there was a perfect determination not to fire at Mr. Clay. That determination rested on two grounds; first, an entire unwillingness to hurt Mr. Clay; and, next, a conviction that to return the fire would be to answer, and would be an implied acknowledgment of Mr. Clay's right to make him answer. This he would not do, neither by implication nor in words. He denied the right of any person to question him out of the Senate for words spoken within it. He took a distinction between man and senator. As senator he had a constitutional immunity, given for a wise purpose, and which he would neither surrender nor compromise; as individual he was ready to give satisfaction for what was deemed an injury. He would receive, but not return a fire. It was as much as to say: Mr. Clay may fire at me for what has offended him; I will not, by returning the fire, admit his right to do so. This was a subtle distinction, and that in case of life and death, and not very clear to the common intellect; but to Mr. Randolph both clear and convincing. His allusion to the "two pledges unredeemed," which he might have plead in bar to Mr. Clay's challenge, and would not, was another sarcastic cut at Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay, while rendering satisfaction for cuts already given. The "member of the House" was Mr. George Kremer, of Pennsylvania, who, at the time of the presidential election in the House of Representatives, had avowed himself to be the author of an anonymous publication, the writer of which Mr. Clay had threatened to call to account if he would avow himself – and did not. The "great man" was President Adams, with whom Mr. Clay had had a newspaper controversy, involving a question of fact, – which had been postponed. The cause of this sarcastic cut, and of all the keen personality in the Panama speech, was the belief that the President and Secretary, the latter especially, encouraged the newspapers in their interest to attack him, which they did incessantly; and he chose to overlook the editors and retaliate upon the instigators, as he believed them to be. This he did to his heart's content in that speech – and to their great annoyance, as the coming of the challenge proved. The "two friends" alluded to were Col. Tatnall and myself, and the circumstances which might disqualify one of the two were those of my relationship to Mrs. Clay, of which he did not know the degree, and whether of affinity or consanguinity – considering the first no obstacle, the other a complete bar to my appearing as his second – holding, as he did, with the tenacity of an Indian, to the obligations of blood, and laying but little stress on marriage connections. His affable reception and courteous demeanor to Gen. Jesup were according to his own high breeding, and the decorum which belonged to such occasions. A duel in the circle to which he belonged was "an affair of honor;" and high honor, according to its code, must pervade every part of it. General Jesup had come upon an unpleasant business. Mr. Randolph determined to put him at his ease; and did it so effectually as to charm him into admiration. The whole plan of his conduct, down to contingent details, was cast in his mind instantly, as if by intuition, and never departed from. The acceptance, the refusal to explain, the determination not to fire, the first and second choice of a friend, and the circumstances which might disqualify one and delay the other, the additional cut, and the resolve to fall, if he fell, on the soil of Virginia – was all, to his mind, a single emanation, the flash of an instant. He needed no consultations, no deliberations to arrive at all these important conclusions. I dwell upon these small circumstances because they are characteristic, and show the man – a man who belongs to history, and had his own history, and should be known as he was. That character can only be shown in his own conduct, his own words and acts: and this duel with Mr. Clay illustrates it at many points. It is in that point of view that I dwell upon circumstances which might seem trivial, but which are not so, being illustrative of character and significant to their smallest particulars.
The acceptance of the challenge was in keeping with the whole proceeding – prompt in the agreement to meet, exact in protesting against the right to call him out, clear in the waiver of his constitutional privilege, brief and cogent in presenting the case as one of some reprehension – the case of a member of an administration challenging a senator for words spoken in debate of that administration; and all in brief, terse, and superlatively decorous language. It ran thus:
"Mr. Randolph accepts the challenge of Mr. Clay. At the same time he protests against the right of any minister of the Executive Government of the United States to hold him responsible for words spoken in debate, as a senator from Virginia, in crimination of such minister, or the administration under which he shall have taken office. Colonel Tatnall, of Georgia, the bearer of this letter, is authorized to arrange with General Jesup (the bearer of Mr. Clay's challenge) the terms of the meeting to which Mr. Randolph is invited by that note."
This protest which Mr. Randolph entered against the right of Mr. Clay to challenge him, led to an explanation between their mutual friends on that delicate point – a point which concerned the independence of debate, the privileges of the Senate, the immunity of a member, and the sanctity of the constitution. It was a point which Mr. Clay felt; and the explanation which was had between the mutual friends presented an excuse, if not a justification, for his proceeding. He had been informed that Mr. Randolph, in his speech, had avowed his responsibility to Mr. Clay, and waived his privilege – a thing which, if it had been done, would have been a defiance, and stood for an invitation to Mr. Clay to send a challenge. Mr. Randolph, through Col. Tatnall, disavowed that imputed avowal, and confined his waiver of privilege to the time of the delivery of the challenge, and in answer to an inquiry before it was delivered.
The following are the communications between the respective seconds on this point: