The Life of John Marshall (Volume 2 of 4)

When Henry's resolution, on which the Virginia remonstrance was based, reached Hamilton, he instantly saw its logical result. It was, he thought, the major premise of the syllogism of National disintegration. "This," exclaimed Hamilton, of the Virginia resolution, "is the first symptom of a spirit which must either be killed or it will kill the Constitution of the United States."[178 - Hamilton to Jay, Nov. 13, 1790; Works: Lodge, ix, 473-74. Virginia was becoming very hostile to the new Government. First, there was a report that Congress was about to emancipate the slaves. Then came the news of the Assumption of the State debts, with the presence in Virginia of speculators from other States buying up State securities; and this added gall to the bitter cup which Virginians felt the National Government was forcing them to drink. Finally the tidings that the Senate had defeated the motion for public sessions inflamed the public mind still more. (Stuart to Washington, June 2, 1790; Writings: Ford, xi, footnote to 482.)Even close friends of Washington deeply deplored a "spirit so subversive of the true principles of the constitution… If Mr. Henry has sufficient boldness to aim the blow at its [Constitution's] existence, which he has threatened, I think he can never meet with a more favorable opportunity if the assumption should take place." (Ib.)Washington replied that Stuart's letter pained him. "The public mind in Virginia … seems to be more irritable, sour, and discontented than … it is in any other State in the Union except Massachusetts." (Washington to Stuart, June 15, 1790; ib., 481-82.)Marshall's father most inaccurately reported to Washington that Kentucky favored the measures of the Administration; and the President, thanking him for the welcome news, asked the elder Marshall for "any information of a public or private nature … from your district." (Washington to Thomas Marshall, Feb., 1791; Washington's Letter Book, MS., Lib. Cong.) Kentucky was at that time in strong opposition and this continued to grow.]

The Anti-Nationalist memorial of the Legislature of Virginia accurately expressed the sentiment of the State. John Taylor of Caroline two years later, in pamphlets of marked ability, attacked the Administration's entire financial system and its management. While he exhaustively analyzed its economic features, yet he traced all its supposed evils to the Nationalist idea. The purpose and result of Hamilton's whole plan and of the manner of its execution was, declared Taylor, to "Swallow up … the once sovereign … states… Hence all assumptions and … the enormous loans." Thus "the state governments will become only speculative commonwealths to be read for amusement, like Harrington's Oceana or Moore's Utopia."[179 - Taylor's "An Enquiry, etc.," as quoted in Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 209. (Ib., chap. vii.) Taylor's pamphlet was revised by Pendleton and then sent to Madison before publication. (Monroe to Madison, May 18, 1793; Monroe's Writings: Hamilton, i, 254.) Taylor wanted "banks … demolished" and bankers "excluded from public councils." (Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 209.)]

The fight apparently over, Marshall declined to become a candidate for the Legislature in the following year. The Administration's financial plan was now enacted into law and the vital part of the National machinery thus set up and in motion. The country was responding with a degree of prosperity hitherto unknown, and, for the time, all seemed secure.[180 - Marshall, ii, 192.] So Marshall did not again consent to serve in the House of Delegates until 1795. But the years between these periods of his public life brought forth events which were determinative of the Nation's future. Upon the questions growing out of them, John Marshall was one of the ever-decreasing Virginia minority which stanchly upheld the policies of the National Government.

Virginia's declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Assumption Act had now thundered in Jefferson's ears. He himself was instrumental in the enactment of this law and its unconstitutionality never occurred to him[181 - In Jefferson's letters, already cited, not the faintest suggestion appears that he thought the law unconstitutional. Not until Patrick Henry's resolution, and the address of the Virginia Legislature to Congress based thereon, made the point that Assumption was in violation of this instrument, because the power to pass such a law was not expressly given in the Constitution, did Jefferson take his stand against implied powers.] until Virginia spoke. But, faithful to the people's voice,[182 - "Whether … right or wrong, abstractedly, more attention should be paid to the general opinion." (Jefferson to Mason, Feb. 4, 1791; Works: Ford, vi, 186.)] Jefferson was already publicly opposing, through the timid but resourceful Madison[183 - Monroe had advised Madison of the hostility of Virginia to Assumption and incidentally asked for an office for his own brother-in-law. (Monroe to Madison, July 2, 1790; Monroe's Writings: Hamilton, i, 208; and see Monroe to Jefferson, July 3, 1790; ib., 209.)] and the fearless and aggressive[184 - Anderson, 21.] Giles, the Nationalist statesmanship of Hamilton.[185 - Jefferson himself, a year after he helped pass the Assumption Act, had in a Cabinet paper fiercely attacked Hamilton's plan; and the latter answered in a formal statement to the President. These two documents are the ablest summaries of the opposing sides of this great controversy. (See Jefferson to President, May 23, 1792; Works: Ford, vi, 487-95; and Hamilton to Washington, Aug. 18, 1792; Works: Lodge, ii, 426-72.)]

Thus it came about that when Washington asked his Cabinet's opinion upon the bill to incorporate the Bank of the United States, Jefferson promptly expressed with all his power the constitutional theory of the Virginia Legislature. The opposition had reached the point when, if no other objection could be found to any measure of the National Government, its "unconstitutionality" was urged against it. "We hear, incessantly, from the old foes of the Constitution 'this is unconstitutional and that is,' and, indeed, what is not? I scarce know a point which has not produced this cry, not excepting a motion for adjourning."[186 - Ames to Minot, March 8, 1792; Works: Ames, i, 114.] Jefferson now proceeded "to produce this cry" against the Bank Bill.

Hamilton's plan, said Jefferson, violated the Constitution. "To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress [the Twelfth Amendment][187 - Tenth Amendment, as ratified.] is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." Even if the bank were "convenient" to carry out any power specifically granted in the Constitution, yet it was not "necessary," argued Jefferson; all powers expressly given could be exercised without the bank. It was only indispensable powers that the Constitution permitted to be implied from those definitely bestowed on Congress – "convenience is not necessity."[188 - "Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank of the United States"; Works: Ford, vi, 198; and see Madison's argument against the constitutionality of the Bank Act in Annals, 1st Cong., Feb. 2, 1791, pp. 1944-52; Feb. 8, 2008-12; also, Writings: Hunt, vi, 19-42. This argument best shows Madison's sudden and radical change from an extreme Nationalist to an advocate of the most restricted National powers.]

Hamilton answered with his argument for the doctrine of implied powers.[189 - Hamilton's "Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States"; Works: Lodge, iii, 445-93. Adams took the same view. (See Adams to Rush, Dec. 27, 1810; Old Family Letters, 272.)] Banks, said he, are products of civilized life – all enlightened commercial nations have them. He showed the benefits and utility of banks; answered all the objections to these financial agencies; and then examined the disputed constitutionality of the bill for the incorporation of the Bank of the United States.

All the powers of the National Government were not set down in words in the Constitution and could not be. For instance, there are the "resulting powers," as over conquered territory. Nobody could deny the existence of such powers – yet they were not granted by the language of the fundamental law. As to Jefferson's argument based on the word "necessary," his contention meant, said Hamilton, that "no means are to be considered necessary without which the power would be nugatory" – which was absurd. Jefferson's reasoning would require that an implied power should be "absolutely or indispensably necessary."

But this was not the ordinary meaning of the word and it was by this usual and customary understanding of terms that the Constitution must be interpreted. If Jefferson was right, Congress could act only in "a case of extreme necessity." Such a construction of the Constitution would prevent the National Government even from erecting lighthouses, piers, and other conveniences of commerce which could be carried on without them. These illustrations revealed the paralysis of government concealed in Jefferson's philosophy.

The true test of implied powers, Hamilton showed, was the "natural relation [of means] to the … lawful ends of the government." Collection of taxes, foreign and interstate trade, were, admittedly, such ends. The National power to "regulate" these is "sovereign"; and therefore "to employ all the means which will relate to their regulation to the best and greatest advantage" is permissible.

"This general principle is inherent in the very definition of government," declared he, "and essential to every step of the progress to be made by that of the United States, namely: That every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign and included by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society…

"The powers of the Federal Government, as to its objects are sovereign"; the National Constitution, National laws, and treaties are expressly declared to be "the supreme law of the land." And he added, sarcastically: "The power which can create the supreme law of the land in any case is doubtless sovereign as to such case." But, said Hamilton, "it is unquestionably incident to sovereign power to erect corporations, and consequently to that of the United States, in relation to the objects intrusted to the management of the government."

And, finally: "The powers contained in a constitution of government … ought to be construed liberally in advancement of the public good… The means by which natural exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniences obviated, national prosperity promoted are of such infinite variety, extent, and complexity, that there must of necessity be great latitude of discretion in the selection and application of those means."[190 - "Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States"; Works: Lodge, iii, 445-93. Washington was sorely perplexed by the controversy and was on the point of vetoing the Bank Bill. (See Rives, iii, 170-71.)]

So were stated the opposing principles of liberal and narrow interpretation of the Constitution, about which were gathering those political parties that, says Marshall, "in their long and dubious conflict … have shaken the United States to their centre."[191 - Marshall, ii, 206-07.] The latter of these parties, under the name "Republican," was then being shaped into a compact organization. Its strength was increasing. The object of Republican attack was the National Government; that of Republican praise and affection was the sovereignty of the States.

"The hatred of the Jacobites towards the house of Hanover was never more deadly than that … borne by many of the partisans of State power towards the government of the United States," testifies Ames.[192 - Ames to Dwight, Jan. 23, 1792; Works: Ames, i, 110-11.] In the Republican view the basis of the two parties was faith as against disbelief in the ability of the people to govern themselves; the former favored the moneyed interests, the latter appealed to the masses.[193 - "A Candid State of Parties" —National Gazette, Sept. 26, 1792.] Such was the popular doctrine preached by the opponents of the National Government; but all economic objections centered in a common assault on Nationalism.

Thus a clear dividing line was drawn separating the people into two great political divisions; and political parties, in the present-day sense of definite organizations upon fundamental and popularly recognized principles, began to emerge. Henceforth the terms "Federalist" and "Republican" mean opposing party groups, the one standing for the National and the other for the provincial idea. The various issues that arose were referred to the one or the other of these hostile conceptions of government.

In this rise of political parties the philosophy of the Constitution was negatived; for our fundamental law, unlike those of other modern democracies, was built on the non-party theory and did not contemplate party government. Its architects did not foresee parties. Indeed, for several years after the Constitution was adopted, the term "party" was used as an expression of reproach. The correspondence of the period teems with illustrations of this important fact.

For a considerable time most of the leading men of the period looked with dread upon the growing idea of political parties; and the favorite rebuke to opponents was to accuse them of being a "party" or a "faction," those designations being used interchangeably. The "Farewell Address" is a solemn warning against political parties[194 - "I was no party man myself and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them." (Washington to Jefferson, July 6, 1796; Writings: Ford, xiii, 230.)] almost as much as against foreign alliances.

CHAPTER III

LEADING THE VIRGINIA FEDERALISTS

I think nothing better could be done than to make him [Marshall] a judge. (Jefferson to Madison, June 29, 1792.)

To doubt the holiness of the French cause was the certain road to odium and proscription. (Alexander Graydon.)

The trouble and perplexities have worn away my mind. (Washington.)

In Richmond, Marshall was growing ever stronger in his belief in Nationalism. Hamilton's immortal plea for a vital interpretation of the fundamental law of the Nation and his demonstration of the constitutionality of extensive implied powers was a clear, compact statement of what Marshall himself had been thinking. The time was coming when he would announce it in language still more lucid, expressive of a reasoning even more convincing. Upon Hamilton's constitutional doctrine John Marshall was to place the seal of finality.[195 - Compare Hamilton's "Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States" with Marshall's opinion in McCulloch vs. Maryland, The student of Marshall cannot devote too much attention to Hamilton's great state papers, from the "First Report on the Public Credit" to "Camillus." It is interesting that Hamilton produced all these within five years, notwithstanding the fact that this was the busiest and most crowded period of his life.]

But Marshall did not delay until that great hour to declare his Nationalist opinions. Not only did he fight for them in the House of Delegates; but in his club at Farmicola's Tavern, on the street corners, riding the circuit, he argued for the constitutionality and wisdom of those measures of Washington's Administration which strengthened and broadened the powers of the National Government.[196 - Binney, in Dillon, iii, 301-02.]

Although he spoke his mind, in and out of season, for a cause increasingly unpopular, Marshall, as yet, lost little favor with the people. At a time when political controversy severed friendship and interrupted social relations,[197 - La Rochefoucauld, iii, 73. For a man even "to be passive … is a satisfactory proof that he is on the wrong side." (Monroe to Jefferson, July 17, 1792; Monroe's Writings: Hamilton, i, 238.)] his personality still held sway over his associates regardless of their political convictions. Even Mason, the ultra-radical foe of broad National powers, wrote, at this heated juncture, that Marshall "is an intimate friend of mine."[198 - George Mason to John Mason, July 12, 1791; Rowland, ii, 338.]

His winning frankness, easy manner, and warm-heartedness saved him from that dislike which his bold views otherwise would have created. "Independent principles, talents, and integrity are denounced [in Virginia] as badges of aristocracy; but if you add to these good manners and a decent appearance, his political death is decreed without the benefit of a hearing," testifies Francis Corbin.[199 - Corbin to Hamilton, March 17, 1793; as quoted in Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 226.]

"Independent principles, talents, and integrity" Marshall possessed in fullest measure, as all admitted; but his manners were far from those which men like the modish Corbin called "good," and his appearance would not have passed muster under the critical eye of that fastidious and disgruntled young Federalist. We shall soon hear Jefferson denouncing Marshall's deportment as the artifice of a cunning and hypocritical craft. As yet, however, Jefferson saw in Marshall only an extremely popular young man who was fast becoming the most effective supporter in Virginia of the National Government.

In the year of the Bank Act, Jefferson and Madison went on their eventful "vacation," swinging up the Hudson and through New England. During this journey Jefferson drew around Madison "the magic circle" of his compelling charm and won entirely to the extreme Republican cause[200 - "Patrick Henry once said 'that he could forgive anything else in Mr. Jefferson, but his corrupting Mr. Madison.'" (Pickering to Marshall, Dec. 26, 1828; Pickering MSS., Mass. Hist. Soc.) "His [Madison's] placing himself under the pupilage of Mr. Jefferson and supporting his public deceptions, are sufficient to put him out of my book." (Pickering to Rose, March 22, 1808; ib.)] the invaluable aid of that superb intellect. In agreement as to common warfare upon the Nationalist measures of the Administration,[201 - Madison's course was irreconcilable with his earlier Nationalist stand. (See Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 77; and see especially the remarkable and highly important letter of Hamilton to Carrington, May 26, 1792; Works: Lodge, ix, 513-35, on Madison's change, Jefferson's conduct, and the politics of the time.) Carrington was now the brother-in-law of Marshall and his most intimate friend. Their houses in Richmond almost adjoined. (See infra, chap. v.)] the two undoubtedly talked over the Virginia Federalists.[202 - See brief but excellent account of this famous journey in Gay: Madison (American Statesmen Series), 184-85; and contra, Rives, iii, 191.]

Marshall's repeated successes at the polls with a constituency hostile to the young lawyer's views particularly impressed them. Might not Marshall become a candidate for Congress? If elected, here would be a skillful, dauntless, and captivating supporter of all Nationalist measures in the House of Representatives. What should be done to avert this misfortune?

Jefferson's dexterous intellect devised the idea of getting rid of Marshall, politically, by depositing him on the innocuous heights of the State bench. Better, far better, to make Marshall a Virginia judge than to permit him to become a Virginia Representative in Congress. So, upon his return, Jefferson wrote to Madison: —

"I learn that he [Hamilton] has expressed the strongest desire that Marshall should come into Congress from Richmond, declaring that there is no man in Virginia whom he wishes so much to see there; and I am told that Marshall has expressed half a mind to come. Hence I conclude that Hamilton has plyed him well with flattery & sollicitation and I think nothing better could be done than to make him a judge."[203 - Jefferson to Madison, June 29, 1792; Works: Ford, vii, 129-30.]

Hamilton's "plying" Marshall with "flattery & solicitation" occurred only in Jefferson's teeming, but abnormally suspicious, mind. Marshall was in Virginia all this time, as his Account Book proves, while Hamilton was in New York, and no letters seem to have passed between them.[204 - No letters have been discovered from Hamilton to Marshall or from Marshall to Hamilton dated earlier than three years after Jefferson's letter to Madison.] But Jefferson's information that his fellow Secretary wished the Nationalist Richmond attorney in Congress was probably correct. Accounts of Marshall's striking ability and of his fearless zeal in support of the Administration's measures had undoubtedly reached Hamilton, perhaps through Washington himself; and so sturdy and capable a Federalist in Congress from Virginia would have been of great strategic value.

But Jefferson might have spared his pains to dispose of Marshall by cloistering him on the State bench. Nothing could have induced the busy lawyer to go to Congress at this period. It would have been fatal to his law practice[205 - "The length of the last session has done me irreparable injury in my profession, as it has made an impression on the general opinion that two occupations are incompatible." (Monroe to Jefferson, June 17, 1792; Monroe's Writings: Hamilton, i, 230.)] which he had built up until it was the largest in Richmond and upon the returns from which his increasing family depended for support. Six years later, Washington himself labored with Marshall for four days before he could persuade him to stand for the National House, and Marshall then yielded to his adored leader only as a matter of duty, at one of the Nation's most critical hours, when war was on the horizon.[206 - See infra, chap. x.]

The break-up of Washington's Cabinet was now approaching. Jefferson was keeping pace with the Anti-Nationalist sentiment of the masses – drilling his followers into a sternly ordered political force. "The discipline of the [Republican] party," wrote Ames, "is as severe as the Prussian."[207 - Ames to Dwight, Jan., 1793; Works: Ames, i, 126-27.] Jefferson and Madison had secured an organ in the "National Gazette,"[208 - Rives, iii, 192-94; and see McMaster, ii, 52-53; also Hamilton to Carrington, May 26, 1792; Works: Lodge, ix, 513-35.] edited by Freneau, whom Jefferson employed as translator in the State Department. Through this paper Jefferson attacked Hamilton without mercy. The spirited Secretary of the Treasury keenly resented the opposition of his Cabinet associate which was at once covert and open.

In vain the President pathetically begged Jefferson for harmony and peace.[209 - Washington to Jefferson, Aug. 23, 1792; Writings: Ford, xii, 174-75. This letter is almost tearful in its pleading.] Jefferson responded with a bitter attack on Hamilton. "I was duped," said he, "by the Secretary of the Treasury and made a tool for forwarding his schemes, not then sufficiently understood by me."[210 - Jefferson to Washington, Sept. 9, 1792; Works: Ford, vii, 137 et seq. The quotation in the text refers to Jefferson's part in the deal fixing the site of the Capital and passing the Assumption Act. Compare with Jefferson's letters written at the time. (Supra, 64.) It is impossible that Jefferson was not fully advised; the whole country was aroused over Assumption, Congress debated it for weeks, it was the one subject of interest and conversation at the seat of government, and Jefferson himself so testifies in his correspondence.] To somewhat, but not much, better purpose did Washington ask Hamilton for "mutual forbearances."[211 - Washington to Hamilton, Aug. 26, 1792; Writings: Ford, xii, 177-78.] Hamilton replied with spirit, yet pledged his honor that he would "not, directly or indirectly, say or do a thing that shall endanger a feud."[212 - Hamilton to Washington, Sept, 9, 1792; Works: Lodge, vii, 306.]

The immense speculation, which had unavoidably grown out of the Assumption and Funding Acts, inflamed popular resentment against the whole financial statesmanship of the Federalists.[213 - See Marshall, ii, 191-92.] More material, this, for the hands of the artificer who was fashioning the Republican Party into a capacious vessel into which the people might pour all their discontent, all their fears, all their woes and all their hopes. And Jefferson, with practical skill, used for that purpose whatever material he could find.

Still more potter's earth was brought to Jefferson. The National Courts were at work. Creditors were securing judgments for debts long due them. In Virginia the debtors of British merchants, who for many years had been rendered immune from payment, were brought to the bar of this "alien" tribunal. Popular feeling ran high. A resolution was introduced into the House of Delegates requesting the Virginia Senators and Representatives in Congress to "adopt such measures as will tend, not only to suspend all executions and the proceedings thereon, but prevent any future judgments to be given by the Federal Courts in favor of British creditors until" Great Britain surrendered the posts and runaway negroes.[214 - Journal, H.D. (Nov. 28, 1793), 101.] Thus was the practical overthrow of the National Judiciary proposed.[215 - Ib. The Legislature instructed Virginia's Senators and Representatives to endeavor to secure measures to "suspend the operation and completion" of the articles of the treaty of peace looking to the payment of British debts until the posts and negroes should be given up. (Ib., 124-25; also see Virginia Statutes at Large, New Series, i, 285.) Referring to this Ames wrote: "Thus, murder, at last, is out." (Ames to Dwight, May 6, 1794; Works: Ames, i, 143-44.)]

Nor was this all. A State had been haled before a National Court.[216 - Chisholm vs. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419.] The Republicans saw in this the monster "consolidation." The Virginia Legislature passed a resolution instructing her Senators and Representatives to "unite their utmost and earliest exertions" to secure a constitutional amendment preventing a State from being sued "in any court of the United States."[217 - Journal, H.D. (1793), 92-99; also see Virginia Statutes at Large, New Series, i, 284. This was the origin of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. The Legislature "Resolved, That a State cannot, under the Constitution of the United States, be made a defendant at the suit of any individual or individuals, and that the decision of the Supreme Federal Court, that a State may be placed in that situation, is incompatible with, and dangerous to the sovereignty and independence of the individual States, as the same tends to a general consolidation of these confederated republics." Virginia Senators were "instructed" to make "their utmost exertions" to secure an amendment to the Constitution regarding suits against States. The Governor was directed to send the Virginia resolution to all the other States. (Journal, H.D. (1793), 99.)] The hostility to the National Bank took the form of a resolution against a director or stockholder of the Bank of the United States being a Senator or Representative in Congress.[218 - Ib., 125.] But apparently this trod upon the toes of too many ambitious Virginians, for the word "stockholders" was stricken out.[219 - Ib.; also Statutes at Large, supra, 284.]

The slander that the Treasury Department had misused the public funds had been thoroughly answered;[220 - See Annals, 2d Cong., 900-63.] but the Legislature of Virginia by a majority of 111 out of a total vote of 124, applauded her Senators and Representatives who had urged the inquiry.[221 - Journal, H.D. (1793), 56-57. Of Giles's methods in this attack on Hamilton the elder Wolcott wrote that it was "such a piece of baseness as would have disgraced the council of Pandemonium." (Wolcott to his son, March 25, 1793; Gibbs, i, 91.)] Such was the developing temper of Republicanism as revealed by the emotionless pages of the public records; but these furnish scarcely a hint of the violence of public opinion.

Jefferson was now becoming tigerish in his assaults on the measures of the Administration. Many members of Congress had been holders of certificates which Assumption and Funding had made valuable. Most but not all of them had voted for every feature of Hamilton's financial plan.[222 - Beard: Econ. O. J. D., chap. vi.] Three or four were directors of the Bank, but no dishonesty existed.[223 - Professor Beard, after a careful treatment of this subject, concludes that "The charge of mere corruption must fall to the ground." (Ib., 195.)] Heavy speculation went on in Philadelphia.[224 - "To the northward of Baltimore everybody … speculates, trades, and jobs in the stocks. The judge, the advocate, the physician and the minister of divine worship, are all, or almost all, more or less interested in the sale of land, in the purchase of goods, in that of bills of exchange, and in lending money at two or three per cent." (La Rochefoucauld, iv, 474.) The French traveler was also impressed with the display of riches in the Capital. "The profusion of luxury of Philadelphia, on great days, at the tables of the wealthy, in their equipages and the dresses of their wives and daughters, are … extreme. I have seen balls on the President's birthday where the splendor of the rooms, and the variety and richness of the dresses did not suffer, in comparison with Europe." The extravagance extended to working-men who, on Sundays, spent money with amazing lavishness. Even negro servants had balls; and negresses with wages of one dollar per week wore dresses costing sixty dollars. (Ib., 107-09.)] This, said Republicans, was the fruit which Hamilton's Nationalist financial scheme gathered from the people's industry to feed to "monocrats."

"Here [Philadelphia]," wrote Jefferson, "the unmonied farmer … his cattle & corps [sic] are no more thought of than if they did not feed us. Script & stock are food & raiment here… The credit & fate of the nation seem to hang on the desperate throws & plunges of gambling scoundrels."[225 - Jefferson to T. M. Randolph, March 16, 1792; Works: Ford, vi, 408.] But Jefferson comforted himself with the prophecy that "this nefarious business" would finally "tumble its authors headlong from their heights."[226 - Jefferson to Short, May 18, 1792; Works: Ford, vi, 413; and see "A Citizen" in the National Gazette, May 3, 1792, for a typical Republican indictment of Funding and Assumption.]

The National law taxing whiskey particularly aroused the wrath of the multitude. Here it was at last! – a direct tax laid upon the universal drink of the people, as the razor-edged Pennsylvania resolutions declared.[227 - Gallatin's Writings: Adams, i, 3.] Here it was, just as the patriotic foes of the abominable National Constitution had predicted when fighting the ratification of that "oppressive" instrument. Here was the exciseman at every man's door, just as Henry and Mason and Grayson had foretold – and few were the doors in the back counties of the States behind which the owner's private still was not simmering.[228 - Pennsylvania alone had five thousand distilleries. (Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 250.) Whiskey was used as a circulating medium. (McMaster, ii, 29.) Every contemporary traveler tells of the numerous private stills in Pennsylvania and the South. Practically all farmers, especially in the back country, had their own apparatus for making whiskey or brandy. (See chap. vii, vol. i, of this work.)Nor was this industry confined to the lowly and the frontiersmen. Washington had a large distillery. (Washington to William Augustine Washington, Feb. 27, 1798; Writings: Ford, xiii, 444.)New England's rum, on the other hand, was supplied by big distilleries; and these could include the tax in the price charged the consumer. Thus the people of Pennsylvania and the South felt the tax personally, while New Englanders were unconscious of it. Otherwise there doubtless would have been a New England "rum rebellion," as Shays's uprising and as New England's implied threat in the Assumption fight would seem to prove. (See Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 250-51.)] And why was this tribute exacted? To provide funds required by the corrupt Assumption and Funding laws, asserted the agitators.

Again it was the National Government that was to blame; in laying the whiskey tax it had invaded the rights of the States, hotly declared the Republicans. "All that powerful party," Marshall bears witness, "which attached itself to the local [State] rather than to the general [National] government … considered … a tax by Congress on any domestic manufacture as the intrusion of a foreign power into their particular concerns which excited serious apprehensions for state importance and for liberty."[229 - Marshall, ii, 200.] The tariff did not affect most people, especially those in the back country, because they used few or no imported articles; but the whiskey tax did reach them, directly and personally.[230 - Ib., 238.]

Should such a despotic law be obeyed? Never! It was oppressive! It was wicked! Above all, it was "unconstitutional"! But what to do! The agencies of the detested and detestable National Government were at work! To arms, then! That was the only thing left to outraged freemen about to be ravaged of their liberty![231 - Graydon, 372.] Thus came the physical defiance of the law in Pennsylvania; Washington's third proclamation[232 - Sept. 25, 1794; Writings: Ford, xii, 467.] demanding obedience to the National statutes after his earnest pleas[233 - Sept. 15, 1792; Richardson, i, 124; Aug. 7, 1794; Writings: Ford, xii, 445.] to the disaffected to observe the laws; the march of the troops accompanied by Hamilton[234 - Hamilton remained with the troops until the insurrection was suppressed and order fully established. (See Hamilton's letters to Washington, written from various points, during the expedition, from Oct. 25 to Nov. 19, 1794; Works: Lodge, vi, 451-60.)] against the insurgents; the forcible suppression of this first armed assault on the laws of the United States in which men had been killed, houses burned, mails pillaged – all in the name of the Constitution,[235 - Marshall, ii, 200, 235-38, 340-48; Gibbs, i, 144-55; and see Hamilton's Report to the President, Aug. 5, 1794; Works: Lodge, vi, 358-88. But see Gallatin's Writings: Adams, i, 2-12; Beard: Econ. O. J. D., 250-60. For extended account of the Whiskey Rebellion from the point of view of the insurgents, see Findley: History of the Insurrection, etc., and Breckenridge: History of the Western Insurrection.] which the Republicans now claimed as their peculiar property.[236 - The claim now made by the Republicans that they were the only friends of the Constitution was a clever political turn. Also it is an amusing incident of our history. The Federalists were the creators of the Constitution; while the Republicans, generally speaking and with exceptions, had been ardent foes of its adoption. (See Beard: Econ. O. J. D.)]

Foremost in the fight for the whiskey insurgents were the democratic societies, which, as has been seen, were the offspring of the French Jacobin Clubs. Washington finally became certain that these organizations had inspired this uprising against National law and authority. While the Whiskey Rebellion was economic in its origin, yet it was sustained by the spirit which the French Revolution had kindled in the popular heart. Indeed, when the troops sent to put down the insurrection reached Harrisburg, they found the French flag flying over the courthouse.[237 - Graydon, 374. Jefferson's party was called Republican because of its championship of the French Republic. (Ambler, 63.)]

Marshall's old comrade in the Revolution, close personal friend, and business partner,[238 - In the Fairfax purchase. (See infra, chap. v.)] Henry Lee, was now Governor of Virginia. He stood militantly with Washington and it was due to Lee's efforts that the Virginia militia responded to help suppress the Whiskey Rebellion. He was made Commander-in-Chief of all the forces that actually took the field.[239 - See Hamilton's orders to General Lee; Works: Lodge, vi, 445-51; and see Washington to Lee, Oct. 20, 1794; Writings: Ford, xii, 478-80.] To Lee, therefore, Washington wrote with unrestrained pen.

"I consider," said the President, "this insurrection as the first formidable fruit of the Democratic Societies … instituted by … artful and designing members [of Congress] … to sow the seeds of jealousy and distrust among the people of the government… I see, under a display of popular and fascinating guises, the most diabolical attempts to destroy … the government."[240 - Washington to Lee, Aug. 26, 1794; Writings: Ford, xii, 454-56.] He declared: "That they have been the fomenters of the western disturbances admits of no doubt."[241 - Washington to Jay, Nov. 1, 1794; ib., 486.]

Never was that emphatic man more decided than now; he was sure, he said, that, unless lawlessness were overcome, republican government was at an end, "and nothing but anarchy and confusion is to be expected hereafter."[242 - Washington to Thruston, Aug. 10, 1794; ib., 452.] If "the daring and factious spirit" is not crushed, "adieu to all government in this country, except mob and club government."[243 - Washington to Morgan, Oct. 8, 1794; ib., 470. The Virginia militia were under the Command of Major-General Daniel Morgan.]

Such were Washington's positive and settled opinions, and they were adopted and maintained by Marshall, his faithful supporter.