Chattanooga and Chickamauga

Here the story reaches the event of the break in the Union lines, which is widely misunderstood, and has been most unjustly used to throw discredit on General Rosecrans. Just as Longstreet's attack was developing upon Wood's front, the latter received an order from General Rosecrans to "close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." As Brannan was between himself and Reynolds, Wood saw no other way of executing the order, which he deemed imperative, except to withdraw from line, and pass to the rear of Brannan. This he did, although the attack was just bursting on his front.

It has been persistently claimed, to General Rosecrans's detriment, that in the excitement of the height of battle he had issued a blundering order. Nothing could be more unjust. The explanation is perfectly simple. General Thomas had sent for Brannan to meet Breckinridge's flank attack. Stewart's attack had struck Reynolds with force and was rapidly developing on Brannan's front. The latter hastily consulted with Reynolds as to the propriety of withdrawing, and both being clear that to obey the order would open the line to the enemy, Brannan dispatched Van Derveer, his reserve, to the left, in partial compliance with its terms, and then reported to Rosecrans that he had deemed it vitally important to maintain his line till the commanding officer could be advised of the situation. He instantly approved Brannan's action. But just before his message arrived, upon the supposition that he had obeyed the order and gone to Thomas, the noted order to Wood to close to the left on Reynolds had been dispatched. When it reached Wood, the attack, rolling along Brannan's front, had reached his own. Had he exercised the same discretion which Brannan had so wisely displayed, all would have been well, and that nearly fatal break in the Union lines would not have occurred. But instantly on reading it, Wood rapidly withdrew his division and started in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. Longstreet, who had waited most impatiently till 11 o'clock before he could move a man to the attack, had solidified his lines before the Union center and left, and the moment Wood left this wide gap for him, Longstreet thrust into it the eight brigades of his central column of attack. They were formed in three lines, and advancing rapidly they opened on Brannan's right and rear and Davis' left, and greatly widened the gap. Brannan threw back his right, losing something from Connell's brigade on that flank, but, stubbornly resisting Longstreet's advance as he retired that wing of his division, he soon re-established it on Horseshoe Ridge, near the Snodgrass House, on a line nearly perpendicular to the one he had occupied when Longstreet pushed through the gap left by wood. The latter had passed rapidly to the rear of Brannan, and though subjected to heavy attack after passing Brannan's left, he was able to establish his line on a lower ridge in the prolongation of Brannan's new position, and reaching in the direction of Reynolds. The latter officer soon retired his right slightly, and the line was again continuous, except a break between Wood and Reynolds, from Brannan's right to Barnes on Baird's left. Into this vacant space Hazen moved later under orders from Thomas, and then the line on that part of the field was firmly established.

All to the right of Brannan had gone. Negley, with one brigade of his division, which was caught in the gap, had drifted toward Brannan. Here, gathering up much artillery, which he was ordered by Thomas to post on the crest overlooking the field in front of Baird's left, he took it instead to Brannan's right, and soon, without waiting to be attacked in his strong position, and although he had promised Brannan to hold it, abandoned it, and retired in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the artillery to follow him.

Davis had moved rapidly into the breastworks which Negley had occupied, and there placed his weak force of two brigades across Longstreet's advance. But after his terrific fighting of the day before he had only twelve hundred men for action, and though Carlin, and Heg's men under Martin, fought with desperation, they could do nothing but yield. They were driven in disorder to the right and rear.

At the same time Van Cleve, with his two remaining brigades in motion towards Thomas, was thrown into great disorder, though a considerable portion of them rallied with Wood.

As Davis was borne back, McCook, of the Twentieth Corps, in person led Laiboldt's brigade, of Sheridan's division, against Longstreet's advancing columns. The attack was delivered with spirit and power, but it failed in the face of overwhelming numbers, and the brigade was utterly routed. McCook was carried to the rear with it.

Next came Sheridan, with his two remaining brigades under Lytle and Bradley. The former, with splendid bearing and courage, rallied his columns, and though they were taken at every disadvantage, under the inspiration which he imparted they faced the resistless advance with desperate valor. Lytle fell where death was thickest for his comrades. His brigade, and that of Bradley, with Wilder, who had also fought to the extremity to assist, were all borne to the rear and forced to join the fugitive columns falling off from the Union right toward Rossville. General Rosecrans had just ridden the lines from the left, and had passed in the rear of McCook's position, when the line was severed. Finding the roads in rear of the right filled with retreating columns representing all corps of the army, for Negley was there from Thomas, he deemed it prudent to ride to Chattanooga and decide upon a new position in front of the place. General Crittenden's whole command, that is, three divisions, having been ordered in succession to Thomas before the break, Crittenden himself, being without command, rode into Chattanooga after Rosecrans, as did also McCook. Sheridan's division was in good order by the time it reached Rossville, and most of the troops which left the field were about that place and McFarland's Gap in fighting condition throughout the afternoon. Their numbers at 2 o'clock were from seven to ten thousand. They could easily have been led to Baird's left or Brannan's right, as the way to either flank was open. This was proved by the fact that General Garfield, Colonel Gates Thurston, and Surgeons Gross and Perkins, the medical directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. It is one of the myths of current Chickamauga history that Sheridan marched with his division back to the fighting line, but this is an error. He received a request at McFarland's Gap from Gen. Thomas to return to the field, but decided instead to retire to Rossville. Upon reaching the latter point he moved out on the Lafayette road toward Gen. Thomas, but did not form a junction with him. He reached the Cloud House at 7 p. m. and soon after withdrew to Rossville.

Six Confederate divisions under Longstreet had taken part in breaking the Union center and sweeping its right off the field. These were Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Preston, of Buckner's corps: Hood and McLaws, of Longstreet's Virginia troops, and Hindman's division of Polk's corps. Eight brigades of this force had first entered the gap left by Wood, and from that time till Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, and Sheridan had gone, and Brannan had established himself on Horseshoe Ridge, each of these six divisions had advanced and fought with vigor. Finally Hindman, finding no resistance on his left, wheeled to the right to assist Longstreet's center and right, which had been checked by Brannan and Wood. This brought Longstreet's six divisions together in the vicinity of Horseshoe ridge.

THE CONCENTRATION.

KELLEY'S FARM – HORSESHOE RIDGE.

Shortly after 2 o'clock Longstreet ordered a general assault by his wing. It was delivered with confidence and tremendous power. To meet these six divisions Brannan on the right had Croxton's brigade and part of Connell's; Wood, on the left, had Harker's brigade. With these organized commands were a part of John Beatty's, a good part of Stanley's and the Twenty-first Ohio, of Sirwell's, all of Negley; parts of the Ninth and the Seventeenth Kentucky; Forty-fourth Indiana and Thirteenth Ohio, of Van Cleve's division, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana, of Buell's brigade – in all about 4,000 men.

Against this line, hastily formed and without reserves, Longstreet launched his solid columns. They came on magnificently, wave behind wave. They met sheeted fire from the summits, and yet pressed on to hand encounters, but from these they soon recoiled. The whole line retired from the foot of the slopes, and covered by the forests organized for a second attack. It was delivered soon after 3 o'clock. Like the first, it fell on the fronts of Wood and Brannan. But while Hindman assaulted the latter in front he also sent a brigade through the gap to Brannan's right to scale the ridge and gain his rear. Negley, who had held this point with abundant artillery and infantry supports, and who had promised to stay there, had promptly fled before any attack had reached him and was even then in Rossville. There was absolutely nothing to send against Hindman's left, towering there with its fringe of bayonets on the commanding ridge, and forming to sweep down on Brannan's right and rear. Longstreet and all his general officers were exultant, and though their second attack had failed everywhere, except as this lodgment was obtained on the ridge beyond Brannan, they rapidly arranged their lines for what they believed would be a final assault leading to sure victory.

But not a Union soldier moved from his place. The men clutched their guns tighter. Officers everywhere moved closer to the lines to encourage and steady them. The color-bearers set their flags firmer. And then, as if to repay such courage, help came as unexpectedly as if the hand of the Lord had been visibly extended to save. Suddenly a Union column appeared, moving with speed across the fields from the direction of the McDaniel house. It was Granger, of the reserve, with two brigades of Steedman's division. Being stationed four miles away toward Ringgold, Granger, agreeing with Steedman that they must be sorely needed on the field, had started without orders, and though shelled by Forrest on his flank for two miles of the way, had not allowed his columns to be greatly delayed. And now Steedman was sweeping up to the foot of the hill below the Snodgrass House. As he reported to Thomas, coming in from toward the Kelly farm was another well-ordered column. It proved to be Van Derveer returning from the charge upon Breckinridge in the Kelly field. The map shows how he had left Brannan's line just before the break and hastened with deployed lines toward the left; how thus deployed he had marched from the woods to be enfiladed from Breckinridge's front as the latter emerged from the woods and burst upon the Union rear. Here, under this fire, he whirled his brigade to the left, delivered a full volley at pistol range into the enemy's faces, charged into their lines on a run, drove them back on their batteries, and pursued both infantry and artillery to a point beyond the Union left, where Grose, coming from the rear of Palmer, completed the work. The dotted line shows Van Derveer's return. He, too, had moved without orders to the sound of tremendous firing about the Snodgrass house. Just as Steedman had hastily formed and assaulted Hindman's forces beyond the right of Brannan, Van Derveer joined his brigade to Steedman's left and moved also to the assault. Steedman seized a regimental flag and rode with it in his hands to the top. His command was the brigades of those splendid soldiers, John G. Mitchell and Walter C. Whittaker.

One (Whittaker's) plunged into the gorge through which Hindman's left was pouring, the rest of the line, with Van Derveer on its left, charged for the ridge. In twenty minutes it was carried and all of Hindman's forces were driven from it and out of the ravine. Whittaker had been wounded and four of his five staff officers either killed or mortally wounded. One-fifth of Steedman's force had been disabled in the charge. Van Derveer's loss was considerable, but less in proportion, as he was not fairly in front of Hindman, as Steedman was. Twice Hindman turned his recoiling troops to recapture the position, but finally abandoned the effort and relinquished the ridge to Steedman. The center and right of Longstreet's third assault was in like manner repelled. In this movement the Fourth Kentucky, Col. R. M. Kelley, joined Van Derveer and fought with him till night.

The coming of Steedman was more than an inspiration. It was more than the holding of the right. He brought 100,000 rounds of cartridges and artillery ammunition – far more welcome than diamonds. Regiments in the line had been fighting, even at that early hour, with the bayonet and clubbed muskets. Now, when Longstreet's right came on in aid of the attempt of Hindman to hold his position on the west they were received with terrific and continuing fire, and as the lines of gray, with desperate valor, neared the summit Wood's men and Brannan's rushed at them with the bayonet and broke their ranks, rolled them down the slopes, and on Wood's front, with help of a direct fire from Aleshire's battery on the left and a terrible enfilading fire from Battery I, Fourth Regular Artillery, on Brannan's left, under those splendid young soldiers, Lieutenants Frank G. Smith and George B. Rodney, drove them in disorder beyond their artillery.

At this time both Confederate wings were calling for re-enforcements. Bragg's reply to Longstreet was that the right was so badly shattered that it could not help him.

When Steedman's coming with four thousand men had so changed the whole current of the battle, what if the seven thousand men under Sheridan and Negley about McFarland's and Rossville, much nearer than Steedman was, had been brought up? How the officers who were there could stay themselves, or manage to keep the men, is a mystery sickening to think about.

Hindman thus tells of the attack by which he carried the ridge to the right of Brannan, before Steedman arrived:

"In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which continued, at close quarters, without any intermission, over four hours. Our troops attacked again and again with a courage worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet was used and men were also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets."

Of the attack of Steedman's men in the ravine, where they rushed on the Confederate line with the bayonet, pushed in among the guns and killed gunners at their posts, Hindman further says: "I have never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better." Of the second attack upon Brannan's position, which was repulsed, Kershaw, commanding in Longstreet's troops from Virginia, said: "This was one of the heaviest attacks of the war on a single point."

Up to the time of Steedman's arrival there had been a break between Reynolds and Wood, but the flank of the former in advance of the latter somewhat covered it. Upon this point Longstreet now organized a heavy attack. But the lull on the left, arising from the rebels there having been, as Bragg expressed it, "so badly beaten back" that they could be of no service on his left, made it practicable to strengthen the Union center. Hazen was found to have ammunition, and was moved with celerity into the gap, and Grose, Johnson's reserve, replaced him. Hazen arrived none too soon. His lines were hardly established before Longstreet's right was upon him, lapping over upon Reynold's front, and then, from Reynolds to Steedman, there was one continuing hell of battle. Garfield, who had come up with an escort, having ridden from Rossville, after reporting to Thomas, moved along the ranks of his old brigade (Harker, of Wood), encouraging the men, and giving evidence against all loiterers at the gaps in the rear that every officer and man of them could easily have reached the field.

Longstreet's columns assault at every point, as rapidly as his lines rolled back from the crest could be reformed. He had ten brigades in front of Brannan and Steedman, while these officers had only four unbroken in organization, and fragments of two others. One brigade of Preston, which assaulted Wood and Hazen's line, had over 2,000 men in the movement. The successive movements, rather the tremendous dashes of these lines against the hill, was like the advance of breakers with which ocean storms attack the shore. But, as surely, each wave with its crest of steel, its spray of smoke, and its glitter of fire broke and swept back with dead and wounded in its terrible undertow. It was treason, but magnificent. Such was the scene which these soldiers of Thomas saw on the Snodgrass Hill throughout the afternoon till dusk.

To relieve the left Polk was ordered at 3 o'clock, to attack in force with the whole right wing. But it required much time to organize those battered lines for assault, but when done, it was, indeed, formidable. The second map will make it plain. Cleburne, with four brigades, was deployed before Palmer and Johnson. Jackson and Polk's brigades lapped over Baird. Cheatham was in a second line. The map gives his position wrongly, though it is taken from the original official map in the War Department. Ranged further to the right, and crossing the State and Lafayette road at McDaniel's, and thus massed against the Union left, were the divisions of Breckinridge and Liddell, Armstrong's dismounted cavalry division of Forrest, and Forrest's artillery. While Grose, of Preston, was assaulting Hazen and Wood this attack on the Union left began. But, as before, the brigades that moved up to the log breastworks were speedily shattered, though this time they took their artillery through the thickets with them, pushing it by hand.

Once more, as the assault was made on Baird's left, there came a Union charge across the Kelly field, the fourth for the day. This time it was Willich, the reserve of Johnson. Withdrawing from line and facing north, he swept along on the run and with cheers. His lines dashed into the woods at the point where Stanley and Grose had charged before, and without a halt sprang into the faces of the advancing Confederates. King's regulars and Barnes gave brave help, and once more the immediate left was cleared. The force on the road by the McDaniel house, though unbroken, was not advanced. Later, an assault on Reynolds and Palmer was ordered, but, naturally, it was feeble after so many repulses at the breastworks. At half-past 5 there was quiet again along the Union left. Longstreet, however, in front of the right, was active for another hour, though at every point unsuccessful.

At half-after 5 General Thomas, having full discretion, decided to withdraw to occupy the passes in his rear at McFarland and Rossville, which controlled the roads to Chattanooga. His line was solid at every point. Both wings of the Confederates were at bay. Their right was too much broken to successfully assault the Union left. The Union right, though its ammunition ran low, and its officers were constantly searching the boxes of the killed and wounded for cartridges, was becoming practiced in the use of the bayonet against assaulting lines, and in spite of the persistence of Longstreet's men, had begun to feel comfortable in its position. The whole line could have been held until night. But daylight was wanted to set the army in orderly motion toward the gaps which controlled the city. After that was accomplished the darkness afforded the needed cover to complete the movement. It was because Chattanooga, and not the Chickamauga woods, was the objective of the campaign that the army withdrew to Rossville. It was in no sense a military retreat.

If Thomas had not occupied these passes in the night, Bragg could have done so, and the object he had in view would then have been accomplished. Had Thomas allowed it, Bragg would have been only too glad to have withdrawn from the field and "retreated" on Rossville. Thomas did not permit it, but went there first, and Chattanooga was won.

The withdrawal involved some fighting. The movement began on the right of Reynolds. Palmer, Johnson, and Baird were to follow in succession, all leaving their skirmishers in their works.

Reynolds formed his brigades by the flank on each side of the Lafayette road, King on the right and Turchin on the left. Thus he advanced northward along the Kelly field toward Rossville. General Thomas followed at the head of the column. As they passed a short distance beyond the south line of the field they encountered the advancing troops which had taken part in the last rebel attack. Instantly Thomas ordered Reynolds to cause Turchin to file to the left, and after thus changing front to "charge and clear them out." The line of Turchin's charge is shown on the map. Filing into the wood to the left at double-quick, he faced to the front while thus moving, and his lines darted at a run into the faces of the enemy. It was one of the bravest and most brilliant, most important and effective charges of the day – the fifth over those Kelly fields. At the same moment King, forcing his way along the road, fell on the flank of Liddell's division and broke it. Dan McCook, who had been active during the day on the flank of Forrest, advanced and opened with his artillery on the rebel rear, and after short but sharp fighting the formidable array was driven back and the way to Rossville was open.

Turchin and King moved by the roads to McFarland's Gap. Baird, Johnson, and Palmer followed over the same roads. They were attacked as they left their works and crossed the Kelly field, but order in their columns was restored as soon as they gained the shelter of the woods on the west of the road. Hazen and Wood then followed without molestation. Steedman withdrew at six o'clock from the extreme right, and Brannan was left alone on Horseshoe Ridge. The sun was down. The shadows were thickening in the woods before him, and yet Longstreet's men remained on the slopes, and several times appeared in detachments close along his lines. Suddenly a line of Hindman's men were found on the slope where Steedman had been. By some strange oversight Brannan had not been notified that his right was unprotected. A hasty examination in the gathering dusk showed another rebel line on the slope directly in the rear, and which had come round through the gap where Steedman's right had been, and was evidently forming for an assault. The Thirty-fifth Ohio, of Van Derveer's brigade, was thrown back to face both these lines. Fragments of five regiments more, which had opportunely arrived, were given to the commander of the Thirty-fifth. His own regiment had one round and one in the guns. This was placed in front. The others, with fixed bayonets, were formed in the rear. Just before dark a rebel officer rode in on the line and asked what troops were here. He was shot by the near outposts.

Then came a scattering fire from the flank of the rebel line along the ridge, next a volley from the Thirty-fifth, and a silent awaiting results behind its line of bayonets. The volley had scattered the enemy on the ridge, and the force in the rear had withdrawn. These were the last shots on the right. Following them there was absolute quiet everywhere on the field. The stillness was painful and awful. Brannan's officers and men, peering down into the dim and smoking ravine, saw long lines of fire creeping over the leaves, and in and out among the wounded and the dead. It was a sight far more horrible than any of the pictured presentations of Dante's Inferno. From this scene, with the low wailings of the sufferers in their ears, they turned in triumph and exultant to form the rear guard of Thomas's advance to Rossville. Turchin and Willich fought last on the left and formed the rear guard there; Van Derveer covered the right. And thus the Army of the Cumberland at midnight occupied the passes which made the possession of Chattanooga secure.

There had been no such disordered rush of the broken portions of the army on Chattanooga as the panic-stricken correspondent of an Eastern paper depicted, who gave visions of his own early flight to the country as news. Only a small part of the broken wing drifted to Chattanooga. From 7,000 to 10,000 stopped at Rossville, and were fairly organized there. When Thomas's forces arrived the whole army was placed in position on Missionary Ridge, and in front of it, and remained in line of battle throughout the whole of the 21st.

At nightfall the army advanced to Chattanooga – advanced is the word; the term "retreated," so persistently used in regard to this movement has no place in the truthful history of this campaign. The Army of the Cumberland was on its way to Chattanooga, the city it set out to capture. It had halted at Chickamauga, on its line of advance, to fight for its objective. On the night of the 21st it began its last march for the city. Every foot of it was a march in advance, and not retreat. At sunrise of the 22d Brannan's division, which was the rear guard, reached the city, and the campaign for Chattanooga was at an end. Until that morning broke the great bulk of the Army of the Cumberland had never seen the place.

Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, closed the last campaign of General Rosecrans. It was matchless in its strategy, unequaled in the skill and energy with which his outnumbered army was concentrated for battle. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting throughout the two days' battle was not surpassed, and, judged by its returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the great battles of the war. It secured the city which it marched to capture. The loss was no greater than the country would have expected at any time in attaining that result. If Rosecrans had crossed the river in front of the city and captured it with even greater loss, the country would have gone wild with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from Washington he would have entered it without a battle, since, if there had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg's army would not have been nearly doubled with re-enforcements and thus enabled to march back on Chattanooga after its retreat from the city. The reverse on the field on Sunday was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be, and which it has ever since suited several writers of military fiction to persistently represent. The account herewith presented shows that after General Thomas consolidated his lines at 1 o'clock on Sunday not a single position was carried and held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which began soon after 5 o'clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an officer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they could have been held throughout till dark.

The accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's right is that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were swept off the field; but only five brigades of McCook's entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under Thomas on the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and McCook's corps. Wood belonged to Crittenden. Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the large part of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division were detached and cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley's division of Thomas went to the rear, chiefly through the bad conduct of its commander. We have seen, however, how persistently and effectively Stanley's and John Beatty's brigades of that division fought, and Beatty and General Charles Grosvenor and Sirwell and Stoughton, of these brigades, were all found fighting like private soldiers on the hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The battle of Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point throughout the next day and until the army moved on in the night to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at close range and, in the countless assaults, often hand to hand. On the first day there were no field works of any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude log works as could be hastily thrown together. Brannan and Steedman were without a semblance of works. The battle in the main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of brave and magnificent assaults.

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 2,061 effectives, held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several thousand less at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis' division and three regiments of infantry and one battery being engaged in guarding supply trains.

In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg's actual and prospective strength are thus stated:

"If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my return from Richmond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men; General Buckner, 16,118. He was to receive from General Johnson 9,000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as exceeding his expectations."

It will be well to remember, in connection with these official figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Longstreet's force, which was not included by Lee, at 5,000. This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave Bragg 81,219. According to General Johnson's correspondence, after he had sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subsequently dispatched him two small brigades, and these, later, reached him the day before the battle.

A reference to the losses on each side will show that there has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. Rosecrans's loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records Office, were 17,804. Thus the entire loss for each army was over twenty-five per cent. of the entire force of each. Hill's corps of the Confederate right wing lost 2,990 out of a total 8,884. Of the 22,885 in Longstreet's left wing the loss was 7,856, with one brigade heavily engaged not reported. Longstreet's loss on Sunday afternoon was thirty-six per cent, of those engaged.

The casualties in Jackson's brigade of Cleburne's division, which assaulted on Baird's front, was 35 per cent., while the Fifth Georgia, of that brigade, lost 55 per cent., and the First Confederate Regulars 43 per cent. Gregg's brigade, of Buckner's corps, lost 652 out of 1,425. Helm's Kentucky brigade, on the Union left, lost 75 per cent. of its strength. Bate's brigade lost 7 officers killed and 61 officers wounded, and the total casualties were 607 out of 1,316. All his field officers except three were killed or wounded. The losses in Govan's brigade, of Walker's corps, exceeded 50 per cent. Deas, who fought in front of Steedman's assault, lost 745 out of 1,942. Walthall, of Walker, lost 705 out of 1,727. On the Union side Steedman in four hours lost 1,787 out of 3,700, and all were killed and wounded but one. Brannan's division had 5,998 engaged. Its casualties were 2,174, or 38 per cent. The loss in Van Derveer's brigade, of this division, in four regiments and one battery, was 840 out of 1,788 engaged, or 49 per cent. Croxton's brigade, of the same division, made up of five regiments, lost 938. Of Van Derveer's regiments the Ninth Ohio lost 50 per cent.; the Thirty-fifth Ohio, a small fraction less than 50 per cent.; the Second Minnesota 192, or exactly 50 per cent., and the Eighty-seventh Indiana about half of its number. General Wood lost 1,070 in two brigades.

These figures become the more significant when compared with the statement of losses in the world's noted battles. General Wheeler, the distinguished Confederate cavalry commander, thus vividly presented this question at the gathering of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland and Confederates, at Chattanooga, in 1881:

"Waterloo was one of the most desperate and bloody fields chronicled in European history and yet Wellington's casualties were less than 12 per cent., his losses being 2,432 killed and 9,528 wounded out of 90,000 men, while at Shiloh, the first great battle in which General Grant was engaged, one side lost in killed and wounded 9,740 out of 34,000, while their opponents reported their killed and wounded at 9,616, making the casualties about 30 per cent. At the great battle of Wagram Napoleon lost but about 5 per cent. At Wurzburg the French lost but 3½ per cent., and yet the army gave up the field and retreated to the Rhine. At Racour Marshal Saxe lost but 2½ per cent. At Zurich Massena lost but 8 per cent. At Lagriz Frederick lost but 6½ per cent. At Malplaquet Marlborough lost but 10 per cent., and at Ramillies the same intrepid commander lost but 6 per cent. At Contras Henry of Navarre was reported as cut to pieces, yet his loss was less than 10 per cent. At Lodi Napoleon lost 1¼ per cent. At Valmy Frederick lost but 3 per cent., and at the great battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, sanguinary as they were, Napoleon lost an average of less than 14½ per cent. At Magenta and Solferino, in 1859, the average loss of both armies was less than 9 per cent. At Konigrattz, in 1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Specheran, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan, in 1870, the average loss was 12 percent. At Linden General Moreau lost but 4 per cent., and the Archduke John lost but 7 per cent. in killed and wounded. Americans can scarcely call this a lively skirmish.

"At Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Gettysburg, Mission Ridge, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania the loss frequently reached and sometimes exceeded forty per cent., and the average of killed and wounded on one side or the other was over thirty per cent."

Those who remained at Chickamauga and fought till the night of Sunday came, when, for many regiments, every other comrade was dead or wounded, were satisfied with the result, and have always maintained that Chickamauga was fought for Chattanooga, and have so regarded it as a great and notable victory. General D. H. Hill in a recent Century article thus sums up the result for the Confederate side: "A breathing space was allowed him; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga – the objective point of the campaign – was held. There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga – that brilliant dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay to strike was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That 'barren victory' sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy."

The authorities at Washington, to cover their own shortcomings and inexcusable neglect, chose to deepen the erroneous impression that the Army of the Cumberland had been routed and driven back to Chattanooga in confusion. The removal of General Rosecrans was determined upon. In fact, it had been only a question of opportunity since the campaign opened. There was only needed the misrepresentations about Chickamauga to furnish this.

In the mean time General Rosecrans thoroughly fortified Chattanooga and was actually engaged in preparations to open the river for supplies, exactly as it was afterwards done, when he was removed. In fact, his plan was partially perfected before he crossed the river, as is shown by the fact that he made written contracts with Northern firms to have bridges completed by October 1 for the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and the Running Water at Wauhatchie. He had ordered the thorough reconnoitering of the river bank opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge – where Sherman afterward crossed with a view of a flank attack there. It was, therefore, altogether fitting and proper that the order for his relief should arrive while he was absent making a personal examination of the vicinity of Brown's Ferry, where he intended to throw a bridge to unite with Hooker from Bridgeport and open the river exactly as was afterward done. He had even notified Harker of the plan three days before and ordered him to be ready to execute his part of it. General Thomas, at first, insisted that he would resign rather than appear to acquiesce in Rosecrans's removal by accepting the command. It was at Rosecrans's earnest solicitation that he reconsidered this determination. But he did not hesitate to say that the order was cruelly unjust. When General Garfield left for Washington soon after the battle he immediately charged him to do all he could to have Rosecrans righted. These will be new statements to most, but they are true.

The survivors of the Army of the Cumberland should awake to great pride in this notable field of Chickamauga. Why should it not, as well as Eastern fields, be marked by monuments, and its lines accurately preserved for history? There was no more magnificent fighting during the war than both armies did there. Both sides might well unite in preserving the field where both, in a military sense, won such renown.

    H. V. B.