The Works of Daniel Webster, Volume 1

In the mean time, the same complaints, sometimes just, sometimes exaggerated, sometimes groundless, had reached France from the coast of Africa, and a strong feeling against the right of search was produced in that country. The incidents connected with the adjustment of the Syrian question, in 1840, had greatly irritated the French ministry and people, and the present was deemed a favorable moment for retaliation. On the assembling of the Chambers, an amendment was moved by M. Lefebvre to the address in reply to the king’s speech in the following terms: “We have also the confidence, that, in granting its concurrence to the suppression of a criminal traffic, your government will know how to preserve from every attack the interest of our commerce and the independence of our flag.” cxxxv This amendment was adopted by the unanimous vote of the Chambers.

This was well understood to be a blow aimed at the quintuple treaty. It was the most formidable parliamentary check ever encountered by M. Guizot’s administration. It excited profound sensation throughout Europe. It compelled the French ministry to make the painful sacrifice of a convention negotiated agreeably to instructions, and not differing in principle from those of 1831 and 1833, which were consequently liable to be involved in its fate. The ratification of the quintuple treaty was felt to be out of the question. Although it soon appeared that the king was determined to sustain M. Guizot, it was by no means apparent in what manner his administration was to be rescued from the present embarrassment.

The public feeling in France was considerably heightened by various documents which appeared at this juncture, in connection with the controversy between the United States and Great Britain. The President’s message and its accompanying papers reached Europe about the period of the opening of the session. A very sew days after the adoption of M. Lefebvre’s amendment, a pamphlet, written by General Cass, was published in Paris, and, being soon after translated into French and widely circulated, contributed to strengthen the current of public feeling. A more elaborate essay was, in the course of the season, published by Mr. Wheaton, the Minister of the United States at Berlin, in which the theory of a right of search in time of peace was vigorously assailed.

The preceding sketch of the history of the question will show the difficulty of the position in reference to this most important interest, at the time Lord Ashburton’s mission was instituted. With what practical good sense and high statesmanship the controversy was terminated is well known to the country. It is unnecessary here to retrace the steps of the correspondence, to comment on the eighth article of the treaty of Washington, or to analyze the parliamentary and diplomatic discussions to which in the following year it gave rise. It is enough to say, that, under circumstances of some embarrassment to the Department of State, a course of procedure was happily devised by Mr. Webster, and incorporated into the treaty, which, leaving untouched the metaphysics of the question, furnished a satisfactory cxxxvi practical solution of the difficulty. Circumstances having made a restatement expedient of the principles maintained by the United States on this most important subject, a letter was addressed by Mr. Webster to Mr. Everett, on the 28th of March, 1843, to be read to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which the law of nations applicable to the subject was expounded by the American Secretary with a clearness and power which will render any further discussion of the subject, under its present aspects, entirely superfluous. Nor will it be thought out of place to acknowledge the fairness, good temper, and ability with which the doctrine and practice of the English government were sustained by the Earl of Aberdeen.

The wisdom with which the eighth article of the treaty was drawn up was soon seen in its consequences. Its effect was decisive. It put a stop to all discontent at home in reference to the interruption of our lawful commerce on the coast of Africa. Abroad, it raised the jealousy already existing in France on this subject to the point of uncontrollable repugnance. The ratification of the quintuple treaty had long been abandoned. It was soon evident that the conventions of 1831 and 1833 must be given up. In the course of the year 1844, the Duc de Broglie, the honorable and accomplished minister by whom they had been negotiated, accepted a special mission to London, for the purpose of coming to some satisfactory arrangement by way of substitute, and a convention was soon concluded with the British government on precisely the same principles with those of the treaty of Washington.

It may be hoped that the important suggestion of Mr. Webster will be borne in mind, in any future discussions of this and other maritime questions, that the policy of the United States is not that of a feeble naval power interested in exaggerating the doctrine of neutral inviolability. A respect for every independent flag is a common interest of all civilized states, powerful or weak; but the rank of the United States among naval powers, and their position as the great maritime power on the western coasts of the Atlantic and the eastern coasts of the Pacific, may lead them to doubt the expediency of pressing too far the views they have hitherto held, and moderate their anxiety to construe with extreme strictness the rights which the law of nations concedes to public vessels.

The three subjects on which we have dwelt, namely, the northeastern boundary, the extradition of fugitives, and the suppression of the slave-trade, were the only ones which required to be provided for by treaty stipulation. Other subjects, scarcely less important and fully as difficult were happily disposed of in the correspondence of the plenipotentiaries. These were the affair of the “Caroline,” that of the “Creole,” and the question of impressment. Our limits do not permit us to dwell at length on these topics; but we shall be pardoned for one or two reflections.

So urgent is the pressure on the public mind of the successive events which demand attention each as it presents itself, that the formidable difficulties growing out of the destruction of the “Caroline” and the arrest of McLeod are already fading from recollection. They formed, in reality, a crisis of a most serious and delicate character. A glance at the correspondence of the two governments at Washington and London sufficiently shows this to be the case. The violation of the territory of the United States in the destruction of the “Caroline,” however unwarrantable the conduct of the “sympathizers” which provoked it, became, from the moment the British government assumed the responsibility of the act, an incident of the gravest character. On the other hand, the inability of the government of the United States to extricate McLeod from the risks of a capital trial in a State court, although the government of England demanded his liberation on the ground that he was acting under the legal orders of his superior, presented a difficulty in the working of our system equally novel and important. Other cases had arisen in which important constitutional principles had failed to take effect, for want of the requisite legislative provisions. It is believed that this was the first time in which a difficulty of this kind had presented itself in our foreign relations. A more threatening one can scarcely be imagined. In addition to the embarrassment occasioned by the refusal of the executive and judiciary of New York to yield to the representations of the general government, the violent interference of the mob presented new difficulties of the most deplorable character. If McLeod had been executed, it is not too much to say, that war would at once have ensued. His acquittal averted this impending danger. The conciliatory cxxxviii spirit cannot be too warmly commended with which, on the one hand, the proper reparation was made by Lord Ashburton for the violation of the American territory, and, on the other hand, Congress, by the passage of an appropriate law, provided an effectual legislative remedy for any future similar case. They show with what simplicity and ease the greatest evils may be averted, and the most desirable ends achieved, by statesmen and governments animated by a sincere desire to promote the welfare of those who have placed power in their hands, not for selfish, party purposes, but for the public good.

There is, perhaps, no one of the papers written by Mr. Webster as Secretary of State, in which so much force of statement and power of argument are displayed as in the letter on “impressment.” To incorporate a stipulation on this subject into a treaty was, regarding the antecedents of the question, impracticable. But the reply of Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster’s announcement of the American principle must be considered as acquiescence on the part of his government. It may be doubted whether this odious and essentially illegal practice will ever again be systematically resorted to, even in England.[28 - The following passage from a letter of Robert Walsh, Esq., to the editors of the National Intelligencer, dated Paris, 28th October, 1842, furnishes confirmation of the remark in the text:—“The former journal [The Times], of the 18th instant, acknowledges that Mr. Webster ‘has not exaggerated the hardships and evils which the practice of impressment occasioned in the last war.’ It ratifies his ideas of the probable aggravation of them, if the practice should be ever renewed; it would even dispense with press-warrants at home, as adverse to the general principles of British liberty and law: it advises some general measure for the entire abolition of arbitrary impressment both at home and abroad, and it expresses its belief of a very strong probability, that, in the event of a war, no instructions for the impressment of British seamen found in American merchant-vessels will be issued to her Majesty’s cruisers. The Standard chimes with the great oracle, and concludes in this strain: ‘We may infer that, whatever may be the plan hereafter for managing our navy, impressment will never again be resorted to; this is beyond a doubt: the practice complained of by Mr. Webster will be abandoned.’”] Considering the advance made by public sentiment an all questions connected with personal liberty, “a hot-press on the Thames” would hardly stand the ordeal of an investigation in Parliament at the present day. It is certain that the right of impressing seamen from American vessels could never be practically asserted in a future war with any other effect than that of adding the United States to the parties in the contest. No refinements in the doctrine of natural allegiance, although cxxxix their theoretical soundness might equal their subtilty, would be of the least avail here. To force seamen from the deck of a peaceful neutral vessel, pursuing a lawful commerce, and compel them to serve for an indefinite and hopeless period on board a foreign man-of-war, is an act of power and violence to which no nation will submit that is able to resist it. In the case of the United States and Great Britain, that community of language and resemblance in general appearance which may have been considered as palliating the most deplorable results of the exercise of this power, in reality constitute the strongest reason for its abandonment. The unquestionable danger that, with the best intentions, the boarding officer may mistake an American for an Englishman; the certainty that a reckless lieutenant, unmindful of consequences, but bent upon recruiting his ship on a remote foreign station, will pretend to believe that he is seizing the subjects of his own government, whatever may be the evidence to the contrary, are reasons of themselves for denying on the threshold the existence of a right exposed to such inevitable and intolerable abuse.

These and other views of the subject are presented in Mr. Webster’s letter to Lord Ashburton of the 8th of August, 1842, with a strength of reasoning and force of illustration not often equalled in a state paper. That letter was spoken of, in the hearing of the writer of this memoir, by one whose name, if it could be mentioned with propriety, would give the highest authority to the remark, as a composition not surpassed by any thing in the language. The principles laid down in it may be considered as incorporated into the public law of the United States, and will have their influence beyond our own territorial limits and beyond our own time.

Some disappointment was probably felt, when the treaty of Washington was published, that a settlement of the Oregon question was not included among its provisions. It need not be said that a subject of such magnitude did not escape the attention of the negotiators. It was, however, speedily inferred by Mr. Webster, from the purport of his informal conferences with Lord Ashburton on this point, that an arrangement of this question was not then practicable, and that to attempt it would be to put the entire negotiation to great risk of failure. On the other hand, it was not less certain that, by closing up cxl the other matters in controversy, the best preparation was made for bringing the Oregon dispute to an amicable issue, whenever circumstances should favor that undertaking. Considerable firmness was no doubt required to act upon this policy, and to forego the attempt, at least, to settle a question rapidly growing into the most formidable magnitude. It is unnecessary to say how completely the course adopted has been justified by the event.

We have in the preceding remarks confined ourselves to the topics connected with the treaty of Washington. But other subjects of great importance connected with the foreign affairs of the country engaged the attention of Mr. Webster as Secretary of State.

The first of these pertained to our controversies with Mexico, and was treated in a letter to M. de Bocanegra, the Mexican Secretary of State and Foreign Relations. The great and unexpected changes which have taken place in that quarter since the date of this correspondence will not impair the interest with which it will be read. It throws important light on the earlier stages of our controversy with that ill-advised and infatuated government. Among the papers in this part of the volume are those which relate to the Santa Fé prisoners and Captain Jones’s attack on Monterey.

Under the head of “Relations with Spain” will be found a correspondence of great interest between the Chevalier d’Argaïz, the representative of that government, and Mr. Webster, on the subject of the “Amistad.” The pertinacity with which this matter was pursued by Spain, after its adjudication by the Supreme Court of the United States, furnishes an instructive commentary upon the sincerity of that government in its measures for the abolition of the slave-trade. The entire merits of this important and extraordinary case are condensed in Mr. Webster’s letters of the 1st of September, 1841, and 21st of June, 1842.

Of still greater interest are the institution of the mission to China, and the steps which led to the establishment of the independence of the Sandwich Islands. The sixth volume of this collection contains the instructions given to Mr. Cushing as commissioner to China, and the correspondence between Mr. cxli Webster and Messrs. Richards and Haalilio on behalf of the Sandwich Islands. At any period less crowded with important events the opening of diplomatic relations with China, and the conclusion of a treaty of commerce with that power, would have been deemed occurrences of unusual importance. It certainly reflects great credit on the administration, that it acted with such promptitude and efficiency in seizing this opportunity of multiplying avenues of commercial intercourse. Nor is less praise due to the energy and skill of the negotiator,[29 - Mr. Cushing.] to whom this novel and important undertaking was confided, and who was able to embark from China, on his return homeward, in six months after his arrival, having in the mean time satisfactorily concluded the treaty.

The application of the representatives of the Sandwich Islands to the government of the United States, and the countenance extended to them at Washington, exercised a most salutary and seasonable influence over the destiny of those islands. The British government was promptly made aware of the course pursued by the United States, and was no doubt led, in a considerable degree, by this circumstance, to promise the Hawaiian delegates, on the part of England, to respect the independent neutrality of their government. In the mean time, the British admiral on that station had taken provisional possession of them on behalf of his government, in anticipation of a similar movement which was expected on the part of France. If intelligence of this occurrence had been received in London before the promise above alluded to was given by Lord Aberdeen to Messrs. Richards and Haalilio, it is not impossible that Great Britain might have felt herself warranted in retaining the protectorate of the Hawaiian Islands as an offset for the occupation of Tahiti by the French. As it was, the temporary arrangement of the British admiral was disavowed, and the government restored to the native chief.

Among the papers contained in the sixth volume will be found a correspondence between Mr. Webster and the Portuguese Minister, on the subject of duties on Portuguese wines, and a report of great importance on the Sound duties and the Zoll-Verein, topics to which the recent changes in the Germanic system will henceforward impart a greatly increased importance.

This brief enumeration will of itself sufficiently show the extensive range of the subjects to which the attention of Mr. Webster was called, during the two years for which he filled the Department of State.

The published correspondence probably forms but a small portion of the official labors of the Department of State for the period during which it was filled by Mr. Webster. They constitute, nevertheless, the most important part of the documentary record of a period of official service, brief, indeed, but as beneficial to the country as any of which the memory is preserved in her annals. The administration of General Harrison found the United States, in the spring of 1841, on the verge of a war, not with a feeble Spanish province, scarcely capable of a respectable resistance, but with the most powerful government on earth. The conduct of our foreign relations was intrusted to Mr. Webster, as Secretary of State, and in the two years during which he filled that office controversies of fifty years’ standing were terminated, new causes of quarrel that sprung up like hydra’s heads were settled, and peace was preserved upon honorable terms. The British government, fresh from the conquest of China, perhaps never felt itself stronger than in the year 1842, and a full share of credit is due to the spirit of conciliation which swayed its counsels. Much is due to the wise and amiable minister who was despatched from England on the holy errand of peace; much to the patriotism of the Senate of the United States, who confirmed the treaty of Washington by a larger majority than ever before sustained a measure of this kind which divided public opinion; but the first meed of praise is unquestionably due to the American negotiator. Let the just measure of that praise be estimated, by reflecting what would have been our condition during the last few years, if, instead of, or in addition to, the war with Mexico, we had been involved in a war with Great Britain.

CHAPTER IX

Mr. Webster resigns his Place in Mr. Tyler’s Cabinet.—Attempts to draw public Attention to the projected Annexation of Texas.—Supports Mr. Clay’s Nomination for the Presidency.—Causes of the Failure of that Nomination.—Mr. Webster returns to the Senate of the United States.—Admission of Texas to the Union.—The War with Mexico.—Mr. Webster’s Course in Reference to the War.—Death of Major Webster in Mexico.—Mr. Webster’s unfavorable Opinion of the Mexican Government.—Settlement of the Oregon Controversy.—Mr. Webster’s Agency in effecting the Adjustment.—Revival of the Sub-Treasury System and Repeal of the Tariff Law of 1842.—Southern Tour.—Success of the Mexican War and Acquisition of the Mexican Provinces.—Efforts in Congress to organize a Territorial Government for these Provinces.—Great Exertions of Mr. Webster on the last Night of the Session.—Nomination of General Taylor, and Course of Mr. Webster in Reference to it.—A Constitution of State Government adopted by California prohibiting Slavery.—Increase of Antislavery Agitation.—Alarming State of Affairs.—Mr. Webster’s Speech for the Union.—Circumstances under which it was made, and Motives by which he was influenced.—General Taylor’s Death, and the Accession of Mr. Fillmore to the Presidency.—Mr. Webster called to the Department of State.

Mr. Webster remained in the Department of State but a little over two years. His last act was the preparation of the instructions of Mr. Cushing, who had been appointed Commissioner to China. Difficulties had occurred the summer before, between President Tyler and some of the members of his Cabinet, and all of those gentlemen, with the exception of Mr. Webster, tendered their resignations, which were accepted. Hard thoughts were entertained of Mr. Webster in some quarters for continuing to hold his seat after the resignation of his colleagues. President Tyler, however, had in no degree withdrawn his confidence from Mr. Webster in reference to the foreign affairs of the country, nor interfered with the administration of his department, and Mr. Webster conceived that the interests involved in his remaining at his post were far too important to be sacrificed to punctilio. His own sense of duty in this respect was confirmed by the unanimous counsel of the Massachusetts delegation in Congress, and by judicious friends in all parts of the country. In fact, it will be remembered that when difficulties sprung up between Mr. Tyler and the Whig party in Congress, in 1842, the Whig press generally throughout the country called upon the members of the Cabinet cxliv appointed by General Harrison to retain their places till they should be removed by Mr. Tyler.

Mr. Webster remained in private life during the residue of President Tyler’s administration, occupied as usual with professional pursuits, and enjoying in the appropriate seasons the retirement of his farm. He endeavored by private communications to arouse the feeling of the North to the projects which he perceived to be in agitation for the annexation of Texas but the danger was regarded at that time as too remote to be contended against. A short time only elapsed before the fulfilment of his anticipations was forced upon the country, with fearful urgency, and a train of consequences of which it will be left to a late posterity to witness the full development. Between the years 1843 and 1845 the fortunes of the United States were subjected to an influence, for good or for evil, not to be exhausted for centuries.

The nomination of Mr. Clay to the Presidency in 1844 was cordially supported by Mr. Webster. He took the field, as in the summer of 1840 in favor of General Harrison. The proofs of the untiring zeal with which he entered into the canvass, and of the great power and fertility with which he discussed the various topics of the day, will be seen in the second volume of the present collection. It has, however, been found impossible to insert more than a selection of the speeches made by him during the campaign. Others not inferior in merit and interest were made by him in the course of the summer and autumn of 1844.

It is well known that the result of this election was decisive of the question of the annexation of Texas. The opinions expressed by Mr. Van Buren against the immediate consummation of that project had prevented his receiving the nomination of the Baltimore Convention. Mr. Clay was pledged against the measure, and Mr. Polk was selected as its sure friend. If in 1844 the friends of Mr. Van Buren, instead of giving in their adhesion to the Baltimore nomination (which was in fact turning the scale in favor of Texas), had been prepared, as in 1848, to support a separate nomination, or even if the few thousand votes cast by the “Liberty party” against Mr. Clay had been given in his favor, he would have been chosen President of the United States, to the indefinite postponement of the annexation cxlv of Texas and the Mexican war, with all their consequences. But in great things as in small, men throw away the substance while they grasp at the shadow.

At the first session of the Twenty-ninth Congress (1845-46), Mr. Webster took his seat as the successor of Mr. Choate in the Senate of the United States. The question of the admission of Texas was decided at the very commencement of the session. It was opposed by Mr. Webster. To all the other objections to the measure in his mind was added that of unconstitutionality. The annexation was now brought about simply by a joint resolution of the two houses, after it had been found impossible to effect it by treaty, the only form known to the Constitution by which a compact can be entered into with a foreign power. Mr. Jefferson was of opinion in 1803, that even a treaty with France was not sufficient for the annexation of Louisiana, but that an amendment of the Constitution was necessary for that purpose. In 1845 the executive and a majority of Congress, having failed to carry the ratification of a treaty of annexation by the constitutional majority, scrupled not to accomplish their purpose by a joint resolution of the two houses; and this measure was effected under the lead of statesmen who claim to construe the Constitution with literal strictness. Events like these furnish a painful illustration of the frailty of constitutional restraints as a barrier against the consummation of the favorite measures of a dominant party.

The great event of the administration of President Polk was the war with Mexico. The time has not yet arrived when the counsels under which this war was brought about can be fully unfolded. On the 2d of December, 1845, in his first annual message, having communicated to Congress the acceptance by Texas of the terms of annexation offered by the joint resolution, President Polk thus expressed himself:—

“This accession to our territory has been a bloodless achievement. No arm of force has been raised to produce the result. The sword has had no part in the victory. We have not sought to extend our territorial possessions by conquest, or our republican institutions over a reluctant people. It was the deliberate homage of each people to the great principle of our federative Union.”

The proffered annexation of Texas had been declined both cxlvi by General Jackson and Mr. Van Buren, on the ground that, unless made with the consent of Mexico, it would involve a war with that power. That this would be the effect was not less certain on the 2d of December, 1845, when Congress were congratulated on the “bloodless” acquisition, than it was when, on the 13th of January following, General Taylor was instructed to occupy the left bank of the Rio del Norte. In fact, in the very message in which President Polk remarks to Congress “that the sword had had no part in the victory,” he gives them also the significant information, that, upon the earnest appeal both of the Congress and convention of Texas, he had ordered “an efficient military force to take a position between the Nueces and the Del Norte.”

This force, however efficient in proportion to its numbers and in virtue of the gallantry and skill of its commander, was found to be inadequate to sustain the brunt of the Mexican arms. Rapid movements on the part of Generals Ampudia and Arista, commanding on the frontier, seriously endangered the safety of General Taylor’s force, and it became necessary for Congress to strengthen it by prompt reinforcements. In this way the war was commenced. No formal declaration had taken place, nor had it been in the power of Congress to make known its will on the subject, till an absolute necessity arose of reinforcing General Taylor, and the subject had ceased to be one for legislative discretion.

Under these circumstances it was of course impossible for Mr. Webster to approve the war. It had been brought on by the executive will, and without the concurrence of Congress till Congress had ceased to have an option, and its well-known ulterior objects were such as he could not but contemplate with equal disapprobation and alarm. Still, however, in common with the body of his political friends, in and out of Congress, he abstained from all factious opposition, and all measures calculated to embarrass the government. The supplies were voted for by him, but he never ceased to urge upon the President to pursue a magnanimous policy toward the distracted and misgoverned country with which we had been brought in collision. Nor did his opinions of the character of the war lead him to discourage the inclination of his younger son, Mr. Edward Webster, to accept a commission in the regiment of Massachusetts cxlvii Volunteers. This young gentleman had evinced an energy beyond his years, and practical talent of a high order, as a member of the commission for marking the boundary line between Maine and the British Provinces under the treaty of Washington. His friends looked forward with confidence to his running a brilliant military career. These hopes, like those which accompanied so many other gallant and patriotic spirits to the scene of action, were destined to be early blasted. Major Webster fell a victim to the labors and exposures of the service, and to the climate of the country, under the walls of Mexico.

To avoid all misconception, it may be proper to state that Mr. Webster has at all times entertained an unfavorable opinion of the various administrations by which Mexico, almost ever since her revolution, has been successively misgoverned. He has felt constrained to regard the greater part of them as military factions, bent more upon supplanting each other than upon promoting the welfare of their country. He was fully aware of the justice of many of the complaints of citizens of the United States for wrongs inflicted and justice withheld. Both while in the executive government himself, and as a member of Congress, he had uniformly expressed himself in terms of severe condemnation of the conduct of the Mexican government in withholding or delaying redress; and he foresaw and foretold that, in obstinately refusing to recognize the independence of Texas, she was laying up for herself a store of consequences the most humiliating and disastrous. Nothing but the most deplorable infatuation could have led the government of Mexico to suppose, that, after the independence of Texas had been recognized by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Belgium, it would be possible for a power as feeble as that of Mexico to reduce the rebellious province to submission. If any confirmation of these statements is needed, it may be found in Mr. Webster’s letter to Mr. de Bocanegra, in the sixth volume of this collection.

The settlement of the controversy with England relative to the boundary of Oregon was effected in the first year of Mr. Polk’s administration. The foundations for this adjustment had long been laid; in fact, as long ago as the administration of Mr. Monroe, the United States had offered to England the obvious basis of the extension of the forty-ninth degree of latitude cxlviii to the Pacific. Great Britain allowed herself to be influenced by the Hudson’s Bay Company so far, as to insist upon following the course of the Columbia down to the sea. She even took the extravagant ground that, although the United States, by the Louisiana and Florida treaties, combined the Spanish and the French titles with that of actual contiguity and prior discovery of the Columbia River, they had no exclusive title to any portion of the territory, but that it was all subject to her own joint and rival claim. This unreasonable pretension brought the two countries to the verge of war. The Baltimore Convention, in the year 1844, set up a claim, equally unreasonable, to the whole of the territory. President Polk in his inaugural message, quoting the words of the resolution of the Baltimore Convention, pronounced our title to the territory to be “clear and unquestionable.”

The assertion of these opposite extremes of pretension happily resulted in the final adjustment on the forty-ninth degree. Mr. Webster had uniformly been of opinion that this was the fair basis of settlement. Had he supposed that an arrangement could have been effected on this basis with Lord Ashburton, he would gladly have included it in the treaty of Washington. After Mr. Webster’s retirement from the Department of State, it is stated by President Polk that Mr. Upshur instructed Mr. Everett to offer that line to the British government; but the negotiation had in the mean time, by the appointment of Mr. Pakenham, been transferred to Washington. The offer of the forty-ninth degree of latitude was renewed to Mr. Pakenham, but accompanied with conditions which led him to decline it, and to express the hope that the United States would make “some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British government.” The offer thus injudiciously rejected was withdrawn by the administration. In this dangerous juncture of affairs, the following incidents occurred, which we give in the words of the “London Examiner”: