The Battle of Atlanta

The firing of the artillery and the sharp skirmish firing of my movement satisfied Colonel Carr that the enemy was in force in my front, and he immediately sent back word for his other Brigade, Commanded by Colonel Vandever, of the Ninth Iowa Infantry, to come to the rear, now our front. They had hardly reached the Elkhorn Tavern and deployed into line before Price's whole Army moved in on us in line of battle and disabled two of our batteries. The fighting on this front, with only Carr's two Brigades in line, the strength of both not exceeding three thousand men, was kept up continuously all day, until dark, with varying success.

As soon as I saw, near the middle of the day, the formation of the enemy, I knew that I could not hold the extended line we were covering, and I commenced drawing in my right and closing on Vandever until I backed down through an open field that had been cleared, and where the logs had been hauled to the lower edge of the slope to make a fence. Behind these logs I placed my Brigade and fought all the afternoon, with the enemy sometimes around both flanks and sometimes in my rear.

Colonel Vandever held his line at the Elkhorn Tavern in the edge of thick timber on the main Fayetteville road until late in the afternoon, fighting desperately, when the enemy, taking advantage of the timber as a blind, by largely superior numbers, drove him back across an open field to a line of woods in his rear and in my rear, which he successfully held. I was not aware of his movement until the fire in that direction slackened, and I sent out my adjutant, Lieutenant James A. Williamson (afterwards a Brevet Major-General), who returned and reported that the enemy were in possession of that field; in fact, he ran right into them and received their fire, but got back to me safely. It was then nearly dark. The fire on my front had slackened, and my Brigade was almost entirely out of ammunition. I immediately ordered them to form in column and led them right out from the right, moving in the direction where Vandever's Brigade had formed in its new position. As I moved out I passed right in sight of a column of the Confederate forces, who evidently had come out of the hollow and were forming to again attack Vandever. They probably thought I was a portion of their force, for they made no demonstration towards me, and I passed right by them. As I passed out into the open I could see that General Asboth, who had been brought there by General Curtis, was forming to attack at the Elkhorn Tavern again; and I met General Curtis, who seemed astonished to find me with my force intact. He asked me where I was going. I told him that I was out of ammunition, and that I was bringing out my force to form it on the new line. Paying the command a high compliment, he immediately ordered me to fix bayonets and to charge on the enemy at the same time that Asboth with his reinforcement moved down the Fayetteville road towards the Elkhorn Tavern. I immediately did this, and passed right back over the field where I had been fighting, but found no enemy. They had evidently left my front at the same time I retired, and I returned and went into line on the right of Vandever's Brigade, probably 500 feet in the rear of the original line, and there we laid all night under arms.

Van Dorn's plan of attack was to throw the Arkansas forces under McCullough and McIntosh on Curtis's right, facing the Little Cross Hollow road, while at the same time General Price with his force moved around us by the Little Cross Timber road to our rear and attacked from the Cross Timbers.

When passing through Little Cross Timber Hollow Price struck the timber blockade, and, as he shows in his report, was held there for a long time before he could clear out the roads and get his forces and artillery through. This delayed his attack in the rear until nearly 10 o'clock in the morning. The two forces of McCullough and Price were separated by a high ridge by the name of Pea Ridge, over which it was impracticable for them to connect, and, therefore, the two attacks were separate and not in concert.

General McCullough, in attacking from the west, struck General Jeff C. Davis's Division. Davis had a Division of troops that had been thoroughly drilled. He was a very competent officer and handled them with great skill, and the attack of McCullough and McIntosh, though desperate, was without avail, both rebel commanders being killed in the attack, which took all the fight out of the Arkansas troops and made their attacks towards evening of very little effect. Davis pursued them so energetically that after the death of their commanders they straggled off towards Arkansas and no more fighting occurred on that flank.

General Siegel's two Divisions had remained facing Sugar Creek. General Curtis had endeavored to bring them forward, but without avail. A Brigade of General Osterhaus's Division aided General Davis during the latter part of the day, but the Brigade from Asboth's Division did not get into line to help Carr until nearly dark, although General Curtis went in person for them. Colonel Carr's troops had been marching two nights before the battle, and on the night of the 7th he asked General Curtis to relieve them, so they could get some sleep. General Curtis promised they should be relieved by one of General Siegel's Divisions, but they held the line all that night right where they were formed, and when we looked for our relief the next morning we learned that General Siegel and his troops were nearly a mile in our rear, taking their breakfast.

The general plan of General Curtis's attack on the morning of the 8th was for a combined movement on Price's Army by both of General Siegel's Divisions, and General Davis, who had been brought over to our front, holding Carr's Division in reserve. We waited a long time for General Siegel to get into position; and in fact before he got into position Colonel Carr had been brought out from the reserve and placed on the right of Davis. The enemy opened out upon us, and my Brigade holding the right I commenced swinging my line in over the ground I had fought over the day before, and discovered that the enemy were withdrawing from us; were not standing and giving battle; and the fighting on the morning of the 8th was merely a fight of Price's rear-guard to enable him to withdraw by the Huntsville road, he having received orders that morning from Van Dorn to do so, Van Dorn notifying Price that this was necessary, as the Arkansas troops, after the death of McCullough and McIntosh, had most of them retreated to the south, leaving Price's Army the only force intact in our rear, so that he now had the difficult problem of getting away from us.

The fighting lasted but a short time, mostly with artillery, and occasioned very little loss for that day. We soon discovered the rebels fleeing over the hills and down the White River Road, and being nearest to that road I immediately started my Brigade after them. I had not proceeded far when I received an order from General Curtis to return and hold the battle-field. I was a good deal astonished at this, as I could see the enemy demoralized in my front, with their baggage-trains and their artillery, and I had no doubt, (as I knew the country, having had a detachment stationed at Blackburn's Mills, at the crossing of White River, supplying our Army with forage and grain before the battle,) that I could capture this portion of the army before it could make a crossing of White River.

When I arrived on the battle-field General Curtis told me that General Siegel and his Divisions had gone to the rear towards Cassville; in fact, I myself heard him give one of the Brigades that was passing an order to halt there, which they did not obey, but kept on. General Siegel wrote back advising Curtis to form his new line in the rear of Cross Timbers, as Van Dorn might return to the fight, but Curtis instructed Colonel Carr's Division to remain on the field and hold it, which it did. General Curtis afterwards made very severe complaints to General Halleck of the actions of General Siegel, and in answer General Halleck wrote as follows:

I was by no means surprised at General Siegel's conduct before the battle of Pea Ridge. It was plainly in keeping with what he did at Carthage and Wilson's Creek. After your expedition started I received documentary proof from Captains Sturgis, Schofield, and Totten, and a number of other officers, in regard to his conduct on those occasions, which destroyed all confidence in him. It was for that reason that I telegraphed to you so often not to let Siegel separate from you. I anticipated that he would try to play you a trick by being absent at the critical moment. I wished to forewarn you of the snare, but I could not then give you my reasons. I am glad you prevented his project and saved your army. I cannot describe to you how much uneasiness I felt for you. You saved your army and won a glorious victory by refusing to take his advice.

Captain Kinsman, of Company B, Fourth Iowa, who was holding Pea Ridge, and witnessed the battle from that point, and could look down upon Carr's Division, described the battle in the rear as follows:

At 8:30 o'clock Colonel Dodge opened the ball, and the battle was soon raging all along the line with a fierceness and obstinacy which omened a terrific struggle. The weather was splendid, and the smoke instead of hanging murkily among the trees, rose rapidly and rolled away over the hills in dense sulphurous masses. The thunder of the artillery was terrific, and the shot and shell hissed and screamed through the air like flying devils, while the infantry of both armies, with their rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, kept a perfect hurricane of death howling through the woods. The rebels fought well, but generally fired too high, and their batteries, although getting our range accurately, missed the elevation much of the time. Their poor shooting was our salvation. Had they done as well as our men, with the tremendous odds against us, they must have annihilated us. The enemy were clear around our right flank, enveloping us, and it looked as though they would capture Dodge's Brigade, when Colonel Dodge took a battalion of Colonel Carr's regiment, the Third Illinois cavalry, and charged the forces that were turning our right flank like a whirlwind. Everything gave way before them. Every man in that battalion seemed to ride for his life, and they swept way around our front, routing and demoralizing that flank of the enemy, and effectually freeing our rear and flank. Price told some of our boys of the Fourth Iowa who were captured on the day of the fight and have since escaped, that we fought more like devils than human beings. The rebel colonels (several of them) inquired of our boys who those black-coated fellows were, and who led them. They said there must have been at least 3,000 of them. When the boys told them there were less than 600 of them, the Colonels said they needn't tell them any such stuff as that; that they knew it was a damned lie. But they sent their compliments to Colonel Dodge for the bravery of himself and his command, and well they might, for opposed to Colonel Dodge's Brigade of 1,050 men, and two guns of the First Iowa Battery, were six regiments of Confederate troops, a large force of Confederate Missouri State troops, and eighteen guns, and many of these Confederate troops were the men who did the hard fighting at the Wilson Creek battle. All day, from 8:30 in the morning till 5:30 at night, Dodge's Brigade held its ground, dealing death into the rebel ranks, and, when dark came, with ammunition expended, the Fourth Iowa walked away from the field in good order, with the sullen savage tread of men who might be driven by main strength, but could not be conquered. Although this was one of the first battles of the war, the Northern men showed their desperate fighting qualities; and on the second day the South met and faced great slaughter.

Fayel, the correspondent of the Missouri Democrat, gives this account of the part Colonel Eugene A. Carr's Fourth Iowa Division took in the battle at Elk Horn Tavern:

Having given an account of the battle fought by Brigadier-General Jeff C. Davis's Division, which occurred the same day, on our left, I will now attempt to give some details of the Elk Horn Battle – the latter having commenced early in the morning. First in order comes a description of the locality near Elk Horn Tavern.

The house is on the Fayetteville and Springfield road, about four miles north of Sugar Creek, between which two points our camp was pitched, on the elevated ridge constituting the northern bank of the creek. Leading north from the tavern, the road drops into the head of the long gorge running towards Keetsville seven miles, known as the "Cross Timbers."

Into the strong fastness north of the Tavern the enemy had obtained a lodgment from 10,000 to 15,000 strong in the rear of our wing, on the morning of the 7th. His strength consisted in part of the following rebel Divisions, as was subsequently ascertained: Frost's, Slack's, Parson's, and Rains's; and the batteries of Ghebor, Clark (six pieces), E. McDonald (three pieces), and Wade (four pieces). There was present also one Regiment of Indians, the whole commanded by General Van Dorn in person, and General Price, who directs the Missouri forces.

Early in the morning, while General Curtis was in consultation with his officers regarding a change of front, consequent on the approach of the enemy on the west of us, news came that the enemy were in close vicinity to the Elk Horn Tavern. The General then immediately ordered Colonel Carr to proceed to effect a dislodgment of the enemy. The formidable numbers present at the time not being known, Colonel Carr directed Colonel Dodge, with the First Brigade of the Fourth Division, to take a position near the Elkhorn Tavern, Colonel Carr accompanying the expedition himself. The point indicated was about a mile and a half distant from our camp, the ground being level and gradually ascending, with open fields on either side of the road, interspersed with an occasional belt of timber.

Colonel Dodge having discovered the enemy in the timber to the right, opened the First Iowa Battery on them, causing considerable execution; two rebels on horseback were seen to fall, and the rest fled. The enemy having fled to the hollow, Colonel Dodge deployed his line, covering as much ground as possible, the Thirty-fifth Illinois being on his left. He sent forward a company of skirmishers from the Fourth Iowa, who soon became sharply engaged with the enemy and the latter opened on us a perfect tornado of round shot, shell, and grape. The Thirty-fifth Illinois became engaged, fighting with determined bravery, and about, this time Colonel Smith was wounded in the head by a shell, which took off a part of his scalp. He also received a bullet in his shoulder, and his horse was shot under him, all about the same time. Just before he was wounded, several ammunition-chests exploded, one after the other, wounding Captain Jones and Lieutenant Gamble, who were standing near Colonel Carr, the latter making a fortunate escape. The explosion of a caisson was terrific.

There was a short lull in the storm of leaden hail, during which time the enemy advanced up the hollow through the brush, along the main road, when Colonel Vandever, who had arrived, ordered forward the infantry. A desperate conflict with small arms ensued. Back rolled the tide of battle, the enemy being driven to the foot of the hill, when he reopened the batteries. Our men fought like heroes; many fell covered with wounds. The latter, when brought to the rear by their comrades, encouraged those who were still breasting the fierce cannonade, by hurrahing for the Union.

Colonel Vandever, in leading forward his brigade, had his horse hit twice, and Colonel Phelps, in the van of his own Regiment, had three horses shot under him. Major Geiger, of the same Regiment, and Captain Hayden, of the Dubuque Battery, had two horses shot under them. Major Coyle, of the Ninth Iowa, was wounded in the leg.

Colonel Dodge having discovered that the enemy were preparing for a general attack, changed his front to the right, covering his men with a log fence, thus compelling the enemy to cross an open field to reach him. Our line was formed and we opened fire with one section of a battery, the other pieces having left the field for want of ammunition. The enemy advanced on our right, left, and center, under cover of a destructive fire, poured in on our works under twelve pieces of artillery. The fighting now lasted over two hours, during which time we held our position; only one Brigade contending against at least six thousand rebel infantry and a heavy bombardment from their artillery, the latter playing upon us at short range. Our men fought like heroes without wincing under the galling fire belching forth from behind trees and rocks, and much of the time from a concealed foe. At one time we were reinforced by three rifled pieces from a German battery, which fired four rounds, and then was compelled to withdraw from the field, being flanked by a Regiment of the enemy.

Colonel Dodge, in order to discover the position of the enemy on his right, directed his firing to cease, when a thousand rebel plush caps and black broad brims popped up into view from the bushes, and, forming, they advanced with great confidence to within one hundred feet of our line. Our men were then ordered to pour in a fire on the dastardly enemy, taking good aim. They were thrown into confusion by our murderous volley and fled.

Their places were filled by a fresh Regiment, and Colonel Dodge, finding that the enemy were outflanking him on the right and that his force was too weak to permit an extension of his line, sent for and soon received a reinforcement of five companies of the Eighth Indiana, which were posted on the right. The firing now became terrific. The enemy annoyed us severely by placing a battery on our left, which completely enfiladed our line. The Fourth Iowa now getting short of ammunition, and the Thirty-fifth Illinois having been forced to give way on the left, it was at this critical time that Lieutenant-Colonel Challenor was ordered to rally his men, who were hurled on the enemy, driving his left back a short distance. Having advanced too far, the Lieutenant-Colonel was surrounded and captured with forty of his men. Our ammunition, as before stated, having given out, we fell back to the open field, maintaining our line of battle in splendid order. The enemy rushed forward with their batteries and entire force. The Fourth Iowa halted, turned on them, and checked for a time their advance until the last round of ammunition was exhausted. General Curtis coming up about this stage of the action, was received with a round of cheers from our boys. The General learning that the ammunition had given out, ordered the Fourth Iowa to fix bayonets and charge on the enemy. The men did so briskly, across the field, but found no enemy.

On Colonel Vandever's front the enemy now commenced swarming up the road and along the gorge, and out of the brush in front of us. Our troops fought them bravely, the officers exposing their persons in leading in front of their men; but we were overwhelmed at this time by superior numbers. We retreated across the field, but rallied again along the fence behind our original position. Upon retiring as above mentioned, reinforcements were seen coming up under General Asboth. In a gallant attempt to resist the advancing column of the enemy, General Asboth received a severe wound in the arm. After the terrible conflict of the day our gallant troops bivouacked in front of the enemy, awaiting the reopening of the conflict in the morning.

Colonel Vandever fought Little's Division. Colonel Dodge's Brigade contended in the morning directly with Rain's and Clark's Divisions, both immediately under the direction of Sterling Price. The latter had his position for some time behind young Clarke's battery.

The enemy fired wagon-nuts, pieces of chain, marble, gravel, and all sorts of projectiles. The overcoat worn by Colonel Dodge was perfectly riddled by the jagged holes made by these unusual missiles.

Colonel Dodge, the day after the battle, received a letter from a widow lady in Illinois, stating that she had three sons in the field fighting for the Union; that her youngest son, who was in feeble health, was in his Brigade, and she asked it as a special favor to her in her loneliness to have him discharged. The young man whose mother had such solicitude in his behalf was named Preston Green, and was killed in the action of the 7th, near Elkhorn, while bravely performing his duty.

During the battle, Colonel Dodge's horse was shot under him. An enlisted man, detailed as clerk in the Adjutant's office, was acting as orderly for Colonel Dodge. When his horse fell, he ordered the orderly to dismount and give him his horse. The orderly said, "You will be killed if you get on another horse; this is the third you have lost." But the orderly dismounted and stood where the Colonel had stood when he asked for the horse, and at that moment was instantly killed by a shot from the enemy. After the battle, the Adjutant, Lieutenant Williamson, found in the orderly's desk a note in which he said he was sure he would be killed in the battle, and in which, also, he left directions as to the disposal of his effects and whom to write to.

In General Price's command there was a Regiment or more of Indians commanded by Colonel Albert B. Pike. They crawled up through the thick timber and attacked my extreme left. I saw them and turned one of the guns of my battery on them, and they left. We saw no more of them, but they scalped and mutilated some of our dead. General Curtis entered a complaint to General Price, who answered that they were not of his command, and that they had scalped some of his dead, and he said he did not approve of their being upon the field. They evidently scalped many of the dead, no matter what side they belonged to.

The battle of Pea Ridge being one of the first of the war and one of unquestioned victory, had a great deal of attention called to it, and for months – in fact for years, and, I think even now – was considered to have been won by General Siegel. The proper credit was not given to General Curtis, while the history and records of the battle show that he was entitled to all of the credit, and fought the battle in opposition to Siegel's views. A statement of the losses shows what commands fought the battle. The total force engaged on our side, according to General Curtis's report, was 10,500 men, formed in four Divisions, Siegel's two Divisions being the largest, the Third and Fourth Divisions having less than 2,000 men each. The losses were:

Van Dorn's and Price's reports of the battle show how great their defeat was, and why it was, and while for some time General Curtis called anxiously on Halleck for more reinforcements, demanding that the column which was marching South in Kansas be sent to him, Van Dorn and Price, from the time they left the field, never stopped until they landed at Memphis, Tenn., their first movement being towards Pocahontas, with a view of attacking Pope in the rear, who was at New Madrid. Finding New Madrid captured, they turned their forces to Desarc, and were then transported by boats to Memphis. This relieved Missouri of any Confederate force in or near its border, and General Halleck immediately gave General Curtis orders to move on the flank of Van Dorn and keep up with him, but through that swampy, hilly country it was impossible for him to meet Van Dorn, and Curtis with his Army finally landed at Helena, Ark., and most of it joined the Vicksburg siege.

Captain Phil Sheridan was the Quartermaster and Commissary of General Curtis's Army. He kept us in flour, meat, and meal, and sometimes had my whole regiment detailed in running and protecting mills, driving cattle, etc. He had great difficulty in obtaining details, as at that early day a good many commanders, and especially General Siegel and his officers, did not think it the duty of a soldier to be detailed on anything but a soldier's duty; so Sheridan naturally came to me, as he was my Quartermaster while I commanded the post at Rolla, and when with the marching column he camped and tented with me. Sheridan and Curtis had considerable difficulty, and Curtis relieved him and ordered him to report to General Halleck, at St. Louis. We who knew Sheridan's ability, and the necessities of our Army, did all we could to hold him with us. He left us just before the Battle of Pea Ridge, and our Army saw a great difference after he was gone. He used to say to me, "Dodge, if I could get into the line I believe I could do something;" and his ambition was to get as high a rank as I then had and as large a command – a Colonel commanding a Brigade. In his memoirs he pays the Fourth Iowa a great compliment, and says they will have a warm place in his heart during his life.

During the Battle of Pea Ridge Sheridan was at Springfield, Mo., preparing to turn over his property to the officer who was to relieve him, and he there showed his soldierly qualities. The dispatches from Curtis's army had to be relayed at Springfield. The first dispatches after the battle were sent all in praise of General Siegel, and by portions of his command, claiming he had won the battle. Sheridan, knowing this to be untrue, withheld the Siegel dispatches until the telegrams from General Curtis to General Halleck were received, and sent them forward first, notwithstanding the fact that he felt he had been unjustly treated by General Curtis.

This Army had no water or rail communication. It was 300 miles from its nearest supply-depot, and therefore it had to live off of a country that was sparsely settled by poor people; but Sheridan showed that dominant combination of enterprise and energy, by running every mill and using every means of supply within fifty miles of us, that he developed so fully later in the war. He kept us and our stock fairly well supplied; as I remember, there were no complaints. When General Curtis concluded to relieve him, I went with others and endeavored to induce him to change his mind. I had had experience and knew what it was to have an Army well fed a long ways from its base, and I felt that if we lost Sheridan we would suffer, which later proved to be the case; but General Curtis did not listen to us. In fact, he was angry at our appeal, and his Adjutant, General McKinney, came to see us afterwards and urged us not to press the matter; if we did, he said, we might go to the rear with Sheridan.

At the Battle of Pea Ridge and during the campaign we were very destitute of all hospital appliances for the care of the wounded, and the ability and ingenuity of our medical staff in supplying our wants was inestimable. The day after the battle, when we had all our own wounded and so many of the enemy's with us, Mrs. Governor Phelps, the wife of Governor Phelps, of Missouri, who commanded the Twenty-fifth Missouri Infantry, arrived on the field with a general supply of sanitary goods, a part of which had been sent to my Regiment from Philadelphia by the father and mother of Captain Ford, who was then a Lieutenant in Company B, Fourth Iowa Infantry. These were a great relief, as fully one-third of my command were killed and wounded, and were suffering for want of this class of goods. Mrs. Phelps spent her time day and night on the field aiding the surgeons and succoring the wounded.

General Curtis endeavored to send all the wounded to the rear who could stand the trip. I was hauled 250 miles over a rough road in an ambulance, and if any of you have had the same experience you can judge what I suffered. Captain Burton, of my Regiment, who was severely wounded in the arm, sat on the front seat of that ambulance the whole distance, and never murmured, although he came near losing his arm from the exposure. It was during this ambulance trip, while lying on my back, that I received a telegraphic dispatch from General Halleck notifying me of my promotion for services in this battle. It was thought, and was also stated in the papers, that I could not live, and I told General Halleck afterwards that they expected to have the credit of making a Brigadier-General and at the same time to have a vacancy, too, but that on the vacancy I fooled them, for the promotion insured my getting well.

This campaign demonstrated early in the war what could be accomplished by a small Army 300 miles away from any rail or water communication, in a rugged, mountainous, sparsely settled county, marching in winter, and virtually subsisting upon the country. Nothing escaped that Army that was eatable.

The Battle of Pea Ridge was fought by the two Divisions commanded by Carr and Davis, not exceeding 6,000 men, and it is a lesson in war that is very seldom appreciated: that no one can tell what the result of a battle may be, and that even where forces are very wide apart in numbers it is not always the larger force that wins. In this battle Van Dorn had put twice as many men into the fight as Curtis did, and still was defeated. His dividing his force and attacking our Army at two different points was fatal to his success, as General Curtis had the inside line and could move from one part of his command to another within an hour, while for Van Dorn to move from one portion of his Army to the other would have taken at least half a day, and therefore he was whipped in detail. If he had thrown his whole force upon Curtis's right flank at the point where McCullough fought and was overwhelmed by Davis's Division, there would have been great danger of our Army being defeated, or at least forced to the rear.

There was no strategy nor tactics in this battle; it was simply men standing up and giving and taking, and the one that stood the longest won the battle. The only strategy or tactics was the movement of Van Dorn attacking on the right flank and in the rear, and these moves were fatal to his success. Curtis's Army fought each man for himself. Every commander fought his own part of the battle to the best of his ability, and I think the feeling of all was that unless they won they would have to go to Richmond, as the enemy was in the rear, which fact made us desperate in meeting and defeating the continued attacks of the enemy. I sent for reinforcements once when the enemy was clear around my right flank and in my rear, and they sent me a part of the Eighth Indiana, two companies of the Third Illinois Cavalry, and a section of a battery. The battery fought ten minutes under a heavy fire. The four companies of the Eighth Indiana lined up alongside the Fourth Iowa, and stayed there fighting bravely until the end. The Third Illinois held my right flank. The officer who brought this force to me was Lieutenant Shields, of my own Regiment, who was acting as aid on Colonel Carr's staff. As he rode up to me to report the Eighth Indiana he halted alongside of me, and at the same instant both of our horses fell dead without a struggle – something very unusual. I was quick, and jumped clear of my horse, but Shields's horse fell upon him. I walked away, not thinking of Shields; but he called back to me and said, "Colonel, you are not going to leave me this way are you?" and I returned and helped him from under his horse. An examination of the two horses made the next day, showed that they must have been killed by the same bullet, which passed through their necks at the same place, killing them instantly.

A log house was used by us early in the morning as a temporary hospital. When my skirmishers fell back this log house was left in the lines of the enemy, and Hospital Steward Baker, of the Fourth Iowa, was left in charge of the wounded there. When General Price came up he asked him who those black-coated devils were, and when Baker told him there were only six hundred he did not believe him. He said no six hundred men could stand such attacks, and paid the Brigade a very high compliment for their fighting, and told Baker to give them his compliments.

I never returned to this Army, but many of the troops who fought so gallantly fought afterwards in Corps and Armies that I was connected with. My own Regiment went into battle with 548 rank and file present. Company B was on detailed service holding Pea Ridge, and had no casualties in line of battle. My Regiment was greatly reduced from sickness and men on furlough, but the bravery and steadiness with which those with me fought was a surprise and a great satisfaction to me. One-third of them fell, and not a straggler left the field. I had drilled the Regiment to most all kinds of conditions – in the open, in the woods – and many complained, and thought I was too severe, as many Regiments at the posts where they were stationed only had the usual exercises; but after this, their first battle, they saw what drilling, maneuvers, and discipline meant, and they had nothing but praise for the severe drilling I had given them. They never fell under my command again, but on every field that they fought they won the praise of their commanders, and General Grant ordered that they should place on their banners, "First at Chickasaw Bayou."

I have never thought that General Curtis has received the credit he was entitled to for this campaign and battle. With 12,000 men he traversed Missouri into Arkansas, living off the country, and showing good judgment in concentrating to meet Van Dorn and refusing to retreat when urged to do so at the conference at the log schoolhouse on the morning of the 7th. The night of the 7th I know some officers thought we ought to try to cut ourselves out to the East, Price being in our rear; but Curtis said he would fight where we were. He then had no knowledge of the condition of the enemy. On the morning of the 8th he brought General Siegel's two Divisions into the fight and concentrated on Price, whose fighting was simply to cover his retreat. General Curtis failed to reap the full benefit of the battle because Siegel went to Cassville, leaving only Davis's and Carr's Divisions on the field. We who took part in this campaign appreciate the difficulties and obstacles Curtis had to overcome, and how bravely and efficiently he commanded, and we honor him for it. So did General Halleck; but the Government, for some reason, failed to give him another command in the field, though they retained him in command of departments to the end of the war.

Letter of General Grenville M. Dodge to his Father on the Battle of Pea Ridge

    St. Louis, Mo., April 2, 1862.

DEAR FATHER: – I know there is no one who would like to have a word from me more than you. I write but little – am very weak from my wounds; do not sit up much; but I hope ere long to be all right again. Nothing now but the battle will interest you. It was a terrible three days to me; how I got through God only knows. I got off a sick bed to go to the fight, and I never got a wink of sleep for three days and three nights. The engagement was so long and with us so hot that it did not appear possible for us to hold our ground. We lacked sadly in numbers and artillery, but with good judgment and good grit we made it win. My officers were very brave. Little Captain Taylor would stand and clap his hands as the balls grew thick. Captain Burton was as cool as a cucumber, and liked to have bled to death; then the men, as they crawled back wounded, would cheer me; cheer for the Union; and always say, "Don't give up Colonel, hang to em;" and many who were too badly wounded to leave the field stuck to their places, sitting on the ground, loading and firing. I have heard of brave acts, but such determined pluck I never before dreamed of. My flag-bearer, after having been wounded so he could not hold up the colors, would not leave them. I had to peremptorily order him off. One time when the enemy charged through my lines the boys drove them back in confusion. Price fought bravely; his men deserved a better fate, but although two to one they could not gain much. Their artillery was served splendidly – they had great advantage over us in this. Mine run out of ammunition long before night and left me to the mercy of their grape and canister. Had I have had my full battery at night I could have whipped them badly. After the Fourth Iowa's ammunition gave out or before this all the other Regiments and Brigades had given way, leaving me without support, and when I found my ammunition gone I never felt such a chilling in my life. It is terrible right in the midst of a hot contest to have your cartridges give out. We had fired forty-two rounds, and had but a few left. I saved them and ceased firing, falling back to my supports. The enemy charged me in full force. I halted and they came within fifty feet. We opened on them such a terrible fire they fled. General Curtis rode into the field then and asked me to charge. This would have blanched anybody but an Iowa soldier. No ammunition and to charge! We fixed bayonets, and as I gave the order the boys cheered and cheered, swinging their hats in every direction. CHARGE! and such a yell as they crossed that field with, you never heard – it was unearthly and scared the rebels so bad they never stopped to fire at us or to let us reach them. As we marched back, now dark, nearly one-half the entire Army had got on the ground and the black-coats (Fourth Iowa) had got their fame up. The charge without ammunition took them all, and as we passed down the line the whole Army cheered us. General Curtis complimented us on the field, and what was left of the Fourth Iowa held their heads high that night, though a gloomy one for those who knew our situation. The next morning it fell to my lot to open the battle with my artillery again, and for one hour we poured it into them hot and heavy. We opened with thirty-two guns; they answered with as many, and such a roar you never heard. The enemy could not stand it and fled. Our whole army deployed in sight that morning and it was a grand sight with the artillery playing in open view. I had read of such things, but they were beyond my conception. This closed the battle and we breathed free. I escaped most miraculously. A shell burst right in front of me, and, tearing away my saddle holsters and taking off a large piece of my pants, never even scratched me. My clothes were riddled and I got a hit in the side that is serious, but did not think of it at the time.

    Yours, etc.,G. M.

THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA

Fought July 22, 1864

A Paper Read Before New York Commandery