The Turkish Empire, its Growth and Decay

Outwardly, Abdul Hamid had the manners of a gentleman, but inwardly he was as mean a villain as could be found in the purlieus of his capital. He was avaricious to an extreme, and though his expenditure was most lavish and his charities wide, he amassed immense wealth, which he invested secretly through German bankers against the rainy day which he expected. When it came and he was deposed, amid universal execration and loathing, his life was spared in the hope mainly of extracting from him these secret investments. He was not above receiving bribes himself, on a great scale, from financiers in search of concessions. He did nothing to check the chief evil of Turkish rule – the sale of offices and the necessity for officials to recoup themselves for their outlay by local exactions. Though he was not without some instincts for good government, and was free from any fanaticism, his system was such that everything went to the bad in his reign, and that many years of peace, after the treaty of Berlin, were attended by no improvement in the condition of his people, but the reverse. The result of his policy was that his Empire suffered a greater dismemberment than had been the bad fortune of any of his predecessors, and as he monopolized power, he must be held mainly responsible for its evil results.

At the very outset of his reign Abdul Hamid was confronted with most serious questions affecting the integrity of his Empire. In 1875 an outbreak had occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the result not merely of misgovernment by the Turkish pashas and officials, their rapacity and exactions, and of the system of farming the taxes, but of a vicious agrarian system. The great majority of landowners, though of the same Slav race as the rayas, the cultivators of the soil, were Moslems by religion. Their forbears had become so when the Ottomans conquered their State in order to save their property. They were as rapacious and fanatical as any landowners of Turkish race in any part of the Empire. No Christians were employed in the administration of these provinces. The evidence of the Christian rayas was not admitted in the courts of law. Justice or injustice could only be obtained by bribes. The police and other officials lived by extorting money from those whom it was their duty to defend.

The bad harvest of 1874 was the immediate cause of the outbreak, for the farmers of the taxes refused to make any concessions. It was, in the first instance, directed rather against the Moslem landowners and the local Turkish officials than against the Sultan, but it rapidly developed into a general insurrection against the Sultan’s government. Every effort was made by Austria and Russia to localize it and to induce the Porte to make concessions. Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, drew up a scheme for the pacification of the two provinces. It proposed that the system of farming the taxes should be abolished, that the taxes raised in the provinces should be expended locally for their benefit, that complete religious equality should be established, and that a mixed commission should be appointed to supervise the carrying out of these reforms. The scheme was agreed to by Russia, Great Britain, and the other Powers, and was presented to the Sultan, who acquiesced in it. But it proved, like other promises of reform in Turkey, to be a dead letter. Not a single step was taken to give effect to any part of it. The rebellion in the two provinces continued. The insurgents increased their demands. They insisted that one-third of the land should be given up to the rayas. The movement soon extended to Bulgaria, which was seething with disaffection.

On April 21, 1876, an outbreak of Bulgarians occurred on the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains, of which Batak was the centre. It was put down without difficulty by a small Turkish force sent from Constantinople, under Achmet Agha, with little loss of life to the troops engaged, but with relentless cruelty, not only to the actual insurgents who surrendered on promise of life, but to the whole population of the district. Bands of Bashi-Bazouks, consisting of Tartars from the Crimea who had been planted in Bulgaria, were let loose on them. Indiscriminate murders, rapes, and rapine took place. Sixty villages were burnt. Twelve hundred persons, mostly women and children, took refuge in a church at Batak and were there burnt alive. In all about twelve thousand persons perished in these brutal reprisals. Achmet Agha received a high decoration from the Sultan for this performance. There was nothing new in this method of dealing with an outbreak by the Porte. It was in accord with its traditional system and policy to wreak vengeance on those revolting by orgies of cruelty, which would strike terror among subject races and act as a warning to them in the future.

What was new in the case of the Bulgarians in 1876, and was fraught with misfortune to the Turkish cause, was that full and graphic accounts of the horrors committed at Batak, written by Mr. Edwin Pears (now Sir Edwin), the correspondent at Constantinople of the Daily News, appeared in the columns of that paper. They produced a profound impression on public opinion in England. Discredit was thrown on the story in the House of Commons by Mr. Disraeli, the Prime Minister, but it was fully confirmed by Mr. MacGahan, another correspondent of the same paper, who visited the district, and later by Mr. Walter Baring, a member of the British Embassy at Constantinople, who, by the direction of the Government, made full personal inquiries on the spot. He described what had taken place as “perhaps the most heinous crime that has stained the history of the present century.”

It was also unfortunate for the Turks that Mr. Gladstone, the only survivor in the House of Commons of the British statesmen responsible for the Crimean War, who had recently retired from the leadership of the Liberal party, was fired by the description of these horrors in Bulgaria to emerge from his retirement and to take up the cause of the Christian population of European Turkey, for which he held that the treaty of Paris had made his country responsible.

Meanwhile the horrors at Batak had also aroused the indignation of Russia and the fears of Austria. A fanatical outbreak of Moslems at Salonika resulted in the murder of the Consuls of France and Germany. Serbia and Montenegro, impelled by sympathy for their fellow Slavs in Bosnia, declared war against Turkey. A Turkish force defeated the Serbians, who appealed to Russia for assistance. At this stage another effort was made by Russia and Austria, supported by Germany, to avert a general conflagration, and a scheme was embodied in what was known as the Berlin Memorandum for compelling the Porte to carry out the reforms which it had admitted to be necessary. The British Government, however, very curtly refused to be a party to the scheme, on the ground that they had not been consulted in framing it and did not believe in its success. About this time also the British fleet in the Mediterranean was ordered to Besika Bay, a step taken avowedly for the purpose of protecting British subjects in the turmoil which had arisen, but which seemed to the Porte to indicate an intention to support them against the demands of the other Powers.

Mr. Gladstone, fearing that these actions indicated the intention of the British Government to withdraw from the concert of Europe and to renew the separate policy which had led to the Crimean War, made a vehement attack on it in the House of Commons for refusing to agree to the Berlin Memorandum. Later, in September 1876, he published his well-known pamphlet on “the Bulgarian Horrors,” in which, with passionate language, he dwelt at length on the massacres at Batak and denounced the Turkish Government. He protested that he could no longer bear his share of responsibility for the Crimean War. Otherwise he might be accused of “moral complicity in the basest and blackest outrages upon record in that century.”

Those [he wrote] who opposed the Crimean War are especially bound to remember that the treaty of Paris made Europe as a whole, and not Russia alone, responsible for the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, which had given this licence to Turkish officers to rob, murder, and ravish in Bulgaria… As an old servant of the Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require and insist that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour, in common with the other States of Europe, in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves. Their zapties and their mudirs, their bimbashis and their yuzbashis, their kaimakans and their pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned.[42 - The Bulgarian Horrors and the Question in the East, 1876.]

The pamphlet produced an immediate and profound effect on public opinion in Great Britain. It was followed up by speeches of the same force and eloquence on the part of the veteran statesman. Meetings took place in every part of the country, at which sympathy was expressed for the Christian populations of Turkey. The Turks were denounced for their cruelties and bad government. Resolutions were unanimously passed in accord with the policy recommended by Mr. Gladstone. Lord Stratford himself expressed sympathy with the movement, differing only in this from Mr. Gladstone, that England, in his view, should exert its influence not only for the Bulgarians, but for all the oppressed subject races in Turkey. Many of the most cultivated men in England joined in the movement quite irrespective of party politics.

Mr. Disraeli, who was created Earl of Beaconsfield in the course of these events, on his retirement from the House of Commons, showed great courage and persistence in resisting the movement. His sympathies lay wholly in the opposite direction. His Eastern policy was in accord with that of the previous generation of statesmen, such as Palmerston, and, indeed, Gladstone himself in his earlier stage of opinion, who believed that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire was essential to the integrity of the British Empire. He saw no reason for change. He dreaded the further advance of Russia. He did not believe in the honesty of the professions of its Emperor. He enforced his views at a public meeting at Aylesbury on September 20th, and endeavoured to stem the movement. He scoffed at the Bulgarian horrors. He declared the perpetrators of them were not so bad as those who made them the subject of agitation for their political purposes. He was evidently prepared to support the Turks against any invasion of their country by Russia, and to renew the policy of the Crimean War. But it was in vain.

Though the agitation promoted by Mr. Gladstone did not result in inducing the Government to join the other Powers in compelling the Turkish Government to concede autonomy to its Christian provinces, or to carry out reforms, it had two effects of great historical importance, which must be our justification for referring to the subject. It made impossible the renewal of the policy of the Crimean War – the armed support by Great Britain to the Turks against an invasion by Russia on behalf of the Christian population of the Balkans. It paralysed the hands of those, like Lord Beaconsfield, who desired to support the Turks and the status quo. On the other hand, it doubtless stimulated Russia to armed intervention, by making it clear that there would be no resistance on the part of Great Britain. Lord Beaconsfield’s Cabinet was divided on the subject. A majority of its members evidently concurred with Lord Derby, the Foreign Secretary, in opposition to war with Russia on behalf of Turkey.

On September 21st, the day after Lord Beaconsfield had delivered his fiery pro-Turkish speech at Aylesbury, Lord Derby, on behalf of the Government, in a despatch to the Ambassador at Constantinople, directed him to inform the Porte that the atrocious crimes of the Turkish authorities and troops in Bulgaria had aroused the righteous indignation of the British people, and that Great Britain, as signatory to the treaty of Paris, could not be indifferent to them. He demanded that examples should be made of the perpetrators of these crimes.

On October 30th Lord Derby further informed the Russian Government, through the ambassador at St. Petersburg, that, however strong the feeling in England against the Turkish cruelties, it would be superseded by a very different sentiment if it were believed that Constantinople was threatened, or that British interests in the Suez Canal were in any danger. This message to the Emperor could only be interpreted as meaning that the British Government would not interfere with any action that Russia might take against Turkey, provided it did not involve the conquest of Constantinople or endanger British interests in Egypt. It was evidently so understood by the Emperor, for immediately on receipt of the above despatch, on November 2nd, he gave his word of honour to the British Ambassador that he had no designs on Constantinople and no intentions whatever to annex Bulgaria.

In spite of this explicit announcement on the part of the Emperor, in response to the despatch from the British Foreign Minister, Lord Beaconsfield, a few days later, on November 9th, at the annual civic banquet at the Guildhall of London, delivered himself of a most bellicose speech on behalf of Turkey, practically threatening war with Russia, without any reference to the pacific assurance of the Czar, which, as we now know, was in his hands at the time when he made this speech. There could not well be a clearer intimation on the part of the British Premier that he had no belief in the good faith of the Emperor.

This menacing speech of the British Prime Minister was telegraphed to Russia, with the result that the Czar was greatly incensed, and on the next day, November 10th, he made a public pronouncement at Moscow to his people of the gravest importance, to the effect that, if he could not obtain adequate guarantees from the Porte for the protection of its Christian subjects, he would act independently of other Powers, relying on the loyalty of his people to support him.

In the meantime, through Lord Derby’s efforts, it had been arranged with Russia and the other Great Powers that a Conference should be held at Constantinople of representatives of all the Powers, for the purpose of deciding what administrative changes should be proposed to the Sultan, with a view to the common purpose – namely the better protection of his Christian subjects in Europe.

Lord Salisbury, as a member of the British Cabinet and Secretary of State for India, represented England at this Conference. It met at Constantinople on December 23, 1876. On the day before the meeting of the Conference at Constantinople a firman was published by the Sultan, at the instance of Midhat Pasha, promulgating a scheme of constitutional reform, which had been agreed to by the ministers of the Porte in the short reign of Murad, but which Abdul Hamid on his accession had refused to sanction. A National Assembly was convoked, to be elected by universal suffrage, without distinction of race or religion, throughout the Empire. It was hoped to anticipate the demands of the Conference by a scheme of reform wider than they were likely to advise. This was effected with perfect good faith by Midhat, who was earnestly in favour of reform. But subsequent events showed that the Sultan adopted this course for the purpose only of throwing dust in the eyes of the Conference, and with the full intention of setting aside the Constitution as soon as the Conference had broken up. The Conference might perhaps have acted more wisely in treating this act of the Sultan as an honest proposal, and in making it the basis of a wide reform of the Ottoman Empire. They held it to be a sham. They proceeded with their discussions as if it had not been issued. They preferred an alternative scheme of providing autonomous institutions for the Christian provinces of Turkey, and for the appointment of governors subject to the approval of the Great Powers. There was practically no difference of opinion at the Conference between the British and Russian delegates, Lord Salisbury and General Ignatief. The Conference, at their instance, reduced its demands on the Porte to the most moderate minimum.

The Sultan refused point-blank to entertain the proposals of the Conference, on the ground that they interfered with his sovereign powers. He pleaded the new Constitution which he had just accorded to the Empire. There never was any intention on his part to make any concessions. He was under the belief that if war resulted with Russia from his refusal to agree to reforms his country would not stand alone. He took the policy of England from the speech of Lord Beaconsfield at the Guildhall; and not from Lord Derby or Lord Salisbury. Lord Beaconsfield had, in fact, thrown over his colleague, Lord Salisbury, in that unfortunate utterance and had insured the failure of the Conference at Constantinople.

A few days after the break-up of the Conference, Midhat Pasha was ignominiously dismissed from office. The new Constitution did not long survive its author. In May, 1877, Abdul Hamid suspended it and dismissed the National Assembly which had been convoked. During the two months of its existence its members had shown a determination to expose the scandalous abuses of the Hamidian system. Later Abdul Hamid trumped up a charge against Midhat of having been responsible for the murder of Sultan Aziz. Two men employed by that Sultan, a wrestler and a gardener, were suborned to confess that they strangled Aziz at the instance of Midhat. Midhat was tried by corrupt judges and was not allowed to cross-examine these men. He was found guilty and condemned to death. At the instance mainly of the British Government the sentence was commuted to banishment to Arabia. Midhat was there strangled by order of Abdul Hamid in 1882, and his embalmed head was sent to Constantinople, in order that the Sultan might be assured of his death. The two men who had confessed to the murder of Aziz were released and were pensioned by the Sultan. Sir Henry Elliot, who was British Ambassador at Constantinople at the time of the death of Sultan Aziz, put on record his conviction that it was a case of suicide, that the charge against Midhat was trumped up, and that the whole proceedings are an indelible stain on Abdul Hamid.

Meanwhile, in 1877, another attempt was made by the Great Powers to effect a settlement of the Eastern question. Count Schouvaloff was sent to London by the Emperor of Russia on a special mission for the purpose. Agreement was arrived at between the Powers. It was embodied in a protocol, and was presented to the Porte. It was promptly rejected on April 10th by the Sultan as inconsistent with the treaty of Paris by interfering with the independence of the Ottoman Empire. Russia thereupon declared war against Turkey, justifying it in a dignified manifesto, on the ground that the Sultan, by rejecting the protocol, had defied Europe. Russia, therefore, held the strong position of acting on behalf of Europe. England was the only Power to take exception to this. Lord Derby, in a despatch to the Russian Government, said that he and his colleagues regarded the action of Russia as an obstacle to reform in Turkey, and held that the plight of the Christian population could not be improved by war – a most unfortunate prediction, as the result proved. More fortunate was the prediction of Mr. Gladstone at the close of a speech which he made in the House of Commons, on April 24, 1877, immediately after the declaration of war by Russia, when moving a resolution intended to prevent the Government from taking up a hostile attitude to Russia in the coming war.

I believe, for one [he said], that the knell of Turkish tyranny in these provinces (the Balkan provinces) has sounded. So far as human eyes can judge, it is about to be destroyed. The destruction may not come in the way or by the means that we should choose; but come from what hands it may, I am persuaded that it will be accepted as a boon by Christendom and the world.[43 - House of Commons, April 24, 1877.]

The answer of the Government to Mr. Gladstone was given in the debate by the Home Secretary, Sir Richard Cross, later Lord Cross. It showed that the policy of Lord Derby, and not that of Lord Beaconsfield, had prevailed in the Cabinet. The Government, he said, regretted the war which had been declared by Russia, and did not believe that it would do any good, but it would not give support to either side, unless the Suez Canal or Egypt or Constantinople were threatened.

It followed from this decision of the British Cabinet that the hopes which the Sultan had formed from the speeches of Lord Beaconsfield were not realized. He was left alone to fight against Russia in another attack on his Empire. Immediately after the declaration of war, on April 24, 1877, two Russian armies invaded Turkey – the one in Europe, of two hundred and fifty thousand men, under the nominal command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, the other in Asia, of a hundred and fifty thousand men from the Caucasus, under that of the Grand Duke Michael. The former crossed the Pruth into Roumania, which was still nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire. But on April 15th the Roumanian Chamber had given its assent to a convention with Russia providing for the passage of the Russian troops through the principality and otherwise giving promise of friendly support. The Porte, as was to be expected, treated this as a hostile act, and directed the bombardment of Calafat, a Roumanian fortress on the Danube. The Roumanians thereupon, on May 21st, declared war against Turkey. They gave most effective support to the Russians throughout the campaign. Indeed, it may be fairly said from the course of the campaign that the invasion of Bulgaria would not have been successful without the help of the Roumanians.

The Emperor of Russia had further prepared the way for the invasion of Turkey by securing the neutrality of Austria-Hungary. At a personal meeting in the previous year at Reichstadt, he had assured the Emperor of Austria that he had no intention of taking possession of Constantinople. He further promised that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be handed over for occupation by Austria-Hungary as a reward for neutrality in the event of success in his war against the Turks.

Owing to unprecedented inundations in the valley of the Danube, it was not till two months after the commencement of the campaign that the Russian army was able to cross that river. It did so at two points, the one in the Dobrudscha, the other at Hirsova. In neither case did it meet with serious opposition. The Turkish army of defence was little inferior in numbers to that of the Russians, but its general, Abdul Kerim, proved to be quite incompetent. He spread his forces in detachments over a front of five hundred miles, and was too late in concentrating them. The Russians, after capturing Nicopolis, the Turkish stronghold on the Danube, advanced into Bulgaria and captured Tirnovo, its ancient capital. Everywhere they were received by the Bulgarians with rapturous demonstrations of delight at the prospect of deliverance from Ottoman rule.

General Gourko, with a flying corps, then made a very hazardous but successful march across the Balkans by the Hainköi Pass, and advanced into Bulgaria along the Trudja Valley as far as Eski Zagra. Thence, turning back, he attacked the more important Shipka Pass from the south, and defeated a Turkish force in occupation of it. Meanwhile, early in July, the main Russian army from Tirnovo came in contact at Plevna, twenty miles south of the Danube, with a Turkish army of fifty thousand men under Osman Pasha, who had been sent in relief of Nicopolis, but was too late for the purpose.

Plevna was not a fortress. It was a strong natural position, where the Turks entrenched their army behind earthworks and redoubts with great engineering skill, and where they maintained an obstinate and memorable defence for nearly five months, the most striking incident of the campaign of 1877. Three unsuccessful assaults were made by the Russians, assisted by a Roumanian army, in which great losses were incurred. Thereupon, by the advice of General Todleben, the hero of the defence of Sebastopol in the Crimean War, the attempt to take these works at Plevna by assault was given up, and it was subjected to a close investment. The occupation of the Shipka Pass by Gourko prevented the advance of a Turkish army in relief of Plevna, in spite of successive attacks by the Turkish army under Suleiman Pasha. As a result, after five months of heroic resistance, Osman Pasha found himself in great straits for want of food for his army. He determined to make a great effort to break through the lines of the investing army. The sortie failed, and Osman and his whole remaining army of thirty-two thousand men were compelled to surrender on January 9, 1878. This had the effect of releasing the Russian army in front of Plevna. General Gourko and the main part of the Russian army thereupon marched to Sofia. General Skobeleff, in command of another army, determined to force his way across the Balkan range. An army of ninety thousand Turks under another Pasha was stationed at the southern end of the Shipka Pass and barred his way. Directing a part of his army to make a feint attack along the Shipka Pass, Skobeleff led the remainder by two sheep tracks distant about six miles from the pass, and crossing the mountains, was able to attack the enemy on the flank at Shenova. The Turks were defeated and their whole army was compelled to surrender. By this brilliant manœuvre of Skobeleff, the Grand Duke Nicholas, in nominal command of the whole Russian army, was able to advance without further opposition to Adrianople. He took possession of it on January 28th. Meanwhile the Turks met with further defeats from the Serbians and Montenegrins. The former captured the important town of Nisch. The latter captured Spizza, in the bay of Antivari, and Dulcigno, in the Adriatic.

In Asia the Turks were no more fortunate than in Europe. Their army under Muktar Pasha was little inferior in numbers to that of the Russians, but it was divided between Kars, Ardahan, and Erzerum. The Russians in the course of the campaign of 1877 succeeded in successively capturing these important fortresses and in getting possession of nearly the whole of the districts inhabited by Armenians.

By the middle of January 1878 the resistance of the Turks was practically at an end in both continents. They were compelled to sue for peace and to appeal for the mediation of the other Powers of Europe. On January 31st an armistice was agreed on.

The capture of Adrianople and the fact that there was no Turkish army capable of resisting the further advance of the Russians to Constantinople caused great alarm to the British Government. Opinion in England, which had not supported Lord Beaconsfield in his desire to renew the policy of the Crimean War, and to assist the Turks against the invasion of Bulgaria by the Russians, now veered round, at least among the wealthier and a large section of the middle class, and declared itself vehemently opposed to the occupation of Constantinople, which appeared to be imminent, even if it should be only of a temporary character.

The British fleet at Besika Bay was ordered to enter the Dardanelles. The House of Commons was asked to vote six millions for war purposes. Every preparation was made for war. Russia replied to these demonstrations by advancing its army nearer to Constantinople. The headquarters of the Grand Duke Nicholas were established at San Stefano, a village on the shore of the Marmora, within sight of Constantinople. A portion of the British fleet then took up a position near to Prince’s Island, also within sight of the capital. The position between the two countries, England and Russia, was therefore most critical.

Meanwhile negotiations took place directly between Russia and the Porte. Terms of peace were offered and agreed to, and on March 3, 1878, a treaty was signed between the two Powers at San Stefano. It was in accord with the promises which had been made to the British Government by the Czar. Constantinople, the province of Thrace, and Adrianople were left in possession of the Turks, and the capital was not even to be temporarily occupied by the Russian army. Bulgaria was not to become a Russian province or even an independent State. But a great Bulgaria from the Danube southward, with frontiers on the Black Sea and the Ægean Sea, and including the greater part of Thrace, was constituted as an autonomous State, subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Sultan, under a prince to be elected by its people and approved by Russia. As thus constituted, it would cut off the Porte from direct junction and communication by land with its remaining possessions in the Balkan peninsula, such as Macedonia, Epirus, and Albania. Serbia and Montenegro were to be greatly enlarged and both were to be independent States. Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be endowed with autonomous institutions while remaining subject to the Porte. Reformed administration was to be secured for the remaining Balkan provinces. No extension was conceded to Greece, but Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete were included in the provision of reformed administration. The Roumanians were very shabbily treated after the valuable assistance they had rendered to the Russian army. The part of Bessarabia, inhabited largely by Roumanians, which had been taken from Russia by the treaty of Paris and added to Moldavia, was to be restored to the Czar, together with a small strip which brought Russia up to the Danube as a riverain State. In exchange, Roumania was to be content with the barren Dobrudscha, sparsely inhabited by Bulgarians and Turks. Roumania was to be an independent State. In Asia, Kars, Ardahan, Bayezid, and Batoum, and their districts were to be ceded to Russia. Erzerum was to be restored to Turkey. An indemnity for the war of twelve millions sterling was to be paid by Turkey.

The publication of these terms did not allay the apprehensions of the British Government. They were regarded, in the first instance, as meaning the complete dismemberment of Turkey in Europe. Lord Beaconsfield and the Turkophil members of the Government believed that a great Bulgaria would be completely under the influence of Russia, and would be used as a stepping-stone for the ultimate acquisition of Constantinople by that Power. They could not understand, what was often insisted upon by Mr. Gladstone in his speeches, that the best barrier against the advance of Russia, in the Balkan peninsula, would be a self-governing, contented, and prosperous State, and that the larger it was the better it would serve that purpose. The Government, under these misapprehensions, determined to resist the creation of a big Bulgaria, even at the risk of war with Russia. They maintained that the treaty of San Stefano was completely at variance with the treaty of Paris of 1856, and must be revised by a new Congress of the great Powers of Europe.

The Russian Government would not agree to submit the whole treaty to a Congress, but only some parts of it. A collision between Russia and England seemed to be imminent. War preparations were continued by the latter, and Indian troops were sent to Malta. Lord Derby, the Foreign Minister, and Lord Carnarvon, the Colonial Secretary, who were opposed to war, resigned, and the war party in the Cabinet prevailed. But the Czar was very averse to war, whatever might be the wishes of his generals at the front before Constantinople. At the last moment terms of reference to a Congress were agreed upon between the two Governments, and war was averted. By an agreement which was intended to be secret, but which was divulged to the Press in England by an unscrupulous employé at the Foreign Office, the British Government promised to support, at the Congress, the main clauses of the treaty of San Stefano, subject to a concession, on the part of Russia, as to Bulgaria. Under this agreement, the intended big Bulgaria was divided into three parts. That between the Danube and the Balkan range was to be dealt with as proposed in the San Stefano treaty. It was to be an autonomous State under the suzerainty of the Sultan, with a prince elected by its people. A second part of it, immediately south of the Balkan range, to be called Eastern Roumelia, was to be an autonomous province more directly under the control of the Porte. A third, the part bordering on the Ægean Sea and containing a mixed population of Bulgarians, Serbians, Greeks, and (in parts) Moslems, was to be restored to the Porte subject to conditions for better administration equally with other Turkish provinces in Europe. This part has since been generally spoken of as Macedonia.

The Congress of the Powers met at Berlin on June 13, 1878, under the presidency of Prince Bismarck. It was the most important gathering of the kind since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Great Powers were represented by their leading statesmen. England, by Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury; Russia, by Prince Gortchakoff and Count Schouvaloff; France, by its Prime Minister, Waddington; Italy, by Count Corti, its Foreign Minister; Austria, by Count Andrassy. The Porte, apparently, was unable to find a competent Turk for the purpose. It was represented by Karatheodori, a Greek, and by Mehemet Ali, a renegade German. Germany, it need not be said, was represented by Bismarck, who acted as the ‘honest broker.’ Although apparently invested with unlimited authority to deal with all questions arising out of the treaty of San Stefano, the Congress found that its hands were practically tied behind its back by the agreement between England and Russia. It had no other option than to cut down the big Bulgaria under the tripartite scheme already described, which was the essence of the Anglo-Russian agreement. As regards the artificially created province of Eastern Roumelia, Lord Beaconsfield, who throughout the proceedings of the Congress championed the Turkish cause, insisted that the Porte was to have the right to maintain garrisons in its frontier fortresses. He threatened to break up the Congress if this was not conceded. Russia, though strongly opposed to this, ultimately gave way. This was a triumph for Beaconsfield, the value of which we can now appreciate, with the knowledge that no advantage was ever taken by the Porte of this permission to garrison Eastern Roumelia.

The most important point on which the Congress effected a change in the treaty of San Stefano was in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the instance of Bismarck, these two provinces, instead of being endowed with autonomous government, were handed over to Austria for occupation and administration, while remaining nominally a part of the Turkish Empire. Montenegro was to lose half of the territory conceded to it at San Stefano.[44 - Bismarck induced Lord Beaconsfield to propose this to the Congress.] The claims of Greece for a definite extension of its territory were championed by the representative of France, but were opposed by Lord Beaconsfield. The Congress contented itself with a recommendation to the Sultan that the boundaries of Greece should be extended so as to include Thessaly and a part of Epirus. Organic reforms of administration and law were to be carried out by the Porte in the European provinces of the Empire on the recommendation of a Commission to be appointed by the Great Powers.

The Congress confirmed to Russia the acquisition of the provinces in Asia above referred to, and the restoration of Erzerum and Bayezid to the Porte. The Armenians were guaranteed good government and protection from the raids of Kurds and Circassians. Some other amendments of the San Stefano treaty of no great importance were decided upon, and on July 13, 1878, the treaty of Berlin was signed by the representatives of all the Powers, after exactly a month of discussion.

After his success at the Congress in respect of the Roumelian garrisons, obtained by the threat of war, Beaconsfield was able to return to England with a flourish of trumpets, boasting that he had succeeded in obtaining ‘peace with honour.’ Though the treaty of Berlin nullified that of San Stefano as regards the big Bulgaria, it did, in fact, ratify the virtual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire in respect of four-fifths of its territory in Europe and freed about eight millions of people from its rule. This great achievement was due to Russia alone, and the gains to that Power in Bessarabia and Armenia were in comparison small and unimportant. The splitting up of Bulgaria, which constituted the main difference between the two treaties, was due to British diplomacy, backed by threats of war. But the result obtained did not stand the test of even a short experience. Two of the Bulgarian provinces thus torn asunder were reunited seven years later. More recently, the parts of Macedonia and Thrace restored to full Turkish rule by the treaty of Berlin have, within the present century, again been freed from it, and have been annexed to Serbia and Greece in about equal portion.

It will be seen from this brief statement that by the treaty of Berlin Great Britain obtained nothing for itself, unless it were that the division of Bulgaria was of permanent value to it in strengthening the hold of the Turks on Constantinople, a contention which has not been confirmed by subsequent events. It did, however, succeed in getting something out of the general scramble for territory. By another secret treaty which, to the amazement of the members of the Congress at Berlin, was made public during their sittings, the Porte agreed to hand over to the occupation of England the island of Cyprus, on terms very similar to those under which Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed under the charge of Austria. The occupation of the island was limited to the time during which Kars and Ardahan should be in possession of Russia. As a condition of this occupation, Great Britain guaranteed to the Porte its Asiatic possessions. But this guarantee was conditional on good government being secured to the Armenian population in the east of Asia Minor, a condition which has never, in fact, been fulfilled. The treaty was justified in the British Parliament on the ground that Cyprus would be of great value as a place d’armes for the British army in the event of attack by Russia on the Asiatic provinces of Turkey or of an attack from any quarter on Egypt. The Porte was guaranteed by the British Government an annual tribute so long as the occupation should last, based on the average revenue which it had received from the island. The proceeds were assigned for payment of the interest on the loan raised by Turkey during the Crimean War, guaranteed by England and France. The arrangement was made hastily and without due inquiry, with the result that the island has been burthened with a charge far in excess of its past payments to the Porte, and the British taxpayers have been compelled to bear a part of the burthen. An occupation such as that of Cyprus was almost certain to become permanent, and in 1914, during the existing war, the island was permanently annexed by the British Government.

Looking back at the events which led to the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule and to all the other changes sanctioned by the treaty of Berlin, it must now be fully admitted that the agitation which Mr. Gladstone promoted against the Turkish Government had a great ultimate effect. It averted the use of armed force by Great Britain for the purpose of preventing the intervention of Russia on behalf of the Christian population of the Balkans. In a great speech in the House of Commons in review of the treaty of Berlin, Mr. Gladstone delivered himself of this verdict on it: —

Taking the whole provisions of the treaty of Berlin together, I must thankfully and joyfully acknowledge that great results have been achieved in the diminution of human misery and towards the establishment of human happiness and prosperity in the East.

As regards the conduct of England at the Congress he added these weighty words: —

I say, Sir, that in this Congress of the Great Powers the voice of England has not been heard in unison with the constitution, the history, and the character of England. On every question that arose, and that became a subject of serious contest in the Congress, or that could lead to any practical results, a voice has been heard from Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury which sounded in the tones of Metternich, and not in the tones of Mr. Canning, or of Lord Palmerston, or of Lord Russell… I do affirm that it was their part to take the side of liberty, and I do also affirm that, as a matter of fact, they took the side of servitude.[45 - Parliamentary Report, House of Commons, July 30, 1878.]

Lord Salisbury himself lived to make the admission that England in its Eastern policy “put its money on the wrong horse.”

The three years which followed the treaty of Berlin were spent by the Great Powers in the endeavour to give effect to its provisions, by settling the boundaries between Turkey and its disjecta membra, and other important details. Two of these questions led to great difficulty. The Porte, as was to be expected, put every obstruction in the way and resorted to its accustomed dilatory methods. By the treaty Montenegro had been guaranteed a port in the Adriatic. It was not till 1880, after the return of Mr. Gladstone to power in England, that effective pressure was put on the Porte. He induced the other Powers to join in sending a combined fleet to the Adriatic to blockade its coast as a demonstration against the Porte. This, however, was not effective for the purpose. It mattered little to the Porte that its coast in the Adriatic was blockaded. It was not till the British Government threatened to send its fleet to Asia Minor, and by seizing some custom houses there to cut off supplies of money, that the Sultan was brought to book. Eventually the port of Dulcigno and the district round it were ceded to Montenegro and its claim for access to the Adriatic was conceded.

The case of Greece caused even greater difficulty. The treaty of Berlin, it has been shown, contained no specific promise or guarantee of a cession of territory to Greece. It merely made a recommendation to that effect, leaving it to the discretion of the Porte whether to accede to it or not. As Greece had taken no part in the war of liberation of the Balkans, it had no special claim, except such as arose from a wish of the Powers to avoid complications in the future. It was admitted, however, by the Porte that something should be done in the way of rectifying its frontier in this direction. Another conference of the Powers at Berlin reported in favour of drawing the frontier line so as to include in the kingdom of Greece the whole of both Thessaly and Epirus. This was gladly assented to by Greece, but was rejected by the Sultan. The Powers, however, were not willing to back up their proposals by armed force. The French Government, which had supported the claim of Greece at the Congress, now drew back. Eventually, after two years of diplomatic labour, a compromise was arrived at, mainly at the instance of the British Ambassador to the Porte, Mr. Goschen, who showed infinite skill and patience in dealing with the Sultan. A line of frontier was agreed to, which conceded to Greece the whole of Thessaly and about a third part of Epirus. This line excluded Janina and other districts inhabited by Moslem Albanians, and also other districts where Greeks predominated, but under the circumstances it was the most which could be effected without a resort to arms. Greece had to wait some years before a more complete settlement could be secured to her.

As regards the organic local reforms in administration and law which, under the treaty of Berlin, were to be carried out in the European provinces of the Empire, a Commission was appointed by the Great Powers in 1880. The British representative was Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice, later Lord Fitzmaurice. He took the leading part in drawing up a large and complete scheme of reform, which was agreed to by the Commission and was presented to the Sultan for his approval in accordance with the treaty.

There followed, after these proceedings, a period of twenty-eight years, up to 1908, during which Turkey, under the rule of Abdul Hamid, was free from external war, and opportunity was therefore afforded for giving effect to the promises by the Porte, guaranteed by the treaty of Berlin, of reforms and improved administration in Macedonia and other Balkan provinces left in its possession, and also in Crete and Armenia. Except as regards Crete, not a single step, however, was ever taken by the Porte to give effect to these promises. The scheme of organic reform was never approved by the Sultan. It was treated as waste-paper, like every other promise of reform in Turkey. Disorder and misgovernment continued unabated.

Several events soon took place which showed that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was still slowly but surely proceeding. The most important of these was in relation to Bulgaria. The reduced and mutilated province under that name, as settled by the treaty of Berlin, chose as its ruler, with the consent of the Powers, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, a young man of great merit and promise. Eastern Roumelia, cut off from Bulgaria, was also constituted as a separate province, more immediately dependent on the Porte, but with autonomous government, under a Christian governor nominated by the Sultan. But this ingenious scheme of Lord Beaconsfield did not work in practice. Economic difficulties, arising from separate tariffs, equally with national aspirations, necessitated union. The representative chambers of both provinces were incessant in their demands for this.