Kaliningrad – an ambivalent transnational region within a European-Russian scope

In this regard, I share the view of Sezneva who, in writing about Kaliningrad, takes the point that «there are no reasons to believe that a certain behavioral pattern will automatically lead to the formation of a particular political attitude, or learning about a history will automatically form a particular identity. How people categorize and identity the social world and themselves within it, and how these categories impact on their behavior are not the same issue. Categories of self-understanding do not always provide a basis for collective action and the formation of collective subject-ness»[102 - Sezneva, Olga: Modalities of Self-understanding, Identification and Representation in the Post-1991 Kaliningrad. A Critical View. In: Berger, Stefan (Hg.): Kaliningrad in Europa. Nachbarschaftliche Perspektiven nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges. Wiesbaden 2010, p. 37.].

As Barth stressed, the critical focus of investigation should be «the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses»[103 - Barth, Fredrik: Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of cultural difference. London 1969, p. 15.]. As known, Barth emphasizes that boundary-making involves two phenomena: self-ascription and ascription by others. But he tends to focus on one side rather than the other, emphasizing internal identification rather than external constraint and the shaping influence of wider structures, such as those of class and the state. However, it makes sense to distinguish «between two analytically distinct processes of ascription: group identification and social categorization. The first occurs inside the… boundary, the second outside and across it»[104 - Jenkins, Richard: Rethinking ethnicity: Arguments and explorations. London 1997, p. 23.].

Cohen takes the similar point as Barth. He stresses that «culture, identity and symbolism all converge on the concept of ethnicity» and makes a critic of the last one: «In some respects, this is the most difficult word of the three, since it appears to mean something – indeed, has been imported into lay usage for this reason – but, in practice, means either everything or nothing at all. Ethnicity has become the politicization of culture»[105 - Cohen, Anthony: Boundaries and boundary-consciousness: politicizing cultural identity. In: Anderson, Malcolm; Bort, Eberhard (ed.): The frontiers of Europe. London 1998, p. 23.].

Cooper and Brubaker argue that «identity» is always «situated» and «contextual»[106 - Brubaker, Rogers; Cooper, Frederick: Beyond «Identity». In: Theory and Society 29 (2000), p. 1 – 47.]. This related to approach of viewing identity as «a process that is a temporal and dynamic phenomenon, which has a history, and even is itself situated in history as experience»[107 - Sezneva, Olga: Modalities of Self-understanding, Identification and Representation in the Post-1991 Kaliningrad. A Critical View. In: Berger, Stefan (Hg.): Kaliningrad in Europa. Nachbarschaftliche Perspektiven nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges. Wiesbaden 2010, p. 49.].

A combination of historical memory and geography provides a sense of commonality resulting in a perceived, distinct kind of groupness[108 - Ibid, p. 52.]. Does this thesis holds true in Kaliningrad? If Kaliningrad’s territorial isolation engenders a sense of «boundedness»? Borders operate as hard geographic facts and geographic borders translated into social boundaries. If the choice with whom to distinguish themselves (Russian or Europeans) is a choice between two temporalities for Kaliningradians?[109 - Ibid, p. 51.] These questions need to find their answer in this thesis.

Structure of thesis

The main part of the thesis consists of three chapters.

The first is «The Kaliningrad region and its historical background» illuminates the issues of historical background and birth of the Kaliningrad Oblast’. Significant attention paid to migration flows as a source of demographic capacity before the collapse of the USSR and the formation of regional society.

For a comprehensive review of the historical context attention is paid to the deportation of German population and analysis of the settlement of first Kaliningradians. In this regard, important sources are archival materials and the results of the project «Settlers tell» of Kaliningradian historians led by Kostyashov.

We have in the focus the period of formation of the urban landscape of Kaliningrad, its perception by residents and public authorities. During this period of time, the establishment of Kaliningrad as a typical Soviet city based on official model of development of socialistic urban communities occurred. Migration dynamics is experiencing fluctuations and has changed the essence of the regional society in 1950—1980’s.

The developing of generational change and perception of cultural and historical heritage among Kaliningradians and followed change of cultural paradigm are resulted from a complex social und public process. It may be distinguished the process of cognition under the signs of «complex of temporality», «outpost in the West» and «suitcase mood». Attention is given to the turn of 1960—70s, which I believe is appropriate to be designated as the beginning of the mastering of the cultural urban landscape.

This chapter also devoted to theoretical approaches to the Kaliningrad region as exclave in consequence of the collapse of the USSR.

The next two chapters are based on empirical material including interviews and participated observations. The chapter «Positioning between Europe and Russia: strategies and experiences of Europeanization and exceptionality of Kaliningrad everyday» discloses the issue under the motto «what is the European everyday life of Kaliningradians?»

The strategy of everyday practices is affected by the emotional sentiments under the slogans of «fragment of Russia», «poor neighbor» and «pilot region». The Small border traffic, which was put into practice as an example of cross-border «European» everyday life in Kaliningrad is disclosed under the title «Hallo, Lidl, hallo Bedronka». Motives, moods, expectations from trans-boundary movements are viewed through the prism of emotional perception of territorial marginality as the characteristic and inevitable property of daily life in Kaliningrad.

Through the content of the chapter come the issue of «separatist sentiment» as a manifestation of «distinctiveness» and consciousness of the «uniqueness» as part of the public discourse and issue of loyalty to state. The Spirit of «pilot-ness» among Kaliningradians plays role of justification and attribution of distinctiveness of regional culture. «Pilot-ness» is understood as a concept with mostly a positive connotation.

The issue of consciousness of the third generation of Kaliningradians is based on the historical heritage as an actor of the transformation of mentality, which nourishes the discourse about the significance of the historic core of the city and cultural heritage. We approach the potentiality to reflect the past in the present and affect the future.

During interviews the question of «how and who distinguish themselves as young Kaliningradians» was articulated, as well as the adequacy and applicability of the issue «periphery» and metaphor of «bridge» on the boundary of Russian-EU landscape.

Appeal to the issue of the Kaliningradian identification on the transnational space takes place through the prism of All-Russian National Census 2010, which uncovered and marked the phenomenon of nationality «Kaliningradian» as reflection of marginality, rootlessness, and ambivalence.

The last chapter «Kaliningrad regional culture: self-consciousness (Selbstverständigung) in transnational space» reveals positioning and self-identification in the context of Kaliningradians boundary modalities. The historical context and cultural transborder’s dialog plays a role through the prism of migration mobility after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The issue of borderland communities occupies a prominent place in the theory of anthropology and sociology. In this chapter, extensive attention is paid to the perception of the «space» and the aspiration of self-identity, as well as to the theme of Kaliningrad regional culture as a component (periphery) of the Russian national culture and as a link to the European cultural space.

The final part of the last chapter is devoted to empirical research in the «remote field» in relation to the «home field». During two years I had numerous interviews with Kaliningradians, which temporarily or permanently live in Berlin and find the field for the implementation of their motivations, ideas and projects. My respondents were young specialists and teams of professionals who implement and develop their startup initiatives and projects in the field of culture and innovative technologies.

I has spent considerable time searching for relevant respondents and localization of participating observation, because Kaliningradians in Berlin are not numerous and scattered among different co-working spaces and events. A process of search revealed that the consolidating center or space does not exist and is not even forming.

I study the role of startup scene as a channel of transnational mobility for young Kaliningradians and analyzed this role, within entrepreneurs’ initiatives of Kaliningradians in the Berlin startup-scene through theories of self-identity and transmigration.

2. The Kaliningrad region and its historical background

2.1. Birth of the Kaliningrad Oblast

The Kaliningrad regional culture is marked by the presence of ethno-cultural, geopolitical, and historical phenomena. It represents intensive cross-cultural interaction so that it has a considerable sociocultural dynamics and increasing cultural uncertainty. This comprehension is important for the study of the features of ethno-cultural particularity of the Kaliningrad region in terms of European neighbourhood. In this regard, the issues of correlation of national, local, and regional dimensions acquire urgency. The establishment of the region almost 70 years ago as a Soviet Oblast initiated the formation of peculiar social and cultural phenomenon.

The 20th century is characterized by significant and momentous changes on the map of Europe, which suddenly affected the way of life of millions of people and their domicile. The Kaliningrad region is one of the smallest regions of the Russian Federation, which has found a new history, cultural, and social profile due to incorporation to the Soviet Union in 1945. This fact was possible in consequence of World War II and of the diplomatic negotiations that took place between the US, Great Britain, and the USSR.

An intent look at this history is a significant step to grasp a full-scale perspective on the issue. How has the fate of former East Prussia been decided that resulted on the map of Europe a new territorial entity, the Kaliningrad region? Familiarity with this history provides an understanding of how ambiguous the process was. Appeal to the history helps us to understand the peculiarities of perception of this area by the first settlers and official Soviet authorities after the war, to estimate the origins of the contemporary post-Soviet identity of Kaliningradians and their interests in the neighbourhood countries of the European Union and their territorial isolation from the «large Russia».

The issue of East Prussia has appeared in the records of high-level diplomatic negotiations in the initial phase of World War II, when the outcome of the war was not known. On 5 December 1941, during the meeting with the Soviet ambassador in London, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill has explained his idea: «The main challenge is to once and for all eliminate the German threat. This task requires the complete disarmament of Germany at least within of one generation and the fragmentation of Germany, especially separation of Prussia»[110 - Sovetsko-anglijskie otnoshenija vo vremia Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Moscow 1983. Vol. 1, p. 182.].

On 16 December 1941, Joseph Stalin in Moscow during negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed to add to the draft agreement on joint actions the secret protocol on separation of Germany after the war into few independent states. The part of East Prussia with Königsberg he proposed to transfer to the USSR under a term of 20 years as a guarantee of reimbursement of incurred losses from the war with Germany[111 - USSR i Germanskij vopros. 1941—1949. Мoscow 1996. Vol.1, p. 138.]. This attempt to probe English colleagues was not accident: In fact, it was based on the point of view of Churchill, who expressed his opinion a little earlier in conversations with Soviet representatives in London.

During negotiations, Anthony Eden said that Great Britain promised Poland that its borders would be settled at the final peace conference after the war. Stalin suggested that «the western border of Poland will include East Prussia and Corridor (Gdansk). Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union has to go along the river Neman, and Tilsit should be in the hands of Lithuania, which is constituted as a portion of the USSR. Further to the south this border should go roughly along the Curzon line[112 - The «Curzon Line» was recommended in December 1919 by the Supreme Council of the Entente as the eastern border of Poland. The project of boundary was named in honour of Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, who took into account the ethnic composition of population along boundary line. As a result of the offensive of the Red Army in August 1939 the state border of the USSR with Poland was set roughly along the Curzon line.], which can be partially modified to a certain point»[113 - Rzheshevskij, Oleg: Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu v dekabre 1941. In: Novaja i noveishaja istorija, №2, 1994, p. 91.]. By insisting on the immediate recognition of borders of the USSR by the British government, Stalin stated unequivocally that he «puts the conclusion of any kind of Anglo-Soviet agreement under condition of an agreement on this issue»[114 - Churchill, Winston: Vtoraja mirovaja vojna. Moscow 1991. Vol. 6, p. 325.].

Thus, from the very beginning of the war the issue of East Prussia became a part of the Polish question, which was of strategic importance for the Great Powers in framing East European policy. Despite East Prussia being part of Germany, the fate of Konigsberg in times of negotiations was dependent on the Polish question.

The dynamics of the negotiations on the subject can be tracked in the course of major conferences and meetings of representatives of the USSR, the USA, the UK, as well as those of the Polish government-in-exile.

At one of the meetings of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and the UK (19—30 October 1943), which was actually a rehearsal for the Tehran conference, the issue of the fate of Germany was considered. This question was raised on the initiative of the US. Eden laid out the plan of the British government on the future of Germany: «We would like to divide the Germany into separate states; in particular, we would welcome the detachment of Prussia from the rest of Germany»[115 - Sovetskij Sojuz na mezhdynarodnych konferencijach perioda Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Мoscow 1978. Vol. 1, p. 181.]. According to Eden, Franklin Roosevelt told him about the need of formation on the territory of Germany of three new states – Prussia, the Federation of Rhineland, and the South-German Union. The US government was divided on the question of the forms of decentralization of Germany, but its influential members were in favour of the fragmentation of Eastern Prussia.

Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in reply said that the public opinion of the Soviet Union, «speaks for the dismemberment of Germany by addressing this issue on top of allies»[116 - Ibid, p. 183.].

The reference to public opinion in the Soviet Union is cynical, as it is obvious that it had no place and could not have any. However, this is a very important point, which is worth paying attention to. At that time, the military, party staff, and the civilian population began to form an idea of Prussia as a ’centuries-old bridgehead for aggression on Russia’, as «the main source of German militarism».

At the fourth session of the Tehran conference of the three Allied powers – the USSR, the USA and the UK (28 November – 1 December 1943), American President Roosevelt offered to discuss the issue of the partition of Germany. He said that in order to ’stimulate’ the debate on this issue, he would like to present the «plan for the dismemberment of Germany into five states» drawn up by him two months ago[117 - Sovetskij Sojuz na mezhdynarodnych konferencijach perioda Velikoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945.Teheranskaja konferencija. Мoscow 1984. Vol. 2, p. 148—149.]. He suggested, «Prussia must be weakened and possibly reduced in size»[118 - Ibid, p. 149.].

In Tehran, from the start of negotiations on the post-war borders in Europe, the issue of East Prussia was considered by the Allied powers as part of the Polish question.

Churchill strongly sought to reach the agreements that he could present to the representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London. According to his suggestion, a new Polish state should be located between the Curzon Line and the Oder, including East Prussia.

Stalin said, «Russians have no ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea. Therefore, Russians would need to have ice-free ports of Konigsberg, Memel and some part of the East Prussia. Moreover, historically this is originally Slavic lands. If the British agreed to transfer us mentioned area, then we will agree with the formula proposed by Churchill»[119 - Ibid, p. 150.]. Churchill reacted to this proposal with benevolent curiosity: «This is a very interesting suggestion, which I will look into»[120 - Ibid.].

Indeed, the agreement reached in Tehran largely determined the post-war fate of Eastern Prussia. However, at that moment the Western Allies believed that much was still to come and that they would be able to win back some positions. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union took the irrevocable and uncompromising course for the future inclusion of Poland and East Prussia into its own sphere of influence.

The prevailing practice of the international law permitted withdrawal of certain parts of the state aggressor as a sanction against this state. In this case, the sanction was imposed primarily on the territory, which was used as a springboard for attack to prevent the revival of aggression in future.

On 1 February 1944, Churchill informed Stalin in a message about the meeting with representatives of the Polish Government-in-exile in London: «I told them that we went to war to protect Poland, we went for it not because of any particular borderline, but for the establishment of a strong and independent Poland…»[121 - Perepiska predsedatelja Soveta Ministrov USSR s prezidentami USA i premier-ministrami Welikobritanii vo vremia Velkoj Otechestvennoj voiny 1941—1945. Moscow 1976, Vol. 1, p. 230.]

On 4 February 1944, Stalin, in his reply to Churchill concerning borders of Poland, reiterated, «As for your statement to the Poles that Poland could considerably extend its borders to the west and north, then, as you know, we agree with it, but with amendment. About this amendment, I spoke to you and President Roosevelt in Tehran. We claim the north-eastern part of East Prussia, including the ice-free port Königsberg, which should be ceded to the Soviet Union. This is the only piece of German territory, which we claim…»[122 - Ibid, p. 235.]

In a letter to Stalin, which was received in Moscow on 27 February 1944, Churchill for the first time explicitly stated that the British government supported the transfer of Königsberg and surrounding area to the Soviet Union and considered this claim «as fair»… «The land of this part of East Prussia stained with blood of Russian… therefore, Russian have historical and well-founded claim to this German territory». In the same message, Churchill for the first time spoke in favour of «resettlement of the German population»[123 - Ibid, p. 242—243.].

Winston Churchill and Minister of Foreign Affairs Antony Eden were on a visit to Moscow on the 9—18 October 1944. The head of the Polish government-in-exile Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was present during the conversations, asked if he could know which western boundary was defined for Poland in Teheran. Vyacheslav Molotov said that the border along Oder was considered without anyone’s objection. Eden said that «the idea had been that the frontier could be moved as far west toward the Oder as the Poles wished to go». Churchill assured him: «All of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg was to go to Poland»[124 - Feis, Herbert: Churchill. Roosevelt. Stalin. The war they waged and the peace they sought. Princeton 1957, p. 455.].

In early 1945, Soviet troops arrived at the borders of East Prussia. Because of «the East Prussian strategic offensive» of the Red Army (13 January—25 April 1945) on 9 April, the garrison of Konigsberg surrendered. The surrender of Konigsberg actually reinforced the political arrangements over East Prussia. From that moment onwards, the region was under the control of the Soviet Army.

After heated debates on the Yalta conference, the Allies agreed that the eastern border of Poland would have to pass on the «Curzon Line». Therefore, it can be argued that at Yalta Conference in February 1945, the head of the USSR, the USA, and the Great Britain almost solved the issue of the future borders of Poland and the fate of Eastern Prussia. President Roosevelt agreed with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill. On the fifth plenary session of the Yalta Conference, it was agreed that «compensation should be given to Poland at the expense of Germany, including that portion of East Prussia south of the Königsberg line…»[125 - Ibid, p. 525.]

The agreement in principle was reached – only the details remained to be discussed. This discussion took place at the Conference of Potsdam from 17 July to 2 September 1945. At the seventh meeting of the heads of governments on 23 July, the issue of the transfer of the region around Königsberg to the Soviet Union was discussed. Stalin recalled that «President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill at the Tehran Conference gave their consent in this regard, and this issue has been agreed between us. We would like to have this agreement confirmed at this conference»[126 - Teheran – Yalta – Potsdam. Sbornik dokumentov. Мoscow 1970, p. 161—162.]. In response to the exchange of opinions, the US and Great Britain delegations confirmed their consent given in Tehran.

According to an agreement in the communiqué of 2 August 1945 of the Berlin conference, the sixth section under the title «City of Königsberg and the surrounding area» stated the following: «The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above, subject to expert examination of the actual frontier»[127 - Potsdamer Konferenz, http://potsdamer-konferenz.de/dokumente/protokoll_en.php#VI, accessed on 23.02.2014.].