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The Political History of England – Vol XI

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2017
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THE TREATY OF GHENT.

As early as January, 1814, advances had been made towards negotiations for peace, but they were not actually begun till August 6. In the course of a few days a serious difficulty arose, as the British commissioners demanded the delimitation of an Indian territory which should be exempt from territorial acquisitions on the part of either power, and also claimed the military occupation of the lakes for their own government. The Americans thereupon suspended the negotiations, and Castlereagh expressed grave discontent with the conduct of the British negotiators in pressing these points. Late in the year negotiations were resumed, when the British abandoned these claims. The far more comprehensive questions about the rights of neutrals, which had occasioned the war, had ceased to be of practical importance now that peace was restored in Europe. They were therefore, by tacit consent, suffered to drop, and a treaty signed at Ghent on December 24, 1814, ended a war of which the Canadians alone had reason to be proud.

The most dramatic incident in the domestic annals of England in this year was the visit of the allied sovereigns to this country, after their triumphal entry into Paris, and the signature of a convention, to be described hereafter, for the resettlement of Europe. Louis XVIII. left his retreat at Hartwell on April 20, and reached his capital on May 3 to find it occupied by foreign armies, and to discover that his French escort, composed of Napoleon's old guard, was of doubtful loyalty. On July 8 the Tsar of Russia and the King of Prussia, having accepted an invitation from the prince regent, which the Emperor of Austria declined, landed at Dover, and were afterwards received with the utmost enthusiasm in London. Their appearance betokened the supposed termination of the greatest, and almost the longest, war recorded in European history, but it was also accepted as a tribute of gratitude for the unique services rendered by Great Britain, the only European power which had never bowed the knee to the French Republic or the French Empire. They attended Ascot races, were feasted at the Guildhall, witnessed a naval review at Portsmouth, and were decorated with honorary degrees at Oxford, where Blücher was the hero of the day with the younger members of the university. There were men of calmer minds and maturer age, who must have remembered the time, but seven years before, when Alexander swore eternal friendship with Napoleon, on the basis of enmity to Great Britain, and Frederick William of Prussia shrunk from no depths of dishonour, first to aggrandise his kingdom and then to save the remnants of it from destruction. Others foresaw that a restoration of the Bourbons portended reaction, in its worst sense, throughout all the continent of Europe. But such memories and forebodings were hushed in the sincere and general rejoicing over the return of peace, marred by no suspicion of the new trials and privations which peace itself was destined to bring with it for the working classes of Great Britain.

CHAPTER VII.

VIENNA AND WATERLOO

After the restoration of Louis XVIII. as a constitutional king, the treaty of Paris between France and the allied powers was signed on May 30, 1814. The treaty amounted to a settlement in outline of those territorial questions in Europe in which France was concerned, and aimed mainly at the construction of a strong barrier to resist further encroachments by France on her neighbours. The French boundaries were to coincide generally with the limits of French territory on January 1, 1792, but with certain additions. The principle adopted was that France should retain certain detached pieces of foreign states within her own frontier (such as Mühlhausen, Montbéliard, and the Venaissin), while the line of frontier was extended so as to include certain detached fragments belonging to France before 1792, such as Landau, Mariembourg, and Philippeville, as well as Western Savoy with Chambéry for its capital. She was moreover allowed to regain all her colonies except the Mauritius, St. Lucia, and Tobago. The Spanish portion of San Domingo was restored to the Spanish government. Holland was placed under the sovereignty of the house of Orange, and was to receive an increase of territory; so much of Italy as was not to be ceded to Austria was to consist of independent sovereign states; and Germany was to be formed into a confederation. Finally an European congress was to meet at Vienna in two months' time "to regulate the arrangements necessary for completing the dispositions of the treaty". At the same time secret articles provided that the disposition of territories was to be controlled at Vienna by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia; that Austria, was to receive Venice and Lombardy as far as the Ticino; and that the former territories of Genoa were to be annexed to Sardinia, and the late Austrian Netherlands to Holland.

In the midst of the general restoration of legitimate princes difficulties were occasioned by the exceptional cases in which territories were reserved for the new dynasties that had arisen during the Napoleonic wars. France, Spain, and Sicily objected to the retention of the kingdom of Naples by Murat, Spain resented the cession of Parma to the Bonapartes, and Norway was in revolt against the attempt to subjugate it to the king of Sweden and his heir Marshal Bernadotte. The Norwegian government under Prince Christian vainly endeavoured to secure the British recognition of the independence of Norway. The British government, on the contrary, held itself bound to support the claims of Sweden, and on April 29 notified a blockade of the Norwegian ports, which was promptly carried into effect. Meanwhile a new constitution was promulgated in Norway, and Prince Christian was proclaimed king. While the British maintained the blockade Sweden attempted to gain its ends by negotiation. At last, on July 30, the Swedes invaded Norway. After some Swedish successes a convention was signed at Moss on August 14, which recognised the new Norwegian constitution, but provided for a personal union of the crowns of Sweden and Norway. This constitution was accepted by Charles XIII. of Sweden in the following November, and Norway retained almost complete independence, though united to Sweden.

THE SLAVE TRADE.

Among the last acts of Napoleon's government had been the release and restoration of Ferdinand VII. of Spain and of Pope Pius VII. Ferdinand, supported by the vast mass of Spanish opinion, declared against the rather unpractical constitution established in his absence, and entered Madrid as an absolute king on May 14. One of his first acts was the revival of the inquisition. There was some apprehension among British representatives lest the two restored Bourbon monarchies should renew the family compact, and also lest they should attempt to assert the Bourbon claims to Naples and Parma. Sir Henry Wellesley, afterwards Lord Cowley, was, however, successful in negotiating a treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Spain, which made provision against any renewal of the family compact, restored the commercial relations of the two countries to the footing on which they had been before 1796, and promised the future consideration of means to be adopted for the suppression of the slave trade. Spain was in fact too dependent on British credit to be able to adopt a line of her own in politics. But the hold which Great Britain had thus gained over Spain was somewhat weakened by the British attitude towards the slave trade.

It is remarkable how large a space the abolition of the slave trade occupied in the foreign policy of Great Britain, when the liberties of Europe were at stake. During the months preceding the meeting of the congress of Vienna, which had been postponed till September by the tsar, British diplomacy had been engaged in a strenuous effort to obtain the co-operation of such European powers as possessed American colonies in securing this philanthropic object. Sweden had already consented to it, and now Holland also gave her consent. Portugal agreed to relinquish the trade north of the equator, on condition that the other powers consented to impose a similar restriction on themselves. Strong pressure was brought to bear upon France to consent to the immediate abolition of the trade, and Wellington, who had been created a duke in May and who arrived at Paris in August in the capacity of British ambassador, was authorised by Liverpool to offer the cession of Trinidad or the payment of two or three million pounds to obtain this end. By the treaty of Paris only French subjects were allowed to trade in slaves with the French colonies, and French subjects were excluded from trading elsewhere; and the whole trade was to cease within French dominions after five years. Talleyrand, negotiating with Wellington, refused to consent to a general abolition, but, on being pressed to surrender the slave trade north of the equator, consented to abandon it to the north of Cape Formoso. In the following year Napoleon on his return from Elba ordered its immediate suppression, and this was not the least significant act of the Hundred Days. With Spain our diplomatists were less successful. The British government refused to renew its subsidy to Spain for the last half of 1814 except on condition that Spain relinquished the slave trade north of the equator at once, and consented to relinquish that south of the equator in five years' time; while it would not issue a loan except on condition that Spain abolished the whole trade immediately. Even these terms did not prevail with Spain, and the most that she would grant at the congress was to relinquish the trade at the conclusion of eight years.

Meanwhile Talleyrand was endeavouring to induce Great Britain to combine with France in a joint mediation between Austria and Russia at the congress, in the event of Russia demanding the duchy of Warsaw. Wellington, while expressing himself in favour of an understanding, refused to accept anything which might seem equivalent to a declaration in favour of mediation by the two powers in every case. At the congress itself Great Britain was first represented by Castlereagh, who was succeeded in February, 1815, by Wellington. The two principal difficulties were the questions of Poland and Saxony. The tsar desired to erect the duchy of Warsaw, Prussia's share in the two partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795, into a constitutional monarchy attached to the Russian crown, while Prussia, though not unwilling to resign her claims to Polish dominion, wished to increase her territory by the incorporation of Saxony in her monarchy. Austria was naturally averse from any increase of strength in the states on her northern borders, and she was also opposed to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Poland which might serve as a centre for political discontent in her own dominions. Even France urged this objection to a constitutional Poland. Great Britain alone was willing to see an independent Poland, but preferred to join France, Prussia, and Austria in demanding its repartition between the two latter powers rather than its annexation to Russia. All through October Austria, Great Britain, and Prussia endeavoured to induce the tsar to withdraw his demand. Early in November he won over the King of Prussia to whom he promised the kingdom of Saxony, proposing to indemnify the Saxon king with a new state on that lower Rhine which France was not allowed to have, but which no other power desired.

THE RETURN OF NAPOLEON.

It was no longer possible to resist Russia's claims on Poland, but Austria was determined not to allow Prussia to receive the proffered compensation. On December 10 Metternich notified the Prussian minister, Hardenberg, that he would not allow Prussia to annex more than a fifth part of Saxony. Great Britain, France, Bavaria, and the minor German states joined Austria in this action, and thus the attempt to effect a settlement of Europe by a concert of the four allied powers broke down. On January 3, 1815, a secret treaty was concluded between Austria, France, and Great Britain in defence of what their diplomatists called "the principles of the peace of Paris". Each of these powers was to be prepared, if necessary, to place an army of 50,000 men in the field. Bavaria joined them in their preparations for war, and many of the troops which occupied Paris in 1815 would have been disbanded or dispersed, but for the prospect of a rupture between the allies themselves. But a compromise was soon arranged, and on February 8 it was agreed that Cracow, the Polish fortress which threatened Austria most, should be an independent republic, and that Prussia should retain enough of Western Poland to round off her dominions, while the remainder of the duchy of Warsaw became a constitutional kingdom under the tsar. Prussia was to be allowed to annex part of Saxony, and was to receive a further compensation on the left bank of the Rhine and in Westphalia. The most thorny questions were now settled, and Castlereagh had left Vienna when the congress was electrified by the news that Napoleon had reappeared in France.

The episode of "the Hundred Days" interrupted, but did not break up, the councils of the congress at Vienna. It cannot be said that Napoleon's escape from Elba took the negotiators altogether by surprise. They were already aware of his correspondence with the neighbouring shores of Italy, and his removal to St Helena or some other distant island had been proposed by the French government, though never discussed at the congress. Sir Neil Campbell, the British commissioner at Elba, had gone so far as to warn his government of Napoleon's suspected "plan," and to indicate, though erroneously, the place of his probable descent upon the Italian coast. Owing to an almost incredible want of precaution, he embarked on February 26 with the least possible disguise, and accompanied by 400 of his guards, on board his brig the Inconstant, eluded the observation of two French ships, and landed near Cannes on March 1. Thence he hastened across the mountains to Grenoble, passing unmolested, and sometimes welcomed, through districts where his life had been threatened but a few months before. The commandant of Grenoble was prepared to resist his further progress, but a heart-stirring appeal from Napoleon induced a regiment detached to oppose him to join his standard, and the rest of the garrison was brought over by Colonel Labedoyère, one of the officers who had conspired to bring him back. Thence he proceeded to Lyons, issuing decrees, scattering proclamations, and gathering followers at every stage. He was lavish of promises, not perhaps wholly insincere, that he would adopt constitutional government – already established by the charter of Louis XVIII. – and cease to wage aggressive wars. He relied unduly on the discontent provoked by the blind partisans of the Bourbons, who, it was said, had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. This was true, if the spirit of the restoration were to be measured by the parade of expiatory masses for the execution of royalists under the revolution, the ostentatious patronage of priests, the preference of returned émigrés to well-tried servants of the republic and the empire, or the anticipated expulsion of landowners in possession of "national domains" for the purpose of dividing them among their old proprietors. All this naturally exasperated those who had imbibed the principles of the revolution, but it was more than compensated in the eyes of millions of Frenchmen by the cessation of conscription and the infinite blessings of peace.

"THE HUNDRED DAYS."

The king was amongst the least infatuated of the royalists. On hearing of Napoleon's proclamation, he had the sense to appreciate the danger of such a bid for sovereignty and the magic of such a name, while his courtiers regarded Napoleon's enterprise as the last effort of a madman. He addressed the chamber of deputies in confident and dignified language; the Duke of Angoulême was employed to rouse the royalist party at Bordeaux; the Duke of Bourbon was sent into Brittany, the Count of Artois, with the Duke of Orléans and Marshal Macdonald, visited Lyons, upon the attitude of which everything, for the moment, seemed to depend. Most of the marshals remained faithful to the restored monarchy, and Ney was selected to bar the progress of Napoleon in Burgundy, and has been credited with a vow that he would bring him back in an iron cage. But it was all in vain. The Count of Artois was loyally received by the officials and upper classes at Lyons, but he soon found that Napoleon possessed the hearts of the soldiers and the mass of the people. Ney yielded to urgent appeals from his old chief, signed and read to his troops a proclamation drawn up by Napoleon himself, and was followed in his treason by his whole army. As Napoleon approached Paris, all armed opposition to him melted away. On March 19, Louis XVIII., seeing that his cause was hopeless, proclaimed a dissolution of the chambers, and retired once more into exile, fixing his residence at Ghent.

Napoleon re-entered the Tuileries on the 20th, after a journey which he afterwards described as the happiest in his life. But his penetrating mind was not deceived by the manifestations of popular joy. He well knew that he was distrusted by the middle classes, as well as by the aristocracy, and threw himself more and more on the sympathy of the old revolutionists. When he came to fill up the higher offices, he met with a strange reluctance to accept them, and was driven to enlist the services of two regicides, the virtuous republican, Carnot, and the double-dyed traitor Fouché. Feeling the necessity of resting his power on a democratic basis, he promulgated a constitution modelled on the charter of Louis XVIII., and known as the Acte Additionnel, which, however, satisfied no one. The royalists objected to its anti-feudal spirit, the revolutionists and moderates to its express recognition of an hereditary peerage, and its tacit recognition of a dictatorial power. It was by no means with a light heart that Napoleon took leave of Paris on June 7, having appointed a provisional government, to place himself at the head of his army.

Attempts had been made in the southern provinces and La Vendée to organise armed rebellion against the emperor, and met for a time with considerable success. But they were soon quelled by the overwhelming imperialism not only of the regular army, but of vast numbers of disbanded soldiers and half-pay officers, dispersed throughout France, and disgusted with their treatment under the restored monarchy. Even among the bourgeoisie Napoleon had an advantage which he never possessed before. Disguise it as he might, all his former wars had been essentially wars of conquest, and, however patiently they might endure it, the peasantry of France, in thousands upon thousands of humble cottages, groaned under the exaction of crushing taxes – worst of all, the blood-tax of conscription – in order to enable one man, in the name of France, to usurp the empire of the world. Now, however, as in the early days of the revolution, France was put on its defence, and called upon to repel an invasion of its frontiers. For the news of Napoleon's escape, announced by Talleyrand on March 11, instantly stilled the quarrels and rebuked the jealousies which had so nearly proved fatal to any settlement at Vienna. For the moment, the designs of Russia in Poland, the selfish demands of Prussia, and the half-formed coalition between Great Britain, France, and Austria, were thrust into the background. Austria thought it necessary to repudiate decisively the audaciously false assertion of Napoleon that he was returning with the concurrence of his father-in-law, and would shortly be supported by Austrian troops. Metternich, therefore, assumed the lead in drawing up a solemn manifesto, dated March 13, in which Napoleon was virtually declared an outlaw "abandoned to public justice," and the powers which had signed the treaty of Paris in the preceding May bound themselves, in the face of Europe, to carry out all its provisions and defend the king of France, if need be, against his own rebellious subjects.

By a further convention made at the end of March, they engaged to provide forces exceeding 700,000 men in the aggregate, to be concentrated on the Upper Rhine, the Lower Rhine, and the Low Countries, with an immense reserve of Russians to be rapidly moved across Germany from Poland. Wellington having succeeded Castlereagh at Vienna, was appointed to command the British, Hanoverian, and Belgian contingents on the north-east frontier of France; Blücher's headquarters were to be on the Lower Rhine, within easy reach of that frontier; for, whichever side might take the offensive, it was there that the first shock of war might be expected. The recent conclusion of peace with America at Ghent on December 24, 1814, left England free to use her whole military power. Enormous sums were voted by Parliament, with a rare approach to unanimity, for the equipment of a British army, and a sum of £5,000,000 for subsidies to the allied powers. A small section of the opposition led by Whitbread opposed the renewal of war. On April 7 he moved an amendment to the address in reply to the prince regent's message announcing that measures for the security of Europe were being concerted with the allies, but he was only supported by 32 votes against 220. On April 28 his motion for an address to the prince regent, deprecating war with Napoleon, was defeated by 273 votes against 72. This was Whitbread's last prominent appearance in parliament. On July 6, during a fit of insanity, he died by his own hand. The subsidies to the allies were opposed by Bankes, but were carried on May 26 by 160 votes against 17. There can be no doubt that the majorities in the house of commons correctly expressed the national sentiment. Nobody wished to dictate to France the form of government which she was to adopt, but it was generally felt that Napoleon's character rendered peace with him impossible.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815.

In the end, about 80,000 men were assembled in Belgium under Wellington's orders, but of these not half were British soldiers, including untrained drafts from the militia, who replaced veteran Peninsular regiments still detained in Canada and the United States. Yet Napoleon admitted the British contingent to be equal, man for man, to his own troops, while he estimated these to be worth twice their own number of Dutchmen, Prussians, or other Germans. The first blow in the war was struck by Murat. Already in February, dissatisfied with his ambiguous position, he had levied troops and summoned Louis XVIII. to declare whether he was at war with him. As soon as he heard of Napoleon's return, he invaded the Papal States, and summoned the Italians to rise in the cause of Italian unity and independence. Though disowned by Napoleon, he persevered in this plan, but he was attacked and twice defeated by an Austrian army. On May 22 the British and Austrians took the city of Naples, and Murat fled to France. In October he made an attempt to recover his kingdom, but was captured and shot. It is noteworthy that, on hearing of his fate at St. Helena, Napoleon showed but little sympathy with his brother-in-law.

On the morning of June 12, Napoleon left Paris, saying as he entered his carriage that he went to match himself with Wellington. All his troops were already marshalled on the Belgian frontier, and numbered 124,588 men, with 344 guns. The Imperial Guard alone was 20,954 strong, and the whole army was largely composed of seasoned veterans. The Prussian army consisted of 116,897 men, with 312 guns under Marshal Blücher, whose headquarters were at Namur. Though the majority of these were veterans, there was a considerable leaven of inferior troops, hastily raised from the Westphalian and Rhine militia. Between this town and Quatre Bras lay the Prussian line of defence, Sombreffe being the centre, with Ligny and St. Amand in front of it, and rather on the south-west. Wellington's headquarters were at Brussels, and, having no certain intelligence of Napoleon's movements, he kept the various divisions of his army within easy distance of that capital until the very eve of the final conflict. Of the 93,717 men under his command, 31,253 were British, two-thirds of whom had never been under fire; 6,387 were of the king's German legion; 15,935 Hanoverians; 29,214 (including 4,300 Nassauers in the service of the Prince of the Netherlands) Dutch and Belgians; 6,808 Brunswickers; 2,880 Nassauers; the engineers, numbering 1,240, were not classified by nationality. He fully expected that Napoleon would move upon Brussels along the route by Mons and Hal, and maintained in later days that such would have been the best strategical course. Napoleon thought otherwise, and resolved to strike in between the Prussian and British armies, crushing the former before the latter could be fully assembled. He very nearly succeeded, and, if all had gone as he hoped, he could scarcely have failed to win one of his greatest victories.

LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS.

On the evening of the 15th, Wellington was still at Brussels, with the great body of his army, and only a weak force of Dutch and Belgians was at Quatre Bras, some sixteen miles to the south. Blücher, with about three-fourths of his army, was at Sombreffe, a few miles south-east of Quatre Bras. Napoleon himself was at or close by Charleroi, ten or twelve miles south of Quatre Bras; the mass of his army was at Fleurus, south-west of Sombreffe, with Ligny and St. Amand between it and the Prussians; and Marshal Ney, with Reille's corps, was at Frasnes, opposite to and due south of Quatre Bras. On the morning of the 16th, Napoleon arrived from Charleroi at Fleurus, and carefully inspected his enemy's position, but delayed his attack upon Ligny and St Amand until half-past two in the afternoon. The Prussians outnumbered the French, and a murderous conflict ensued among the streets, gardens, and enclosures of these little towns, which lasted until eight or nine o'clock. At last Napoleon ordered his guard to advance, and the plateau behind Ligny was taken, with a loss to the French of 12,000, and to the Prussians of over 20,000. Blücher himself was unhorsed and severely bruised in a furious charge of cavalry, but the Prussians retired in good order towards Wavre, north of the battlefield.

Had Ney been in a condition to obey an urgent message from Napoleon, and to envelop the Prussian right and rear, this defeat would have been overwhelming in its effect. But while the battle of Ligny was raging, another battle was going on at Quatre Bras, six miles distant, in which the French sustained a serious check. Happily for the British, Ney failed to bring up his divisions for an attack on Quatre Bras until two o'clock in the afternoon, when the Dutch and Belgians under the Prince of Orange were still his only opponents. The news for which Wellington had been waiting did not reach him until just before the memorable ball, given by the Duchess of Richmond at Brussels on the night of the 15th, which he nevertheless attended, hurrying off his troops to Quatre Bras. They arrived just in time to reinforce the Prince of Orange and save the position; but Ney, too, was receiving fresh reinforcements every hour, the Duke of Brunswick was killed, and a fearful stress fell on Picton's division and the Hanoverians, who alone were a match for Ney's splendid infantry and Kellermann's cuirassiers.

These made a charge like that which had borne down the Austrians at Marengo, but the British squares were proof against it, and when a division of guards came up from Nivelles, the French in turn were put on the defensive and retreated to Frasnes. The loss on the British side was 4,500 men; that on the French somewhat less. It is not difficult to imagine what the issue of the battle must have been if D'Erlon's corps had been brought into action. This corps was occupied in marching and countermarching, under contradictory orders from Napoleon and Ney, between the British left and the Prussian right during the whole of this eventful day. Its appearance in the distance just when Napoleon was about to launch his guard against the Prussians at Ligny, caused him to hesitate long, and lose the decisive moment for demolishing his enemy. Its failure to appear at Quatre Bras, and to roll up the wavering Dutch-Belgians, before Picton took up the fighting, enabled Wellington to hold his ground at first, to repulse Ney afterwards, and on hearing of Blücher's defeat at Ligny, to fall back in good order on Waterloo. Even then, something was due to good fortune. Had Napoleon joined Ney and marched direct on Quatre Bras early on the 17th, it is difficult to see how his advance to Brussels could have been arrested. But whether he was exhausted by his incessant labours since leaving Paris, or whether his marvellous intuition was deserting him, certain it is that he allowed that critical morning to slip by without an effort – and without a reconnaissance. He assumed that Blücher must retire upon Namur as his base of operations, and that Wellington, retiring towards Brussels, would be cut off from his allies. He therefore despatched Marshal Grouchy, with 33,000 men, to follow up the Prussians eastward by the Namur road. His assumption was unfounded. Blücher, loyal to his engagements, retired upon Wavre; Wellington, relying upon Blücher's loyalty, took his stand on the field of Waterloo; and this error on the part of Napoleon determined the fortunes of the campaign.[61 - For the movements of June 15, 16, see Chesney, Waterloo Lectures, pp. 70-137; Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, pp. 44-196.]

WATERLOO.

The British army retreated upon Waterloo almost unmolested. Ney was probably awaiting orders, and Napoleon, believing the Prussians to be at Namur, probably thought he might safely rest himself and his army before crushing Wellington at his leisure. When they realised that Wellington was deliberately moving his army to a position nearer Brussels, they both followed in pursuit along different roads converging at Quatre Bras, and a brisk skirmish took place near Genappe between Ney's cavalry and that of the British rear-guard. Heavy rain came on, and the two armies spent a miserable night, half a mile from each other, close to Mont St. Jean, and south of Waterloo. Napoleon rose before daybreak on the 18th, reconnoitred the British position, and convinced himself that Wellington intended to give battle. He expressed to his staff his satisfaction and confidence of victory, when General Foy, who had experience of the Peninsular war, replied in significant words: "Sire, when the British infantry stand at bay, they are the very devil himself". Why Napoleon did not begin the battle at eight o'clock has been the subject of much discussion. It is said that he waited for Grouchy to join him before the close of the action. But neither he nor Grouchy, though aware that at least a large force of Prussians had gone to Wavre and not to Namur, suspected that Blücher had promised Wellington to march with his whole army on the morning of the 18th to support the British at Waterloo. It is more likely that he waited for his men to assemble and for the ground to dry and become more practicable for his powerful artillery.[62 - Rose, Life of Napoleon I., ii., 494, 495.]

Exception has been taken to the conduct of Wellington in detaching 17,000 men to guard the approach to Brussels at Hal, and, still more, in not recalling them, when he must have ascertained that nothing was to be feared on that side, and when such a reinforcement of his right wing must have been all-important. But it must be remembered that in this force there were only 1,500 English troops, and 2,000 Hanoverian militia. The rest were Dutch and Belgians. At all events, Napoleon left his right flank undefended, though he was already somewhat anxious about the Prussian movements, and Wellington fought the battle of Waterloo with a force numerically inferior to that under Napoleon's command, though it might have been rendered superior by the accession of the Hal contingent. The effective part of this force, numbering in all 67,661 men, consisted of 24,000 British soldiers, 6,000 soldiers of the king's German legion, and about 11,000 Hanoverians. Napoleon's force numbered 72,000 men, and it was stronger both in cavalry and in guns. It represented the flower of the French army; there were few, if any, recruits as raw as those who swelled the ranks of the British regiments; there were thousands upon thousands who had formed part of that Grande Armée which had overawed the continent of Europe. It is fair, however, to record that, while the British rank and file suffered much for want of sufficient food, the French had fared still worse, and that very many of them could have been in no fit condition for the struggle impending over them.

Both armies occupied ground extending from west to east, on opposite ridges, and crossed at right angles by the great highway running north and south from Charleroi to Brussels. In front of the British right were the château and enclosures of Hougoumont which were occupied by the British; nearly in front of the centre were the large farm-house and buildings of La Haye Sainte. Further to the left were the hamlet of Smohain and the farms Papelotte and La Haye. Wellington had arranged his brigades so as to distribute the older troops as much as possible among the less experienced. Sir Thomas Picton's fifth division formed the left of the line; to his right was Alten's second division, and beyond him to the right was the guards division under Cooke. Further to the right and partly in reserve was Clinton's second division, while Chassé's Dutch division on the extreme right occupied the village of Braine l'Alleud. Somerset's brigade of heavy cavalry and Kruse's Dutch cavalry were posted behind Alten's division, and Ponsonby's "union brigade," consisting of the royal dragoons, Scots greys, and Inniskillings, was stationed in Picton's rear. The whole line lay on the inner slopes of the ridge with the exception of Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade which was posted on the outer slope in front of Picton's division. D'Erlon's corps was opposite the British left, Reille's opposite the British right. Squadrons of cavalry covered the outer flank of either of the two French corps. The magnificent squadrons of French cavalry, 15,000 strong, under Milhaud, Kellermann, and other famous leaders, were in the second line; the imperial guard, as usual, was massed in the rear.

WATERLOO.

The battle opened about half-past eleven with a furious attack on Hougoumont. It was defended with desperate gallantry, mainly by the British guards, who reopened the old loopholes in the garden-walls, and closed by sheer muscular force the eastern gate of the yard, which had been forced open by the French. In the fruitless siege of Hougoumont, as it may be called, the French left wing thus wasted most of its strength, and incurred enormous loss. Meanwhile, the French right wing under D'Erlon, advanced to attack the British left, which had been assailed for an hour and a half by the fire of a battery with seventy-eight guns. The Dutch and Belgians, who in their exposed position had suffered severely from the French artillery fire, soon gave way; but Picton's division, after a single volley, charged with the bayonet and drove their assailants reeling backward, though Picton himself fell dead on the field. Without orders from Wellington, Lord Uxbridge, in command of the British cavalry, seized the opportunity, and launched the union brigade with other regiments upon the flying masses. This whirlwind of British horsemen swept all before it, slaughtering many of the French cavalry in passing, taking 3,000 prisoners, sabring the gunners of Ney's battery, and spiking fifteen of the guns. But their ardour carried them too far. By Napoleon's orders a large force of French cuirassiers and lancers fell upon their flank before they could take breath again, and their ranks were frightfully thinned in a disorderly retreat. But their charge had saved the day.

At one o'clock, while the fate of D'Erlon's onslaught was still undecided, Napoleon observed Prussian troops on his right. An intercepted despatch proved these to be Bülow's corps. He instantly sent off a despatch to Grouchy, whom he supposed to be within reach, ordering him to attack Bülow in the rear. Then followed the memorable succession of charges by the whole of the French cavalry upon the squares of the British infantry. Not one of these squares was broken; a great part of the French cavalry was mown down by volleys or cut to pieces by the British cavalry in their precipitate retreat, and the British line remained unmoved, though grievously weakened, behind its protecting ridge. This was the crisis of the fight. Much of the British artillery was dismounted, and Wellington confessed to one of his staff that he longed for the advent of night or Blücher. Napoleon next felt himself compelled to detach Lobau's corps for the purpose of meeting the advancing Prussians. Soon afterwards Ney carried La Haye Sainte by a most determined assault, aided by the failure of ammunition within its defences, and thus captured the key of the British position. But Napoleon saw that his one chance of victory lay in a final coup before the Prussians could wrest it from him. He ordered the imperial guard to the front, leading it himself across the valley, and then handing over the command to Ney. The guard was but the remnant of its original strength, for all its cavalry had been wrecked in wild charges against the British squares, and several battalions of its infantry were kept in reserve to hold back the Prussians and protect the baggage train. Nevertheless, the advance of this superb corps, the heroes of a hundred fights, who had seldom failed to hurl back the tide of battle at the most perilous junctures, was among the most impressive spectacles in the annals of war. They swerved a little to the left, thereby exposing themselves to the fire of the British footguards and of a battery in excellent condition. The former were lying down for shelter, but when the imperial guard came within sixty paces of them they started up at the word of command from Wellington himself. The footguards poured a deadly fire into the front, and the 52nd regiment into the flank of their columns; as they wavered under the storm of shot a bayonet charge followed, and the imperial guard, hitherto almost invincible, was dissolved into a mob of fugitives scattered over the plain.

It was now past eight o'clock; Bülow's Prussians had long been engaged on the British left, and Blücher, with indomitable energy, was pressing forward with all his other divisions. Wellington first sent Vandeleur's and Vivian's cavalry, still comparatively fresh, to sweep away what remained of the French reserves, and then ordered a general advance. The French retreat speedily became a rout, and a rout to which there is no parallel except that which succeeded the battle of Leipzig. Wellington and Blücher met at La Belle Alliance on the high road, just south of the battlefield, and lately the French headquarters. The British troops were utterly tired out, but the Prussian cavalry never drew rein until they had driven the last Frenchman over the river Sambre in their relentless pursuit. The slaughter had been prodigious, though far short of that at Borodino. The British army lost 13,000 men, the Prussian 7,000, and the French 37,000[63 - Oman in English Historical Review, xix., 693, and xxi., 132.] (including prisoners), besides the whole of their artillery, ammunition, baggage-waggons, and military train. But the battle was one of the most decisive recorded in history, and was the real beginning of a peace which lasted over the whole of Europe for nearly forty years. Grouchy heard the cannonade of Waterloo on his march from Ligny to Wavre, and was strongly urged by Gérard to hasten across country, with his whole force, in the direction of the firing. But he pleaded the letter of Napoleon's instructions, and reached Wavre only to find Blücher gone. After an encounter with a Prussian corps, which had been left behind, he received news of Napoleon's defeat, and ultimately escaped into France.

NAPOLEON'S SECOND ABDICATION.

The march of the allies into France after the battle of Waterloo was not wholly unchecked, but it was far more rapid than in 1814. The French could not be rallied, and in the first week of July Paris was occupied by Anglo-Prussian troops. The Austrians and Prussians were moving again upon the eastern frontiers of France, but were still far behind. The Prussian general and soldiers were animated by the bitterest spirit of vengeance, and it needed all the firmness of Wellington to prevent the bridge of Jena from being blown up, and a ruinous contribution levied on the citizens of Paris. Napoleon himself was now at Rochefort, having quitted Paris after a second abdication on June 22, but four days after the battle. No other course was open to him. When he started for his last campaign, he was no longer the champion of an united nation, and consciously staked his all on a single throw. When he returned from it, discomfited and without an army, he found the chambers actively hostile to him. Carnot, who had formerly opposed his assumption of the imperial title, was now the only one of his ministers to deprecate his abdication, but Napoleon himself saw no hope of retaining his power, or transmitting it to his son, without a reckless appeal to revolutionary passions. From this he shrank, and he represented himself at St. Helena as having sacrificed personal ambition to patriotism.

The chamber of deputies appointed an executive commission of five, including the infamous Fouché, and from this body the late emperor actually received an order to quit Paris. He retired to Malmaison, where he received a fresh order to set out for Rochefort, which he reached on July 3. On the next day Paris capitulated to the allies, and the necessity for his leaving the shores of France became more urgent. Two frigates were assigned for his escape to America, but a British squadron was lying ready to intercept them. Some of his bolder companions devised a scheme for smuggling him on board a swift merchant ship, but it was foiled by the vigilant watch of the British squadron off the islands of Oléron and Ré. At last he surrendered himself on board the Bellerophon, relying, as he said, on the honour of the British nation, and claiming the generous protection of the prince regent. He was, however, clearly informed that he would be at the disposal of the government. Under an agreement with the allied powers, the ministers decided, and were supported by the nation in deciding, that he could not be detained in England, either as a guest or as a prisoner, with any regard to public safety or the verdict of Europe at Vienna. The proposal of banishing him to St. Helena, suggested in the previous year, was finally adopted, and he sailed thither in the Northumberland on August 8, vehemently protesting against the bad faith of Great Britain. Louis XVIII. was restored, and the treaty of Vienna, signed on the eve of the Waterloo campaign, was but slightly modified.

The action of Murat had solved the difficulties which the congress had to face in Italy. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies reverted to the Bourbon, Ferdinand; and the Bourbons also acquired a right of reversion in Parma, where the protest of Spain against the rule of Maria Louisa could now be ignored. Genoa was annexed to the kingdom of Sardinia; the pope received back the states of the Church; the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena were restored; while Austria had to be content with Venetia and Lombardy as far as the Ticino. The organisation of Germany occupied the congress until June, and was the least durable part of its work. The basis of it was a confederation of thirty-eight states, represented and in theory controlled by a diet under the presidency of Austria. This diet naturally resolved itself into a mere permanent congress of diplomatists for the purpose of settling the mutual relations of the constituent states. Each state was ordered to adopt a constitutional form of government, but, as no provision was made for enforcing this clause, it remained a dead letter. Prussia regained her provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, with a population exceeding 1,000,000, and was allotted the northern part of Saxony, with a population of 800,000, besides retaining her original share of Poland, with the province of Posen, which had formed part of the duchy of Warsaw. Most of this duchy was annexed by Russia, but Cracow was left a republic. Prussia also gained Swedish Pomerania. Bavaria, Hanover, and Denmark profited more or less by the repartition of Germany. Denmark, however, finally lost Norway, and Sweden paid the price of this acquisition by resigning Finland to Russia. The neutrality of Switzerland was proclaimed and her constitution simplified. The Belgian Netherlands were united to Holland, the two forming together the kingdom of the Netherlands, to which Austria ceded all her claims in the Low Countries.

THE SECOND TREATY OF PARIS.

The treaty of Vienna left the boundaries of France itself as they had been defined by the first treaty of Paris in 1814. The second treaty of Paris, however, signed on November 20, 1815, was less favourable to France, which had already ceded Western Savoy to Sardinia, and was now required to abandon Landau and other outlying territories beyond the frontier of 1792. She was also compelled to restore all the works of art accumulated during the war.

Great Britain had failed to obtain from the congress any binding regulation on the subject of the slave trade. The most that she could obtain was a solemn denunciation of that trade issued on February 8, which declared it to be "repugnant to the principles of civilisation and of universal morality". The moderation of the British demands, as embodied in these treaties, excited not only the amazement but the contempt of Napoleon, who discussed the subject at St. Helena with great freedom. Well knowing that his paramount object throughout all his wars and negotiations had been to crush Great Britain, and that Great Britain had been the mainstay of all the combinations against him, he could find no explanation of our self-denial except our insular simplicity. Perhaps it might be attributed with greater reason to politic magnanimity; nor, indeed, could Great Britain, as a member of the European council, dictate such terms as Napoleon suggested. Still, the gains of Great Britain were substantial. She retained Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, the Isle of France (Mauritius), Trinidad, St. Lucia, Tobago, and, above all, Malta. She also obtained possession of Heligoland and the protectorate of the Ionian Islands, both of which she has since resigned of her own accord. If she afterwards lost the commanding position which she had attained among the allied powers, it was chiefly because the colossal empire which she had defied was effectually shattered, because neither her armies nor her subsidies were any longer needed on the continent of Europe, and perhaps because the energies of her statesmen were no longer braced up by the stress of a struggle for national life.

Even before the allied armies entered Paris Wellington considered it necessary to induce Louis XVIII. to make advances to certain politicians of the revolution so as to inspire national confidence in him, and to anticipate the risk of a "White Terror," or a continuance of the war. Fouché was accordingly summoned to power, and he had sufficient influence to prevent any national opposition to the Bourbon restoration. Napoleon remained at large for three weeks after his abdication, that is, for eight days after the allied troops had entered Paris, and the fear of a future Bonapartist revolution inclined the British government under Liverpool to entertain favourably the demand of Prussia for the cession of Alsace, Lorraine, and the northern fortresses. When, however, Napoleon had placed himself on board the Bellerophon, the situation changed. A contented France seemed preferable to an impotent France, and Wellington argued that the Bourbon restoration could not last, if French opinion connected it with the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. The tsar took this line from the first, and Wellington won for it the adhesion first of his own government and then of Austria. Prussia had finally to be contented with a provision for the cession of the outlying districts, which the treaty of Paris of 1814 had left to France. The second treaty of Paris, which embodied this stipulation, also provided for an indemnity of £40,000,000 to be paid by France to the allies, and for the temporary occupation of Northern France by the allied armies. On the same day Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia signed a treaty pledging themselves to act together in case fresh revolution and usurpation in France should endanger the repose of other states, and providing for frequent meetings of congresses to preserve the peace of Europe.

In addition to the formal treaties of alliance signed at Chaumont, Vienna, and Paris, an attempt was made by the Tsar Alexander to bind together the European sovereigns in an union based on the principles of Christian brotherhood. A form of treaty was accordingly drawn up which gave expression to these motives, dealt with all Christians as one nation, and committed their sovereigns to mutual affection and reciprocal service. This treaty of the holy alliance was signed on September 26, by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. All European princes except the sultan were invited to adhere to it, and all except the pope and the sultan ultimately either accepted it or expressed their sympathy with its principles. But in England there was hardly a statesman who regarded the treaty seriously, Wellington avowed his distrust of it, the prince regent declined to join it, and its effective value in promoting the subsequent concert of the powers was less than nothing. Still, however visionary and extravagantly worded, it remains as an unique record embodying the deliberate adoption of the principle of international brotherhood, and the sacrifice of separate national interests for the sake of European peace.

NAPOLEON AT ST. HELENA.

It is remarkable that so little public discussion took place on two questions which have since been so hotly debated – the legal status of Napoleon after he surrendered himself, and the moral right of Great Britain to banish him to St. Helena. One reason for this apparent indifference to the fate of one who had overawed all Europe may be found in the fact that parliament was not sitting when the decision of the government was taken, and that, when it met on February 1, 1816, that decision was virtually irrevocable. We know, however, that the first question was fully considered by the allied powers and the British ministry before his place of exile was fixed, and Great Britain undertook the custody of his person. The view which prevailed was that, after his escape from Elba, he could neither be treated as an independent sovereign nor as a subject of the French king, but must be regarded as a public enemy who had fallen into the hands of one among several allied powers. Accordingly, it was by their joint mandate that he remained the prisoner of Great Britain, and was to be under the joint inspection of commissioners appointed by the other powers. Still the minds of Liverpool, Ellenborough, and Sir William Scott, judge of the court of admiralty, were not altogether easy on the legal aspect of the case, which Eldon reviewed in an elaborate and exhaustive memorandum. His conclusion was that Napoleon's position was quite exceptional, that he could not rightly be made over to France as a French rebel, but was a prisoner of war at the disposal of the British government, both on the broad principles of international law, and under the express terms of his surrender, as reported officially by Captain Maitland of the Bellerophon.

It was thought expedient, however, to pass an act of parliament in the session of 1816 for the purpose of setting at rest any objections which might afterwards be raised. This measure was introduced on March 17 by Lord Castlereagh, who defended it on grounds of national justice and national policy. It met with no opposition in the house of commons, but Lords Holland and Lauderdale criticised it in the house of lords, not as sanctioning a wrong to Napoleon, but as implicitly admitting the right of other powers to join in arrangements for his custody. Little attention was then bestowed by parliament or the public on the moral aspect of his life-long detention at St. Helena, the restrictions to be there imposed upon his liberty, or the provision to be made for his comfort. Yet these subjects have ever since exercised the minds of myriads both in England and France, and have given birth to a copious literature for more than three generations.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE FIRST YEARS OF PEACE

When Parliament met on February 1, 1816, after a recess of unusual length, Castlereagh was received with loud acclamations from all parts of the house as the chief actor in the pacification of Europe. There was, of course, a full debate upon the treaties, but the opposition dwelt less upon the arbitrary partition of Europe than upon their alleged tendency to guarantee sovereigns against the assertion of popular rights and upon the manifest intention of the government to "raise the country into a military power". From this moment dates the whig and radical watchword of "Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform". The nation was, in fact, entering upon a period of unprecedented depression and discontent, which lasted through the last four years of George III.'s reign. At the close of 1815, however, the whole horizon was apparently bright. Great Britain had saved Europe by her example, and, however small her army in comparison with those of continental states, she stood foremost among the powers which had crushed the rule of Napoleon. Her national debt, it is true, had reached the prodigious total of £861,039,049, and the interest on it amounted £32,645,618, but the expansion of our national resources had kept pace with it. In spite of the continental system, the orders in council, and the American war, the imports and exports had enormously increased, chiefly by means of an organised contraband traffic; the carrying trade of the world had passed into the hands of British shipowners; British manufactures were largely fostered by warlike expenditure at home and the suspension of many industries abroad; while population, stimulated by a vicious poor law, was rapidly on the increase. In this last element, then considered as a sure sign of prosperity, really consisted one of the chief national dangers.

So long as the war lasted, low as the rate of wages might be, there was generally employment enough in the fields or in the factories for nearly all the hands willing to labour. When the inflated war prices came to an end, and wheat fell below 80s. or even 70s. a quarter, until it reached 52s. 6d. early in 1816, labourers were turned off and wages cut down still further; bread was not proportionately cheapened, and agrarian outrages sprang up. The continent, impoverished by the war, no longer required British goods for military purposes, and, as its own domestic industries revived, ceased to absorb British products, flung in profusion on its markets. Hence came a reduction of 16 per cent. in the export trade, and of nearly 20 per cent. in the import trade, which resulted in bankruptcies and the dismissal of workpeople. If we add to these causes of distress, the influence of over-speculation, the accession of disbanded soldiers to the ranks of the unemployed, and the substitution of the factory system with machinery for domestic manufactures with hand labour, we can partly understand why Great Britain, never harried by invading armies, should have suffered more than France itself from popular misery and disaffection for several years after the restoration of peace.
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