Secrets of the Late Rebellion

In pursuance of the commanding officer's orders, the six Union officers were next day forwarded, as prisoners of war, to Richmond; while Moseby himself soon after reported at the Adjutant General's office under arrest, to await such action as the authorities might think proper in his case. And thus, and thus, were the lives of six more men saved from the infernal clutch and ravenous maw of this hyena in human form.

Not many days after, the same officer who had released from Moseby's clutch the six Union officers above spoken of, chanced to be riding along a public highway when he observed, at considerable distance off, in a deep gully, a man entirely naked, dodging from place to place, as if in fear or distress. The sight was so strange that the officer turned his horse's head and quickly rode to the place where he had first seen the man. Here he found not the one only, but three, all entirely naked, and all huddled together, as if to protect themselves from each other's sight. The officer demanded what it all meant. It was some moments before the men could answer at all, but when they did, they told the Confederate officer that they were three Union officers who had been gobbled up the day before by Moseby's guerillas, stripped of everything they had on earth, even to their shirts, and then left in that woods or ravine to do as best they might, with the warning, however, that if they made the least alarm they would be again caught and either hung or shot; that they had feared to approach any house in their nude state, lest they might be shot at as ghosts or wild men; that they had not had a morsel of food for a long time, and that even death was preferable to longer enduring such suspense and torture. The officer had seen inhumanity in almost every possible shape, but this, he said, was a refinement of cruelty which shocked him more than anything he had ever seen before. He went to a house, not far off, and obtained shirts for two, and a woman's chemise for one, with such other clothing as they chanced to have. Thus, partially dressed, he then took them to the house, where they remained while the officer went to other houses of the neighborhood to get enough additional clothing to cover their nakedness. He then had them accompany him to the nearest military command, where he turned them over as regular prisoners of war. And thus were three more clutched from the grasp of these bloodthirsty hyenas. Clutched from death, too, for had they not been seen and rescued by this officer, they would, in all human probability, have been sought for by the guerillas next day, and either shot or hung.

There was no month, and probably but few weeks or days, during the entire war that Moseby's guerillas were not planning or executing some villanous enterprise against the Union army or Union men; but we have room only for a few more, and these we will select from his operations in the Shenandoah Valley and vicinity during the summer and fall of 1864.

In August, 1864, General Sheridan was assigned to the command of the Middle Military Division, comprising the Middle Department and the Departments of Washington, the Susquehanna, and West Virginia. Occupying the Shenandoah Valley, in front of Sheridan, General Early lay, with about eighteen thousand Confederate troops. To drive these troops out of, or at least further up, the Valley, and to keep them so employed that no part of them should be detached from Early to send to Hood in his defence of Atlanta against the attack of Sherman, was Sheridan's first concern during the summer and fall of '64. In pursuance of this plan, on the 10th of August, Sheridan began to move out his forces from Halltown for the possession of the Shenandoah Valley. When Early's positions were reached, he fell back, and continued to fall back, until he reached Fisher's Hill, beyond Strasburg. In pursuing Early, Sheridan had passed several gaps in the mountains which skirt the Valley, and left them unguarded. Moseby, learning of this, hastily got together as many of his guerillas as possible, dashed through Snicker's Gap on the 13th, struck Sheridan's supply-train, which was only guarded by Kenly's brigade of one hundred days' men, at Berryville, and, before the guard had fairly recovered from the panic, Moseby had captured the entire train, consisting of seventy-five wagons, from five to six hundred horses and mules, two hundred beef cattle, and a large quantity of stores. He also secured over two hundred prisoners. His own loss was only two killed and three wounded.

The attack and loss were so sudden, so unexpected, and so exaggerated in the telling from one soldier to another, that they seemed for the moment to paralyze Sheridan's entire army; so much so that he deemed it expedient to make a retrograde movement, which he continued until he reached, on the 21st of August, a position about two miles out from Charlestown. While Sheridan was thus falling back from day to day, Moseby's guerillas hung upon his rear and flanks, treacherously capturing and killing whenever opportunity offered. In one instance, it is alleged, after taking some Union cavalrymen prisoners; after, indeed, they had fully surrendered as prisoners of war and been disarmed, Moseby ordered every one of them brutally murdered on the spot, in pursuance of his maxim that "dead men never bite." In retaliation for this terrible outrage, Sheridan ordered that from thenceforth every house and barn of these half-guerillas, half-farmers in the Valley, that could possibly be# reached by his cavalrymen, should be destroyed.

Not only in retaliation for this one act, but for scores of other acts of a like or worse character, of which they were cognizant, and with a view to strike terror into the minds of such men as had been, and still were, harboring and encouraging these guerillas – men who were farmers by day and robbers by night – both General Grant and General Sheridan determined to inaugurate a wholesale system of devastation in the localities where these outrages had been mostly carried on – especially in the Virginia counties of Shenandoah, Rockingham, Loudon, and Fauquier. As a result of this policy – or, more properly speaking, as a result of the outrages which had been perpetrated by Moseby's guerillas (for the policy would never have been thought of but for these outrages) – the following destruction of property is reported to have occurred in the four counties named, between the 1st of October, when the policy was inaugurated, and the forepart of December (1864), when Merritt's cavalry division crossed the Blue Ridge, and made a grand raid through the upper part of Loudon and Fauquier counties:

In Shenandoah and Rockingham counties – according to the official report of a commissioner of the revenue to the Richmond authorities – "there were burned 18 dwelling-houses, 215 barns, 11 grist-mills, 9 water saw-mills, 2 steam saw-mills, 1 furnace, 2 forges, 1 fulling-mill, besides a number of smaller buildings, such as stables, etc. The quantity of grain destroyed is immense. I cannot give you any idea of the amount of grain, hay, fodder, etc., destroyed, but the quantity is very large."

In Loudon and Fauquier counties – according to the official report made by General Sheridan to General Grant at the time – the property burned and captured was as follows: Burned – barns, 1168; mills, 49; tanneries, 1; factories, 2; distilleries, 6; tons of hay, 27,620; bushels of wheat, 51,500; bushels of corn, 62,900; bushels of oats, 2000; haystacks, 1121; wheatstacks, 57; stacks of other grains, 104. Captured – horses, 388; mules, 8; cattle, 5520; sheep, 5837; swine, 1141. Total estimated value of property destroyed and captured in these two counties, $2,508,756.

It should be added, as a further reason for the destruction of wheat, corn, hay, etc., that General Lee had been drawing his supplies largely from these four counties, and it was therefore for the purpose of crippling Lee's army, as well as to punish these farmers for harboring and aiding Moseby's guerillas, that this wholesale destruction of property was planned and executed.

Those who have witnessed the distress following the burning of a single dwelling-house, or a single barn with contents, in a neighborhood of farmers, can form some faint idea of the distress which must have followed the burning of eighteen dwelling-houses, and 1383 barns, with all their contents, and with all the stacks of grain, hay, and fodder surrounding them! Even the thought is fearful, – how much more the reality! After what we have related of the operations of Moseby's guerillas – and what we have told is not a hundredth part of what might be told – none of our readers, we think, will question the propriety of the caption to this chapter, "Guerillas on the War-path – Cunning and Duplicity Prompting the Actors;" nor, after learning of the destruction of property which followed, will any one, we think, question the third line of the caption, "Destruction in the Background!"

CHAPTER IX. WHAT BECAME OF SLAVES DURING AND AFTER THE WAR. THE ALMIGHTY DOLLAR PROMPTING THE ACTORS. – "WE NEBER SEED'EM ANY MORE."

IT is a well-attested fact, that there were many less slaves, or those who had been slaves, in the United States on the 9th of April, 1865, when General Lee surrendered to General Grant, near the Appomattox Court House, than when the war commenced by the firing on Fort Sumter, on the 12th of April, 1861. Had there been no war, and had the ratio of increase been the same from 1861 to 1865 as it had been for the previous four years, there would have been several hundred thousand more in 1865 than there were in 1861.

It is also well known that from and after the 1st of January, 1863, when President Lincoln's proclamation of freedom to the slave – issued on the 22d of September, 1862 – went into effect, many hundreds, if not thousands, of those who had been slaves were taken into the military service of the United States; that, when captured by the Confederate forces, they were not recognized as prisoners of war, but in many cases, as at Fort Pillow, were massacred like so many dogs; that thousands were destroyed in this way, and that many other thousands died on fields of battle; that many during the war tried to escape, but, being overtaken, were killed on sight by their former masters or their agents; that the excessive amount of labor which they were compelled to perform for their masters on plantations, and for the Confederate government, in digging rifle-pits and throwing up fortifications, lessened their power of reproduction, and caused thousands of premature deaths; but, notwithstanding all these facts, there still remains a very large number to be accounted for; and to account for these in part, if not wholly, is the object of the present chapter.

The facts which we shall relate in this connection cannot fail to be as startling to our readers as they were to us. They have never before been related, either in book or newspaper form; nor would they now be, but that time has wiped out the passions of the war and the limits of personal responsibility, and made the facts legitimate for the purposes of history.

That our readers may understand that no animosity towards the South, or the Southern Confederacy, nor sympathy with the slave in any way, has led to the divulging of these facts, we may say that Colonel Abercrombie, to whom we are indebted for the facts, is a Southern man (a Baltimorian) by birth, and from his earliest recollection was taught to look upon the negro as a different race from our own – as a chattel, to be bought and sold, the same as a horse or cow; that he was a captain in the Thirteenth United States Infantry in the early stages of the war, but, being convinced that his duty lay with the South, resigned his commission in the United States army, went South, joined the Confederate service, and remained as an officer in that service until the close of the war; and that it was not until soon after the war, when he went from New York to Galveston by steamship, and from Galveston travelled nearly all over Texas on horseback, that he became fully aware of the facts which he detailed to us, and which we now purpose to communicate to our readers.

The Colonel, Captain Philip Lander, and three others, left Galveston for Brownsville about the middle of June, 1865. From Galveston to Houston they went by steamboat; at Houston they purchased mules, and from thenceforth pursued their journey on muleback. At Columbus they found a considerable number of Confederate soldiers, who had belonged to General Kirby Smith's command, and were then on their way to their homes. At Bastrop they found two companies of United States volunteers doing guard duty. At Austin, the capital of the State, they found General Sturges with four companies of the regiment which he commanded, the Seventh United States Cavalry. About the middle of July, they left Austin for San Antonio. On the road they saw two men in one place, and one in another, hanging by the neck to limbs of trees, who had been strung up there by roving banditti – probably on the suspicion that they were Union men – and left to hang there as a warning to others. At San Antonio they found General Magruder, who claimed that he had not yet surrendered, though "lying around loose," and, as they afterwards learned, was probably looking after the interests of slave exporters, rather than the interests of the Southern Confederacy. It was the latter part of August when they left San Antonio for Brownsville. After five days' travel from San Antonio, and just before reaching the branch road which leads to Brazos San Diego, from the main military road to Brownsville, they overtook a gang of from six to eight hundred negroes, in charge of, and driven along by, about forty white men, part Americans and part Mexicans. The negroes consisted of men, women, and children. There were no old men or old women among them. Some were handcuffed together; others were tied together with ropes; others not bound in any way. Some women were carrying children in their arms. All were on foot and seemed weary from long travel. Their drivers were all on horseback, some at the front, some at the sides, and some in the rear, all armed with pistols, all with whips in their hands, and all with curses in their mouths, which were hurled at the poor negroes on the slightest provocation. Like cattle drivers, or worse, those at the sides and rear were constantly hallooing, cursing, and saying to the negroes, "Git along! git along! Faster! faster!" with an oath between each command. Many of the women, especially such as were carrying children, seemed ready to faint from exhaustion, and often turned their faces beseechingly, and with tears in their eyes, towards their drivers, but their pleadings were only met by curses, still louder and still deeper, from their inhuman captors and drivers. Behind the gang were three two-wheeled carts and an old ambulance, in the first of which rations, etc., were carried; in the ambulance, besides old clothes, lay a woman whom the drivers said "was about to kid."

The Colonel and his party rode along with this negro-driving party some three or four hours, meanwhile gathering from their own lips all they could relative to the character and extent of the business; how, when, and where inaugurated; how and to whom they sold their human chattels; what the profits of the business, and with whom the profits were divided; what part, if any, the former owner got, etc., etc. The drivers were not at all disposed to be communicative, nevertheless a considerable amount of information was drawn from them, part of which led to other clues, which, being followed up, led to additional information, the whole resulting in a development of the facts embraced in this chapter.

When the branch road before spoken of was reached, the negro-drivers, with their drove of human chattels, turned off for Brazos San Diego, while the Colonel and his party pursued their way to Brownsville (opposite Matamoras), which they reached on the following day. Here, too, they saw a considerable number of negroes in confinement, awaiting boats to take them down the Rio Grande River and thence to a market. From Brownsville the Colonel and his party went into Mexico, where they remained about six months. In February, 1866, the Colonel returned to Texas, and while stopping some time with Mr. Higgins, a large landowner and extensive cattle raiser, near Bastrop, overheard a Mexican ask his son, William Higgins, to get up a fandango at his saw-mills and invite all the negroes of the neighborhood, in order that he (the Mexican) and his party might have opportunity to seize some of the negroes and run them off to a market. This, it will be borne in mind, was about ten months after the close of the war, about six months since the Colonel had seen the drove of negroes on the road to Brazos San Diego, and about three years after President Lincoln's proclamation went into effect, declaring freedom to every slave within the limits of the Southern Confederacy.

Of course, the Colonel was surprised at hearing such a proposition, and, though as much of a pro-slavery man as any one could be after all that had transpired, still felt curious to know all about this new business, or old business, as it might happen to be, of kidnapping, running off, and selling such as had been slaves. His inquiries resulted in developing the following facts:

For many years prior to the war the breeding and raising of negroes had become as much of a standard business in Virginia as the planting and raising of cotton had formerly been, or as the breeding and raising of cattle still is in Texas. As the lands became poorer in Virginia from long cultivation, the raising of crops became less and less profitable, until it was finally discovered that to raise about enough of crops to supply themselves and their negroes with bread and clothing, and to devote all else of their thoughts and energies to the raising of negroes for market and use in States where the climate and quality of soil made the raising of cotton and rice a remunerative business, would, in the long run, be much more profitable to them. This, therefore, became the general sense of the State, and from thenceforth was generally pursued throughout the State. This necessitated middlemen, or slave merchants – such as would purchase the slave of the Virginia farmer at such price as might be agreed upon, take him or her to his place of business, put them in the best possible trim for a market, and then take them off in droves to South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, or wherever else needed, and sell them at private or public sale for the best prices they could obtain. Whatever inhumanity there might be in such business, it certainly resulted in large profits, especially to the dealers, and hence it is not at all surprising that a great many should have been engaged in it.

When the war commenced there were hundreds, if not thousands, of these slave-dealers throughout the South. Some went into the army; some, who had well-filled purses, fled to Cuba, to 'Canada, to Nassau, to England; while others, too poor to get away, too cowardly to fight, too lazy to work, and too ignorant to do any business other than what they had been doing, remained in the country and continued to ply their vocation whenever and wherever opportunity offered. It was a fixed policy with the Confederate Government not to allow slaves to be taken or sold beyond their bounds, and that every possible precaution be taken to prevent the escape of slaves into the Union lines; but the Government had no objection to the sale and transfer of slaves from Virginia to Georgia, or to any other of the Confederate States, and as the Union army advanced into Virginia, rather encouraged such sales and transfers, to prevent the escape of slaves into the Union lines. The effect of this was to make an active and very profitable business for slave-dealers, and to largely increase the number of slaves in the more southern of the Confederate States.

When, besides going into Virginia, Union armies commenced forward movements into Kentucky and Tennessee, into Missouri and Arkansas, it was deemed expedient to run off a large number of the slaves of those States into Texas, the better to secure them from capture by the Union armies, and have them where they could be shipped to foreign ports, if not thereafter needed by the States of the Confederacy, or if, peradventure, the Confederacy itself might fail of success. When, on the 16th of November, 1864, Sherman commenced his march "from Atlanta to the sea," a like necessity of getting slaves beyond the reach of Union soldiers existed in all the Gulf States, and so far as it was possible to get them into Texas it was done. How many thousands, yea, how many hundreds of thousands were thus driven into Texas from other Confederate States, God only knows, or will ever know!

This particular route was made necessary because of the blockading of Southern ports; and because once in Texas, they could be held there until the result of the war was known. It was not, as before stated, the policy of the Confederate Government to have the slaves taken beyond their control, as the corner-stone of the Confederacy was to be slavery, and the more they could have of it the greater, they thought, would be their prosperity; nor was it the policy of the slave-dealer to take his chattel beyond the reach of the best market in the world, so long as there was a reasonable prospect of that market being kept open. In Texas the dealer had the double chance – either to return with his human chattels to the Confederate States, in case it became an established government, or, if that failed, then to ship them from Brazos San Diego, from Brownsville, from Corpus Christi, from Powder Horn, or from any other port that might not be blockaded, to Cuba, to Brazil, or wherever else slavery existed and a market could be found. These slave-dealers watched the result of the contest between the North and the South with the same interest that stock-jobbers and gold-gamblers watched the rise and fall of stocks, and the rise and fall of gold, when they had a large quantity of either on hand, and were waiting to turn their speculation to the best possible account. When news would reach them that the Union armies were carrying everything before them, off would go one or more cargoes of negroes to Cuba or Brazil. When, by the next mail probably, news would reach them that the Confederate armies were meeting with great successes, making it probable that a Southern Confederacy would be established, they would regret that they had sent any away, and hold the firmer to those they had left. The price at which slaves could be sold – especially at forced or hurried sales – in the Brazil and Cuban markets, was far less than what they could reasonably hope to obtain in the Southern Confederacy, provided it became an acknowledged government.

When shipments of negroes were commenced from the Texan ports heretofore named, and how often, or to what extent they were made, we are unable to say definitely; but the probabilities are that they commenced immediately after President Lincoln issued his proclamation of freedom to the slaves, September 22, 1862, and were made, to a greater or less extent, thereafter as news reached the dealers elevating or depressing their hopes of a permanent Southern Confederacy. After Sherman commenced his march from Chattanooga to Atlanta, in May, 1864, and especially after he resumed his march from Atlanta to Savannah, in November, 1864, and still more especially after he commenced his march from Savannah to Charleston, and thence to Richmond, in January, 1865, the slave-dealers in Texas thought they saw the handwriting on the wall, "Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin" – "Thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting," and from thenceforth every steamer, schooner, or water-craft of any kind, that could carry ten or more persons, and which they could possibly procure in any way, was secured to run the negroes from Texas to such markets as it were possible to reach. They could not be taken to the principal open ports of either Cuba or Brazil, lest, being seen by an anti-slavery man, the facts might be reported to United States consuls and thence to the United States government; but they were taken to out-of-the-way places along the coast of both countries, where copartners in the business were in waiting to receive and make further disposition of them. The money received from sales was sent back to the copartners in Texas by the partner or agent bringing out the last lot, and thus a flow of negroes in one direction, and a flow of money, with which to buy more, in another direction, was kept up constantly.

But it was not necessary in all cases to make purchases and payments. Indeed, towards the close of the war, actual purchases were seldom made, and after the close of the war, none at all, though the business still remained active. The plan pursued was this: a dealer would go to a planter, to a farmer, or to a man living in town or city, and ask him how many slaves he owned. The answer would be ten, twenty, fifty, one hundred, or more, as the case might be; but he would probably add, immediately after, that only one-half, or one-fourth, or less were then with him – the others were hired out, or with the army, helping to dig trenches, or running at large, he did not know where. The dealer, after explaining to the owner the nature of his business, would propose to take from him a written bill of sale of all the negroes he owned take his own chances of catching them when and where he could, send them to a market when and where he could, and divide with the owner whatever might be the net result of sales. The owner, reasoning from the standpoint that "a half loaf is better than no bread," and that if the Confederacy proved a failure he would get nothing at all for his slaves, would enter into such written agreement with the dealer. With this in his pocket, to assure him from interference from pro-slavery men, and to prove to all who might question him that his business was of a "mercantile," rather than of a kidnapping, character, the dealer and his agents would go forth to seize the negroes – men, women, and children – for whom he had bills of sale in his pocket. If resisted by a white man, out would come his bill of sale to prove title; if resisted by a black man, he was shot down or hung on the spot; if resisted by the alleged slave, he was at once handcuffed, gagged, and marched away; if identity was questioned by a white man, the questioner had to prove property, while the bill of sale held by the dealer was regarded as prima facie evidence of his right to the person claimed; if identity was questioned by the person seized, or by any other colored man, he was laughed at, gagged, or shot down. In this way thousands were seized, thousands driven from where seized into Texas, and tens of thousands run from Texas to Brazilian and Cuban ports.

After the close of the war, the fact that they had been made free by proclamation and by law spread rapidly among those who had been slaves, and from thenceforth the business of kidnapping and running them off became much more dangerous. While travelling through Texas, our informant met many negroes on the road with pistols at their sides, or guns upon their shoulders, and, when asked what it meant, they would reply, "Des am dangerous times, sa; we has to protect ourselves, you know."

He saw, too, as before stated, both black men and white men hanging to the limbs of trees by the roadside, some of whom, doubtless, had been hung there because of resistance to kidnappers. All manner of means were devised by these kidnappers to catch the negroes when and where they could make the least resistance and the least noise. Even ten months after the war; as before stated, one of these dealers – the partner, probably, of an extensive firm, made up of both Americans and Mexicans – proposed to William Higgins to get up a fandango, or dance, at his saw-mills, and invite thereto all the negroes in the neighborhood, for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of enabling these kidnappers to seize and run off as many as could be ensnared within the trap, or got hold of; and, as we have seen, it was four months after the war that the drove of from six to eight hundred negroes were seen on the road to Brazos San Diego.

It will be a wonder with some readers how it was possible to continue such a business after Union troops had been stationed at Austin, the capital of the State, under so able a commander as General Sturges; and after they had been stationed at Bastrop, and at other large towns throughout the State. The explanation is simply this: While the sentiment of the Union troops was entirely opposed to any such traffic, and while, in pursuance of law, their duty plainly was to hang any man whom they found engaged in such a business, yet the sentiment of the white people, among whom the troops were located, was largely, if not universally, in favor of the traffic, and hence they would not inform against those who were engaged in it; and had the troops learned of, and attempted to arrest, any of the parties, every white man of the town or neighborhood would have risen in arms and attempted the rescue of the parties. Law, without public sentiment to sustain it, is a dead letter, or nearly so, under all circumstances, and where public sentiment is decidedly opposed to a law, its execution is next to impossible.

Another wonder, scarcely less than the first, will be with some readers, how it could be possible that honorable men – men whose personal characters before the war were above reproach, either from Southern or Northern men; men who had led consistent Christian lives, and who had been regarded as bright and shining lights in their respective church organizations, could permit such things to be done before their very eyes, and look on indifferently, if not approvingly. The explanation is this: Most of this business of running off slaves was done without the knowledge of the Confederate authorities. Indeed, had it come to their ears during the earlier stages of the war they would have done what they could to prevent it, however indifferent they might have been to it during the last year or last few months of the war. But a far weightier reason is, that what seems so heinous, so diabolical, so criminal indeed, to a Northern anti-slavery man, was, in the eyes of a Southern pro-slavery man, only a fair business transaction, based on Bible authority, State law, and the law of self-preservation. They regarded these negroes as much the property of those who had owned them, as horses or cattle would have been. Nor did they regard the proclamation of President Lincoln and the acts of Congress, whereby slaves were declared free, with any more awe or respect than they would have regarded a like proclamation, or like acts of Congress, if issued or made with regard to horses or cattle. Hence, to their consciences it was no more of a sin to seize and run off to a market these negroes during the war, or even after the war, than it would have been to seize or run off from the grasp of an enemy a like number of horses or cattle. That conscience is largely dependent on surroundings, and on education, is no longer a disputable question among mental philosophers. That the cannibal, who kills and eats his fellow-man, is just as conscientious in what he does as the man who kills and eats a lamb, is now a generally admitted fact. With this philosophic truth as a stand-point from which to look at the subject, who can doubt that General Polk, who for so many years had been the universally respected and highly beloved Bishop of the diocese of Louisiana, was just as conscientious in his advocacy of slavery, and in his defence of the Southern Confederacy, as Bishop Simpson was in his opposition to slavery and his advocacy of the Union. Who can doubt that General Pendleton, who had been for so many years a reverend doctor in the Episcopal Church, and the head of a seminary near Alexandria, Va., and who never gave the order to fire without first raising his eyes heavenward and saying, "God have mercy on their souls," was just as conscientious in the belief that slavery was justified by the Bible, and approved of by God, as John Wesley was in the belief that "slavery was the sum of all villanies"? Who can doubt that General Jackson ("Stonewall"), with whom the Bible was a constant companion, who prayed while he marched, who prayed when he encamped, who prayed even while directing the movements of a battle, was just as conscientious in his belief that slavery was right, as Wendell Phillips was that slavery was wrong; just as conscientious in the belief that the Southern Confederacy should succeed, in order to make slavery perpetual in this country, as General Birney was that the Union cause should succeed, if for no other reason than to wipe out slavery once and forever from the United States. This, certainly, is the charitable view to take of the whole subject; nor, with our present knowledge of ethics and mental philosophy, is it any more charitable than true.

Reason about it as we may, however, the fact remains that tens of thousands, probably hundreds of thousands, were driven out and run out of the United States in the manner indicated, and are now, if still alive, toiling as slaves in other lands; and that many a father, many a mother, many a sister, and many a brother, after their loved ones had been thus kidnapped and taken away, without any knowledge upon the part of their friends, have had reason to cry out in the bitterness of their souls, "We neber seed 'em any more!"

CHAPTER X. THE CONFEDERACY AS SEEN FROM WITHIN. PRIDE, PASSION, AND WANT IN THE BACKGROUND

SINCE the war, we have seen, and had long conversations with, a reverend doctor, whom we had known for many years previous to the war, who resided in Virginia when the war commenced, was among the first to take part in it, and who continued in the service until the war closed. We have also met other Confederate officers since the war, some of whom had extraordinary facilities for obtaining information while the war continued. From all these we learned much beyond anything we had ever known before, or ever seen in newspapers or books. To put on record some of the things so learned is the object of the present chapter.

The South well knew, in the very beginning of the contest, that in point of numbers, in wealth, and in material resources, it was greatly inferior to the North. They had hope, however, of dividing the North, or, rather, of having the North divide against itself; and had the one-hundredth part of the promises made them by Northern men been kept, there would indeed have been a division of force, as well as a division of political sentiment, in the North; and the result of such division might have given the final victory to the Confederacy, instead of to the Union cause. But what the South relied upon still more, was assistance from England. They had been led to believe that King Cotton was almost, if not quite, as powerful in England as Queen Victoria, and they had laid the "flattering unction to their souls" that so soon as King Cotton saw those who had made him king in distress, he would rush, pell-mell, to their rescue; scatter the Yankee blockading squadrons to the winds; throw open all the Southern ports; bring men, ammunition, clothing, and provisions to exchange for their cotton, and thus, beyond any reasonable doubt, insure success to the Southern cause.

As well assured as they felt of all this, they still regarded it as important to keep all the while the "best foot foremost;" to keep up an appearance of strength, however weak they might be; to keep up a show of independence, however much they might be hoping and praying for help. Like as an expectant bride, though she has the plighted faith of her lover, will continue to smile, to dress, to allure in every way she can, up to the very hour of the marriage ceremony, so the South continued to smile, to dress, to allure, in every way she could, her Northern allies, who had solemnly plighted their faith to her, and her English sympathizers, whose pecuniary interests lay all in that direction, and these things she continued to do up to the very moment when the Confederacy collapsed, and when it was found that nothing was left of the egg but the shell. As our reverend friend said to us, over and over again, and as other Confederate officers have said to us, over and over again, "none but those within the lines, and behind the scenes, knew of the destitution, of the suffering, of the heart-aches, of the skeletons within closets while those who held the keys were smiling as if they were full of good things, of the turns and shifts which not only the army but which almost every family in the South had to make, in order to preserve life, and yet keep up a fair outside show, during those four terrible years of war." And now for the illustrations – little or none of which has ever before been published.

After the first year of the war, so much in want of food was the Confederate army at times, that, in one instance, an officer, with an escort, travelled sixty miles before he could purchase food enough to load one six-mule wagon which he had with him. Even then they had to go within the Union lines, and run very great risk of being captured.

The same officer from whom we learned the above incident, also told us that, on one occasion, he and the men with him were so ravenous from hunger that he shot an old sow that had had a large litter of pigs only the day before, and that while he and his fellow officers ate the meat (if meat it could be called) of the old sow, his men ate not only the one-day-old pigs, but even the very entrails of the mother.

On another occasion this same officer shot an opossum that had just been having its young, and while, under ordinary circumstances, he could no more have eaten its flesh than he could have eaten a viper, yet such was his hunger at the time that the dish seemed palatable. Often, he said, he had gone for a whole day, and occasionally two or three days at a time, without one "square meal;" and this he knew to be an ordinary experience among officers of the Confederate army, especially during the last year of the war, and largely so during the two or three last years of the war. Certainly, if there was an officer in that army who had opportunities to live on the "fat of the land," he was one of them, and if he suffered thus, God only knows what must have been the sufferings of others!

Early in the war, coffee became scarce, and, during the last year or two, hardly to be had at all within the lines of the Confederacy. To procure it, all manner of devices were resorted to. On one occasion, when two sentinels were within calling distance of each other – one on either side of an intervening deep ravine – a Confederate officer present told his sentinel to ask the Union sentinel whether his company had any coffee which they would exchange for tobacco. The Union sentinel inquired of his captain, and after a time hallooed back that they had of their company rations a bag of coffee left over, which they would exchange for tobacco, provided they could make a good trade. The Confederate officer instructed his sentinel to reply that they would give twenty-five boxes of plug tobacco for one bag of coffee. The offer was accepted, and as soon after as the coffee and the tobacco could be brought to the spot, the Union sentinel rolled down the bag of coffee, the Confederate sentinel rolled down the twenty-five boxes of tobacco, to the foot of the ravine, when, with assistants, each took away the article traded for – hostilities being suspended meanwhile. Each of the parties was highly pleased with the trade. Before the war one or two boxes of tobacco would have brought in the New York market as much, if not more, than one bag of coffee.

Pins and needles became so scarce in the Confederacy that at least one man – a Mr. Webster Sly, of Charles County, Md., brother to a celebrated doctor in that vicinity – made quite a fortune by smuggling trunks full of these articles across the Union lines and selling them within the Confederate lines.

As early as 1863, one of our informants saw dogs in the streets of Charleston so emaciated that they could scarcely walk, and at one time saw one of these animals leaning against a fence and chewing upon an old shoe. In that city and in Richmond he knew of families who had once been wealthy that were, during the war, compelled to sell not only their clothing, but even their beds, to procure food to live upon. Our reverend friend himself, though at one time the owner of a handsome house and of slaves, had, while at Petersburg, been compelled to live, with his wife and daughter, in a garret, and upon food that a dog would scarcely have eaten under ordinary circumstances.

Not only did such destitution prevail throughout the Confederate States during the war, but still worse evils prevailed, engendered by pride, jealousy, and passion. While this fact was carefully concealed from Northern eyes and ears, and from English eyes and ears, yet it prevailed to an alarming extent, and when occasionally it would burst forth in such violence as to cause death, no mention of the fact was made in the newspapers at Richmond lest it might reach Northern or English ears.

Almost at the beginning of the war two parties sprang up in the Confederacy, known as the "Davis party" and the "Stephens party." President Davis advocated one line of policy; Vice-President Stephens advocated another line of policy. Their respective friends took sides, each with his chief, and so bitter became the strife between the two, that when the Government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond Mr. Stephens would not come there to preside over the deliberations of the Senate. At one time, in 1863, the strife between their respective partisans in the Confederate Congress, then meeting in Richmond, became so great, that a Virginian (a Davis man) shot and killed a Georgian (a Stephens man) upon the floor of the House for some words uttered in debate. The excitement for the moment was intense. Pistols and bowie-knives were drawn by dozens of Congressmen, and it seemed that many additional lives would have to be sacrificed then and there before the affray could end, but erelong quiet was restored and the dead body of the slain member removed from the chamber. Our informant saw the dead body as it was carried along the street, inquired after and learned all the incidents of the bloody affair, but neither on that day nor on any day thereafter was a word said about it in the Richmond newspapers.

Another cause of much irritation, much jealousy, and much bad blood, arose in the appointing of general officers for the Confederate army. Mr. Davis, being himself a "West-Pointer," it was not unnatural that he should prefer, in all cases, graduates of West Point; but, as the people of the several States had to furnish not only the money, but the men for the army, it was not unnatural that they should desire to see some of their leading citizens in command of the men they furnished. The people believed that brains were quite as essential to success as technical military knowledge, and were not willing to trust all their interests, personal and pecuniary, to the direction of such as knew little or nothing beyond military tactics. The demand became so strong and so persistent that the administration yielded, so far as to appoint Bishop Polk, Rev. Dr. Pendleton, John C. Breckinridge, and Bradley Johnson, to generalships; but beyond this, few, if any, held high positions in the army, other than West-Point-ers. Towards the close of the war, General Lee said, at a dinner given to army officers, at Orange Court-House, near his headquarters, that from thenceforth the "policy of the government would be to give promotion to such, and such only, as fairly earned it on the field of battle, without regard to their previous military education." This speech was reported at once in every part of the Confederacy, and as he was presumed to speak by authority, it had the effect to quiet, in a great measure, the excitement which had so long existed relative to military appointments.

Another source of demoralization, and, consequently, of weakness in the Confederacy, was the disposition to gamble among so many of its officers and leading citizens. At Richmond, while so many, who had been affluent, were almost starving; while the gradual disappearance, and finally the entire absence, of cats and dogs in the city, proved that meat other than lamb was supplying the tables of many of its citizens; while even the highest officers of State were, at times, sorely perplexed about food for their families, the gambling houses of that city were doing a splendid business, and furnishing free lunches to their patrons far superior to what could be found upon the table of President Davis or any member of his cabinet. Indeed, it became well known among Confederate army officers, and among the leading gentlemen of the city as well, that the best eatables and the best drinkables to be had in the Confederacy were to be had at these gambling saloons, and many a one was induced to patronize them on this account more than on any other. It was said that the proprietors of these saloons could obtain, and did obtain, supplies from the North, when the highest officers and the wealthiest men of Richmond could not obtain them. How done, except through pals and noted gamblers, some of whom were well-known spies, and often in Washington, was never known. Notwithstanding the expensive free lunches given by these gambling houses every day, they made immense amounts of money. What they made in gold and greenbacks they carefully stored away, or made use of in the purchase of supplies. What they got in Confederate money they invested in real estate, so that, when the war ended, the gamblers of Richmond owned more real estate than any other class of persons, if not more than all other classes combined. What was true of Richmond, in all these particulars, was probably true of every other city in the Confederacy.

Still another source of weakness in the Confederacy was the lack of confidence; almost from the beginning, in the currency issued by the government, or by its authority. It was thought to be a terrible condition of things in the North when a gold dollar commanded $2.85 in greenbacks; when muslin, that had sold for ten cents per yard, sold for thirty; when coffee, sugar, meats, almost everything, commanded double, and, in some cases, treble the prices at which they had sold before the war; but these were as nothing when compared with the South. A single chicken leg, or a single chicken wing, with a small piece of corn-bread tied to it, sold at from one to two dollars at many of the railroad depots; a drink of brandy or whiskey, at the Ballard House, Richmond, cost five dollars; a single meal, at the same house, ten dollars; a gentleman's dressing-gown, smuggled through from the North by a land blockade-runner, sold, in Richmond, for eleven hundred dollars. Of course, all these prices mean Confederate currency. Such as were wise enough to invest their Confederate money in real estate had something of real value after the war. Such as failed to do this, had large amounts in what purported to be money, but not one penny in real value, after the war ended. Every dollar of gold or silver that came within the Confederate lines, after the second year of the war, was either hoarded or hid away, or expended for needed supplies, in which case it soon found its way back to the North or to England.

And thus we close this tenth scene of the drama, in which we have endeavored to give our readers a glimpse of the Southern Confederacy as seen from within; and to show, too, that pride, passion, and want formed a fearful picture in the background.

CHAPTER XI. HOW ORDER WAS MAINTAINED. KINDNESS AND POWER (HAND-IN-HAND) BEHIND THE SCENES

THE city of Alexandria is situated about seven miles below Washington, on the Potomac River. It was at one time a part of the District of Columbia, but, by a subsequent arrangement, was retroceded to Virginia. Prior to the war it was a place of considerable business; contained, probably, thirty thousand inhabitants; had some fine streets, and a few handsome buildings; and was a favorite place of resort, as well as of residence, for the more wealthy and influential citizens of that part of Virginia.

After the war commenced, by the firing on Fort Sumter, the first object of the United States Government was to save Washington from falling into the hands of the enemy. Between the 18th of May and the 23d of June, 1861, thirty-one fully organized regiments and three independent companies arrived in that city. Of these, four were from Pennsylvania, also the three independent companies, four from Massachusetts, eleven from New York State, four from New Jersey, two from Rhode Island, three from Connecticut, one from Michigan, and two from Ohio. These regiments numbered about 28,000 men. Besides these, there were about 4,000 District of Columbia militia, organized under Colonel Stone, and about 4,000 regular United States troops. All these were concentrated, thus early, for the defence of the capital, and to form a pivot for future movements.

Though these volunteer regiments had had but little opportunity for drill, the impatience of the North soon made it necessary for them to make a forward movement of some kind; and, as Alexandria was the most approximate point, and as a considerable force of the Confederates were known to be concentrated there, it was resolved to make an attack upon, and, if possible, capture that city. Accordingly, at midnight on the 23d of May, 1861, a small force was pushed across the Long Bridge to the Virginia side, to clear and hold the head of the bridge; and at two o'clock on the following morning a considerable force left Washington on foot, while a regiment of Zouaves, under command of Colonel Ellsworth, left on two steamers – all for Alexandria. The movement was so concerted that the force on foot reached the outskirts of the city at the same time that Ellsworth's force reached the wharves. The Confederate force at Alexandria was far too small to contend with the Union force sent against them, and as the one entered the other retired from the city. But for the unfortunate death of Colonel Ellsworth, who was shot by James Jackson, the proprietor of the Marshall House, while the former was removing a Confederate flag which had been flying from the flag-staff of that hotel, and the killing of Jackson, which followed immediately after, there would have been no blood shed in the capture of that city.