Two Wars: An Autobiography of General Samuel G. French

The two forts, "T" and "C," are interior isolated works for artillery, and the fire from each swept all the other works both inside and externally. Both were surrounded by ditches six feet deep, making their parapets about twelve feet high. Consequently they could not be taken by assault without scaling ladders, or otherwise, usual in sieges, unless by the sally port. In fact these two inside forts could be used as citadels, or a place of refuge when the long exterior lines of defense were captured. And this was the case with fort "C" in the battle of Allatoona. The whole formed a mountain fortress.

The Federals call the intrenchments at "R" "rifle pits," to which they bear about as much relation, in regard to strength, as a battleship does to a dispatch boat. Commencing about one hundred and twenty-five yards west of the fort "C," and on the south side of the Cartersville road, are two lines of intrenchments running nearly parallel with that road. These two, or double, lines of defense converge and meet below the crest of the ridge, then, turning north, cross the road (with angles for flanking fire) and continue north down the slope. From this north line an intrenchment runs due east toward the main fort. The parapet is revetted with timber, and the interior ditch is very wide. On the parapet are large chestnut head logs to protect the persons of the soldiers. In front were immense entanglements of abatis, stockades, stakes, etc., to check any assault on the works. So well was the work done that in 1890, when I was there, time had not defaced them, and the revetments and "head logs" are today as round as when placed there. I am the more particular about this redoubt because here happened, perhaps, the bloodiest tragedy in the history of the war.

3. The strength of the respective forces.

Col. Tourtellotte's command was composed of the Ninety-Third Illinois, officers and men, 294; the Eighteenth Wisconsin, guns, 150; Fourth Minnesota, guns, 450; the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, men, 16; giving an apparent total of 910. To this must yet be added the force for the six pieces of artillery, not less than 60. If we add the company officers not enumerated, it will be found that Tourtellotte had about 1,000 officers and men. The above numbers are official.

Corse's official statement is that he brought with him to Allatoona the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, 280 men; Seventh Illinois, 267 men; Fiftieth Illinois, 267 men; Fifty-Seventh Illinois, 61 men; Twelfth Illinois, 155 men; or 1,030 men. To this must be added (say) 107 regimental and company officers, making the force that he brought with him 1,137 officers and men. So with Tourtellotte's troops the aggregate is 2,137 instead of 1,944 as reported by him, which excluded himself and officers.

As regards the strength of my division at Allatoona, the War Records show that on September 20, at inspection, I had present for duty 331 officers and 2,945 men. Total, 3,276.

Cockrell's Brigade was composed of eight small regiments consolidated into four, Ector's Brigade of six regiments, and Sears's Brigade of six regiments, and two batteries, 8 guns.

To this force add one four-gun battery sent with me, and deduct one gun and one regiment left at Allatoona creek bridge, and my entire force present was 3,197.

And thus officially we have Federals, 2,132; Confederates, as above.

4. Equalization of forces.

The ratio of inequality between a force within ordinary intrenchments in line of battle and the attacking force without is well known.

Gen. Cox in his "Atlanta Campaign," page 129, says: "One man in the trench is equal to five in front." Gen. O. O. Howard, in reference to the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, says: "My experience is that a line of works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our own or that of the enemy, cannot be carried by direct assault." Gen. R. S. Granger informs Gen. G. H. Thomas that the fort at Athens, manned by 700 men, can hold out an enemy 10,000 strong. (War Records, V. 39, Part 3, page 519.) Vicksburg, Jackson, Cold Harbor, Kennesaw, Petersburg, Atlanta, Knoxville, and other lines repelled the assaults. Now Allatoona was, without doubt, thrice as strong as these, and the attacking force was only one and a half to one inside. Then, too, we should consider that the works on the hills were almost inaccessible.

Battery Wagner, a sand fort on a level plain on Morris Island, Charleston, S. C., was garrisoned by only 740 men, who successfully defended it fifty-eight days and nights against the assaults and continuous fire of 11,500 men, with forty-seven cannon, aided by ships – the Ironsides, eight monitors, and five gunboats. And Fort Sumter never was taken by assault. It was quietly abandoned February 18, 1865.

On Sunday, April 16, 1865, seven days after the surrender at Appomattox, a small redoubt or fort, of weak construction, garrisoned by an unorganized force hastily collected, at West Point, Ga., near Atlanta, consisting of 64 men under Gen. Tyler and Col. J. H. Fannan, held the fort all day against 3,750 men of Gen. J. M. Wilson's command, and surrendered only for want of ammunition and loss of men. Col. O. H. LaGrange, of Wisconsin, commanded the Federals. Ratio, 1 to 62.

5. The inspiring hopes given the garrison will be discovered in the following dispatches informing them aid was at hand, begging them to hold out until reënforcements arrived. In these dispatches bear in mind that Gen. Stanley was in temporary command of the Army of the Cumberland, and Gen. Elliott was the commander in chief of Sherman's cavalry. I give only a few of the many dispatches in the War Records.

No. 1. Volume 39, Part 3, Page 53

SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA

    October 3, 1864.

Hood might slip up to Acworth and Allatoona. I want the utmost vigilance there. If he goes to Allatoona, I want him only delayed long enough for me to reach his rear… If he moves up to Allatoona, I will surely come in force.

No. 2. Volume 39, Page 65

SHERMAN TO STANLEY

    In the Field, October 4, 1864.

I heard from Gen. Elliott to-night. He was on the Sandtown and Allatoona road… I will be up to-day and move to Kennesaw.

No. 3. Volume 39, Page 66

SHERMAN TO STANLEY

    October 4, 1864. Received 10 A.M.

Yes, move to Little Kennesaw and west of it. Tell Elliott in my name to interpose with his whole force between Dallas and Allatoona, and strike for any force in the direction of Acworth.

No. 4. Volume 39, Page 71

SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT

    October 4, 1864, 11 P.M.

Don't risk the safety of your cavalry until I get up with my whole force, but make bold reconnoissances in connection with Gen. Stanley. My chief object is to prevent the enemy from making an attack on Allatoona to-morrow.

No. 5. Volume 39, Page 71

SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICERS AT ALLATOONA, KINGSTON, AND ROME

    October 4, 1864.

The enemy is moving on Allatoona, thence to Rome.

No. 6. Volume 39, Page 52

SHERMAN TO GEN. VANDEVER

    October 3, 1864.

Sherman wants the force at Big Shanty cleaned out, and wants it done to-night if possible.

No. 7. Volume 39, Page 75

CORSE TO GEN. J. E. SMITH

    Rome, October 4, 1864.

I will move my entire command to Cartersville and unite with Gen. Raum in attacking the enemy from Allatoona direct.

No. 8. Volume 39, Page 75

CORSE TO RAUM

    Rome, October 4, 1864.

I am expecting a train every moment; as soon as I can get ready I will move 3,000 to 4,000 men.

No. 9. Volume 39, Page 77

VANDEVER TO SHERMAN

    Near Kennesaw, October 4, 1864.