Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

"If it is treated properly," says also the Epitome, the doctrine of predestination "is a consolatory article" (830, 1); that is to say, if predestination is viewed in the light of the Gospel, and particularly, if sola gratia as well as gratia universalis are kept inviolate. Outside of God's revelation in the Gospel there is no true and wholesome knowledge whatever concerning election, but mere noxious human dreams. And when the universality of grace is denied, it is impossible for any one to know whether he is elected, and whether the grace spoken of in the Gospel is intended for or belongs to him. "Therefore," says the Formula of Concord, "if we wish to consider our eternal election to salvation with profit, we must in every way hold sturdily and firmly to this, that, as the preaching of repentance, so also the promise of the Gospel is universalis (universal), that is, it pertains to all men, Luke 24, 47," etc. (1071, 28.) By denying that universal grace is meant seriously and discounting the universal promises of the Gospel, "the necessary consolatory foundation is rendered altogether uncertain and void, as we are daily reminded and admonished that only from God's Word, through which He treats with us and calls us, we are to learn and conclude what His will toward us is, and that we should believe and not doubt what it affirms to us and promises." (1075, 36.) If God cannot be trusted in His universal promises, absolutely nothing in the Bible can be relied upon. A doctrine of election from which universal grace is eliminated, necessarily leads to despair or to contumaciousness and carnal security. Calvin was right when he designated his predestination theory, which denies universal grace, a "horrible decree." It left him without any objective foundation whatever upon which to rest his faith and hope.

In like manner, when the doctrine of election and grace is modified synergistically, no one can know for certain whether he has really been pardoned and will be saved finally, because here salvation is not exclusively based on the sure and immovable grace and promises of God, but, at least in part, on man's own doubtful conduct – a rotten plank which can serve neither foot for safely crossing the great abyss of sin and death. Only when presented and taught in strict adherence to the Bible is the doctrine of election and grace fully qualified to engender divine certainty of our present adoption and final salvation as well, since it assures us that God sincerely desires to save all men (us included), that He alone does, and has promised to do, everything pertaining thereto, and that nothing is able to thwart His promises, since He who made them and confirmed them with an oath is none other than the majestic God Himself.

Accordingly, when Calvinists and Synergists criticize the Formula of Concord for not harmonizing (modifying in the interest of rational harmony) the clear doctrines of the Bible, which they brand as contradictions, they merely display their own conflicting, untenable position. For while professing to follow the Scriptures, they at the same time demand that its doctrines be corrected according to the dictate of reason, thus plainly revealing that their theology is not founded on the Bible, but orientated in rationalism, the true ultimate principle of Calvinism as well as synergism.

In the last analysis, therefore, the charge of inconsistency against the Formula of Concord is tantamount to an indirect admission that the Lutheran Church is both a consistently Scriptural and a truly evangelical Church. Consistently Scriptural, because it receives in simple faith and with implicit obedience every clear Word of God, all counter-arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. Truly evangelical, because in adhering with unswerving loyalty to the seemingly contradictory, but truly Scriptural doctrine of grace, it serves the purpose of the Scriptures, which – praise the Lord – is none other than to save, edify, and comfort poor disconsolate sinners.

233. Statements of Article XI on Consolation Offered by Predestination

The purpose of the entire Scripture, says the Formula of Concord, is to comfort penitent sinners. If we therefore abide by, and cleave to, predestination as it is revealed to us in God's Word, "it is a very useful, salutary, consolatory doctrine." Every presentation of eternal election, however which produces carnal security or despair, is false. We read: "If any one presents the doctrine concerning the gracious election of God in such a manner that troubled Christians cannot derive comfort from it, but are thereby incited to despair, or that the impenitent are confirmed in their wantonness, it is undoubtedly sure and true that such a doctrine is taught, not according to the Word and will of God, but according to [the blind judgment of human] reason and the instigation of the devil. For, as the apostle testifies, Rom. 15, 4: 'Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope.' But when this consolation and hope are weakened or entirely removed by Scripture, it is certain that it is understood and explained contrary to the will and meaning of the Holy Ghost." (1093, 91f., 837, 16; 1077, 43.)

Predestination is comforting when Christians are taught to seek their election in Christ. We read: "Moreover, this doctrine gives no one a cause either for despondency or for a shameless, dissolute life, namely, when men are taught that they must seek eternal election in Christ and His holy Gospel, as in the Book of Life, which excludes no penitent sinner, but beckons and calls all the poor, heavy-laden, and troubled sinners who are disturbed by the sense of God's wrath, to repentance and the knowledge of their sins and to faith in Christ, and promises the Holy Ghost for purification and renewal, and thus gives the most enduring consolation to all troubled, afflicted men, that they know that their salvation is not placed in their own hands (for otherwise they would lose it much more easily than was the case with Adam and Eve in Paradise, yea, every hour and moment), but in the gracious election of God which He has revealed to us in Christ, out of whose hand no man shall pluck us, John 10, 28; 2 Tim. 2, 19." (1093, 89.)

In order to manifest its consolatory power predestination must be presented in proper relation to the revealed order of salvation. We read: "With this revealed will of God [His universal, gracious promises in the Gospel] we should concern ourselves, follow and be diligently engaged upon it, because through the Word, whereby He calls us, the Holy Ghost bestows grace, power, and ability to this end [to begin and complete our salvation], and should not [attempt to] sound the abyss of God's hidden predestination, as it is written in Luke 13, 24, where one asks: 'Lord, are there few that be saved?' and Christ answers: 'Strive to enter in at the strait gate.' Accordingly, Luther says [in his Preface to the Epistle to the Romans]: 'Follow the Epistle to the Romans in its order, concern yourself first with Christ and His Gospel, that you may recognize your sins and His grace; next that you contend with sin, as Paul teaches from the first to the eighth chapter; then, when in the eighth chapter you will come into [will have been exercised by] temptation under the cross and afflictions, – this will teach you in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh chapters how consolatory predestination is,' etc." (1073, 33.)

Predestination, properly taught, affords the glorious comfort that no one shall pluck us out of the almighty hands of Christ. The Formula says: "Thus this doctrine affords also the excellent glorious consolation that God was so greatly concerned about the conversion, righteousness, and salvation of every Christian, and so faithfully purposed it [provided therefor] that before the foundation of the world was laid, He deliberated concerning it, and in His [secret] purpose ordained how He would bring me thereto [call and lead me to salvation], and preserve me therein. Also, that He wished to secure my salvation so well and certainly that, since through the weakness and wickedness of our flesh it could easily be lost from our hands, or through craft and might of the devil and the world be snatched and taken from us, He ordained it in His eternal purpose, which cannot fail or be overthrown, and placed it for preservation in the almighty hand of our Savior Jesus Christ, from which no one can pluck us, John 10, 28. Hence Paul also says, Rom. 8, 28. 39: 'Because we have been called according to the purpose of God, who will separate us from the love of God in Christ?' [Paul builds the certainty of our blessedness upon the foundation of the divine purpose, when, from our being called according to the purpose of God, he infers that no one can separate us, etc.]" (1079, 45.) "This article also affords a glorious testimony that the Church of God will exist and abide in opposition to all the gates of hell, and likewise teaches which is the true Church of God, lest we be offended by the great authority [and majestic appearance] of the false Church, Rom. 9, 24. 25." (1079, 50.)

Especially in temptations and tribulations the doctrine of eternal election reveals its comforting power. We read: "Moreover, this doctrine affords glorious consolation under the cross and amid temptations, namely, that God in His counsel, before the time of the world determined and decreed that He would assist us in all distresses [anxieties and perplexities], grant patience, give consolation, excite [nourish and encourage] hope, and produce such an outcome as would contribute to our salvation. Also, as Paul in a very consolatory way treats this, Rom. 8, 28. 29. 35. 38. 39, that God in His purpose has ordained before the time of the world by what crosses and sufferings He would conform every one of His elect to the image of His Son, and that to every one his cross shall and must work together for good, because they are called according to the purpose, whence Paul has concluded that it is certain and indubitable that neither tribulation nor distress, nor death, nor life, etc., shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus, our Lord." (1079, 48.)

XXI. Luther and Article XI of the Formula of Concord

234. Luther Falsely Charged with Calvinism

Calvinists and Synergists have always contended that Luther's original doctrine of predestination was essentially identical with that of John Calvin. Melanchthon was among the first who raised a charge to this effect. In his Opinion to Elector August, dated March 9, 1559, we read: "During Luther's life and afterwards I rejected these Stoic and Manichean deliria, when Luther and others wrote: All works, good and bad, in all men, good and bad, must occur as they do. Now it is apparent that such speech contradicts the Word of God, is detrimental to all discipline and blasphemes God. Therefore I have sedulously made a distinction, showing to what extent man has a free will to observe outward discipline, also before regeneration," etc. (C. R. 9, 766.) Instead of referring to his own early statements, which were liable to misinterpretation more than anything that Luther had written, Melanchthon disingenuously mentions Luther, whose real meaning he misrepresents and probably had never fully grasped. The true reason why Melanchthon charged Luther and his loyal adherents with Stoicism was his own synergistic departure from the Lutheran doctrine of original sin and of salvation by grace alone. Following Melanchthon, rationalizing Synergists everywhere have always held that without abandoning Luther's doctrine of original sin and of the gratia sola there is no escape from Calvinism.

In this point Reformed theologians agree with the Synergists, and have therefore always claimed Luther as their ally. I. Mueller declared in Lutheri de Praedestionatione et Libero Arbitrio Doctrina of 1832: "As to the chief point (quod ad caput rei attinet), Zwingli's view of predestination is in harmony with Luther's De Servo Arbitrio." In his Zentraldogmen of 1854 Alexander Schweizer endeavored to prove that the identical doctrine of predestination was originally the central dogma of the Lutheran as well as of the Zwinglian reformation. "It is not so much the dogma [of predestination] itself," said he (1, 445), "as its position which is in dispute" among Lutherans and Calvinists. Schweizer (1, 483) based his assertion on the false assumption "that the doctrines of the captive will and of absolute predestination [denial of universal grace] are two halves of the same ring." (Frank 1, 12. 118. 128; 4, 262.) Similar contentions were made in America by Schaff, Hodge, Shedd, and other Reformed theologians.

As a matter of fact, however, also in the doctrine of predestination Zwingli and Calvin were just as far and as fundamentally apart from Luther as their entire rationalistic theology differed from the simple and implicit Scripturalism of Luther. Frank truly says that the agreement between Luther's doctrine and that of Zwingli and Calvin is "only specious, nur scheinbar." (1, 118.) Tschackert remarks: "Whoever [among the theologians before the Formula of Concord] was acquainted with the facts could not but see that in this doctrine [of predestination] there was a far-reaching difference between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic theology." (559.) F. Pieper declares that Luther and Calvin agree only in certain expressions, but differ entirely as to substance. (Dogm. 3, 554.)

The Visitation Articles, adopted 1592 as a norm of doctrine for Electoral Saxony, enumerate the following propositions on "Predestination and the Eternal Providence of God" which must be upheld over against the Calvinists as "the pure and true doctrine of our [Lutheran] churches": "1. That Christ has died for all men, and as the Lamb of God has borne the sins of the whole world. 2. That God created no one for condemnation, but will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. He commands all to hear His Son Christ in the Gospel, and promises by it the power and working of the Holy Ghost for conversion and salvation. 3. That many men are condemned by their own guilt who are either unwilling to hear the Gospel of Christ, or again fall from grace, by error against the foundation or by sins against conscience. 4. That all sinners who repent are received into grace and no one is excluded, even though his sins were as scarlet, since God's mercy is much greater than the sins of all the world, and God has compassion on all His works." (CONC. TRIGL. 1153.) Not one of these propositions, which have always been regarded as a summary of the Lutheran teaching in contradistinction from Calvinism, was ever denied by Luther.

235. Summary of Luther's Views

Luther distinguished between the hidden and the revealed or "proclaimed" God, the secret and revealed will of God; the majestic God in whom we live and move and have our being, and God manifest in Christ; God's unsearchable judgments and ways past finding out, and His merciful promises in the Gospel. Being truly God and not an idol, God, according to Luther, is both actually omnipotent and omniscient. Nothing can exist or occur without His power, and everything surely will occur as He has foreseen it. This is true of the thoughts, volitions, and acts of all His creatures. He would not be God if there were any power not derived from, or supplied by Him, or if the actual course of events could annul His decrees and stultify His knowledge. Also the devils and the wicked are not beyond His control.

As for evil, though God does not will or cause it, – for, on the contrary, He prohibits sin and truly deplores the death of a sinner – yet sin and death could never have entered the world without His permission. Also the will of fallen man receives its power to will from God, and its every resolve and consequent act proceeds just as God has foreseen, ordained, or permitted it. The evil quality of all such acts, however, does not emanate from God, but from the corrupt will of man. Hence free will, when defined as the power of man to nullify and subvert what God's majesty has foreseen and decreed, is a nonent, a mere empty title. This, however, does not involve that the human will is coerced or compelled to do evil, nor does it exclude in fallen man the ability to choose in matters temporal and subject to reason.

But while holding that we must not deny the majesty and the mysteries of God, Luther did not regard these, but Christ crucified and justification by faith in the promises of the Gospel, as the true objects of our concern. Nor does he, as did Calvin, employ predestination as a corrective and regulative norm for interpreting, limiting, invalidating, annulling, or casting doubt upon, any of the blessed truths of the Gospel. Luther does not modify the revealed will of God in order to harmonize it with God's sovereignty. He does not place the hidden God in opposition to the revealed God, nor does he reject the one in order to maintain the other. He denies neither the revealed universality of God's grace, of Christ's redemption, and of the efficaciousness of the Holy Spirit in the means of grace, nor the unsearchable judgments and ways of God's majesty. Even the Reformed theologian A. Schweizer admits as much when he says in his Zentraldogmen (1, 445): "In the Zwinglio-Calvinian type of doctrine, predestination is a dogma important as such and regulating the other doctrines, yea, as Martyr, Beza, and others say, the chief part of Christian doctrine; while in the Lutheran type of doctrine it is merely a dogma supporting other, more important central doctrines." (Frank 4, 264.)

Moreover, Luther most earnestly warns against all speculations concerning the hidden God as futile, foolish, presumptuous, and wicked. The secret counsels, judgments, and ways of God cannot and must not be investigated. God's majesty is unfathomable, His judgments are unsearchable, His ways past finding out. Hence, there is not, and there cannot be, any human knowledge, understanding, or faith whatever concerning God in so far as He has not revealed Himself. For while the fact that there are indeed such things as mysteries, unsearchable judgments, and incomprehensible ways in God is plainly taught in the Bible, their nature, their how, why, and wherefore, has not been revealed to us and no amount of human ingenuity is able to supply the deficiency. Hence, in as far as God is still hidden and veiled, He cannot serve as a norm by which we are able to regulate our faith and life. Particularly when considering the question how God is disposed toward us individually, we must not take refuge in the secret counsels of God, which reason cannot spy and pry into. According to Luther, all human speculations concerning the hidden God are mere diabolical inspirations, bound to lead away from the saving truth of the Gospel into despair and destruction.

What God, therefore, would have men believe about His attitude toward them, must according to Luther, be learned from the Gospel alone. The Bible tells us how God is disposed toward poor sinners, and how He wants to deal with them. Not His hidden majesty, but His only-begotten Son, born in Bethlehem, is the divinely appointed object of human investigation. Christ crucified is God manifest and visible to men. Whoever has seen Christ has seen God. The Gospel is God's only revelation to sinful human beings. The Bible, the ministry of the Word, Baptism, the Lord's Supper, and absolution are the only means of knowing how God is disposed toward us. To these alone God has directed us. With these alone men should occupy and concern themselves.

And the Gospel being the Word of God, the knowledge furnished therein is most reliable. Alarmed sinners may trust in its comforting promises with firm assurance and unwavering confidence. In De Servo Arbitrio Luther earnestly warns men not to investigate the hidden God, but to look to revelation for an answer to the question how God is minded toward them, and how He intends to deal with them. In his Commentary on Genesis he refers to this admonition and repeats it, protesting that he is innocent if any one is misled to take a different course. "I have added" [to the statements in De Servo Arbitrio concerning necessity and the hidden God] Luther here declares, "that we must look upon the revealed God. Addidi, quod aspiciendus sit Deus revelatus." (CONC. TRIGL. 898.)

This Bible-revelation, however, by which alone Luther would have men guided in judging God, plainly teaches both, that grace is universal, and that salvation is by grace alone. Luther always taught the universality of God's love and mercy, as well as of Christ's redemption, and the operation of the Holy Spirit in the means of grace. Also according to De Servo Arbitrio, God wants all men to be saved, and does not wish the death of sinners, but deplores and endeavors to remove it. Luther fairly revels in such texts as Ezek. 18, 23 and 31, 11: "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live. Turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" He calls the above a "glorious passage" and "that sweetest Gospel voice —illam vocem dulcissimi Evangelii." (E. v. a. 7, 218.)

Thus Luther rejoiced in universal grace, because it alone was able to convince him that the Gospel promises embraced and included also him. In like manner he considered the doctrine that salvation is by grace alone to be most necessary and most comforting. Without this truth divine assurance of salvation is impossible, with it, all doubts about the final victory of faith are removed. Luther was convinced that, if he were required to contribute anything to his own conversion, preservation, and salvation, he could never attain these blessings. Nothing can save but the grace which is grace alone. In De Servo Arbitrio everything is pressed into service to disprove and explode the assertion of Erasmus that the human will is able to and does "work something in matters pertaining to salvation," and to establish the monergism or sole activity of grace in man's conversion. (St. L. 18, 1686, 1688.)

At the same time Luther maintained that man alone is at fault when he is lost. In De Servo Arbitrio he argues: Since it is God's will that all men should be saved, it must be attributed to man's will if any one perishes. The cause of damnation is unbelief, which thwarts the gracious will of God so clearly revealed in the Gospel. The question, however, why some are lost while others are saved, though their guilt is equal, or why God does not save all men, since it is grace alone that saves, and since grace is universal, Luther declines to answer. Moreover, he demands that we both acknowledge and adore the unsearchable judgments of God, and at the same time firmly adhere to the Gospel as revealed in the Bible. All efforts to solve this mystery or to harmonize the hidden and the revealed God, Luther denounces as folly and presumption.

Yet Luther maintains that the conflict is seeming rather than real. Whatever may be true of the majestic God, it certainly cannot annul or invalidate what He has made known of Himself in the Gospel. There are and can be no contradictory wills in God. Despite appearances to the contrary, therefore, Christians are firmly to believe that, in His dealings with men, God, who saves so few and damns so many, is nevertheless both truly merciful and just. And what we now believe we shall see hereafter. When the veil will have been lifted and we shall know God even as we are known by Him, then we shall see with our eyes no other face of God than the most lovable one which our faith beheld in Jesus. The light of glory will not correct but confirm, the truths of the Bible, and reveal the fact that in all His ways God was always in perfect harmony with Himself.

Indeed, according to Luther, the truth concerning the majestic God, in whom we live and move and have our being, and without whom nothing can be or occur, in a way serves both repentance and faith. It serves repentance and the Law inasmuch as it humbles man, causing him to despair of himself and of the powers of his own unregenerate will. It serves faith inasmuch as it guarantees God's merciful promises in the Gospel. For if God is supreme, as He truly is, then there can be nothing more reliable than the covenant of grace to which He has pledged Himself by an oath. And if God, as He truly does, controls all contingencies, then there remains no room for any fear whether He will be able to fulfil His glorious promises, also the promise that nothing shall pluck us out of the hands of Christ. – Such, essentially was the teaching set forth by Luther in De Servo Arbitrio and in his other publications.

236. Object of Luther's "De Servo Arbitrio."

The true scope of De Servo Arbitrio is to prove that man is saved, not by any ability or efforts of his own, but solely by grace. Luther says: "We are not arguing the question what we can do when God works [moves us], but what we can do ourselves, viz., whether, after being created out of nothing, we can do or endeavor [to do] anything through that general movement of omnipotence toward preparing ourselves for being a new creation of His Spirit. This question should have been answered, instead of turning aside to another." Luther continues: "We go on to say: Man, before he is renewed to become a new creature of the kingdom of the Spirit, does nothing, endeavors nothing, toward preparing himself for renewal and the kingdom; and afterwards, when he has been created anew, he does nothing, endeavors nothing, toward preserving himself in that kingdom; but the Spirit alone does each of these things in us, both creating us anew without our cooperation and preserving us when recreated, – even as Jas. 1, 18 says: 'Of His own will begat He us by the Word of Truth that we should be a kind of firstfruits of His creatures,' He is speaking here of the renewed creature." (E. v. a. 7, 317; St. L. 18, 1909; compare here and in the following quotations Vaughan's Martin Luther on the Bondage of the Will, London, 1823.)

Man lacks also the ability to do what is good before God. Luther: "I reply: The words of the Prophet [Ps. 14, 2: "The Lord looketh down from heaven upon the children of men to see if there were any that did understand and seek God. They are all gone aside," etc.] include both act and power; and it is the same thing to say, 'Man does not seek after God,' as it would be to say, 'Man cannot seek after God.'" (E. 330; St. L. 1923.) Again: "Since, therefore, men are flesh, as God Himself testifies, they cannot but be carnally minded (nihil sapere possunt nisi carnem); hence free will has power only to sin. And since they grow worse even when the Spirit of God calls and teaches them, what would they do if left to themselves, without the Spirit of God?" (E. 290; St. L. 1876.) "In brief, you will observe in Scripture that wherever flesh is treated in opposition to the Spirit, you may understand by flesh about everything that is contrary to the Spirit, as in the passage [John 6, 63]: 'The flesh profiteth nothing.'" (E. 291; St. L. 1877.) "Thus also Holy Scripture, by way of emphasis (per epitasin), calls man 'flesh,' as though he were carnality itself, because his mind is occupied with nothing but carnal things. Quod nimio ac nihil aliud sapit quam ea, quae carnis sunt." (E. 302; St. L. 1890.)

According to Luther there is no such thing as a neutral willing in man. He says: "It is a mere logical fiction to say that there is in man a neutral and pure volition (medium et purum velle); nor can those prove it who assert it. It was born of ignorance of things and servile regard to words, as if something must straightway be such in substance as we state it to be in words, which sort of figments are numberless among the Sophists [Scholastic theologians]. The truth of the matter is stated by Christ when He says [Luke 11, 23]: 'He that is not with Me is against Me,' He does not say, 'He that is neither with Me nor against Me, but in the middle,' For if God be in us, Satan is absent, and only the will for good is present with us. If God be absent, Satan is present, and there is no will in us but towards evil. Neither God nor Satan allows a mere and pure volition in us; but, as you have rightly said, having lost our liberty, we are compelled to serve sin; that is sin and wickedness we will, sin and wickedness we speak, sin and wickedness we act." (E. 199; St. L. 1768.)

In support of his denial of man's ability in spiritual matters Luther quotes numerous Bible-passages, and thoroughly refutes as fallacies a debito ad posse, etc., the arguments drawn by Erasmus from mandatory and conditional passages of Scripture. His own arguments he summarizes as follows: "For if we believe it to be true that God foreknows and preordains everything, also, that He can neither be deceived nor hindered in His foreknowledge and predestination furthermore that nothing occurs without His will (a truth which reason itself is compelled to concede), then, according to the testimony of the selfsame reason, there can be no free will in man or angel or any creature. Likewise, if we believe Satan to be the prince of the world, who is perpetually plotting and fighting against the kingdom of Christ with all his might, so that he does not release captive men unless he be driven out by the divine power of the Spirit, it is again manifest that there can be no such thing as free will. Again, if we believe original sin to have so ruined us that, by striving against what is good, it makes most troublesome work even for those who are led by the Spirit, then it is clear that in man devoid of the Spirit nothing is left which can turn itself to good, but only [what turns itself] to evil. Again, if the Jews, following after righteousness with all their might rushed forth into unrighteousness, and the Gentiles, who were following after unrighteousness, have freely and unexpectingly attained to righteousness, it is likewise manifest, even by very deed and experience, that man without grace can will nothing but evil. In brief, if we believe Christ to have redeemed man by His blood, then we are compelled to confess that the whole man was lost; else we shall make Christ either superfluous, or the Redeemer only of the vilest part [of man] which is blasphemous and sacrilegious." (E. 366; St. L. 1969.)

237. Relation of Man's Will toward God's Majesty

According to Luther man has power over things beneath himself, but not over God in His majesty. We read: "We know that man is constituted lord of the things beneath him, over which he has power and free will, that they may obey him and do what he wills and thinks. But the point of our inquiry is whether he has a free will toward God, so that God obeys and does what man wills; or, whether it is not rather God who has a free will over man, so that the latter wills and does what God wills, and can do nothing but what God has willed and does. Here the Baptist says that man can receive nothing except it be given him from heaven: wherefore free will is nothing." (E. 359, St. L. 1957.)

God as revealed in the Word may, according to Luther, be opposed and resisted by man, but not God in His majesty. We read: "Lest any one should suppose this to be my own distinction, [let him know that] I follow Paul, who writes to the Thessalonians concerning Antichrist (2 Thess. 2, 4) that he will exalt himself above every God that is proclaimed and worshiped, plainly indicating that one may be exalted above God, so far as He is proclaimed and worshiped, that is, above the Word and worship by which God is known to us, and maintains intercourse with us. Nothing, however, can be exalted above God as He is in His nature and majesty (as not worshiped and proclaimed); rather, everything is under His powerful hand." (E. 221; St. L. 1794.)

God in His majesty is supreme and man cannot resist His omnipotence, nor thwart His decrees, nor foil His plans, nor render His omniscience fallible. Luther: "For all men find this opinion written in their hearts, and, when hearing this matter discussed, they, though against their will, acknowledge and assent to it, first, that God is omnipotent, not only as regards His power, but also, as stated His action; else He would be a ridiculous God; secondly, that He knows and foreknows all things, and can neither err nor be deceived. These two things, however, being conceded by the hearts and senses of all men they are presently, by an inevitable consequence, compelled to admit that, even as we are not made by our own will, but by necessity, so likewise we do nothing according to the right of free will, but just as God has foreknown and acts by a counsel and an energy which is infallible and immutable. So, then, we find it written in all hearts alike that free will [defined as a power independent of God's power] is nothing, although this writing [in the hearts of men] be obscured through so many contrary disputations and the great authority of so many persons who during so many ages have been teaching differently." (E. 268; St. L. 1851.)

The very idea of God and omnipotence involves that free will is not, and cannot be, a power independent of God. Luther: "However, even natural reason is obliged to confess that the living and true God must be such a one who by His freedom imposes necessity upon us, for, evidently, He would be a ridiculous God or, more properly, an idol, who would either foresee future events in an uncertain way, or be deceived by the events, as the Gentiles have asserted an inescapable fate also for their gods. God would be equally ridiculous if He could not do or did not do all things, or if anything occurred without Him. Now, if foreknowledge and omnipotence are conceded, it naturally follows as an irrefutable consequence that we have not been made by ourselves, nor that we live or do anything by ourselves, but through His omnipotence. Since, therefore, He foreknew that we should be such [as we actually are], and even now makes, moves, and governs us as such, pray, what can be imagined that is free in us so as to occur differently than He has foreknown or now works? God's foreknowledge and omnipotence, therefore, conflict directly with our free will [when defined as a power independent of God]. For either God will be mistaken in foreknowing, err also in acting (which is impossible), or we shall act, and be acted upon, according to His foreknowledge and action. By the omnipotence of God, however, I do not mean that power by which He can do many things which He does not do but that active omnipotence by means of which He powerfully works all things in all, in which manner Scripture calls Him omnipotent. This omnipotence and prescience of God, I say, entirely abolish the dogma of free will. Nor can the obscurity of Scripture or the difficulty of the matter be made a pretext here. The words are most clear, known even to children; the subject-matter is plain and easy, judged to be so even by the natural reason common to all, so that ever so long a series of ages, times, and persons writing and teaching otherwise will avail nothing." (E. 267; St. L. 1849.)

According to Luther, therefore, nothing can or does occur independently of God, or differently from what His omniscience has foreseen. Luther: "Hence it follows irrefutably that all things which we do, and all things which happen, although to us they seem to happen changeably and contingently, do in reality happen necessarily and immutably, if one views the will of God. For the will of God is efficacious and cannot be thwarted since it is God's natural power itself. It is also wise, so that it cannot be deceived. And since His will is not thwarted, the work itself cannot be prevented, but must occur in the very place, time, manner, and degree which He Himself both foresees and wills." (E. 134; St. L. 1692.)

238. God Not the Cause of Sin

Regarding God's relation to the sinful actions of men, Luther held that God is not the cause of sin. True, His omnipotence impels also the ungodly; but the resulting acts are evil because of man's evil nature. He writes: "Since, therefore, God moves and works all in all, He necessarily moves and acts also in Satan and in the wicked. But He acts in them precisely according to what they are and what He finds them to be (agit in illis taliter, quales illi sunt, et quales invenit). That is to say, since they are turned away [from Him] and wicked, and [as such] are impelled to action by divine omnipotence, they do only such things as are averse [to God] and wicked, just as a horseman driving a horse which has only three or two [sound] feet (equum tripedem vel bipedem) will drive him in a manner corresponding to the condition of the horse (agit quidem taliter, qualis equus est), i. e., the horse goes at a sorry gait. But what can the horseman do? He drives such a horse together with sound horses, so that it sadly limps along, while the others take a good gait. He cannot do otherwise unless the horse is cured. Here you see that when God works in the wicked and through the wicked, the result indeed is evil (mala quidem fieri), but that nevertheless God cannot act wickedly, although He works that which is evil through the wicked; for He being good, cannot Himself act wickedly, although He uses evil instruments, which cannot escape the impulse and motion of His power. The fault, therefore, is in the instruments, which God does not suffer to remain idle, so that evil occurs, God Himself impelling them, but in no other manner than a carpenter who, using an ax that is notched and toothed, would do poor work with it. Hence it is that a wicked man cannot but err and sin continually, because, being impelled by divine power, he is not allowed to remain idle, but wills, desires, and acts according to what he is (velit, cupiat, faciat taliter, qualis ipse est)." (E. 255; St. L. 1834.) "For although God does not make sin, still He ceases not to form and to multiply a nature which, the Spirit having been withdrawn is corrupted by sin, just as when a carpenter makes statues of rotten wood. Thus men become what their nature is, God creating and forming them of such nature." (E. 254; St. L. 1833.)

Though God works all things in all things the wickedness of an action flows from the sinful nature of the creature. Luther: "Whoever would have any understanding of such matters, let him consider that God works evil in us, i. e., through us, not by any fault of His, but through our own fault. For since we are by nature evil, while God is good, and since He impels us to action according to the nature of His omnipotence, He, who Himself is good, cannot do otherwise than do evil with an evil instrument, although, according to His wisdom, He causes this evil to turn out unto His own glory and to our salvation." (E. 257; St. L. 1837.) "For this is what we assert and contend, that, when God works without the grace of His Spirit [in His majesty, outside of Word and Sacrament], He works all in all, even in the wicked; for He alone moves all things, which He alone has created, and drives and impels all things by virtue of His omnipotence, which they [the created things] cannot escape or change, but necessarily follow and obey, according to the power which God has given to each of them – such is the manner in which all, even wicked, things cooperate with Him. Furthermore, when He acts by the Spirit of Grace in those whom He has made righteous, i. e., in His own kingdom, He in like manner impels and moves them; and, being new creatures, they follow and cooperate with Him; or rather, as Paul says, they are led by Him." (E. 317; St. L. 1908.) "For we say that, without the grace of God, man still remains under the general omnipotence of God, who does, moves, impels all things, so that they take their course necessarily and without fail, but that what man, so impelled, does, is nothing, i. e., avails nothing before God, and is accounted nothing but sin." (E. 315; St. L. 1906.)

Though everything occurs as God has foreseen, this, according to Luther, does not at all involve that man is coerced in his actions. Luther: "But pray, are we disputing now concerning coercion and force? Have we not in so many books testified that we speak of the necessity of immutability? We know … that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ. But we affirm that, if God foreknew it, this volition would certainly and without fail occur in this very Judas… We are not discussing the point whether Judas became a traitor unwillingly or willingly, but whether at the time foreappointed by God it infallibly had to happen that Judas of his own volition betrayed Christ." (E. 270; St. L. 1853.) Again: "What is it to me that free will is not coerced, but does what it does willingly? It is enough for me to have you concede that it must necessarily happen, that he [Judas] does what he does of his own volition, and that he cannot conduct himself otherwise if God has so foreknown it. If God foreknows that Judas will betray, or that he will change his mind about it, – whichever of the two He shall have foreknown will necessarily come to pass, else God would be mistaken in foreknowing and foretelling, – which is impossible. Necessity of consequence effects this: if God foreknows an event, it necessarily happens. In other words, free will is nothing" [it is not a power independent of God or able to nullify God's prescience]. (E. 272; St. L. 1855.)

To wish that God would abstain from impelling the wicked is, according to Luther, tantamount to wishing that He cease to be God. Luther: "There is still this question which some one may ask, 'Why does God not cease to impel by His omnipotence, in consequence of which the will of the wicked is moved to continue being wicked and even growing worse?' The answer is: This is equivalent to desiring that God cease to be God for the sake of the wicked, since one wishes His power and action to cease, i. e., that He cease to be good, lest they become worse!" (E. 259; St. L. 1839.)

239. Free Will a Mere Empty Title

Luther considers free will (when defined as an ability in spiritual matters or as a power independent of God) a mere word without anything corresponding to it in reality (figmentum in rebus seu titulus sine re, E.v.a. 5, 230), because natural will has powers only in matters temporal and subject to reason, but none in spiritual things, and because of itself and independently of God's omnipotence it has no power whatever. We read: "Now it follows that free will is a title altogether divine and cannot belong to any other being, save only divine majesty, for He, as the Psalmist sings [Ps. 115, 3], can do and does all that He wills in heaven and in earth. Now, when this title is ascribed to men, it is so ascribed with no more right than if also divinity itself were ascribed to them, – a sacrilege than which there is none greater. Accordingly it was the duty of theologians to abstain from this word when they intended to speak of human power, and to reserve it exclusively for God, thereupon also to remove it from the mouth and discourse of men, claiming it as a sacred and venerable title for their God. And if they would at all ascribe some power to man, they should have taught that it be called by some other name than 'free will,' especially since we all know and see that the common people are miserably deceived and led astray by this term, for by it they hear and conceive something very far different from what theologians mean and discuss. 'Free will' is too magnificent, extensive, and comprehensive a term; by it common people understand (as also the import and nature of the word require) a power which can freely turn to either side, and neither yields nor is subject to any one," (E. 158; St. L. 1720.)

If the term "free will" be retained, it should, according to Luther, be conceived of as a power, not in divine things, but only in matters subject to human reason. We read: "So, then, according to Erasmus, free will is the power of the will which is able of itself to will and not to will the Word and work of God, whereby it is led to things which exceed both its comprehension and perception. For if it is able to will and not to will, it is able also to love and to hate. If it is able to love and to hate, it is able also, in some small degree, to keep the Law and to believe the Gospel. For if you will or do not will, a certain thing, it is impossible that by that will you should not be able to do something of the work, even though, when hindered by another, you cannot complete it." (E. 191; St. L. 1759.) "If, then, we are not willing to abandon this term altogether, which would be the safest and most pious course to follow, let us at least teach men to use it in good faith (bona fide) only in the sense that free will be conceded to man, with respect to such matters only as are not superior, but inferior to himself, i. e., man is to know that, with regard to his means and possessions, he has the right of using, of doing, and of forbearing to do according to his free will; although also even this is directed by the free will of God alone whithersoever it pleases Him. But with respect to God, or in things pertaining to salvation or damnation, he has no free will, but is the captive, subject, and servant, either of the will of God or of the will of Satan." (E. 160; St. L. 1722.) "Perhaps you might properly attribute some will (aliquod arbitrium) to man, but to attribute free will to him in divine things is too much, since in the judgment of all who hear it the term 'free will' is properly applied to that which can do and does with respect to God whatsoever it pleases, without being hindered by any law or authority. You would not call a slave free who acts under the authority of his master. With how much less propriety do we call men or angels truly free, who, to say nothing of sin and death, live under the most complete authority of God, unable to subsist for a moment by their own power." (E. 189; St. L. 1756.)

Lost liberty, says Luther, is no liberty, just as lost health is no health. We read: "When it has been conceded and settled that free will, having lost its freedom, is compelled to serve sin, and has no power to will anything good, I can conceive nothing else from these expressions than that free will is an empty word, with the substance lost. My grammar calls a lost liberty no liberty. But to attribute the title of liberty to that which has no liberty is to attribute an empty name. If here I go astray, let who can correct me; if my words are obscure and ambiguous, let who can make them plain and definite. I cannot call health that is lost health. If I should ascribe it to a sick man, I believe to have ascribed to him nothing but an empty name. But away with monstrous words! For who can tolerate that abuse of speech by which we affirm that man has free will, and in the same breath assert that he, having lost his liberty, is compelled to serve sin, and can will nothing good? It conflicts with common sense, and utterly destroys the use of speech. The Diatribe is rather to be accused of blurting out its words as if it were asleep, and giving no heed to those of others. It does not consider, I say, what it means, and what it all includes, if I declare: Man has lost his liberty, is compelled to serve sin, and has no power to will anything good." (E. 200; St. L. 1769.)

Satan causes his captives to believe themselves free and happy. Luther: "The Scriptures set before us a man who is not only bound, wretched, captive, sick, dead, but who (through the operation of Satan, his prince) adds this plague of blindness to his other plagues, that he believes himself to be free, happy, unfettered, strong, healthy, alive. For Satan knows that, if man were to realize his own misery, he would not be able to retain any one in his kingdom, because God could not but at once pity and help him who recognizes his misery and cries for relief. For throughout all Scripture He is extolled and greatly praised for being nigh unto the contrite in heart, as also Christ testifies, Isaiah 61, 1. 2, that He has been sent to preach the Gospel to the poor and to heal the broken-hearted. Accordingly, it is Satan's business to keep his grip on men, lest they recognize their misery, but rather take it for granted that they are able to do everything that is said." (E. 213; St. L. 1785.)

240. The Gospel to be Our Only Guide