Australasian Democracy

At first sight it seems strange that the brewers should have worked with the party which had passed the most stringent liquor legislation on the Statute Book, but it must be remembered that this question had neither been debated nor divided the House on the ordinary lines of cleavage. The brewers, many persons maintain, know that they have the sympathy of the Government which, according to this hypothesis, has done as little as possible to meet the wishes of the Prohibitionists, and that only under virtual compulsion, and, in its measure of 1896, introduced a Bill which would certainly be rejected by the Council and was calculated to cast ridicule upon the agitation of the Prohibitionists. It was provided therein that a fourth issue should be added at the Local Option polls, that of national prohibition, and that, if it were carried by a three-fifths majority of the votes recorded in all the districts, it should be unlawful, subject to the exception mentioned hereafter, to import into the Province any liquor for any purpose or to distil it in the Province or to manufacture it for sale or barter. No person selling any spirituous or distilled perfume, nor any apothecary, chemist, or druggist administering or selling any spirituous, distilled, or fermented liquor for medicinal use, should do so otherwise than in such combination as rendered it unfit for use as a beverage. The Governor might declare, by notice in The Gazette, by what combination of ingredients the articles would be rendered sufficiently unpalatable. Persons requiring liquor for medicinal use or use in the arts and manufacturers were to make applications to Her Majesty's Customs and if their bonâ fides were proved, might receive it, for ready money, "in such closed and sealed bottles or other receptacle as that the liquor therein cannot be poured out without such seal being first broken," and attached "with a Government label declaring the kind, quantity, quality, and price of the liquor, as these may be determined by the Governor." In this measure the Government seem to have attempted to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. The brewers would laugh in their sleeves and the Prohibitionists would welcome a measure which instituted machinery for the attainment of national prohibition. If the assumption be correct, the latter are credited with a lamentable lack of any sense of humour; from all appearances they are not prepared to allow themselves to be hoodwinked.

Many of the representatives seem to have had an equally low opinion of the average intelligence of female electors, as they sought to capture the votes of domestic servants by a Bill which was rejected by the Council, in which a weekly half-holiday was decreed to them except in cases of sickness or death in the family, or where an annual holiday of not less than fourteen days had been substituted by mutual agreement between employers and their servants. How the period of rest was to be enforced was, perhaps wisely, not laid down, as domestics would, in few cases, be prepared to give information against their employers. Those among the latter, however, who took the matter seriously would, presumably, guard themselves against judiciary proceedings by compelling their servants to be out of the house on the holiday between three o'clock and half-past nine, whatever might be the state of the weather. Again, the undoubted evil, that young girls, by the culpable weakness of their parents, are allowed to parade the streets at night, was to be cured, according to the Government, by the so-called Juvenile Depravity Suppression Bill, which failed to meet with acceptance by the usually docile House of Representatives. Its danger and absurdity can be gathered, without further comment, from the quotation of one of the clauses: "Whenever any constable finds any girl" (who is apparently not over the age of sixteen years) "loitering in the streets or in out-of-the-way places after the hour of ten of the clock at night, and he has reason to believe that she is there for improper purposes, the following provisions shall apply:—

"1. He shall forthwith take her to the nearest beat of another constable, or, failing him, to the nearest justice or clergyman, or, failing him, to the nearest house of some married person of good repute, in whose presence the girl shall be questioned as to her name, her abode, her parents or guardians, and her reason for being from home and loitering as aforesaid.

"2. The constable shall then take, or shall cause her to be taken, to her home, where she shall be handed over to the person in charge of the house, and the constable shall forthwith on his return from duty make report of the facts to the officer in charge of the station."

Should the offence be repeated and the girl's reply be deemed by the officer in charge of a police station to be unsatisfactory, she may be brought before a magistrate and be committed to a reformatory or an industrial school. Some justification, I must add, for the seemingly depreciatory opinion of the members was afforded by the proceedings at the convention of the National Council of Women held at Christchurch early in 1896. This Association, which claims to be non-political and to focus the views of the women of New Zealand, passed resolutions in favour of the nationalisation of the land, a compulsory eight hours' day, and the enactment of a minimum rate of wages; but the climax was reached when it was resolved that "in all cases where a woman elects to superintend her own household and to be the mother of children, there shall be a law attaching a certain just share of her husband's earnings or income for her separate use, payable if she so desires it into her separate account." The first portion of this sentence is mysterious, and seems to be based on the assumption that the husband has nothing to say in the matter.

The extraordinary legislative activity which I have summarised need arouse no astonishment, as it is in consonance with the usual practice of the Parliament of New Zealand. Between the years 1876 and 1894, it has been computed, 2,972 measures were passed, and of these no less than 1,602 have already been repealed.

So much for the past: we must now consider briefly the present position of affairs and the further effects which may be anticipated from female suffrage.

It is the general impression that while a large majority of the women voted in 1893 as their husbands and brothers advised them, yet they were induced, in many instances, by their leagues, which had been started on independent lines, to support candidates on moral rather than political considerations. In the following year these leagues, with the exception of those which placed liquor questions before all others, were captured by one of the political parties, most of them by the Ministerialists. An amusing incident occurred in this connection at Dunedin. Shortly before the last elections it was decided, at a thinly-attended meeting of the Women's Franchise League, to support the three Ministerial candidates, although one of them was an anti-prohibitionist. Thereupon many of the members protested against the party character given to the association, and called a meeting, the proceedings at which were thus described by the local newspaper:—

"The meeting which was held yesterday afternoon in connection with the Women's Franchise League was, in some respects, the most unique gathering ever held in the city. There were nearly 200 women present, and they were divided into two parties—the followers of Mrs. Hatton and the supporters of Mrs. Don and Mrs. Hislop. At the close of the opening remarks of the Chairman (the Rev. Mr. Saunders), Mr. Hatton mounted the platform, and declining to take his seat, the Chairman threatened to send for a policeman. Then occurred a scene and uproar, of which it is impossible to give any conception. The noise was deafening; and attracted to the spot passers-by in the street. Half a dozen persons occupied the stage, and while some persons were addressing the meeting, others were engaged in heated argument. Women stamped on the floor with their feet and parasols, others were speaking at the highest pitch of their voices; there were hissing and hooting, and other unwomanly demonstrations. Eventually a portion of Mrs. Hislop's supporters withdrew to a side room, and the Chairman, having dissolved the meeting, vacated the chair."[10 - Otago Daily Times, November 2, 1896.]

We find, therefore, that, with the exception of ardent Prohihitionists, women are subordinating their special interests to their increasing attachment to one or other of the parties; but it does not follow that they will cease to exercise a direct influence upon legislation. It is not easy to learn to what extent their views have been modified during the last few years. The proceedings of the National Council of Women cannot be taken seriously, and the practical aspirations of the sex must be sought rather in the points emphasised by the local leagues. The files of the newspapers, unfortunately, afford little information, as it was the practise of candidates to speak upon general topics at their public meetings, and to take part in informal and unreported discussions with the members of the various women's leagues. On these occasions, I understand, and I must again except the Prohibitionists, the women made their views known, but did not seek to exact pledges as a condition of support. It is believed that they took less interest in the second elections, but statistics are not yet available for a comparison of the numbers that went to the poll on the two occasions. Of 9,332 women who were registered for the City of Auckland, 6,304 recorded their votes, but I am unable to say whether the proportion of about seven in ten holds good for the Province.

But, while it is necessary to consider the view of local leagues in order to form general conclusions as to the trend of female thought, it is found that, in the absence of one predominating centre, different issues obtain prominence in different places, and that the vote lacks the force which would be given to it by concentration. A general similarity of aims, however, enables an estimate to be formed of the questions which the women will press upon the attention of Parliament in the immediate future. The repeal of the C.D. and Totalisator Acts, amendments of the marriage laws, and greater protection of women and children against the cruelty of husbands and fathers, are subjects which are certain again to provoke discussion. Parliament will also be asked again to admit women within its precincts, as they are no longer satisfied with the possession of the franchise; but the agitation will, I think, at present be unsuccessful, partly because, in the only instance in which a woman has held a public position, the experiment is regarded as having been a failure. Some three years ago Mrs. Yates was elected to be Mayor of Onehunga, and was unable to fill the position satisfactorily. She was a woman of considerable ability, but of a hasty temper, and came into constant conflict with the Councillors. Very possibly they did not give her a fair chance; but the fact remains that the proceedings excited much ridicule, in the press and elsewhere, and retarded the movement in favour of rendering women eligible for seats in Parliament.

The Prohibitionists do not count upon much legislative assistance during the next three years, as the number of members of the House of Representatives who are in favour of prohibition upon the vote of a bare majority was reduced by the last election. They believe that if the "National Option" Bill be re-introduced, the Council may seize upon that fact as a ground for again rejecting it. In the meanwhile, they will concentrate their efforts upon the education of the electorate, and have, as I have shown, no reason to be discouraged by the results of the second local option poll.

"Equal wages for equal work" is a new cry of the female voters. They believe that if the Government were to introduce the principle of equal wages for similar work as between the men and women in the Civil Service, private employers would gradually follow the example. This proposal has the support both of those who desire to raise the wages of women and of those who think that they would no longer be able to compete with men in the search for employment. It might have been expected that the habit which women have now acquired of meeting together for the discussion of a common policy would have inclined them to the formation of Trades Unions; but it is too early to look for indirect results from female suffrage, which has hitherto had no appreciable effect upon the rate of wages of women. Nor has it modified the domestic instincts of the vast majority of the sex.

Lastly, the women of the working classes, almost without exception, are in favour of pensions to the aged and needy, and regard objections based on the deterrence of thrift or the difficulty of raising the necessary funds as factitious and disingenuous. Herein, as in some of the other matters to which I have referred, we see the principal danger of female suffrage in New Zealand, the tendency of the women to subordinate reason to sentiment. They note the prevalence of an evil, and believe that if the State decrees its cessation it will promptly cease to exist. But we must cherish the hope, though the justification for it is not yet manifest, that as the women become accustomed to the exercise of their power, they will no longer take a purely emotional view of the problems which engage their attention. At the same time, as we have seen, they have promoted several unobtrusive but eminently useful reforms which would have had less chance of acceptance in a House elected by men. It is in this direction, and not in attempts to make people virtuous or sober by Act of Parliament, that we may anticipate the best results from the enfranchisement of the women of New Zealand.

IX

THE EVOLUTION OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The five self-governing Provinces of the mainland of Australia have been evolved from the Crown Colonies of New South Wales, South Australia, and Western Australia by the successive detachment of Victoria and Queensland from the former and the gradual growth of the system of responsible government, and are separated by lines of demarcation which, except where the Murray or one of its tributaries forms the boundary, are purely arbitrary and have not been drawn in accordance with any distinctive geographical features. In the exercise of fiscal autonomy as regards their reciprocal relations, they have adopted protective tariffs which have not only impeded the interchange of commodities, but in some cases diverted trade from its natural course. New South Wales, indeed, after a period of protection, has reverted to the policy of free trade, while the tariffs of Queensland and Western Australia are directed mainly to the acquisition of revenue; but they are actually protective, as are, avowedly and to a high degree, those of Victoria and South Australia. Under these circumstances, and as the result of insufficient intercourse, antagonistic interests have been created and jealousies aroused which are a source of anxiety to those who consider the future of Australia.

The dangers which would be likely to arise from the independent development of the Provinces were recognised at an early date. At the time of the suggested separation of the district of Port Phillip from New South Wales and of the discussion of the new constitutions which were about to be granted, it was proposed by the Imperial Authorities that the government should be in the hands of a General Assembly and local Provincial Councils, but it was objected by the colonists that, in the absence of regular means of communication, any scheme which included the creation of a central legislature and executive would be found to be impracticable. In deference to their views the idea was allowed to drop, and no attempt was made to secure unity of action between the Provinces, except that, in 1850, the Governor of New South Wales received a commission as Governor-General of Australia and Governor of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, the administrators of which obtained the rank of Lieutenant-Governor. They were to be superseded in their authority by the former when he was in their territories, but were instructed to correspond directly with the Colonial Office. It is not clear to what extent the Governor-General was expected to direct the administration of the other Provinces. Some writers maintain that his pre-eminence was purely titular and intended as a compliment to the Mother Colony. In any case, when, a few years later, responsible government was established and the Governors gradually became little more than figure-heads of the Executive, the matter ceased to be of any importance.

The next phase in the movement originated in Victoria upon the initiative of Mr. (now Sir Charles) Gavan Duffy, who, in 1857, induced the Legislative Assembly to appoint a committee to consider the advisability of federal union. Upon their recommendation that an inter-provincial conference should be held, communications were addressed to New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania, which, though separated from the mainland of Australia, has always identified itself closely with Australian affairs. The proposal was in each case favourably received, as also, a little later, by Queensland, which had been erected into a separate Province in 1859; and Tasmania actually appointed its delegates. But there the matter was allowed to rest; and, although occasional conferences were held at which a uniform tariff, the immigration of the Chinese, and other subjects were discussed, no practical steps were taken until 1883, when external questions impressed Australian statesmen with the necessity for the creation of some body which would voice the opinions of Australia. Germany was reputed to have designs upon New Guinea, France upon the New Hebrides; while the latter country also gave offence by the penal settlement in New Caledonia. In the spring of that year Sir T. M'Ilwraith, the Premier of Queensland, which from its position has the greatest interest in New Guinea, had hoisted the British flag on the Island and taken formal possession of that part of it which was not under the control of the Dutch; but his action had been disavowed by the Imperial Government. A convention, attended by representatives from the five Australian Provinces, Tasmania, New Zealand, and Fiji, was accordingly held at Sydney, at which a decision was arrived at as to the main principles which were embodied in the Federal Council Act of 1885, the first legislative recognition of the Unity of Australia. Under this Act it was provided that a Federal Council, containing two representatives from a self-governing Province and one from a Crown Colony, should come into existence as soon as four of the Australasian Provinces had expressed their willingness to join it, and should thenceforward hold biennial sessions. The motive which had called the Council into existence was shown clearly in the principal power delegated to it, that of legislating, subject to Imperial approval, in regard to the relations of Australasia with the Islands of the Pacific. It was also authorised to deal, among other subjects, with the fisheries in Australasian waters beyond territorial limits and certain aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction, upon which it could pass enactments which would bind the Provinces represented upon it; and with questions such as general defences, quarantine, copyright, uniformity of weights and measures, and others which might be referred to it by the Legislatures of two or more Provinces, and any other matters of general Australasian interest on which the Legislatures can legislate within their own limits, but as to which it is deemed desirable that there should be a law of general application. Such legislation, however, was to take effect only in the Provinces that requested the Council to act, and in any others that might subsequently adopt it. It will thus be seen that the measure is of a purely permissive character, as each Province decides for itself whether it will be represented on the Council. New South Wales, mainly under the influence of the late Sir Henry Parkes, and New Zealand have never taken part in the deliberations, and South Australia has only been represented on a single occasion. The abstention of New Zealand is of smaller importance, from her geographical position and her intention not to identify herself at present with any scheme of Australian federation; but the hostility of New South Wales and the apathy of South Australia have placed great obstacles in the way of Queensland, Victoria, Western Australia, and Tasmania, which, and especially Victoria, have attempted to turn the Council to the best account. Other causes have combined to minimise its utility; it has neither an Executive to carry out, nor a judiciary to enforce its decisions; it has no control over public funds; and, as has recently been pointed out, "it transacts its business without a Ministry or a department, without a leader or an Opposition, without a party or a programme; there is no necessary continuity of representation, or similarity in the mode of appointment of representatives, or fixed area within which its legislation has force; it is vagrant in domicile and without a roof to shelter it, without a foot of territory to rest upon, without a ship or a soldier to protect it, without a single man in its service, or a shilling of its own to pay one."[11 - "The Federal Council of Australasia," by the Hon. Alfred Deakin, Australasian Review of Reviews, February, 1895.] But, in spite of these drawbacks, the Council has done practical work: it has paved the way for a system of national defence by the establishment of federal garrisons at King George's Sound and Thursday Island; it has regulated the pearl-shell and bêche-de-mer fisheries on the coasts of Queensland and Western Australia, and it has interested itself actively in the promotion of the proposed Pacific cable. More would have been done, particularly in the consideration of the matters referred to it by Provincial Legislatures, had it not been hoped that by the postponement of action the Council would be enabled, through the adhesion of South Australia and New South Wales, to legislate for the whole of Australia. Several of the Provinces, notably Western Australia and Queensland, which have shown little eagerness for the immediate realisation of a closer union, believed that the Council would, by a gradual process of development, be transformed into a Federal Parliament, and were prepared to allow events to take their natural course; but in other quarters a strong feeling arose, which was strengthened by the report of Imperial officers on the condition of the Provincial Defences, that the time had arrived when an attempt should be made to draft a Federal Constitution Bill which should be submitted to the various Provinces, and, if approved by them, to the Imperial Authorities. As the result of correspondence between the Premiers, delegates from the whole of Australasia, with the exception of Fiji, met at Melbourne in 1890, and passed resolutions which led to the convocation at Sydney in the following year of a constituent convention, which was attended by Parliamentary representatives from the seven Provinces. The convention sat for several weeks, under the presidency of Sir Henry Parkes, and drew up a Bill "to constitute the commonwealth of Australia," which formed the basis of the discussions at the recent Federal Convention.

The legislative powers of the Commonwealth are, under the provisions of the Bill, vested in a Governor-General, appointed by the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives. The laws passed by the Parliament are to be presented to the Governor-General, who may assent to them in the Queen's name, reserve them for the signification of her pleasure, withhold his assent, or return them to the Parliament with any amendments that he may recommend. Laws assented to by the Governor-General may be disallowed within two years by the Queen in Council, and laws that have been reserved shall not come into force unless within the same period they have received the assent of the Queen in Council. The Members of the Convention did not deem it necessary that any class of Bills should be reserved, but understood that, as they proposed that the Commonwealth should be able to legislate on several matters affecting the relations of Australia with foreign nations, the Constitution would not be acceptable to the Imperial Authorities unless a considerable power of intervention were reserved to them.

The Senate is to be composed of eight members for each Province, which is henceforth to be called a State, of whom one-half retire triennially, directly chosen by the Houses of Parliament of the several States for a period of six years. Senators are subject to no property qualification, but must be of the age of thirty years, have resided for five years within the limits of the Commonwealth, be entitled to vote for a member of the House of Representatives, and if not British subjects by birth, have been naturalised for at least five years before the time of their election. Bankrupts, criminals, and Government contractors are specially disqualified. Similar provisions and disqualifications apply to members of the House of Representatives, except that the minimum age is reduced to twenty-one years, and that the periods of residence and naturalisation are reduced from five years to three. They are to be chosen, in constituencies of thirty thousand inhabitants, by electors whose qualification shall be that prescribed by each State as the qualification for electors of its more numerous House of Parliament. The members of both Houses are to be paid at the rate of £500 a year, and are precluded from sitting in a State Parliament. The Parliament of the Commonwealth is to have authority to deal with "external affairs and treaties," to take over the powers of the Federal Council, which will cease to exist from the date of its establishment, and to have the exclusive right to legislate in regard to the affairs of the people of any race, not being Australian aboriginals or Maoris of New Zealand, with respect to whom it is deemed desirable to make laws not applicable to the general community; the seat of the Federal Government and any places required for Federal purposes; and the provisional administration of any territory surrendered by any State, and accepted by the Commonwealth, or any territory in the Pacific placed by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth. The framers of the Constitution doubtless had in view the Northern Territory, which, as it forms a heavy burden upon its resources, South Australia might be glad to hand over to the Federation. The Federal Parliament is also to deal exclusively with the postal and telegraphic services, military and naval defences and munitions of war, ocean beacons and lighthouses, quarantine, and, as soon as a uniform tariff has been imposed, with foreign and internal trade, bounties and duties of customs and excise. In the meanwhile, the duties are to be collected by Federal officials, but will be those that are, or may be, imposed by the Parliaments of the several States. Upon the enactment of a uniform Federal tariff, all such State laws will thereby be repealed and "trade and intercourse throughout the Commonwealth, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free." The expenditure of the Commonwealth is to be charged to the several States in proportion to the numbers of their people, and any surplus of revenue over expenditure is to be returned to them in proportion to the amount of revenue raised therein respectively, subject to certain reservations and to the right of the Federal Parliament, after the imposition of a uniform tariff, to prescribe the method of its disposal. The Federal revenue is to consist of customs and excise duties and of moneys raised by any other mode or system of taxation, but so that all such taxation shall be uniform through the Commonwealth. The Federal Parliament may also, "with the consent of the Parliaments of all the States, make laws for taking over and consolidating the whole or any part of the public debt of any State or States; but so that a State shall be liable to indemnify the Commonwealth in respect of the amount of a debt taken over, and that the amount of interest payable in respect of a debt shall be deducted and retained from time to time from the share of the surplus revenue of the Commonwealth which would be otherwise payable to the State."[12 - Cap. iv., Clause 13.] Certain other legislative powers are vested in the Federal Parliament, which may concurrently be exercised by the several States, and in such cases Federal shall supersede State legislation. All subjects not exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Parliaments of the several States, are reserved to, and shall remain vested in, the State Parliaments.

The authority of the Senate in regard to Money Bills formed the subject of much discussion, and was decided by a compromise which, it was hoped, would satisfy both those who desired to secure the financial supremacy of the House of Representatives and the inhabitants of the smaller States, who would naturally struggle for the rights of the Senate in which they would be on a footing of equality with their more powerful neighbours. The views of the former were met by the provisions that "laws appropriating any part of the public revenue, or imposing any tax or impost, shall originate in the House of Representatives," and that "the Senate shall have equal power with the House of Representatives in respect to all proposed laws, except laws imposing taxation and laws appropriating the necessary supplies for the ordinary annual services of the Government, which the Senate may affirm or reject, but may not amend. But the Senate may not amend any proposed law in such a manner as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people." The interests of the latter were safeguarded by the four succeeding sub-sections:

"Laws imposing taxation shall deal with the imposition of taxation only.

"Laws imposing taxation, except laws imposing duties of customs on imports, shall deal with one subject of taxation only.

"The expenditure for services other than the ordinary annual services of the Government shall not be authorised by the same law as that which appropriates the supplies for such ordinary annual services, but shall be authorised by a separate law or laws.

"In the case of a proposed law which the Senate may not amend, the Senate may at any stage return it to the House of Representatives with a message requesting the omission or amendment of any items or provisions therein. And the House of Representatives may, if it thinks fit, make such omissions or amendments, or any of them, with or without modifications."[13 - Cap. i., Clauses 54 and 55.]

The executive authority of the Commonwealth is to be exercised by the Governor-General as the Queen's representative, with the aid and advice of a Federal Executive Council. Considerable discussion took place at the Convention as to the relations which should exist between the Federal Executive and Legislature, some of the Representatives being in favour of the British system, others of the direct popular election of the head of the Government. It was finally agreed that the members of the Council should be chosen and summoned by the Governor-General, should hold office, during his pleasure, and should be capable of being chosen and of sitting in either House of Parliament. They are to execute the provisions of the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth; to assume at once control of the departments of customs and excise, posts and telegraphs, military and naval defence, ocean lights and quarantine; and, until other provision is made by Parliament, to appoint and remove all other officers of the Government.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth may establish a Supreme Court of Australia, consisting of a Chief Justice and not less than four other Justices, who shall be appointed by the Governor-General in Council, and shall be irremovable except upon an address from both Houses of Parliament. The Supreme Court shall be a final Court of Appeal from any other Federal Court, which may be established by Parliament, and from the highest Court of final resort in any State; and may be invested by Parliament with final and conclusive jurisdiction in all cases upon which an appeal has hitherto been allowed to the Queen in Council, subject to the right of the Queen to grant an appeal to herself in Council against the judgment of the Supreme Court in any case which concerns the public interests of the Commonwealth, or of any State, or of any other part of the British Empire. The Parliament may also confer upon the Federal Courts, other than the Supreme Court, jurisdiction to deal, either exclusively or concurrently with the Courts of the States, with cases arising under the Constitution or under any law made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth or affecting the Representatives of Foreign Powers, and with certain other matters including cases in which the Commonwealth is a party, or in which a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.

As the powers of the State are to be substantially those which they possess at present with the exception of such as are transferred to the Federal Legislature and Executive, it is only necessary to add that the Governors of the States are to be appointed in the manner which their Parliament may prescribe, but are to correspond with the Imperial Authorities through the Governor-General: that States are not to be subdivided nor deprived of any of their territories without the consent of their Parliaments; and that they are forbidden explicitly to raise or maintain any military or naval force, to coin money, or make anything but gold and silver legal tender in payment of debts, to make any law prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, or to make or enforce any law abridging any privilege or immunity of citizens of other States of the Commonwealth, or to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Finally, it is provided that any of the existing Provinces that have not adopted the Constitution may, upon doing so, be admitted to the Commonwealth, and that any law for the alteration of the Constitution is not to be submitted to the Governor-General for the Royal Assent until it has been passed by an absolute majority of both Houses of Parliament, and has been approved by conventions of a majority of the States representing a majority of the people of the Commonwealth.

When the Constitution Bill had been drafted, the next step should have been its reference to the Parliaments of the Constituent Provinces; but it was not even introduced in New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia, or New Zealand. In Victoria it was passed by the Assembly and forwarded to the Council, which passed it subject to certain amendments which were never considered by the Assembly; in South Australia it was introduced in the Assembly, and was dropped; in Tasmania it passed the Assembly and was dropped at an early stage in the Council. This procession of failures caused the advocates of Federation to realise that there must be something faulty in the method of procedure, and to ask themselves whether it was reasonable to expect that fourteen independent Chambers, or twelve, if New Zealand be excluded, should be able to arrive at a uniform decision on so complicated and contentious a subject. It was felt, also, that the Parliaments had no popular mandate to deal with the question, and that, in the general apathy and absence of interest, the electors themselves should be stirred up by direct participation in the movement. Accordingly, Mr. Reid, the Premier of New South Wales, invited the Premiers of the other Australian Provinces to meet him at Hobart in January, 1895, taking advantage of the fact that four of them would be there in connection with the biennial meeting of the Federal Council. The invitation was accepted, and a new scheme was devised of which the main principles were the popular election of delegates empowered to meet and frame a Federal Constitution; the reference of the Constitution so framed to a plebiscite of the several electorates and its subsequent transmission for Imperial legislation. The Premiers of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania accepted the proposal in its entirety; the Premier of Queensland agreed to it, except as regards the reference of the Constitution to a plebiscite; but the Premier of Western Australia was unable to concur with the decision of his colleagues. Sir John Forrest did not believe that popular election would lead to the choice of the most highly trained jurists and financiers, who could alone frame a consistent and workable Constitution, and he regarded as absurd the assumption that the average elector could give an intelligent opinion upon a measure of so complicated a character. There is much force in these objections; but it must be remembered that the former effort failed from its dissociation from popular impulse, and that the delegates would have the benefit of the work of their predecessors, which they would be bound to accept as the basis of their deliberations. As regards the plebiscite, it cannot have been expected that the vote of the bulk of the electorate would be more than an affirmative or negative reply upon the broadest issue; but, assuming it to be necessary that the Constitution Bill should in some manner or other be submitted for the judgment of each of the Provinces, the direct reference has the merit of being expeditious and conclusive and of avoiding the quagmire of Parliamentary discussions.

Before proceeding to note the results of the resolutions passed at the Premiers' Conference, it may be of interest to consider to what extent recent events have affected the status of the Federal Council. As has already been remarked, it has pursued a policy of self-effacement, and in spite of the increase in its numbers, it has never appealed to the imagination of Australians. It was undoubtedly dwarfed by comparison with the Federal Convention, which, indeed, decreed its contingent extinction, and it has, to some extent, been supplanted by the informal meetings of Australian Premiers which tend to become an annual institution. At a Conference held at Sydney in January, 1896, the urgent necessity for Federation was again emphasised, and it was resolved that, pending its attainment, the military laws of the Provinces should be assimilated, and a cordite factory be established under State supervision. Resolutions were also passed in favour of a Federal system of quarantine, the distribution of the cost of lighthouses on the basis of population, the extension to all coloured races of the provisions of the Chinese Restriction Acts, and non-participation in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. In this manner the Premiers, instead of referring questions to the Federal Council through their respective legislatures, decided, after personal consultation, upon measures which each would endeavour, in the common interest, to pass through the Parliament of his own Province. Other interprovincial conferences also are becoming more common. The precautions to be adopted against the tick fever were discussed at Sydney in 1896, and a few months ago, earlier, several Ministers of Agriculture met the South Australian Minister at Adelaide and decided upon the advisability of uniform legislation which would promote similarity of out-put in the products of the different Provinces, such as frozen meat, butter, wine, and fruit, for which it was hoped to create a large market in England. It has been argued that the growing realisation of the interdependence of the Provinces and of the material advantages accruing from combined action, will tend to hasten the advent of Federation.

The new proposals in that direction were favourably received, and the Legislatures of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania passed the so-called Australasian Federation Enabling Act, in substantially similar form, upon the lines laid down by the Premiers. The details of their scheme may be gathered from the principal provisions of the Victorian Act:—

"The Convention shall consist of ten Representatives of each Colony represented.

"The Convention shall be charged with the duty of framing for Australasia a Federal Constitution under the Crown in the form of a Bill for enactment by the Imperial Parliament.

"Every Member and every person eligible for Membership of either House of Parliament shall be eligible for Membership of the Convention as a Representative of Victoria. And any one hundred or more electors duly qualified to vote for the election of a Member of the Legislative Assembly shall be entitled in the prescribed manner to nominate any eligible person.

"Every person duly qualified to vote for the election of a member of the Legislative Assembly shall be qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Representatives of Victoria.

"The voting shall be taken throughout Victoria as one electoral district, and every voter shall vote for the full number of Representatives required, otherwise the vote shall be rejected as informal.

"No person shall vote or attempt to vote more than once at the same election of Representatives of Victoria."

(A similar provision applies to the subsequent referendum.)

"When the Constitution has been framed by the Convention, copies thereof shall be supplied to the Members of the Convention, and the President shall declare the sitting of the Convention adjourned to a time and place to be fixed by the Convention, not being less than sixty nor more than one hundred and twenty days thereafter. And as soon as convenient the draft constitution shall be submitted for consideration to each House of Parliament sitting in Committee of the whole, and such amendments as may be desired by the Legislature, together with the draft Constitution, shall be remitted to the Convention through the Senior Representative.

"On the reassembling of the Convention the Constitution as framed prior to the adjournment shall be reconsidered, together with such suggested amendments as shall have been forwarded by the various Legislatures, and the Constitution so framed shall be finally adopted with any amendments that may be agreed to."

"So soon as practicable after the close of the proceedings of the Convention the question of the acceptance or rejection of the Constitution shall be referred and submitted to the vote of all persons in Victoria qualified and entitled to vote for the election of Members of the Legislative Assembly."

"The majority of votes shall decide the question, and if the Constitution be thereby rejected, no further action shall be taken pursuant to this Act: Provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than fifty thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Bill.

"If two Colonies in addition to Victoria accept the Constitution the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly of Victoria may adopt a Joint Address to the Queen praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial Parliament upon receipt from the Parliaments of such two Colonies, either of similar joint or separate Addresses from each House of such Parliaments."

It will be noticed that the Convention will have entire freedom in regard to any amendments suggested by the Provincial Parliaments, and that if the Constitution be accepted, the Victorian Parliament will not be bound to join in submitting it for Imperial enactment. It is assumed that it will bow to the popular pronouncement unless the Government should have some grave reason for recommending a contrary course. A difficulty, not provided against in the Act, might arise if the Constitution were to be amended during its passage through the Imperial Parliament.

The Act passed by Western Australia provided for the election of the delegates by the two Houses of Parliament sitting as one Chamber, the area of selection being limited to candidates nominated by not less than twenty persons who are qualified to vote at elections for Members of the Assembly. "The draft Constitution, as finally adopted by the Convention, if approved by Parliament, shall be submitted for the decision of the electors of Western Australia by their vote; and if a majority of the electors voting on such question signify their approval of such Constitution, the same may be adopted by the Colony, provided that any number of votes in the affirmative less than six thousand shall be equivalent to the rejection of the Constitution." "The adoption of the Constitution by Western Australia may be signified by the passing of an Act or by a joint resolution of both Houses of Parliament, and both Houses may thereupon adopt Addresses to the Queen, praying that the Constitution may be passed into law by the Imperial Parliament, subject to the adoption of similar Addresses by at least two other Colonies, of which New South Wales shall be one." Parliament thus retains the initiative in each successive phase of the movement, but will have no power to alter the Bill when it finally leaves the Convention. If the provisions are regarded as unacceptable, it will be able to decline to submit the Bill to the electorate. The Western Australian measure was based in its general language upon that previously introduced in Queensland, but differed from it in several important particulars. In the latter case it was proposed that the election of the delegates should be vested in the members of the Assembly alone, that, of the ten delegates, five should be chosen by the Southern, three by the Northern, and two by the Central Parliamentary Representatives, a provision inserted in view of the somewhat divergent interests of different portions of the Province, and that the draft Constitution should be submitted for the consideration of the electors in such manner as Parliament might prescribe. The Bill was passed by the Assembly, in spite of a widespread feeling that Queensland should have followed the course of the other Provinces, and was amended by the Council, which regarded itself as unjustifiably ignored, and provided that it should have an equal share with the Assembly in the appointment of the delegates to the Convention. It is unnecessary to consider the arguments by which the Premier supported his proposal of indirect election, or those put forward by the two Houses during the deadlock which followed upon their disagreement. Finally, when each House had insisted several times upon its attitude, the Bill was laid aside by the Council. As a result of this action the new movement was blocked at its first step, which was regarded with little anxiety even by those who appreciated the difficulties which were likely to attend the later stages. Great disappointment was felt in Australia, and efforts were made, though in vain, to induce Sir Hugh Nelson to reintroduce the Bill in some form that would be acceptable to both Houses. At the same time public opinion demanded that the Convention should be held, even though one of the Provinces would be unrepresented.

The benefits which would follow Federation are so obvious as scarcely to require enumeration. The Federal Government would be able to deal adequately with the problem of National Defence and to speak authoritatively, to the manifest satisfaction of the Imperial Authorities, upon such matters as the contribution of Australia towards the expenses of the Imperial squadron maintained upon its coast; the consolidation of the debts would, it has been estimated, enable a million pounds to be saved upon the annual bill of interest; Interprovincial Free Trade would promote intercourse between neighbours who have hitherto been estranged by arbitrary lines of demarcation; and in the words of the Chief Justice of Queensland,[14 - "Notes on Australian Federation," by Sir S. W. Griffith. Parliamentary Paper, Queensland, 1896.] "The first effect in point of importance, though some time may elapse before the effect is fully felt, will be the creation of an Australian Nation, forming a distinct constituent part of the British Empire, having one mind, speaking with one voice instead of the six, often discordant and sometimes inarticulate, voices now heard, consulted on all matters of Imperial concern, and exercising a powerful influence in the political affairs of the whole world." Such would appear to be the destiny of Australia, which has, however, doubtless been benefited by the independent development of its component parts. In the absence of distinctions of race and language, in the general diffusion of the Roman Catholics among the Protestants, and the steady determination to exclude coloured races, the early establishment of Federal relations would have produced among Australians a monotonous uniformity of characteristics, which has to some extent been prevented by the divergent political tendencies of the several Provinces.

But, to put the practical question, what are the prospects of Federation? The general impression is not one of hopefulness: it is pointed out that the Provinces have so long maintained an independent existence that they are unlikely to submit to a curtailment of their powers except under the imperative impulse of the fear of foreign invasion; that all but the leading politicians realise that they would be affected prejudicially by a change which would dwarf the Legislatures with which they are connected; that many, especially during the period of depression, dread the creation of a new taxing and governing body; and that the Labour members, in the natural belief that their influence would be smaller in a Federal Parliament, are either apathetic or actively hostile. The economic aspects of Intercolonial Free Trade, in reference to its probable effect upon the prosperity of manufacturers and producers in the different Provinces, also form an important factor in the situation. Time alone can show whether popular participation in the successive stages of the movement, though it will not be universal, will generate an enthusiasm sufficient to outweigh the opposing forces and weld Australia into a strong and united Nation.

APPENDIX TO IX.