Then came the news that the tribes had risen, that the Malakand had been attacked, that Chakdara, the fortified post on the Swat river, was invested, and that the tribes on this side of the Panjkora were in revolt. This, however, was soon followed by a report that the post had been relieved, that heavy losses had been inflicted upon the tribesmen, and that the trouble was over.
For some time the frontier had been in a state of tension. The Mullahs, or priests, had been inciting the tribesmen to insurrection; and one especially, who was called the Mad Mullah, had gone about from tribe to tribe, stirring the people up. He professed to be a successor of the great Akhund of Swat, and to have inherited his powers. He claimed to be able to work miracles. The Heavenly host were, he said, on his side.
His excited appeals, to the fanaticism which exists in every Pathan, were responded to in a marvellous manner. The villagers flew to arms. Still, it was thought and hoped that, when the first excitement caused by his appeals had died away, matters would calm down again. The hope, however, was short lived for, before long, the startling news came that the Mohmunds, a tribe whose territory lay near Peshawar, were in revolt; and that Shabkadr, a village within our frontier, had been raided and destroyed.
Within the next few days the Samana was invested, and the Khyber Pass was in the hands of the Afridis. The Peshawar movable column, of four guns, two squadrons of native horse, and the 20th Punjabi regiment, with a few companies of the Somersets, were sent out to Shabkadr. On arriving there they found that the bazaar had been burnt, and that the enemy had taken up a position facing the fort, about a mile and a half distant.
The cavalry skirted the cultivated ground between the force and the plateau, and pushed the enemy backward, with severe loss, into the low hills that skirt the border. Next morning the enemy were seen in possession of the lower hill, and the force moved out to attack them. They were found to be in great strength, numbering nearly seven thousand. Leaving a strong force to face the column, flanking parties came down concealed by the low hills.
The infantry retired in two sections, but the artillery came into action. The cavalry made their way up one of the ravines and, when they got within charging distance, they went at the enemy at a gallop. Taking the entire length of the plateau, about a mile and a half, they charged the attacking force from end to end; and drove them, demoralized, into the hills. The severity of the morning's fighting may be judged from the fact that sixty percent of the force engaged suffered casualties.
From that time, until it was determined to send an expedition into the Mohmund country, the force remained as a corps of observation. A force drawn chiefly from the Peshawar garrison was speedily got together and, on 11th September, had concentrated at or about Shabkadr fort; a general advance having been arranged for, on the 15th of the month.
In the meantime, more serious troubles had arisen with the Zakka-Khels. This tribe was the most powerful of the Pathans. They were at all times troublesome, and frequently made raids across the frontier, carrying off large quantities of cattle; and living, indeed, entirely upon plunder. The Zakhels and the Kukukbels had joined them, as well as several other smaller tribes. They believed that they could do this with impunity, for no Englishman had ever visited their wild country, with its tremendous gorges and passes. A large proportion of them were furnished with Martini and Lee-Metford rifles, and many of the others carried Sniders.
To operate against such formidable enemies, possessing almost impregnable positions, a large force was needed; and time was required to collect the troops. Still more, an enormous train of baggage animals would be required, and a vast amount of stores of all kinds.
It was clear that the time that would be occupied in the preparations of the campaign would be very considerable; but, while these were being made, it was determined that the expedition from Peshawar should move, at once, into the Mohmund country, and finish with that tribe before the main operation began; and that the Malakand division, and the Mohmund field force should carry out the work of punishment, in the stretch of country lying between Lalpura and the Swat River.
It was known that Chakdara was holding out, but that it was hardly pressed, and the first step was to relieve the garrison. Colonel Meiklejohn pushed forward, with a comparatively small force, and arrived at the Malakand on the 1st of August. The reinforcement that had reached that garrison had enabled them to take the offensive, and orders were issued for a strong cavalry reconnaissance to the Amandara valley, five miles away. They found the enemy in such force that the cavalry were obliged to retire, and they effected their retreat with great difficulty, under a very heavy fire. As the path was narrow, cavalry could only proceed in single file, exposed the while to the fire of the enemy.
Sir Bindon Blood arrived, that evening, to take the command. The main body were to move down the road; while a force under Colonel Goldney advanced up the hill to the right, and turned the enemy's flank. Colonel Goldney's attack was perfectly successful. The enemy were taken completely unawares, and entirely routed. The march of the main column, therefore, met with no opposition for some distance; then the enemy opened fire, from among the rocks on the hills.
A party of the Guides and the 45th Sikhs were ordered to take the position, at the point of the bayonet. The enemy, however, stuck to their position until they were bayoneted, or driven over the rocks. The 34th and 55th Sikhs stormed some sangars on the left and, pushing their way pluckily up the steep slopes, slowly gained the heights, step by step and, in spite of the hot fire and the showers of rocks and stones, drove the enemy out of their strongholds. On this the tribesmen lost heart and fled, hotly pursued by the cavalry, who cut them up in great numbers.
During the fighting at the Malakand, previous to the arrival of the relief, our casualties were one hundred and seventy-three killed and wounded, including thirteen British officers and seven natives. The siege of the small fort of Chakdara had been a severe one. The garrison consisted of two companies of the 45th Sikhs, with cavalry. On the evening of the 26th they were attacked, but repulsed their assailants with loss. Next morning Captain Wright, with a company of forty troopers, arrived from the Malakand, having run the gauntlet of large parties of the enemy. The whole of the day was spent in repelling rushes of the enemy and, for the next few days, Wright's garrison were unable to leave their posts.
On the 29th the enemy attacked the tower and endeavoured to burn it down; but were again repulsed, with heavy loss.
Chapter 7: Tales Of War
As soon as it became evident that the Afridis were up, and that there would be stern fighting, the conversation in the mess room naturally turned on past expeditions against the wild tribesmen. Two or three of the officers had exchanged into the regiment, when their own went home. Having been two or three years on the frontier, they had many tales of hill fighting to tell; and these were eagerly listened to by all the younger officers, as they felt certain that they too would, ere long, be taking part in such struggles.
"A fine instance of defence," one of the junior captains said, "was that of Thobal in 1891. As you all know, I am a ranker, and I received my commission for that business. I was with a mere handful of men, thirty Ghoorkhas and fifty rifles of the 12th Burmah Infantry. We were commanded by Lieutenant Grant. I was with him as quartermaster sergeant, and general assistant. The Ghoorkhas had sixty rounds per man for their Martini rifles, the Burmah men one hundred and sixty rounds per man for their Sniders. They were a pretty rough lot, only twenty of them being old soldiers, the rest recruits.
"One morning we received news that Mr. Quintin with four civil officers, and an escort of seven British officers and four hundred and fifty-four Ghoorkhas, who had gone up to Manipur, had been massacred. Happily the news was exaggerated, but a treacherous attack was made upon the party, and Mr. Quintin and many others killed. Grant thought that this was probably the case, and determined to push on with his little force, in the hope of rescuing some survivors.
"The distance from Tamu to Manipur is about fifty-five miles. We started at half-past five, on the morning of the 28th. The difficulties were so great that we only moved at the rate of a mile an hour. At two in the morning we started again, and marched about ten miles; in the course of which we were occasionally fired at by the enemy. The moon rose at eleven, and the advance was continued.
"The resistance now became severe. The telegraph wires had been cut, taken down from the poles, and twisted about the road; and trees had also been felled across it. While we were endeavouring to clear away the obstacles, a heavy fire was poured into us. Small parties were therefore sent out to disperse the enemy, and this they did most successfully, capturing three guns and a good deal of ammunition.
"Pushing on, we issued, at six in the morning, on the hills. Before us was the village of Palel, which was garrisoned by two hundred Manipur soldiers. You must remember that Manipur had been a sort of subsidiary state, and had a regular army, drilled by Europeans. However, Grant attacked them at once, and drove them out with loss.
"After halting at Palel for some hours a start was made, at eleven o'clock at night; and at daybreak we came upon some villages, each house in which was standing alone in a large enclosure, surrounded by a wall, ditch, and hedge. We went at them and carried them, one by one, without any great loss to ourselves. Issuing on the other side, we came upon a plain about a thousand yards across. Beyond this was a bridge, on fire. The enemy were strongly posted in trenches and behind hedges.
"Grant decided to attack, and to try and save the bridge. He advanced across the plain with two sections of ten men each, supported by another section of the same strength. The rest of his force, consisting of forty men, he kept in reserve.
"I own that it seemed to me a desperately risky thing; for, from what we could see, we judged that the enemy were about a thousand strong. Grant himself led the party, and he put me in charge of the reserve. A very heavy fire was opened by the enemy; but Grant and his men steadily advanced, and succeeded in getting within a hundred yards of the enemy. Here I came up with him; and we dashed into the river, carried the enemy's trenches at the point of the bayonet, and hunted them out, from enclosure to enclosure, till they all drew off.
"By the side of the bridge was the village of Thobal; and as, with so small a force, it was impossible to advance against the overwhelming numbers that would meet us before we got to Manipur, fifteen miles away, Grant determined to hold Thobal; where he could, he thought, defend himself, and afford refuge to any who had escaped the massacre. As soon as the enemy had retired, we all set to work to prepare a defensive position; by setting fire to the crops, so as to prevent the enemy from creeping up unseen, and by making an abattis.
"The night passed off quietly. At six in the morning the enemy were seen advancing in force, but Lieutenant Grant sent out thirty men to the farthest wall of the village, some four hundred yards in advance of the enclosure; and their fire checked the enemy, and forced them to retire. At three in the afternoon the enemy advanced in great force, their line being over a mile long. Grant again occupied the front wall, and held his fire till the enemy reached a point which had been carefully marked as being six hundred yards away. Fire was then opened, the muskets being sighted for this known range. The tribesmen fell in great numbers, and drew back under the protection of their artillery, who now opened fire at a range of about a thousand yards. In half an hour they were completely silenced.
"They then withdrew to another hill, five hundred yards farther off but, even at this range, we got at them with our Martinis, and they soon began firing wildly. The infantry advanced several times, but were always driven back as soon as they reached the six-hundred-yards limit.
"It was now becoming dark, and the enemy were working round on our flank. We therefore fell back on the entrenched position and, though the enemy kept up a heavy fire till two in the morning, ammunition was too scanty to allow us to waste a cartridge, and no reply was made. At three we set to work to strengthen the defences, using baskets filled with earth and sacks filled with sand, as well as adding to the abattis.
"In the course of the day the enemy sent in a flag of truce, offering to allow us to retreat. This Grant refused to do, till all prisoners still in the hands of the Manipuris were delivered over to him. In order to deceive the enemy as to his strength, Grant put on a colonel's badge and uniform and, in his communications with the enemy, spoke and behaved as if he had the whole regiment under his command in the village. The enemy were undoubtedly misled, and wasted three days in negotiations.
"Then fighting recommenced and, at daybreak, the enemy made a determined attack upon the advance, with artillery. By eight o'clock they had pushed the attack home, and passed the line of walls and hedges a hundred yards from our position. The situation was growing serious when, leaving me in command, Grant went out with ten Ghoorkhas, crept along unobserved to the end of one of the walls and, turning this, made a sudden attack upon the enemy from behind. Taken wholly by surprise they fled, leaving six or seven dead behind them.
"At eleven o'clock they were again pressing hotly and, encouraged by the success of his first sortie, Grant determined to make another. This time he took me with him. With six Ghoorkhas he had driven the enemy from one hedge, when he discovered a party of about sixty men behind a wall, twenty yards distant.
"'Now, my lads,' he said, 'we have got to run the gauntlet, but you need not be afraid of their fire. Seeing us so close to them, it is sure to be wild.'
"Then, with a cheer, we dashed across the open. The enemy blazed at us, but their fire was wild and confused; and we were among them before they could reload, killing a dozen, and sending the rest to the right about, many of them wounded.
"On returning to the camp, we found that there were only fifty rounds left for the Snider rifles, and thirty rounds each for the Martinis. Strict orders were therefore given that no one was to fire till the enemy were within close range. However, there was no doubt that the fight was all taken out of them, by the spirit with which those two little sorties had been made. They kept up a steady fire till nightfall, but took good care not to show themselves; and they retired, as soon as they could do so, in the darkness.
"That was really the end of the fighting. Three days passed, and then a letter arrived from the officer in command of the expedition, ordering him to fall back to Tamu, whence a detachment had been despatched to meet him. This order had fallen into the hands of the enemy. They no doubt informed themselves of its contents, and were so utterly glad to get rid of us, without further loss, that they gladly sent it in to us. That night there was a heavy thunderstorm, with a tremendous downpour of rain, and under cover of it we withdrew quietly, and before long were met by the relieving force."
"That was a splendid resistance."
"Magnificent! You certainly earned your commission well, Towers.
"Now, Major, let us hear the story of the battle of Ahmed Kheyl, where you met the fanatics in force. I doubt whether the Afridis will fight in the same way; but they may and, at any rate, the story will be instructive."
"Well, it is seventeen years ago, now," the major said, "and I was a junior lieutenant. I was, as you all know, marching from Kandahar to Kabul under Sir Donald Stewart; and at Ahmed Kheyl, twenty-three miles south of Ghuzni, we met the Afghans in force, estimated at fifteen thousand foot and a thousand horse. For several days we had known that they were in the neighbourhood. Their cavalry scouts could be seen marching parallel to us, about eight miles away, on the right flank.
"On the 19th of April we marched at daybreak. The advance guard consisted of seven hundred rifles, seven hundred and fifty cavalry, and six guns; the main body of somewhat over a thousand rifles, three hundred and forty-nine sabres, and ten guns; then came the trains and hospitals, guarded by strong detachments on each flank; while the rear guard was fourteen hundred infantry, three hundred and sixteen cavalry, and six mountain guns. The length of the column was about six miles.
"Its head had marched about seven miles, when the cavalry in advance caught sight of the enemy, in position, three miles ahead. Preparations were made for receiving an attack and, at eight o'clock, the march was resumed. Half a squadron of Bengal Lancers were sent to cover the left front of the infantry brigade, which was now close to a range of low hills that ran parallel to the line of march for some distance, then made a bend to the east. The enemy were seen in position, covering the point of passage through the hills, and also upon the hills flanking the road by which the division would advance.
"When within a mile and a half of the enemy, two batteries moved out and took up positions to shell them in front; while the infantry deployed, the line on the left facing the enemy on the hills. The 2nd Punjab Cavalry were on the right of the guns, whose escort consisted of a squadron of 19th Bengal Lancers, and a company of Punjab Infantry.
"It was the general's intention to advance to the attack but, at nine o'clock, before his dispositions were completed, the whole crest of the hills held by the enemy seemed to be swarming with men. Scarcely had the guns opened fire, when the enemy swept down from the hills, in successive lines of swordsmen, stretching out far beyond either flank of our force. At the same time a large body of horse rode along the hills, threatening the left flank.
"As the swordsmen swept down on the infantry and guns, the Afghan horse came out of two ravines, and charged the Bengal Lancers before they could acquire sufficient speed to meet them fairly. The Lancers were forced back, disorganizing the 3rd Ghoorkhas, who composed the left battalion of the line. The colonel of the Ghoorkhas threw his men into company squares, and they stood their ground; but the Lancers could not be rallied until they had swept along almost the whole rear of the infantry.
"In the meantime the swordsmen on foot swept down with fanatical fury, and it became necessary to bring up the whole reserve into the fighting line. The two batteries of artillery on the right were now firing grape shot, at close range, into the mass of Afghans; but neither this, nor the fire of the infantry supporting them, could check the advance of the enemy. The batteries, having used up all their case shot, were compelled to retire two hundred yards; and the right of the infantry line was also forced back.
"The situation at this moment was horribly critical: both our flanks were turned, and the troops were a good deal shaken by the suddenness and fierceness of the attack. The enemy's horsemen, however, pushing round to the left flank, were checked by the firmness of the 3rd Ghoorkhas–who stood their ground bravely–and by the fire of the batteries on that flank. On the right the 2nd Punjab Cavalry charged and drove back the enemy, thus giving time for the two batteries to take up their fresh position, and again come into action.
"The infantry on the right also recovered from the confusion into which they had been temporarily thrown, and poured a withering fire into the Afghans. In the centre the 2nd Sikhs maintained, through out the fight, a steady and unyielding front. The steady and well-directed fire of the whole line, aided by the batteries, was creating terrible havoc among the enemy and, after an hour's gallant and strenuous exertion on both our flanks, their efforts began to slacken and, before long, the whole of them were in flight, leaving a thousand dead and wounded on the ground.
"It was calculated that they had at least two thousand casualties, while our own loss amounted to only one hundred and forty-one. They were not pursued, as the cavalry were required to guard the baggage."
"It was a grand fight, Major," the colonel said; "but you were at Maiwand also, were you not?"