The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.

The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what Christianity teaches.

To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity, is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must therefore be excused.

I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent Author and Governor of the world

1. It does not exclude design and deliberation.

1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.

– Necessity does not account for the existence of any thing, but is only a circumstance relating to its origin. Instance the case of a house: the fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only question would be, was he obliged to build it as he did?

2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To say it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker, who acted by necessity: for necessity is only an abstract notion, and can do nothing.

3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all causes; but we cannot say that every thing so exists. The fact that many changes in nature are produced by man’s contrivance is a proof of this.

4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by necessity an agent acting necessarily, he is obliged to mean this.

5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by necessity does not exclude design.

2. It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion.

1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own principles, – viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he does; and is not subject to praise or blame. (It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common sense, so educate his child?)

– The child would be delighted with his freedom; but would soon prove a pest, and go to destruction.

– He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which would teach him that he was accountable.

– He would, in the end, be convinced either that his doctrine was wrong, or that he had reasoned inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it.

2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would be found equally fallacious: e. g. that he need not take care of his life.

3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.

– Reasoning on this ground is justified by all experience.

– The constitution of things is as if we were free.

4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we apply it to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we be sure it would not mislead us with respect to future interests?

5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on the supposition of necessity.

3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a character.

1.) It does not hinder us from having a will and a character; from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.

2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it equally excuses the punishment of crime; for if it destroys the sin of the one, it destroys the sin of the other.

3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime, shows that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of justice and injustice.

Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he has that character; and so destroy the proofs of religion?

Ans. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a father and a magistrate; and his natural rule of government must be veracity and justice. We shall proceed to show that,

II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion

1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.

1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.

2.) This implies a rule, a peculiar kind of rule; i. e. one from which we cannot depart without being self-condemned.

3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with sanctions. It not only raises a sense of duty, but a sense of security in obeying, and danger in disobeying; and this is an explicit sanction.

4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has given us; and we must infer that in the upshot happiness will follow virtue, and misery vice.

5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means of keeping up the sense of this government.

6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course of proof.

– The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts; not from what might appear to us to be fit, but from what his actions tell us he wills.

2. Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true, does not affect.

1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present state of mankind, he would inquire:

– How this religion came?

– How far the belief of it extended?

– If he found that some one had totally propounded it, as a deduction of reason, then, though its evidences from reason would not be impaired, its history would furnish no further proof.

2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary,

– That essentially it had been professed in all countries.

– And can be traced up through all ages.

– And was not reasoned out, but revealed.

3.) These things are of great weight.

– Showing natural religion to be conformed to the common sense of mankind.

– And either that it was revealed, or forces itself upon the mind.

– The rude state of the early ages leads to the belief of its being revealed, and such is the opinion of the learned.