The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

5. Vicarious atonement for sinners, serves to vindicate the authority of God’s laws, and to deter men from sin.

6. Objections to vicarious suffering are obviously not objections to Christianity, but to the whole course of nature.

7. The objection, therefore, amounts to nothing more than saying that a divine arrangement is not necessary, or fit, because the objector does not see it to be so; though he must own he is no judge, and could not understand why it should be necessary, if it were so!

VIII. We have no reason to expect the same information touching God’s conduct, as we have in relation to our own duty

1. God instructs us by experience.

2. This experience, though sufficient for our purposes, is an infinitely small part of his providence.

3. The things not understood involve God’s appointment, and Christ’s execution; but what is required of us, we are clearly informed.

4. Even the reasons for Christian precepts are made obvious.

CHAPTER VI

SUPPOSED LACK OF PROOF OF REVELATION, AND ITS WANT OF UNIVERSALITY

It has been thought to be a positive argument against revelation, that its evidences are not adequate, and that it is not universally known and believed.

But the argument amounts to just this, that God would not bestow on us any favor, except in such a mode and degree as we thought best, and did exactly the same for everybody else.

Such a notion, all analogy contradicts.

I. Men act in their most important concerns on doubtful evidence

1. It is often absolutely impossible to say which of two modes of acting will give most pleasure or profit.

2. If it were possible, we cannot know what changes temper, satiety, ill health, &c. might produce, so as to destroy our pleasure.

3. We cannot foresee what accidents may cut it all off.

4. Strong objections and difficulties may attach to the course of action we adopt, which yet all would admit ought not to deter us.

5. We may, after all, be deceived by appearances, or by our passions, &c.

6. Men think it reasonable to engage in pursuit of advantage, even when the probabilities of success are against them.

II. As to the light of Christianity not being universal

1. Temporal good is enjoyed in very different degrees even among creatures of the same species.

2. Yet it is certain that God governs.

3. We may prudently or imprudently use our good things.

4. The Jewish religion was not universal.

5. If it be intended that Christianity should be a small light, shining in a great and wide-spread darkness, it would be perfectly uniform with other parts of God’s providence.

6. If some have Christianity so corrupted, and interpolated, as to cause thoughtful persons to doubt it, as is the case in some countries; and if, where it is the purest, some learn much less from it than they might, there are manifest parallels in God’s natural dispensations.

7. No more is expected of any one, than is equitable under his circumstances.

8. Every one is bound to get rid of his ignorance, as far as he can, and to instruct his neighbor.

9. If revelation were universal, in extent and degree, different understandings, educations, tempers, length of lives, and outward advantages, would soon make the knowledge of it as different as it is at present.

III. Practical reflections

First. That the evidence of religion is not such as unavoidably to convince all, may be part of our probation.

1. It gives scope for a wise or vicious use of our understanding. Just as is the case in common affairs.

2. Intellectual inattention to so serious a matter, is as immoral, as disobedience after conviction of the truth.

Secondly. If the evidence is really doubtful, it puts us on probation.

1. If a man were in doubt whether a certain person had done him the greatest favor, or whether his whole temporal interest depended on him, he ought not to regard that person as he would if there were no reason to think so.

2. So if there is only reason to apprehend that Christianity may be true, we are as much bound to examine, &c. as we would be bound to obey, if we knew it was true.

3. Considering the infinite importance of religion, there is not much difference as to what ought to be the mode of life of those who are convinced and those who doubt its truth. Their hopes and fears are the same in kind, though not in degree; and so their obligations are much the same.

4. Doubts presuppose some evidence, belief more, and certainty more still. Each state should influence our conduct, and does so, in common things.

5. It shows a mental defect not to see evidence unless it is glaring; and a corrupt heart not to be influenced by it unless overpowering.

Thirdly. Difficulties as to believing religion, are no more a ground of complaint, than difficulties in practising it.

1. They constitute a wholesome discipline.

1.) In allowing an unfair mind to deceive itself.

2.) In requiring belief and the practice of virtue under some uncertainties.

2. In the case of some minds, speculative difficulties as to the evidence of religion is the principal trial. A full conviction of its truth would constrain some to obedience.

Fourthly. The difficulties may be in the objector rather than in the religion.

1. Not sufficiently in earnest to be informed.

2. Secretly wishes religion not to be true.

3. Looks at objections rather than replies.

4. Treats the subject ludicrously.