History of Julius Caesar Vol. 1 of 2

By this expedition, the Republic gained great popularity throughout Greece; the Athenians and the Achaian league especially were lavish of thanks, and began from that time to consider the Romans as their protectors against their dangerous neighbours, the kings of Macedonia. As to the Illyrians, the lesson they had received was not sufficient to correct them of their piratical habits. Ten years later another expedition was sent to chastise the Istrians at the head of the Adriatic,[503 - Titus Livius, Epitome, XX., year of Rome 533. – Orosius, IV. xiii.] and soon afterwards the disobedience of Demetrius to the orders of the Senate brought war again upon Illyria. He was compelled to take refuge with Philip of Macedon, while the young king became the ally or subject of the Republic.[504 - Polybius, III. 16 et seq.] In the mean time a new war attracted the attention of the Romans.

Invasion of the Cisalpines (528).

IV. The idea of the Senate was evidently to push its domination towards the north of Italy, and thus to preserve it from the invasion of the Gauls. In 522, at the proposal of the tribune Flaminius, the Senones had been expelled from Picenum, and their lands, declared public domain, were distributed among the plebeians. This measure, a presage to the neighbouring Gaulish tribes of the lot reserved for them, excited among them great uneasiness, and they began to prepare for a formidable invasion. In 528, they called from the other side of the Alps a mass of barbarians of the warlike race of the Gesatæ.[505 - A people situated between the Rhone and the Alps. (Polyb., II. 22, 34.)] The terror at Rome was great. The same interests animated the peoples of Italy, and the fear of a danger equally threatening for all began to inspire them with the same spirit.[506 - “It was not Rome alone that the Italians, terrified by the Gaulish invasion, believed they had thus to defend; they understood that it was their own safety which was in danger.” (Polybius, II. 23.)] They rushed to arms; an army of 150,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry was sent into the field, and the census of men capable of bearing arms amounted to nearly 800,000. The enumeration of the contingents of each country[507 - The following, according to Polybius (II. 24), was the number of the forces of Italy: —] furnishes valuable information on the general population of Italy, which appears, at this period, to have been, without reckoning the slaves, about the same as at the present day, yet with this difference, that the men capable of bearing arms were then in a much greater proportion.[508 - See the Memoir of Zumpt, Stand der Bevölkerung im Alterthum. Berlin, 1841.] These documents also give rise to the remark that the Samnites, only forty years recovered from the disasters of their sanguinary struggles, could still furnish 77,000 men.

The Gauls penetrated to the centre of Tuscany, and at Fesulæ defeated a Roman army; but, intimidated by the unexpected arrival of the consul L. Æmilius coming from Rimini, they retired, when, meeting the other consul, Caius Atilius, who, returning from Sardinia, had landed at Pisa, they were enclosed between two armies, and were annihilated. In the following year, the Gaulish tribes, successively driven back to the other side of the Po, were defeated again on the banks of the Adda; the coalition of the Cisalpine peoples was dissolved, without leading to the complete submission of the country. The colonies of Cremona and Placentia contributed, nevertheless, to hold it in check.

While the north of Italy seemed sufficient to absorb the attention of the Romans, great events were passing in Spain.

Second Punic War (536-552).

V. Carthage, humiliated, had lost the empire of the sea, with Sicily and Sardinia. Rome, on the contrary, had strengthened herself by her conquests in the Mediterranean, in Illyria, and in the Cisalpine. Suddenly the scene changes: the dangers which threatened the African town disappear, Carthage rises from her abasement, and Rome, which had lately been able to count 800,000 men in condition to carry arms, will soon tremble for her own existence. A change so unforeseen is brought about by the mere appearance in the ranks of the Carthaginian army of a man of genius, Hannibal.

His father, Hamilcar, chief of the powerful faction of the Barcas, had saved Carthage by suppressing the insurrection of the mercenaries. Charged afterwards with the war in Spain, he had vanquished the most warlike peoples of that country, and formed in silence a formidable array. Having discovered early the merit of a young man named Hasdrubal, he took him into his favour with the intention of making him his successor. In taking him for his son-in-law, he entrusted to him the education of Hannibal, on whom rested his dearest hopes. Hamilcar having been slain in 526, Hasdrubal had taken his place at the head of the army.

The progress of the Carthaginians in Spain, and the state of their forces in that country, had alarmed the Senate, which, in 526, obliged the government of Carthage to subscribe to a new treaty, prohibiting the Punic army from passing the Ebro, and attacking the allies of the Republic.[509 - Polybius, III. 30.] This last article referred to the Saguntines, who had already had some disputes with the Carthaginians. The Romans affected not to consider them as aborigines, and founded their plea on a legend which represented this people as a colony from Ardea, contemporary with the Trojan war.[510 - Titus Livius, XXI. 7.] By a similar conduct Rome created allies in Spain to watch her old adversaries, and this time, as in the case of the Mamertines, she showed an interested sympathy in favour of a weak nation exposed to frequent collisions with the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal had received the order to carry into execution the new treaty; but he was assassinated by a Gaul, in 534, and the army, without waiting for orders from Carthage, chose by acclamation for its chief Hannibal, then twenty-nine years of age. In spite of the rival factions, this choice was ratified, and perhaps any hesitation on the part of the council in Carthage would only have led to the revolt of the troops. The party of the Barcas carried the question against the government, and confirmed the power of the young general. Adored by the soldiers, who saw in him their own pupil, Hannibal exercised over them an absolute authority, and believed that with their old band he could venture upon anything.

The Saguntines were at war with the Turbuletæ,[511 - Appian, Wars of Spain, 10.] allies or subjects of Carthage. In contempt of the treaty of 256, Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, and took it after a siege of several months. He pretended that, in attacking his own allies, the Saguntines had been the aggressors. The people of Saguntum hastened to implore the succour of Rome. The Senate confined itself to despatching commissioners, some to Hannibal, who gave them no attention, and others to Carthage, where they arrived only when Saguntum had ceased to exist. An immense booty, sent by the conqueror, had silenced the faction opposed to the Barcas, and the people, as well as the soldiers, elevated by success, breathed nothing but war. The Roman ambassadors, sent to require indemnities, and even to demand the head of Hannibal, were ill received, and returned declaring hostilities unavoidable.

Rome prepared for war with her usual firmness and energy. One of the consuls was ordered to pass into Sicily, and thence into Africa; the other to lead an army by sea to Spain, and expel the Carthaginians from that country. But, without waiting the issue of negotiations, Hannibal was in full march to transfer the war into Italy. Sometimes treating with the Celtiberian or Gaulish hordes to obtain a passage through their territory, sometimes intimidating them by his arms, he had reached the banks of the Rhone, when the consul charged with the conquest of Spain, P. Cornelius Scipio, landing at the eastern mouth of that river, learnt that Hannibal had already entered the Alps. He then leaves his army to his brother Cneius, returns promptly to Pisa, places himself at the head of the troops destined to fight the Boii, crosses the Po with them, hoping by this rapid movement to surprise the Carthaginian general at the moment when, fatigued and weakened, he entered the plains of Italy.

The two armies met on the banks of the Tessino (536). Scipio, defeated and wounded, fell back on the colony of Placentia. Rejoined in the neighbourhood of that town by his colleague Tib. Sempronius Longus, he again, on the Trebia, offered battle to the Carthaginians. A brilliant victory placed Hannibal in possession of a great part of Liguria and Cisalpine Gaul, the warlike hordes of which received him with enthusiasm and reinforced his army, reduced, after the passage of the mountains, to less than 30,000 men. Flattered by the reception of the Gauls, the Carthaginian general tried also to gain the Italiots, and, announcing himself as the liberator of oppressed peoples, he took care, after the victory, to set at liberty all the prisoners taken from the allies. He hoped that these liberated captives would become for him useful emissaries. In the spring of 537 he entered Etruria, crossed the marshes of the Val di Chiana, and, drawing the Roman army to the neighbourhood of the Lake Trasimenus, into an unfavourable locality, destroyed it almost totally.

The terror was great at Rome; yet the conqueror, after devastating Etruria, and attacking Spoletum in vain, crossed the Apennines, threw himself into Umbria and Picenum, and thence directed his march through Samnium towards the coast of Apulia. In fact, having reached the centre of Italy, deprived of all communication with the mother country, without the engines necessary for a siege, with no assured line of retreat, having behind him the army of Sempronius, what must Hannibal do? – Place the Apennines between himself and Rome, draw nearer to the populations more disposed in his favour, and then, by the conquest of the southern provinces, establish a solid basis of operation, in direct communication with Carthage. In spite of the victory of Trasimenus, his position was critical, for, except the Cisalpine Gauls, all the Italiot peoples remained faithful to Rome, and so far no one had come to increase his army.[512 - Polybius, III. 90. – “The allies had till then remained firm in their attachment.” (Titus Livius, XXII. 61.) – “This fidelity which they have preserved towards us in the midst of our reverses.” (Speech of Fabius, Titus Livius, XXII. 39.)] Thus Hannibal remained several months between Casilinum and Arpi, where Fabius, by his skilful movements, would have succeeded in starving the Carthaginian army, if the term of his command had not expired. Moreover, the popular party, irritated at a system of temporising which it accused of cowardice, raised to the consulship, as the colleague of Æmilius Paulus, Varro, a man of no capacity. Obliged to remain in Apulia, to procure subsistence for his troops, Hannibal, being attacked imprudently, entirely defeated, near Cannæ, two consular armies composed of eight legions and of an equal number of allies, amounting to 87,000 men (538).[513 - There were among the Roman troops Samnite cavalry. (Titus Livius, XXVII. 43.)] One of the consuls perished, the other escaped, followed only by a few horsemen. 40,000 Romans had been killed or taken, and Hannibal sent to Carthage a bushel of gold rings taken from the fingers of knights who lay on the field of battle.[514 - Titus Livius, XXII. 49; XXIII. 12. – “In the second Punic war, the use of rings had already become common; otherwise it would have been impossible for Hannibal to send three modii of rings to Carthage.” (Pliny, XXXIII. 6.) – We read in Appian: “The tribunes of the soldiers wear the gold ring, their inferiors have it of ivory.” (Punic Wars, VIII. cv.)] From that moment part of Samnium, Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium declared for the Carthaginians, while the Greek towns of the south of the peninsula remained favourable to the Romans.[515 - “The Greek towns, inclined to maintain their alliance with Rome.” (Titus Livius, XXIV. 1.) – Even in Bruttium, the small town of Petelia defended itself against Hannibal with the greatest energy; the women fought like the men. (Appian, VII. 29.)] About the same time, as an increase of ill fortune, L. Postumus, sent against the Gauls, was defeated, and his army cut to pieces.

The Romans always showed themselves admirable in adversity; and thus the Senate, by a skilful policy, went to meet the consul Varro, and thank him for not having despaired of the Republic; it would, however, no longer employ the troops which had retreated from the battle, but sent them into Sicily with a prohibition to return into Italy until the enemy had been driven out of it. They refused to ransom the prisoners in Hannibal’s hands. The fatherland, they said, had no need of men who allowed themselves to be taken arms in hand.[516 - Eutropius, III. 6.] This reply made people report at Rome that the man who possessed power was treated very differently from the humble citizen.[517 - Titus Livius, XXVI. 1.]

The idea of asking for peace presented itself to nobody. Each rivalled the other in sacrifices and devotion. New legions were raised, and there were enrolled 8,000 slaves, who were restored to freedom after the first combat.[518 - Titus Livius, XXIV. 14.] The treasury being empty, all the private fortunes were brought to its aid. The proprietors of slaves taken for the army, the farmers of the revenue charged with the furnishing of provisions, consented to be repaid only at the end of the war. Everybody, according to his means, maintained at his own expense freedmen to serve on the galleys. After the example of the Senate, widows and minors carried their gold and silver to the public treasury. It was forbidden for anybody to keep at home either jewels, plate, silver or copper money, above a certain value, and, by the law Oppia, even the toilette of the ladies was limited.[519 - “The Oppian law, proposed by the tribune C. Oppius, under the consulship of Q. Fabius and Tiberius Sempronius (539), in the height of the second Punic war, forbad the women to have for their use more than half an ounce of gold, to wear dresses of different colours, &c., to be driven or carried about Rome, within a radius of seven miles, in a chariot drawn by horses, except to attend the public sacrifices.” This law, being only temporary, was revoked, in spite of the opposition of P. Cato, in 559. (Titus Livius, XXXIV. 1, 6.)] Lastly, the duration of family mourning for relatives slain before the enemy was restricted to thirty days.[520 - Valerius Maximus, I. i. 15.]

After the victory of Cannæ it would have been more easy for Hannibal to march straight upon Rome than after Trasimenus; yet, since so great a captain did not think this possible to attempt, it is not uninteresting to inquire into his motives. In the first place, his principal force was in Numidian cavalry, which would have been useless in a siege;[521 - “It was in his cavalry that Hannibal placed all his hopes.” (Polybius, III. 101.) – “Hannibal’s cavalry alone caused the victories of Carthage and the defeats of Rome.” (Polybius, IX. 3.) – “The loss of 500 Numidians was felt more by Hannibal than any other check, and from that time he had no longer the superiority in cavalry which had previously given him so much advantage” (543). (Titus Livius, XXVI. 38.)] then, he had generally the inferiority in attacking fortresses. Thus, after Trebia, he could not reduce Placentia;[522 - “Hannibal remembered how he had failed before Placentia.” (Titus Livius, XXVII. 39.)] after Trasimenus, he failed before Spoletum; three times he marched upon Naples, without venturing to attack it; later still, he was obliged to abandon the sieges of Nola, Cumæ, and Casilinum.[523 - Titus Livius, XXIII. 15 and 18. – Hannibal reduced by famine the fortresses of Casilinum and Nuceria; as to the citadel of Tarentum, it resisted five years, and could not be taken by force. (Titus Livius, XXVII. 25.)] What, then, could be more natural than his hesitation to attack Rome, defended by a numerous population, accustomed to the use of arms?

The most striking proof of the genius of Hannibal is the fact of his having remained sixteen years in Italy, left almost to his own forces, reduced to the necessity of recruiting his army solely among his new allies, and of subsisting at their expense, ill seconded by the Senate of his own country, having always to face at least two consular armies, and, lastly, shut up in the peninsula by the Roman fleets, which guarded its coasts to intercept reinforcements from Carthage. His constant thought, therefore, was to make himself master of some important points of the coast in order to open a communication with Africa. After Cannæ, he occupies Capua, seeks to gain the sea by Naples,[524 - “Hannibal descends towards Naples, having at heart to secure a maritime place to receive succours from Africa.” (Titus Livius, XXIII. 15.)] Cumæ, Puteoli; unable to effect these objects, he seizes upon Arpi and Salapia, on the eastern coast, where he hopes to meet the ambassadors of the King of Macedonia. He next makes Bruttium his base of operation, and his attempts are directed against the maritime places, now against Brundusium and Tarentum, now against Locri and Rhegium.

All the defeats sustained by the generals of the Republic had been caused, first, by the superiority of the Numidian cavalry, and the inferiority of the hastily levied Latin soldiers,[525 - Polybius, III. 106.] opposed to old veteran troops; and, next, by excessive rashness in face of an able captain, who drew his adversaries to the position which he had chosen. Nevertheless, Hannibal, considerably weakened by his victories, exclaimed, after Cannæ, as Pyrrhus had done after Heraclea, that such another success would be his ruin.[526 - Appian, Wars of Hannibal, 26.] Q. Fabius Maximus, recalled to power (539), continued a system of methodical war; while Marcellus, his colleague, bolder,[527 - Plutarch, Marcellus, 11, 33.] assumed the offensive, and arrested the progress of the enemy, by obliging him to shut himself up in a trapezium, formed on the north by Capua and Arpi, on the south by Rhegium and Tarentum. In 543 the war was entirely concentrated round two places; the citadel of Tarentum, blockaded by the Carthaginians, and Capua, besieged by the two consuls. These had surrounded themselves with lines of countervallation against the place, and of circumvallation against the attacks from without. Hannibal, having failed in his attempt to force these latter, marched upon Rome, in the hope of causing the siege of Capua to be raised, and by separating the two consular armies, defeating them one after the other in the plain country. Having arrived under the walls of the capital, and foreseeing too many difficulties in the way of making himself master of so large a town, he abandoned his plan of attack, and fell back to the environs of Rhegium. His abode there was prolonged during several years, with alternations of reverse and success, in the south of Italy, the populations of which were favourable to him; avoiding engagements, keeping near the sea, and not going beyond the southern extremity of the territory of Samnium.

In 547, a great army, which had left Spain under the command of one of his brothers, Hasdrubal, had crossed the Alps, and was advancing to unite with him, marching along the coast of the Adriatic. Two consular armies were charged with the war against the Carthaginians: one, under the command of the consul M. Livius Salinator, in Umbria; the other, having at its head the consul C. Claudius Nero, held Hannibal in check in Lucania, and had even obtained an advantage over him at Grumentum. Hannibal had advanced as far as Canusium, when the consul Claudius Nero, informed of the numerical superiority of the army of succour, leaves his camp under the guard of Q. Cassius, his lieutenant, conceals his departure, effects his junction with his colleague, and defeats, near the Metaurus, Hasdrubal, who perished in the battle with all his army.[528 - Titus Livius, XXVII. 49.] From that moment Hannibal foresees the fate of Carthage; he abandons Apulia, and even Lucania, and retires into the only country which had remained faithful, Bruttium. He remains shut up there five years more, in continual expectation of reinforcements,[529 - Appian, Wars of Hannibal, 54.] and only quits Italy when his country, threatened by the Roman legions, already on the African soil, calls him home to her defence.

In this war the marine of the two nations performed an important part. The Romans strained every nerve to remain masters of the sea; their fleets, stationed at Ostia, Brundusium, and Lilybæum, kept incessantly the most active watch upon the coasts of Italy; they even made cruises to the neighbourhood of Carthage and as far as Greece.[530 - In 536, Rome had at sea 220 quinquiremes and 20 small vessels (Titus Livius, XXI. 17), with which she protected efficiently the coasts of Sicily and Italy. (Titus Livius, XXI. 49, 51.) – In 537, Scipio, with 35 vessels, destroyed a Carthaginian fleet at the mouth of the Ebro (Titus Livius, XXII. 19), and the consul Servilius Geminus effected a landing in Africa with 120 vessels, in order to prevent Carthage from sending reinforcements to Hannibal. (Titus Livius, XXII. 31.) – In 538, the fleet of Sicily is reinforced with 25 ships. (Titus Livius, XXII. 37.) – In 539, Valerius Lævinus had 25 vessels to protect the coast of the Adriatic, and Fluvius the same number to watch the coast of Ostia (Titus Livius, XXIII. 32) after which the Adriatic fleet, raised to 55 sails, is sent to act as a check upon Macedonia. (Titus Livius, XXIII. 38.) – The same year, the fleet of Sicily, under Titus Otacilius, defeats the Carthaginians. (Titus Livius, XXIII. 41.) – In 540 Rome has 150 vessels (Titus Livius, XXIV. 11) this year and the following, the Roman fleet defends Apollonia, attacked by the King of Macedonia, and lands troops which ravage the territory of Utica. The effective strength of the Roman fleet appears not to have varied until 543, the epoch at which Greece again required the presence of 50 Roman ships and Sicily 100. (Titus Livius, XXVI. 1.) – In 544, 20 vessels were stationed in the waters of Rhegium, to secure the passage of provisions between Sicily and the garrison of Tarentum. (Titus Livius, XXVI. 39.) – In 545, 30 sails are detached from the fleet of Sicily to cruise before that town. (Titus Livius, XXVII. 22.) – In 546, Carthage was preparing a formidable fleet of 200 sails (Titus Livius, XXVII. 22); Rome opposes it with 280 ships: 30 defend the coast of Spain, 50 guard Sardinia, 50 the mouths of the Tiber, 50 Macedonia, 100 are stationed in Sicily, ready to make a descent in Africa, and the Carthaginian fleet is beaten before Clupea. (Titus Livius, XXVII. 29.) – Lastly, in 547, a second victory gained by Valerius Lævinus renders the sea entirely free. (Titus Livius, XXVIII. 4.)] The difficulty of the direct communications induced the Carthaginians to send their troops by way of Spain and the Alps, where their armies recruited on the road, rather than dispatch them to the southern coast of Italy. Hannibal received but feeble reinforcements;[531 - “The Carthaginians, occupied only with the care of maintaining themselves in Spain, sent no succour to Hannibal, as though he had had nothing but successes in Italy.” (Titus Livius, XXVIII. 12.)] Livy mentions two only: the first of 4,000 Numidians and 40 elephants; and the second, brought by Bomilcar to the coast of the Ionian Gulf, near Locri.[532 - Titus Livius, XXIII. 13 and 41.] All the other convoys appear to have been intercepted, and one of the most considerable, laden with stores and troops, was destroyed on the coast of Sicily.[533 - Appian, Wars of Hannibal, liv.]

We cannot but admire the constancy of the Romans in face of enemies who threatened them on all sides. During the same period they repressed the Cisalpine Gauls and the Etruscans, combated the King of Macedonia, the ally of Hannibal, sustained a fierce war in Spain, and resisted in Sicily the attacks of the Syracusans, who, after the death of Hiero, had declared against the Republic. It took three years to reduce Syracuse, defended by Archimedes. Rome kept on foot, as long as the Second Punic war lasted, from sixteen to twenty-four legions,[534 - In 540, Rome had on foot eighteen legions; in 541, twenty legions; in 542 and 543, twenty-three legions; in 544 and 546, twenty-one; in 547, twenty-three; in 551, twenty; in 552, sixteen; in 553, fourteen; in 554, the number is reduced to six. (Titus Livius, XXIV. 11-44; XXV. 3; XXVI. 1, 28; XXVII. 22, 36; XXX. 2, 27, 41; XXXI. 8.)] recruited only in the town and in Latium.[535 - “The Romans raised their infantry and cavalry only in Rome and Latium.” (Titus Livius, XXII. 37.)] These twenty-three legions represented an effective force of about 100,000 men, a number which will not appear exaggerated if we compare it with the census of 534, which gave 270,213 men, and only comprised persons in a condition to bear arms.

In the thirteenth year of the war the chances seemed in favour of the Republic. P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the consul defeated at Trebia, had just expelled the Carthaginians from Spain. The people, recognising his genius, had conferred upon him, six years before, the powers of proconsul, though he was only twenty-four years of age. On his return to Rome, Scipio, elected consul (549), passed into Sicily, and from thence to Africa, where, after a campaign of two years, he defeated Hannibal in the plains of Zama, and compelled the rival of Rome to sue for peace (552). The Senate accorded to the conqueror the greatest honour which a Republic can confer upon one of her citizens – she left it to him to dictate terms to the vanquished. Carthage was compelled to give up her ships and her elephants, to pay 10,000 talents (58,000,000 francs [£2,320,000]), and, finally, to enter into the humiliating engagement not to make war in future without the authorisation of Rome.

Results of the Second Punic War.

VI. The second Punic war ended in the submission of Carthage and Spain, but it was at the price of painful sacrifices. During this struggle of sixteen years, a great number of the most distinguished citizens had perished; at Cannæ alone two thousand seven hundred knights, two questors, twenty-one tribunes of the soldiers, and many old consuls, prætors, and ediles were slain; and so many senators had fallen, that it was necessary to name a hundred and seventy-seven new ones, taken from among those who had occupied the magistracies.[536 - Titus Livius, XXIII. 23.] But such hard trials had tempered anew the national character.[537 - Q. Metellus said “that the invasion of Hannibal had re-awakened the slumbering virtue of the Roman people.” (Valerius Maximus, VII. ii. 3.)] The Republic felt her strength and her resources unfold themselves; she rejoiced in her victories with a just pride, without yet experiencing the intoxication of a too great fortune, and new bonds were formed between the different peoples of Italy. War against a foreign invasion, in fact, has always the immense advantage of putting an end to internal dissensions, and unites the citizens against the common enemy. The greater part of the allies gave unequivocable proofs of their devotion. The Republic owed its safety, after the defeat of Cannæ, to the assistance of eighteen colonies, which furnished men and money.[538 - The Senate demanded of thirty colonies men and money. Eighteen gave both with eagerness, namely, Signia, Norba, Saticulum, Brundusium, Fregellæ, Luceria, Venusia, Adria, Firmum, Ariminum, Pontia, Pæstum, Cosa, Beneventum, Isernia, Spoletum, Placentia, and Cremona. The twelve colonies which refused to give any succours, pretending that they had neither men nor money, were: Nepete, Sutrium, Ardea, Cales, Alba, Carseoli, Cora, Suessa, Setia, Circeii, Narnia, Interamna. (Titus Livius, XXVII. 9.)] The fear of Hannibal had fortunately given strength to concord, both in Rome and in Italy: no more quarrels between the two orders,[539 - “The quarrels and struggles between the two parties ended in the second Punic war.” (Sallust, Fragments, I. vii.)] no more divisions between the governing and the governed. Sometimes the Senate refers to the people the most serious questions; sometimes the people, full of trust in the Senate, submits beforehand to its decision.[540 - “Four tribes referred it to the Senate to grant the right of suffrage to Formiæ, Fundi, and Arpinum; but they were told in reply that to the people alone belonged the right of suffrage.” (Titus Livius, XXXVIII. 36.)]

It was especially during the struggle against Hannibal that the inconvenience of the duality and of the annual change of the consular powers became evident;[541 - “The annual change of generals was disastrous to the Romans. They recalled all those who had experience in war, as though they had been sent not to fight, but only to practice.” (Zonaras, Annales, VIII. 16.)] but this never-ceasing cause of weakness was, as we have seen before, compensated by the spirit of patriotism. Here is a striking example: while Fabius was pro-dictator, Minucius, chief of the cavalry, was, contrary to the usual custom, invested with the same powers. Hurried on by his temper, he compromised the army, which was saved by Fabius. He acknowledged his error, submitted willingly to the orders of his colleague, and thus restored, by his own voluntary act, the unity of the command.[542 - Titus Livius, XXII. 29.] As to the continual change of the military chiefs, the force of circumstances rendered it necessary to break through this custom. The two Scipios remained seven years at the head of the army of Spain; Scipio Africanus succeeded them for almost as long a period. The Senate and the people had decided that, during the war of Italy, the powers of the proconsuls and prætors might be prorogued, and that the same consuls might be re-elected as often as might be thought fit.[543 - Titus Livius, XXVII. 5, 7.] And subsequently, in the campaign against Philip, the tribunes pointed out in the following terms the disadvantage of such frequent changes: “During the four years that the war of Macedonia lasted, Sulpicius had passed the greater part of his consulship in seeking Philip and his army; Villius had overtaken the enemy, but had been recalled before giving battle; Quinctius, retained the greater part of the year at Rome by religious cares, would have pushed the war with sufficient vigour to have entirely terminated it, if he could have arrived at his destination before the season was so far advanced. He had hardly entered his winter quarters, when he made preparations for recommencing the campaign with the spring, with a view of finishing it successfully, provided no successor came to snatch victory from him.”[544 - Titus Livius, XXXII. 28.] These arguments prevailed, and the consul was prorogued in his command.

Thus continual wars tended to introduce the stability of military powers and the permanence of armies. The same legions had passed ten years in Spain; others had been nearly as long in Sicily; and though, at the expiration of their service, the old soldiers were dismissed, the legions remained always under arms. Hence arose the necessity of giving lands to the soldiers who had finished their time of service; and, in 552, there were assigned to Scipio’s veterans, for each year of service in Africa and Spain, two acres of the lands confiscated from the Samnites and Apulians.[545 - Titus Livius, XXXI. 4, 49.]

It was the first time that Rome took foreign troops into her pay, sometimes Celtiberians, at others Cretans sent by Hiero of Syracuse,[546 - Titus Livius, XXIV. 49. – Polybius, III. 75.] in fact, mercenaries, and a body of discontented Gauls who had abandoned the Carthaginian army.[547 - Zonaras, Annales, VIII. 16.]

Many of the inhabitants of the allied towns were drawn to Rome,[548 - Titus Livius, XXXIX. 3.] where, in spite of the sacrifices imposed by the wars, commerce and luxury increased. The spoils which Marcellus brought from Sicily, and especially from Syracuse, had given development to the taste for the arts, and this consul boasted of having been the first who caused his countrymen to appreciate and admire the masterpieces of Greece.[549 - Plutarch, Marcellus, 28.] The games of the circus, in the middle of the sixth century, began to be more in favour. Junius and Decius Brutus had, in 490, exhibited for the first time the combats of gladiators, the number of which was soon increased to twenty-two pairs.[550 - Titus Livius, XXIII. 30.] Towards this period, also (559), theatrical representations were first given by the ediles.[551 - Titus Livius, XXXIV. 54.] The spirit of speculation had taken possession of the high classes, as appears by the law forbidding the senators (law Claudia, 536) to maintain at sea ships of a tonnage of more than three hundred amphoræ; as the public wealth increased, the knights, composed of the class who paid most taxes, increased also, and tended to separate into two categories, some serving in the cavalry, and possessing the horse furnished by the State (equus publicus),[552 - “Et equites Romanos milites et negociatores.” (Sallust, Jugurtha, 65.)] the others devoting themselves to commerce and financial operations. The knights had long been employed in civil commissions,[553 - “In 342, a senator and two knights were charged, during a famine, with the provisioning of Rome.” (Titus Livius, IV. 3.)] and were often called to the high magistracies; and therefore Perseus justly called them “the nursery of the Senate, and the young nobility out of which issued consuls and generals (imperatores).”[554 - Seminarium senatus. (Titus Livius, XLII. 61.)] During the Punic wars they had rendered great services by making large advances for the provisioning of the armies;[555 - Titus Livius, XXIII. 49. – Valerius Maximus, V. vi. 8.] and if some, as undertakers of transports, had enriched themselves at the expense of the State, the Senate hesitated in punishing their embezzlements, for fear of alienating this class, already powerful.[556 - Titus Livius, XXI. 63; XXV. 3.] The territorial wealth was partly in the hands of the great proprietors; this appears from several facts, and, among others, from the hospitality given by a lady of Apulia to 10,000 Roman soldiers, who had escaped from the battle of Cannæ, whom she entertained at her own private cost on her own lands.[557 - Valerius Maximus, IV. viii. 2.]

Respect for the higher classes had been somewhat shaken, as we learn from the adoption of a measure of apparently little importance. Since the fall of the kingly power, there had been established in the public games no distinction between the spectators. Deference for authority rendered all classification superfluous, and “never would a plebeian,” says Valerius Maximus,[558 - Valerius Maximus, IV. v. 1.] “have ventured to place himself before a senator.” But, towards 560, a law was passed for assigning to the members of the Senate reserved places. It is necessary, for the good order of society, to increase the severity of the laws as the feeling of the social hierarchy becomes weakened.

Circumstances had brought other changes; the tribuneship, without being abolished, had become an auxiliary of the aristocracy. The tribunes no longer exclusively represented the plebeian order; they were admitted into the Senate; they formed part of the government, and employed their authority in the interest of justice and the fatherland.[559 - They had no deliberative voice, because, according to the public Roman law, no acting magistrate could vote. (See Mommsen, i. 187.)] The three kinds of comitia still remained,[560 - “Now you have still the comitia by centuries, and the comitia by tribes. As for the comitia by curiæ, they are observed only for the auspices.” (Cicero, Second Oration on the Agrarian Law, 9.)] but some modifications had been introduced into them. The assembly of the curiæ[561 - The ancient mode of division by curiæ had lost all significance and ceased to be in use. (Ovid, Fasti, II. 1. 531.) So Cicero says, speaking of them: “The comitia, which are retained only for the sake of form, and because of the auspices, and which, represented by the thirty lictors, are but the appearance of what was before. Ad speciem atque usurpationem vetustatis.” (Oration on the Agrarian Law, II. 12.) – In the latter times of the Republic, the curiæ, in the election of the magistrates, had only the inauguration of the flamens, of the king of the sacrifices (rex sacrificulus), and probably the choice of the grand curion (curio maximus). (Titus Livius, XXVII. 8. – Dionysius of Halicarnassus, V. 1. – Aulus Gellius, XV. 27. – Titus Livius, XXVII. vi. 36.)] consisted now only of useless formalities. Their attributes, more limited every day, were reduced to the conferring of the imperium, and the deciding of certain questions about auspices and religion. The comitia by centuries, which in their origin were the assembly of the people in arms, voting in the Campus Martius, and nominating their military chiefs, retained the same privileges; only, the century had become a subdivision of the tribe. All the citizens inscribed in each of the thirty-five tribes were separated into five classes, according to their fortune; each class was divided into two centuries, the one of the young men (juniores) the other of the older men (seniores).

As to the comitia by tribes, in which each voted without distinction of rank or fortune, their legislative power continued to increase as that of the comitia by centuries diminished.

Thus the Roman institutions, while appearing to remain the same, were incessantly changing. The political assemblies, the laws of the Twelve Tables, the classes established by Servius Tullius, the yearly election to offices, the military services, the tribuneship, the edileship, all seemed to remain as in the past, and in reality all had changed through the force of circumstances. Nevertheless, this appearance of immobility in the midst of progressing society was one advantage of Roman manners. Religious observers of tradition and ancient customs, the Romans did not appear to destroy what they displaced; they applied ancient forms to new principles, and thus introduced innovations without disturbance, and without weakening the prestige of institutions consecrated by time.

The Macedonian War (554).

VII. During the second Punic war, Philip III., king of Macedonia, had attacked the Roman settlements in Illyria, invaded several provinces of Greece, and made an alliance with Hannibal. Obliged to check these dangerous aggressions, the Senate, from 540 to 548, maintained large forces on the coasts of Epirus and Macedonia; and, united with the Ætolian league, and with Attalus, king of Pergamus, had forced Philip to conclude peace. But in 553, after the victory of Zama, when this prince again attacked the free cities of Greece and Asia allied to Rome, war was declared against him. The Senate could not forget that at this last battle a Macedonian contingent was found among the Carthaginian troops, and that still there remained in Greece a large number of Roman citizens sold for slaves after the battle of Cannæ.[562 - “Achaia alone had twelve hundred for her share.” (Titus Livius, XXXIV. 50.)] Thus from each war was born a new war, and every success was destined to force the Republic into the pursuit of others. Now the Adriatic was to be passed, first, to curb the power of the Macedonians, and then to call to liberty those famous towns, the cradles of civilisation. The destinies of Greece could not be a matter of indifference to the Romans, who had borrowed her laws, her science, her literature, and her arts.

Sulpicius, appointed to combat Philip, landed on the coast of Epirus, and penetrated into Macedonia, where he gained a succession of victories, while one of his lieutenants, sent to Greece with the fleet, caused the siege of Athens to be raised. During two years the war languished, but the Roman fleet, combined with that of Attalus and the Rhodians, remained master of the sea (555). T. Quinctius Flamininus, raised to the consulship while still young, justified, by his intelligence and energy, the confidence of his fellow-citizens. He detached the Achaians and Bœtians from their alliance with the King of Macedonia, and, with the aid of the Ætolians, gained the battle of Cynoscephalæ in Thessaly (557), where the legion routed the celebrated phalanx of Philip II. and Alexander the Great. Philip III., compelled to make peace, was fain to accept hard conditions; the first of which was the obligation to withdraw his garrisons from the towns of Greece and Asia, and the prohibition to make war without the permission of the Senate.

The recital of Livy, which speaks of the decree proclaiming liberty to Greece, deserves to be quoted. We see there what value the Senate then attached to moral influence, and to that true popularity which the glory of having freed a people gives: —

“The epoch of the celebration of the Isthmian games generally attracted a great concourse of spectators, either because of the natural taste of the Greeks for all sorts of games, or because of the situation of Corinth, which, seated on two seas, offered easy access to the curious. But on this occasion an immense multitude flocked thither from all parts, in expectation of the future fate of Greece in general, and of each people in particular: this was the only subject of thought and conversation. The Romans take their place, and the herald, according to custom, advances into the middle of the arena, whence the games are announced according to a solemn form. The trumpet sounds, silence is proclaimed, and the herald pronounces these words: ‘The Roman Senate, and S.T. Quinctius, imperator, conquerors of Philip and the Macedonians, re-establish in the enjoyment of liberty, their laws, and privileges, the Corinthians, the Phocians, the Locrians, the island of Eubœa, the Magnetes, the Thessalians, the Perrhœbi, and the Achæans of Phthiotis.’ These were the names of all the nations which had been under the dominion of Philip. At this proclamation, the assembly was overcome with excess of joy. Hardly anybody could believe what he heard. The Greeks looked at each other as if they were still in the illusions of a pleasant dream, to be dissipated on awakening, and, distrusting the evidence of their ears, they asked their neighbours if they were not deceived. The herald is recalled, each man burning, not only to hear, but to see the messenger of such good news; he reads the decree a second time. Then, no longer able to doubt their happiness, they uttered cries of joy, and bestowed on their liberator such loud and repeated applause as make it easy to see that, of all good, liberty is that which has most charm for the multitude. Then the games were celebrated, but hastily, and without attracting the looks or the attention of the spectators. One interest alone absorbed their souls, and took from them the feeling of every other pleasure.

“The games ended, the people rush towards the Roman general; everybody is anxious to greet him, to take his hand, to cast before him crowns of flowers and of ribbons, and the crowd was so great that he was almost suffocated. He was but thirty-three years of age, and the vigour of life, joined with the intoxication of a glory so dazzling, gave him strength to bear up against such a trial. The joy of the peoples was not confined to the enthusiasm of the moment: the impression was kept up long afterwards in their thoughts and speech. ‘There was then,’ they said, ‘one nation upon earth, which, at its own cost, at the price of fatigues and perils, made war for the liberty of peoples even though removed from their frontiers and continent: this nation crossed the seas, in order that there should not be in the whole world one single unjust government, and that right, equity, and law should be everywhere dominant. The voice of a herald had been sufficient to restore freedom to all the cities of Greece and Asia. The idea alone of such a design supposed a rare greatness of soul; but to execute it needed as much courage as fortune.’”[563 - Titus Livius, XXXIII. 32.]

There was, however, a shadow on the picture. All Peloponnesus was not freed, and Flamininus, after having taken several of his possessions from Nabis, king of Sparta, had concluded peace with him, without continuing the siege of Lacedæmon, of which he dreaded the length. He feared also the arrival of a more dangerous enemy, Antiochus III., who had already reached Thrace, and threatened to go over into Greece with a considerable army. For this the allied Greeks, occupied only with their own interests, reproached the Roman consul with having concluded peace too hastily with Philip, whom, in their opinion, he could have annihilated.[564 - “The allies exclaimed that the war must be continued, and the tyrant exterminated, without which the liberty of Greece would be always in danger. It would have been better not to have taken up arms at all than to lay them down without having attained the end. The consul replied, ‘If the siege of Lacedæmon retained the army a long time, what other troops could Rome oppose to a monarch (Antiochus) so powerful and so formidable?’” (Titus Livius, XXXIV. 33.)] But Flamininus replied that he was not commissioned to dethrone Philip, and that the existence of the kingdom of Macedonia was necessary as a barrier against the barbarians of Thrace, Illyria, and Gaul.[565 - Titus Livius, XXXIII. 12.] Meanwhile, accompanied even to their ships by the acclamations of the people, the Roman troops evacuated the cities restored to liberty (560), and Flamininus returned to a triumph at Rome, bringing with him that glorious protectorate of Greece, so long an object of envy to the successors of Alexander.

War against Antiochus (563).

VIII. The policy of the Senate had been to make Macedonia a rampart against the Thracians, and Greece herself a rampart against Macedonia. But, though the Romans had freed the Achæan league, they did not intend to create a formidable power or confederation. Then, as formerly, the Athenians, the Spartans, the Bœotians, the Ætolians, and, finally, the Achæans, each endeavoured to constitute an Hellenic league for their own advantage; and each aspiring to dominate over the others, turned alternately to those from whom it hoped the most efficient support at the time. In the Hellenic peninsula, properly so called, the Ætolians, to whose territory the Senate had promised to join Phocis and Locris, coveted the cities of Thessaly, which the Romans obstinately refused them.

Thus, although reinstated in the possession of their independence, neither the Ætolians, the Achæans, nor yet the Spartans, were satisfied: they all dreamt of aggrandisement. The Ætolians, more impatient, made, in 562, three simultaneous attempts against Thessaly, the island of Eubœa, and Peloponnesus. Having only succeeded in seizing Demetrias, they called Antiochus III. to Greece, that they might place him at the head of the hegemony, which they sought in vain to obtain from the Romans.

The better part of the immense heritage left by Alexander the Great had fallen to this prince. Already, some years before, Flamininus had given him notice that it belonged to the honour of the Republic not to abandon Greece, of which the Roman people had loudly proclaimed itself the liberator; and that after having delivered it from the yoke of Philip, the Senate now wished to free from the dominion of Antiochus all the Asian cities of Hellenic origin.[566 - Titus Livius, XXXIV. 58.] Hannibal, who had taken refuge with the King of Syria, encouraged him to resist, by engaging him to carry the struggle into Italy, as he himself had done. War was then declared by the Romans. To maintain the independence of Greece against an Asiatic prince was at once to fulfil treaties and undertake the defence of civilisation against barbarism. Thus, in proclaiming the most generous ideas, the Republic justified its ambition.

The services rendered by Rome were already forgotten.[567 - “Other peoples of Greece had shown in this way a no less culpable forgetfulness of the benefits of the Roman people.” (Titus Livius, XXXVI. 22.)] Antiochus thus found numerous allies in Greece, secret or declared. He organised a formidable confederacy, into which entered the Ætolians, the Athamanes, the Elians, and the Bœotians, and, having landed at Chalcis, conquered Eubœa and Thessaly. The Romans opposed to him the King of Macedonia and the Achæans. Beaten at Thermopylæ, in 563, by the consul Acilius Glabrio, aided by Philip, the King of Syria withdrew to Asia, and the Ætolians, left to themselves, demanded peace, which was granted them in 563.

It was not enough to have compelled Antiochus to abandon Greece. L. Scipio, having his brother, the vanquisher of Carthage, for his lieutenant, went in 564 to seek him out in his own territory. Philip favoured the passage of the Roman army, which crossed Macedonia, Thrace, and the Hellespont without difficulty. The victories gained at Myonnesus by sea, and at Magnesia by land, terminated the campaign, and compelled Antiochus to yield up all his provinces on this side Mount Taurus, and pay 15,000 talents – a third more than the tax imposed on Carthage after the second Punic war. The Senate, far from reducing Asia then to a province, exacted only just and moderate conditions.[568 - Titus Livius, XXXVII. 45.] All the Greek towns of that country were declared free, and the Romans only occupied certain important points, and enriched their allies at the expense of Syria. The King of Pergamus and the Rhodian fleet had seconded the Roman army. Eumenes II., the successor of Attalus I., saw his kingdom increased; Rhodes obtained Lycia and Caria; Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, who had given aid to Antiochus, paid two hundred talents.[569 - Appian, Wars of Hannibal, 43.]

The War in the Cisalpine (558-579).

IX. The prompt submission of the East was a fortunate occurrence for the Republic, for near at home, enemies, always eager and watchful, might at any moment, supported or excited by their brethren on the other side of the Alps, attack her in the very centre of her empire.

Indeed, since the time of Hannibal, war had been perpetuated in the Cisalpine, the bellicose tribes of which, though often beaten, engaged continually in new insurrections. The settlement of the affairs of Macedonia left the Senate free to act with more vigour, and in 558 the defeat of the Ligures, of the Boii, of the Insubres, and of the Cenomani, damped the ardour of these barbarous peoples. The Ligures and the Boii, however, continued the strife; but the bloody battle of 561, fought near Modena, and, later, the ravages committed by L. Flamininus, brother of the conqueror of Cynoscephalæ, and Scipio Nasica, during the following years, obliged the Boii to treat. Compelled to yield the half of their territory, they retired towards the Danube in 564, and three years afterwards Cisalpine Gaul was formed into a Roman province.

As to the Ligures, they maintained a war of desperation to the end of the century. Their resistance was such that Rome was obliged to meet it with measures of excessive rigour; and in 574, more than 47,000 Ligures were transported into a part of Samnium which had been left almost without inhabitants since the war with Hannibal. In 581, lands beyond the Po were distributed to other Ligures.[570 - Titus Livius, XL. 38; XLII. 22.] Every year the frontiers receded more towards the north, and military roads,[571 - Roads from Arezzo to Bologna, from Placentia to Rimini (Titus Livius, XXXIX. 2), and from Bologna to Aquileia.] the foundation of important colonies, secured the march of the armies – a system which had been interrupted during the second Punic war, but was afterwards adopted, and especially applied to the south of Italy and the Cisalpine.[572 - Roman Colonies – 488-608.Æsulum (507), or Æsium, according to Mommsen, Jesi in Umbria, on the River Æsis.Alsium (507), a maritime colony, Etruria (Via Aurelia); Palo, near Porto.Fregenæ (509), a maritime colony, Etruria (Via Aurelia); Torre Maccarese.Pyrgi (before 536), maritime colony, Etruria (Via Aurelia); Santa Severa.Castrum (555), Pagus, near Sylaceum; Bruttium, near Squillace; united in 631 to the colony Minerviæ.Puteoli (560), maritime colony, Campania; Pozzuoli; Prefecture.Vulturnum (560), maritime colony, Campania; Castelamare, or Castel di Volturno; Prefecture.Liternum (560), maritime colony, Campania; Tor di Patria, near the Lago di Patria; Prefecture.Salernum (560), maritime colony, Campania; Salerno; decreed three years before.Buxentum (560), maritime colony, Lucania; Policastro.Sipontum (560), maritime colony, Apulia; Santa Maria di Siponto; recolonised.Tempsa (Temesa) (560), maritime colony, Bruttium; perhaps near to Torre del Piano del Casale.Croton (560), maritime colony, Bruttium; Cotrone.Potentia (570), maritime colony, Picenum; Porto di Potenza, or di Ricanati.Pisaurum (570), maritime colony, Gaulish Umbria (Via Flaminia); Pesaro.Parma (571), Cispadane Gaul (Via Æmilia); Parma; Prefecture.Mutina (571), Cispadane Gaul (Via Æmilia); Modena; Prefecture.Saturnia (571), Etruria (centre); Saturnia.Graviscæ (573), maritime colony, Etruria (south) (Via Aurelia); San Clementino or Le Saline (?).Luna (577), Etruria (north), (Via Aurelia); Luni, near Sarzana.Auximum (597), maritime colony, Picenum; Osimo.Latin Colonies: 488-608.Firmum (490), Picenum (Via Valeria); Fermo.Æsernia (491), Samnium; Isernia.Brundisium (510), Iapygian Calabria (Via Egnatia); Brindisi.Spoletum (513), Umbria (Via Flaminia); Spoleto.Cremona (536), Transpadane Gaul; Cremona; reinforced in 560.Placentia (536), Cispadane Gaul (Via Æmilia); Piacenza.Copiæ (territory of Thurium) (561), Lucania.Vibo, or Vibona Valentia, called also Hipponium, Bruttium (565, or perhaps 515); Bibona. Monte-Leone.Bononia (565), Cispadane Gaul (Via Æmilia); Bologna.Aquileia (573), Transpadane Gaul; Aquileia.Carteia (573), Spain; St. Roque, in the Bay of Gibraltar.]

In achieving the submission of this last province, Rome had put an end to other less important wars. In 577 she reduced the Istrians; in 579, the Sardinians and the Corsicans; finally, from 569 to 573, she extended her conquests into Spain, where she met the same enemies as Carthage had encountered.