Ad Infinitum: A Biography of Latin

(#litres_trial_promo) Hannibal himself had been educated in Greek and was an author in it, and in fact his old tutor Sosylus of Sparta accompanied him on his campaigns and wrote up their history in the language. Other Greeks, Silenus and Chaereas, also were involved as chroniclers.

(#litres_trial_promo) Phoenicians, like those who founded Carthage, might have been the ones to give the Greeks their original letters (tá phoinikḗia grámmata, as the Greeks still called them); but Carthage’s nobility had nevertheless been drawn into the cultural force-field created by the application of those letters to Greek, recognizing it as the international language par excellence—or more authentically, in Greek, kat’exokhḗn. When, during a lull in his campaign in 205, Hannibal set an altar inscribed with his achievements in the temple of Juno at Lacinia, on the point of Italy’s instep that faced the Ionian Sea, he used both Punic and Greek, but not Latin or Oscan.

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In 202 BC, with Carthage defeated, Rome can with hindsight be seen to have stood at a crossroads. It held, in principle, a score still to be settled with Philip V of Macedon, who had allied with Carthage against Rome; and Antiochus III, widely victorious Seleucid king of Asia, might have been seen as a very long-term threat to Italy—but only if he chose to pursue his conquests in a direction, and to an extent, that no Greek successor of Alexander’s ever had before. Essentially, sleeping dogs here could have been left to lie—and would probably have been so left by a less aggressive, less military society. These major Greek kingdoms of the eastern Mediterranean made up a system four generations old, with endemic political problems and rivalries quite unfamiliar to Rome. To choose to enter this was an unprecedented step, whose long-term consequences were quite unpredictable. And it cannot have been popular with everyone to enter into such a new theatre, with no end in sight, two years after the deliverance from Carthage.

Furthermore, foreign wars, without any casus belli in Italy, were strictly illegal. By Rome’s IVS FETIALE, the law of the college of priests charged with opening and closing states of war, the relevant rites could only be performed if Rome was acting in defence of itself or its oath-bound SOCII ‘allies’. Rome had no such SOCII east of the Adriatic. It had treaties of AMICITIA ‘friendship’ (Greek philía) with some of the states there, notably Egypt, but this relationship was unprecedented as a basis for a war of solidarity, and not in any case very relevant to the immediate choice of adversary, Philip of Macedon.

Nevertheless the Senate did resolve to act against the great powers of the east. There is little in the written record to justify this momentous decision.

(#litres_trial_promo) Polybius, the main near-contemporary historian and a Greek himself, placed the initiative with the Greeks. Of the conference of Naupactus in 217, which brought Philip V of Macedon and sundry Greeks into ineffectual alliance with Carthage, he wrote:

This was the time and the conference which first brought into interplay Greek, Italian, and Libyan (i.e. Carthaginian) affairs: no longer would Philip or the leading Greek statesmen, when dealing with affairs in Greece, make reference to, war on, or agreements with, each other: from now on they would all look to their aims in Italy … those disaffected with Philip and some with differences with Attalus (king of Pergamum) would no longer turn east to Antiochus (of Asia) or south to Ptolemy (of Egypt), but send missions west, either to the Carthaginians or the Romans. Similarly, the Romans sent to the Greeks, for fear of Philip’s audacity and to forestall any advantage he might take of their current predicament.

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But this merely marked the turning point as a Greek might have seen it. Rome chose to keep raising the stakes and extending its involvement until all the Greek regimes, big and small, had been deposed or incorporated into subservient alliances.

Whatever the arguments presented in the Senate, the war—if it could be decisively won—must have been financially tempting. In crude financial terms, the Punic Wars had shown Rome what the benefits of victory over a major foreign power could be: the war reparations adjudged against Carthage were two hundred talents per annum for fifty years, a grand total of ten thousand talents or 240 million sesterces (‘MHS’).

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The lesson did not go amiss, and the rewards for conquest of Greek powers turned out to be quite comparable. The 24 MHS exacted from Philip V by T. Quinctius Flamininus

(#litres_trial_promo) in 197 (half at once, half over ten years) were a mere first fruit of what was to come. When Antiochus was forced to surrender western Asia Minor by the brothers P. and L. Cornelius Scipio

(#litres_trial_promo) in 189, he settled for a record indemnity of fifteen thousand talents, or 360 MHS. Annual revenues to Rome at this time were running at 30 MHS. When L. Aemilius Paullus

(#litres_trial_promo) returned victorious from his war against Philip’s son Perseus in 167, he brought with him at least another 120 MHS in booty. Revenues from Macedon thereafter ran at 2.4 MHS per annum. In all, in the fifty years after 201, Rome would actually receive 648 MHS in indemnity payments, principally from Carthage, Macedon, and Asia, equivalent to 13 MHS annually.

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To put this in proportion, the property qualification for a senator was a landed fortune valued at more than 0.4 MHS. Pliny observed that Rome’s treasury coffers in 157 BC held a credit balance of 100.3 MHS.

(#litres_trial_promo) And this sum was to be doubled in 130 BC, when the northwest Asian kingdom of Pergamum was bequeathed to Rome. Then in 63 BC, after Pompey’s conquest of Syria, the level leapt to 340 MHS.

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Flush with these windfalls of militarism, Rome was to go on a hundred-year spree. The indemnity paid by Antiochus in 189 sufficed to pay off the crippling national debt that Rome had incurred to its citizens during the war with Hannibal, equivalent to 25½ years of tax revenues (TRIBVTVM SIMPLEX).

(#litres_trial_promo) At the same time Livy said that the return of the army from Asia at this time saw the “first influx of foreign luxury” into Rome.

(#litres_trial_promo) In 167, with access to the loot from Perseus’ kingdom in Macedon, Rome ceased to levy taxes on its own citizens, a kind of “war dividend.” Meanwhile, there was a surge in public works spending: in 184, 24 MHS was spent on sewers; in 144–140 a new aqueduct, the Aqua Marcia, was built at a cost of 180 MHS; in 142 the first stone bridge across the Tiber, the Pons Aemilius, went up. Most of the major routes in Italy were built in this same century.

(#litres_trial_promo) Politicians began to see the potential for applying Rome’s wealth in unprecedented ways, directly for the benefit of the poor.

In 122 C. Gracchus involved the state in subsidizing the price of grain; in 58 BC P. Clodius began the policy of a free grain ration for citizens, an extravagant policy that once instituted could never be dropped.

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These eastern wars were certainly profitable, indeed life-transforming for the citizen populace back home. For a state that had always emphasized the glory of conquest, the new eastern-Mediterranean focus of Rome’s unending willingness to pursue wars far from home needs little special explanation: that was, after all, where the world’s wealth was to be found, and to be plucked.

There is controversy on how money-minded Roman strategy really was, from those who emphasized motives that were more publicly acceptable to the Romans, the preemption of dangerous rivals, and the aspiration for glory from a string of victories.

(#litres_trial_promo) These motives were no doubt also present and are not incompatible. And evidently, Roman victories against the greatest and oldest powers then known—for that is what the Greek kingdoms were—may not have seemed so inevitable before the wars were waged. But the Roman attitude can perhaps best be gauged from an anecdote that Cicero put into the approving mouth of even an archconservative, Cato the Censor.

(#litres_trial_promo) The great national hero M’. Curius Dentatus,

(#litres_trial_promo) sitting at his hearth in his latter years, was brought a great weight of gold by the Samnites, but declined it: it did not seem to him as glorious, he said, to have gold himself, as to rule over those that had it.

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Whatever the ambivalence about the tangible rewards, Rome’s new enthusiasm for Greek culture provided an effective, and widely acceptable, justification for these interventions. When Romans made policy pronouncements during the wars with Philip, Antiochus, and Perseus, they consistently took the line that Rome’s interest was in the freedom of the Greeks. Their declaration of war in 200 had the effrontery to require Philip to abstain from war against any Greek state.

(#litres_trial_promo) In an inconsequential conference with Philip in 198, the Roman general T. Quinctius Flamininus declared that Philip must withdraw totally from Greece. After winning the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197,

(#litres_trial_promo) Flamininus announced at the Isthmian Games in 196 that all the Greeks in Asia and in Europe were to be free and enjoy their own laws, a statement that apparently surprised with joy most of his audience, since they had been assuming that Rome would simply take over the control of Philip’s possessions. In 193 he went on to declare that Rome would next liberate the Greeks of Asia from Antiochus. This promise was fulfilled in 188 in the Treaty of Apamea, concluded by the brothers Scipio,

(#litres_trial_promo) who had just defeated Antiochus at Magnesia. Again Rome had scored a total victory, but not exacted control of the conquered, or even tranches of their land for settlement. Unlike the previously gained overseas territories in Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Spain, no prōvincia was created in Greece with a Roman magistrate in command. Taxes were not exacted. It looked as if the Romans, faced with the Greeks, had found a new—and more restrained—model of empire.

Things began to change immediately afterwards. The kingdom of Macedon under Philip’s son Perseus rebelled and after a three-year war was crushed at the battle of Pydna (168) by L. Aemilius Paullus. Epirus, to its southwest, which had given some aid to the rebels, he also sacked, selling 150,000 of its inhabitants into slavery. In both Macedon and Epirus, land taxes were henceforth payable to the Roman treasury. But the power vacuum so created in the territories was judged to lay them open to unrest. Thus, in 148, Macedonia was annexed as a regular province.

Central Greece too became (for Rome) worryingly unstable in the two generations after Flamininus’ declaration of its freedom. political dissension continued to fizz in the free cities, which frequently appealed to Rome against one another and were felt to harbour undesirable elements on the run from Macedonia. Rome had attempted to eliminate troublemakers by interning one thousand prominent citizens in Italy from 164 to 151, but an anti-Roman rebellion occurred after they returned. It was based in Corinth, at the time the preeminent Greek centre of trade and culture.

In 146 the new governor of Macedonia (Q. Caecilius Metellus

(#litres_trial_promo) Macedonicus) crushed the revolt, and his successor, L. Mummius, reorganized Greece into an unstructured but unthreatening mass of unallied city-states, all under Macedonian command. Roman tax gatherers moved in. Mummius is most famous, though, for razing the ancient city of Corinth. Roman punitive action was not light, and not forgotten. Corinth never recovered, but one effect of the action was a sudden appearance of Greek artworks in the Italian mansions of Mummius’ friends and associates. After fifty years of “freedom,” the logic, or rather the accounting,

(#litres_trial_promo) of Roman imperium had asserted itself over Greece.

An immediate effect of Rome’s annexation of mainland Greece was a surge of Greek immigrants to Italy. Supply was available to meet the increasingly sophisticated, and urbanized, demand from all levels of Roman society for entertainers, prostitutes, tailors, couturiers, grocers, vintners, cooks, importers, trainers, slave traders, farm labourers, gardeners, nursemaids, butlers, lady’s maids, secretaries, accountants, doctors, architects, tutors, professors.

(#litres_trial_promo) Greek words in Plautus’ plays, our fullest record of early colloquial Latin, do occur mostly in the speech of lower-class characters, but this reflects the era 205–184 BC, the generation when the Greek wars were still being fought. Many of the newcomers would indeed have been slaves resulting from Roman clearances, but increasingly there were volunteer adventurers from free families seeking their fortunes in the households of the newly dominant “barbarians” across the Adriatic. In an autobiographical incident datable to 167, Polybius, recently brought to Rome as a Greek political internee, said to his new friend, the young aristocrat Scipio, “As for these studies, which you and your brother seem to find more and more enthralling as well as promising for your careers, you will find plenty of people to help both of you: there are masses of scholars whom I can see flooding from Greece into Italy nowadays.”

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“These studies” were in grammar and rhetoric, Greek specialities curiously ripe for transplantation, now that significant careers based on public persuasion in the courts and assemblies were less and less possible in a Greece under foreign masters. But such skills were precisely the ones needed to make a mark in Rome’s republican institutions, which in the last two centuries BC were to be increasingly open to talent (if suitably well-heeled), and somewhat less dominated by scions of the old families with distinguished military traditions.

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Despite the masses of scholars recognized by Polybius as descending on Italy, no noted Greek grammarian or rhetorician taught at Rome until 159. Then one Crates of Mallos, who lived and taught in Pergamum in Asia Minor, came to Rome on an embassy from the king. It does not seem that these inaugural sessions were by invitation, or even deliberate: the story goes that Crates had broken his leg in a street culvert on the Palatine Hill and had to prolong his stay, profiting from the time by giving lectures.

(#litres_trial_promo) But many high-class Romans had already had Greek classes in their education for a hundred years: Livius Andronicus and Ennius were famous early family tutors in the later third century (called by Suetonius “semi-Greeks”), and references to a PAEDAGOGVS, a Greek slave who accompanied children to school (and often acted as ‘pedagogue’) go back to the early second century, for example, this jokey line from the comedian Pacuvius:

DEPVLSVM MAMMA PAEDAGOGANDVM ACCIPIT REPOTIALIS LIBER

untimely weaned, he was taken up by the wine god of all-nighters for special “schooling”