The Boys of '98

Nearly four hundred men, with a pack-train and a large quantity of arms and ammunition, sailed for a point about twenty-five miles east of Havana, on the steamer Florida. These men and their equipment constituted an expedition able to operate independently, and to defend itself against any body of Spanish troops which might oppose it.

The Florida returned to Key West on the thirty-first, after having successfully landed the ammunition and men.

May 22. The U. S. S. Charleston again left San Francisco, bound for Manila.

May 25. The U. S. S. St. Paul captured the British steamer Restormel, loaded with coal, off Santiago de Cuba. The prize is a long, low tramp collier belonging to the Troy company of Cardiff, Wales. She left there on April 22d, the day before war was declared, with twenty-eight hundred tons of the finest grade of Cardiff coal consigned to a Spanish firm in San Juan de Porto Rico, where the Spanish fleet was supposed to make its first stop.

“When we reached San Juan,” said the captain of the Restormel, “the consignees told me very curtly that the persons for whom the coal was destined were in Curacoa. At Porto Rico I learned that war had been declared. I began to suspect that the coal was going to Cervera’s fleet, but my Spanish consignees said it would be all right. They told me not to ask any questions, but to go to Curacoa as soon as possible. I did so, placing my cargo under orders.

“The consignee at Curacoa was a Spanish officer. He said there had been another change of base, and that the coal was wanted at Santiago de Cuba. I tried to cable my owners for instructions, but found that the cables had been cut. Under the circumstances there was nothing for me to do but to go to Santiago. By this time I was pretty well convinced that the cargo was for Cervera. I suspected that coal had been made a contraband of war, so I wasn’t a bit surprised when the St. Paul brought us to, with a shot, three and a half miles from shore.”

In the prize court it was decided to confiscate the coal, and release the steamer.

The President issued a proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men.

Three troop-ships, laden with soldiers, sailed from San Francisco for Manila.

May 26. The battle-ship Oregon, which left San Francisco March 19th, arrived at Key West.

May 27. The Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer arrived at San Juan de Porto Rico.

May 28. From Commodore Dewey the following cablegram was received:

    “Cavite, May 25th, via Hongkong, May 27th.

“Secretary Navy, Washington: – No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible for the people of Manila to buy provisions, except rice.

“The captain of the Olympia, Gridley, condemned by medical survey. Is ordered home. Leaves by Occidental and Oriental steamship from Hongkong the twenty-eighth. Commander Lamberton appointed commander of the Olympia.”

May 29. Maj. – Gen. Wesley Merritt issued an order formally announcing that he had taken command of the Philippine forces and expeditions.

May 31. United States troops board transports for Cuba.

The beginning of June saw the opening of the first regular campaign of the war, and it is eminently proper the operations around and about Santiago de Cuba be told in a continuous narrative, rather than with any further attempt at giving the news from the various parts of the world in chronological order.

Therefore such events, aside from the Santiago campaign, as are worthy a place in history, will be set down in regular sequence after certain deeds of the boys of ’98 have been related in such detail as is warranted by the heroism displayed.

CHAPTER VIII.

HOBSON AND THE MERRIMAC

May 29. The blockading fleet, under command of Commodore Schley, off Santiago de Cuba, was composed of the Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, New Orleans, Marblehead, and Vixen.

At about midnight on May 29th the officer of the deck on board the Texas saw, by aid of his night-glass, two low-lying, swiftly-running steamers stealing out of Santiago Harbour, and keeping well within the shadows of the land.

As soon as might be thereafter the war-vessel’s search-lights were turned full on, and at the same moment the sleeping crew were awakened.

It was known beyond a question that the Spanish fleet under Admiral Cervera was hidden within the harbour, not daring to come boldly out while the blockading squadron was so strong, and the first thought of men as well as officers, when these stealthily moving vessels were sighted, was that the Spaniards were making a desperate effort to escape from the trap they had voluntarily entered.

The search-lights of the Texas revealed the fact that the two strangers were torpedo-boats, and a heavy fire was opened upon them instantly.

With the report of the first gun the call to quarters was sounded on all the other ships, and a dozen rays of blinding light flashed here and there across the entrance to the harbour, until the waters were so brilliantly illumined that the smallest craft in which mariner ever set sail could not have come out unobserved.

The same report which aroused the squadron told the Spaniards that their purpose was no longer a secret, and the two torpedo-boats were headed for the Brooklyn and the Texas, running at full speed in the hope of discharging their tubes before the fire should become too heavy.

The enemy had not calculated, however, upon such a warm and immediate reception. It was as if every gun on board both the Brooklyn and Texas was in action within sixty seconds after the Spaniards were sighted, and there remained nothing for the venturesome craft save to seek the shelter of the harbour again, fortunate indeed if such opportunity was allowed them.

May 31. The U. S. S. Marblehead, cruising inshore to relieve the monotony of blockading duties, discovered that lying behind the batteries at the mouth of Santiago Harbour were four Spanish cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers.

When this fact was reported to the commodore he decided to tempt the Spanish fleet into a fight, and at the same time discover the location of the masked batteries. In pursuance of this plan he transferred his flag from the Brooklyn to the more heavily armed Massachusetts.

Two hours after noon the Massachusetts, New Orleans, and Iowa, in the order named, and not more than a cable length apart, steamed up to the harbour mouth to within four thousand yards of Morro Castle.

Two miles out to sea lay the Brooklyn, Texas, and other ships of the blockading fleet awaiting the summons which should bring them into the fight; but none came.

The Massachusetts opened fire first, taking the Spanish flag-ship for its target. An 8-inch shell was the missile, and it fell far short of its mark. Then the big machine tried her 13-inch guns.

The Cristobal Colon and four batteries – two on the east side, one on the west, and one on an island in the middle of the channel, replied. Their 10 and 12-inch Krupps spoke shot for shot with our sixes, eights and thirteens. It was noisy and spectacular, but not effective on either side.

The American fleet steamed across before the batteries at full speed; circled, and passed again. Both sides had found the range by the time of the second passing, and began to shoot close. Several shots burst directly over the Iowa, three fell dangerously near the New Orleans, and one sprayed the bow of the Massachusetts.

After half an hour both forts on the east and the one on the island were silenced. Five minutes later our ships ceased firing. The western battery and the Spanish flag-ship kept up the din fifteen minutes longer, but their work was ineffective.

June 1. Rear-Admiral Sampson, with the New York as his flag-ship, and accompanied by the Oregon, the Mayflower, and the torpedo-boat Porter, joined Commodore Schley’s squadron off Santiago on the first of June.

A naval officer with the squadron summed up the situation in a communication to his friend at home:

“Pending the execution of Admiral Sampson’s plan of campaign, our ships form a cordon about the entrance of Santiago Harbour to prevent the possible egress of the Spaniards, should Admiral Cervera be foolhardy enough to attempt to cut his way out.”

The officers of the blockading squadron were well informed as to the situation ashore. Communication with the Cubans had been established, and it was known that a line of insurgents had been drawn around Santiago, in order that they might be of assistance when the big war-vessels had struck the first blow.

The defences of the harbour were fairly well-known despite the vigilance of the enemy, and it was no secret that within the narrow neck of the channel, which at the entrance is hardly more than three hundred feet wide, eighteen or twenty mines had been planted.

A report from one of the newspaper correspondents, under date of June 1st, was as follows:

“So far as has been ascertained, there are three new batteries on the west side of the entrance. These appear to be formed entirely of earthworks.

“The embrasures for the guns can easily be discerned with the glasses. Cayo Smith, a small island which lies directly beyond the entrance, is fortified, and back of Morro, which sits on the rocky eminences at the right of the entrance, are Estrella battery and St. Carolina fort. Further up the bay, guarding the last approach to the city of Santiago, is Blanco battery.

“The first are of stone, and were constructed in the early sixties. St. Carolina fort is partially in ruins. The guns in Morro Castle and Estrella are of old pattern, 18 and 24-pounders, and would not even be considered were it not for the great height of the fortifications, which would enable these weapons to deliver a plunging fire.

“Modern guns are mounted on the batteries to the left of the entrance. On Cayo Smith and at Blanco battery there are also four modern guns. The mines in the narrow, tortuous channel, and the elevation of the forts and batteries, which must increase the effectiveness of the enemy’s fire, and at the same time decrease that of our own, reinforced by the guns of the Spanish fleet inside, make the harbour, as it now appears, almost impregnable. Unless the entrance is countermined it would be folly to attempt to force its passage with our ships.

“But the Spanish fleet is bottled up, and a plan is being considered to drive in the cork. If that is done, the next news may be a thrilling story of closing the harbour. It would release a part of our fleet, and leave the Spaniards to starve and rot until they were ready to hoist the white flag.”

“To drive in the cork,” was the subject nearest Rear-Admiral Sampson’s heart, and he at once went into consultation with his officers as to how it could best be done. One plan after another was discussed and rejected, and then Assistant Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson proposed that the big collier Merrimac, which then had on board about six hundred tons of coal, be sunk across the channel in such a manner as to completely block it.

The plan was a good one; but yet it seemed certain death for those who should attempt to carry it out as proposed. Lieutenant Hobson, however, claimed that, if the scheme was accepted, he should by right be allowed to take command of the enterprise.