A case study of the Danish social impact bonds project (Andersen et al., 2020) shows that funding can be flexible: in particular, the municipalities certainly funded recruitment, project review and evaluation, while investors were involved in funding the actual growth acceleration. The roles of the provider, project operator and evaluator were combined in the project, which is considered a conflict of interest in the classical SIB model. The lack of a project coordinator responsible for concept development and management greatly hindered the ability to build an integral framework in place of an array of isolated elements. Also, funding was predominantly activity-based, not outcome-based. Looking at this case study, we can conclude that outsourcing public services is not the only form for SIBs to take; they can also exist in the format of an external reconfiguration of existing public social policy practices.
CANADA'S EXPERIENCE. COMBINING THE ROLES OF MODERATOR AND EVALUATOR
Deloitte conducted a survey of Canadian investors in 2013 (that is, at the very beginning of the SIB launch within the country). In discussing the main barriers, investors cited high transaction costs and an unwillingness to work with the state due to the uncertainty of its priorities. One of the most common collaboration formats is joint investment in a project as part of an investment consortium, as this allows the number of market entry points to expand. Consortia also enable pooling and sharing expertise, which is a major gain for the investor, second to the actual social impact. As a confidence-building measure during the initial implementation stages of social impact bonds, the consultants suggest considering the option of providing a guarantee for a portion of the invested capital. The scheme works as follows: for any outcome of the project, the state guarantees to return a certain portion (i.e. 5–15 %) of the upfront investment. The essence of SIBs is the transfer of risk from the state to the private sector, and therefore the demand for this step is bound to decrease as the project practice spreads, mechanisms are developed and, most importantly, the state demonstrates a sustained commitment to long-term participation in such projects. Most respondents indicated the optimum project duration to be 4–6 years, which is sufficient for long-term cooperation. The investors surveyed confirmed the relevance of the British model, pointing to the need to have two extra agents beyond the PPP triangle: an impact evaluator (which is not a common service in the Canadian context) and a mediator to communicate with the government. However, Canada mainly used a 4-part model, where the roles of a moderator and evaluator were combined.
THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE. DREAM
The Inter-American Development Bank Research Lab (Ronicle & Strid, 2021) has formulated five criteria for a successful social impact bonds project – DREAM (Demand from government, Regulatory framework, Economic and political context, Availability of data, Market capacity):
1. Demand from Government – Developing an approach based on the governmental demand, which includes influential private players in the discussion. In Argentina, the state agency combined the roles of financial guarantor and contractor. This led to the state funding its own services, which violates the logic of SIB and reduces the effectiveness of the projects.
5 criteria for a success of SIBs – Demand from government, Regulatory framework, Economic and political context, Availability of data, Market capacity.
2. Regulatory Framework – the presence of an appropriate regulatory framework for SIBs that is flexible, results-oriented and regulates government payments. In Mexico, a specialized research institute was established to study the legal barriers to implementing social impact bonds. And in Chile, legal consultants were used for this purpose.
3. Economic and political context – in the political sense, it is essential to provide guarantees that programs will not be phased out after a change in government at the beginning of a new political cycle. While Argentina and Colombia made some attempts to create enforcement mechanisms for SIBs that do not depend on political campaigns, the general recommendation is to launch projects within the political cycle and negotiate with elected politicians at the beginning of their elected term. The economic context is important in the sense that high inflation levels require contracts accommodating regular price increases. This is what happened in Argentina without an inflation adjustment mechanism, which obstructed the successful implementation of social impact bonds.
4. Availability of data – During the SIB ecosystem growth states, it is critical to have sufficient administrative data (or to have the resources to obtain the necessary data on your own) in order to develop SIB concepts and assess their impact. In Colombia, for example, the development of data banks resulted in data-driven decision-making.
5. Market Capacity – this includes investor willingness to take risks and to participate in the social investment process, access to expertise to design the SIB concept and the results evaluation system, and the availability of contractors to implement social impact bonds.
HOW SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS ARE SIMILAR
Social impact bonds (SIBs) emerged as a contractual mechanism at the junction of social investments and governmental social development programs. The original UK program, which laid the foundation for similar projects on a global scale, was based on the principles of long-term financing, regular monitoring of interim results, and the development of new tools for evaluating the social effect.
The British experience demonstrated the importance of having two additional participants within the project framework: the investor, the government, and the contractor benefit from the involvement of financial and expert mediators. The first type of mediator is concerned with coordinating transactions and managing contractual obligations. The second type of mediator reviews the project design, costs, and offers a social impact research toolkit.
The US experience solidified the understanding of SIBs as a tool within impact investing, whose organizational structure facilitated the development of more efficient social interventions and assessed their impact. It also demonstrated that large investors can offset the increased risks of participating in SIBs by economies of scale. Canada developed a format consisting of a conglomerate of investors, which allowed risk and expertise to be shared.
Negative experiences mainly stem from a failure to comply with the DREAM criteria (Demand from government, Regulatory framework, Economic and political context, Availability of data, Market capacity). For example, Portugal’s institutional environment led to SIBs duplicating existing community development funds. Canada’s experience was not successful because the stakeholder engagement scheme combined the roles of project operator and impact evaluator. The Danish experience was not extensive enough to build a results evaluation scheme, which in the context of roles mixed between the provider, project operator and evaluator, undermined project sustainability.
Investors need social impact bonds as an opportunity to enter the social investment sector at a relatively low cost. For the state, this type of project represents an option to outsource the social function and mitigate political risks in the event of failure. The market as a whole receives a new contractual mechanism and innovative impact assessment tools. The public benefits from improvements in a particular aspect of the social situation. And in general, all this means that such a tool is worth at least studying in more detail.
REFERENCES
1. Participants in social impact bonds. (2021). VEB.RF. (in Russ.).
2. A guide to Social Impact Bonds. (2017, September 26). Government of the UK.
3. A. P. (2013, May 10). The Peterborough principles. The Economist.
4. Andersen, M. M., Dilling-Hansen, R., & Hansen, A. V. (2020). Expanding the Concept of Social Impact Bonds. Journal of Social Entrepreneurship, 1–18. doi:10.1080/19420676.2020.1806100
5. Davies, R. (2014, August). Social impact bonds. Private finance that generates social returns. European Parliamentary Research Service.
6. Deloitte, MaRS Centre for Impact Investing. (2013). Social Impact Bonds in Canada: Investor insights. Deloitte.
7. Ferreira, F. S. V. (2020). Social Impact Bonds: The Portuguese Case.
8. First US Social Impact Bond Financed by Goldman Sachs. (2020, May). Goldman Sachs.
9. Fraboul, A. (2020, February 4). BNP Paribas and the European Investment Fund launch a €10 million fund to co-invest in Social Impact Bonds ("SIB") in the European Union. BNP Paribas.
10. From potential to action: Bringing social impact bonds to the US. (2012, May 1). McKinsey & Company.
11. Guidance on developing a Social Impact Bond. (2017). The Centre for Social Impact Bonds. Retrieved April 22, 2022.
12. Koekoek, R. (2016, October). World's first binational Social Impact Bond fosters Dutch-German collaboration. Medium.
13. Moodie, A. (2013, January 20). British social impact investing has left the US playing catch-up. The Guardian.
14. Ronicle, J., & Strid, А. А. (2021, January). Social Impact Bonds in Latin America. IDB Lab's Pioneering Work in the Region Lessons Learnt. American Development Bank.
15. Social Impact Bonds: how private finance can help transform public outcomes. (2016, September 11). Centre for Public Impact. A BCG Foundation.
16. Urban Institute. (2020). «What Role do Intermediaries Play in Pay for Success?» Urban Institute.
17. Warner, M. E. (2013). Private finance for public goods: social impact bonds. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 16(4), 303–319 doi:10.1080/17487870.2013.835727.
18. Weller, A., and E. R. G. Pedersen. (2018). Pay for Success Literature Review: A PreCare Report. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School.
Школа Будущего. Есть ли в ней место для развития soft skills?
Личные и социальные качества и навыки, так называемые soft skills, все чаще звучат в публичном поле и становятся предметом исследований. Однако в школьном и вузовском образовании фокус все еще остается на знаниях. Будет ли в Школе Будущего развитию «мягких навыков» придаваться не меньше значения, чем предметному обучению? Мы начинаем цикл публикаций, посвященных моделям Школы Будущего. И наш первый разговор – о роли школы в развитии «мягких навыков» у детей.
Зоя Талицкая
Эксперт Фонда развития медиапроектов и социальных программ Gladway
ОТ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ СРЕДИ ИНЖЕНЕРОВ ДО СОТРУДНИКОВ GOOGLE
Уже довольно давно ученые выяснили, что глубокие знания и тем более хорошие оценки в школе и университете совсем не обязательно трансформируются в жизненный и карьерный успех человека. Например, Американская Ассоциация Софт Скиллс (National Soft Skills Association) рассказывает о результатах исследования среди нескольких тысяч американских инженеров, проведенного более ста лет назад – в 1918 году. Уже тогда около 85 % инженеров назвали персональные (личные) качества самым важным фактором, влияющим на успех в карьере инженера – по сравнению с 15 %, которые указали на технические знания и навыки (Mann, 1918).
Среди гораздо более свежих результатов – информация от компании Google, которая проанализировала данные о найме, карьерном росте и увольнении своих сотрудников с 1998 по 2013 годы. Результат анализа показал, что знания и навыки в технической области стоят на последнем месте среди восьми самых важных качеств лучших сотрудников Google. А семь более важных характеристик успеха представлены социальными навыками: быть хорошим наставником; хорошо общаться и уметь слушать; уметь понимать других людей (включая другие ценности и точки зрения); сочувствовать и поддерживать своих коллег; уметь критически мыслить и решать проблемы; а также способность устанавливать связи между сложными идеями (Strauss, 2017).
ЧТО ОТНОСИТСЯ К НАВЫКАМ SOFT SKILLS?
У термина soft skills («мягкие» или «гибкие» навыки) нет четкого определения не только в русском, но и в английском языке. Собственно, и сам термин может звучать по-разному: и как common skills (общие навыки), и как core skills (ключевые навыки), хотя soft skills используется чаще. Это навыки, умения и черты характера, которые важны и нужны в любой профессии, а также в целом в жизни любого человека. К ним обычно относят критическое мышление, способность решать проблемы, умение выступать на публике, работать в команде, быть лидером, уметь творчески мыслить и так далее. Такие навыки сложно измерить, в отличие от hard skills – знаний и навыков в конкретных областях и профессиях.
Джеймс Хекман, нобелевский лауреат по экономике, посвятил довольно много времени исследованиям образования и профессионального обучения в том числе, он показал, что высокий IQ увеличивает шансы человека на финансовый успех лишь на 1–2 %. А вместо этого к финансовому успеху приводят такие «мягкие» навыки как «добросовестность» (conscientiousness) и «усердие, настойчивость и самодисциплина» (diligence, perseverance and self-discipline) (Faye, 2016).
В своих работах, исследующих soft skills, Хекман предлагает опираться на таксономию персональных характеристик (черт характера), которую используют психологи, занимающиеся вопросами развития личности (Heckman, Kautz, 2012). Это так называемая «большая пятерка» качеств, которая включает в себя: Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism. Перевод на русский язык, определения и описания этих терминов находятся в Таблице 1. Данная таблица полезна наличием описаний и пояснений всех терминов, поскольку далеко не все они однозначно и просто переводятся на русский язык, а в русскоязычных источниках по теме soft skills нередко бывают искажены их смыслы или неточно переданы важные нюансы.
Если «большая пятерка» персональных характеристик кажется слишком сложной для операционализации, на помощь приходят политики. Так, в 2016 году на Всемирном экономическом форуме в Давосе были представлены десять гибких навыков будущего, которые к 2020 году понадобятся специалисту в любой профессии (Gray, 2016):
1. Умение решать комплексные (сложные) задачи.
2. Критическое мышление.