SOE Manual: How to be an Agent in Occupied Europe

This is the most important part of your training. You will, therefore, in your own interest be subject to strict security rules.

GENERAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS.

a. You will not be allowed to leave these grounds during the course unless accompanied or specially instructed to do so.

(N.B:- i. This does not apply to British Officers undergoing non-operational training.

ii. House Commandants may use their discretion about recreational walks; if in doubt they should refer to the Security Officer.)

b. You must never disclose at any time to anyone that you have been at this School or at Beaulieu.

c. You must never recognise anyone whom you have met here if you happen to meet them later on elsewhere, except on official business.

LOCAL SECURITY RULES.

a. You will hand to me all identity documents now in your possession for inspection. (Paybooks will be retained by me during the course.)

b. You will hand to me any firearms, other weapons, cameras or notebooks in your possession for retention during the course.

c. You will hand to me any money in excess of £5 and any valuables for safekeeping until your departure. If you wish to retain more than this sum you must obtain permission through me from the Area Commandant. Failure to comply with this rule will be regarded as contributory negligence in the event of any loss. Any loss of kit or personal property must be reported to me immediately.

d. Mail.

i. Outgoing. All letters will be handed to me in a stamped, unsealed envelope for censoring. You must not make any reference in your letters to the fact that they are censored.

You will use the Postal Box address already given to you or the special arrangements for writing overseas.

Your letters will be posted in London.

ii. Incoming. All letters sent to you will be censored by the Administrative Officer.

e. Telegrams. Telegrams, which may only be sent in cases of urgency, will be handed to me for censorship and despatch.

f. Telephone. You will not use the telephone here or in the locality. (This rule is only relaxed in special cases where H.Q. desires to communicate urgently with a student.)

OPENING ADDRESS. (#u429c0a8d-2b34-5390-a949-a29f22c47bf8)

First of all let me bid you welcome. I hope that you will enjoy your Course here and will find it helpful to you.

Now let’s get to work. The purpose of the Organisation to which you and I belong is Subversion. Subversion, properly applied, is one of the most potent weapons one can use. It is the fourth arm in modern warfare. What are its objects? They are fourfold. I will give you these four headings, and I should like you to pay particular attention to them as they are going to govern most of what I am going to say to you this morning.

In the first place the objective is to damage the enemy’s material to the maximum extent, and also all his means of communication and production. Modern warfare is almost entirely dependent on material and communications. With every successive war there is an increasing emphasis on machines and equipment, so much so that no country without considerable industry at its call can now dream of making war on a large scale. Therefore if you destroy as many machines as possible, and damage the means of production, you have gone a long way in hampering the enemy’s effort.

The second objective is to strain the enemy’s resources of man-power. Towards the end of any long war the question of man-power grows every day more vital. The Germans at this moment are combing all their industries for men to put into the field, and trying to replace them by foreign labour. Every General seeks to employ the maximum amount of his resources at the vital point of attack or danger. If a sufficient force can be diverted to provide sentries, police, etc. the enemy’s main force is thereby weakened.

The third objective is to undermine the morale of the enemy. In any long war the question of morale becomes an increasing anxiety to leaders on both sides. If the morale of one side cracks they lose the war, however many troops they may have left. In the Autumn of 1918 the German troops were no longer fighting in the same way as they had been previously. Why was that? Partly because they were getting hungrier every day, partly because they were getting tired of being kicked round by their N.C.O.’s – you can stand that on a full stomach but it is not so easy on an empty one – partly because they were getting misery letters from their people at home. The morale of the German army was cracking and, in consequence, the German army cracked. Anything we can do to help along this process during the present war is going to help to shorten it. There are plenty of methods. We must not forget also the question of the Quislings, the collaborators. We want them also to feel thoroughly uncomfortable.

Finally, there is the converse of this, to raise the morale of the populations of the Occupied countries in order that they may give us vital assistance when the right moment comes.

How do we achieve all this? There are plenty of methods to produce all the effects we seek to bring about.

Damage to the enemy’s material and means of production is, of course, achieved by sabotage. Now there are various kinds, or degrees, of sabotage and we can put these in an ascending scale. There are at least four stages.

First of all there is the form of sabotage known as Passive Resistance – an innumerable series of small acts which entail virtually no risk to the perpetrators. The main principle is non-co-operation – making the enemy feel that, while you are keeping within the letter of his law, you are not in the least won over by him and are only waiting your chance to liberate yourselves. The enemy’s life in Occupied countries should be made as thoroughly uncomfortable as possible. He should be made to feel an alien in a hostile environment. The Boche is an emotional creature who cannot stand too much dislike.

All sorts of extra work can be created for him by over-caution and especially by excessive zeal. The sort of zeal that sends him anonymous denunciations of his collaborators, that sends him in reports of non-existent unexploded bombs, elusive parachutists, etc. etc. If the thing is properly worked he need never suspect that he is being made a fool of.

The second stage we may call “industrial sabotage”. Here there is some risk to the perpetrators, but it is not excessive. In the first place anything which can be done to prevent workers going to German factories is all to the good. As we have said, the Boche is anxious to recruit all the foreign labour he can in order to release his own men for the Army. Let us try to stop that. But one may as well take advantage of the fact that the workers will undoubtedly continue to flock to Germany, whether as volunteers or as conscripts, by including amongst them agents recruited specially for the purpose of starting sabotage in German factories. Here the possibilities are immense. The Germans claim to have already millions of foreign workers in Germany and only a very small percentage of these workers can really wish Germany to win the war.

In the third place, a great deal of damage can be done to factories and workshops by omitting to carry out certain essential functions, such as lubricating, or by substituting some abrasive for the real lubricant.

Lastly, workers can also hold up German production by a measurable percentage by causing waste and delay, and by excess of zeal or by over-caution. One can insist on a pedantic adherence to regulations or ask for frequent renewals and overhauls of machinery “so as to produce the best results”. Too much time can be spent on doing any one job. One can always appear to insist upon an unnecessarily high standard. If every worker in every German factory were to leave his bench for the purposes of nature for double the usual period the effect on production would be quite measurable. One can also waste precious lubricants by over-lubrication, and time by too much attention to the safety regulations.

The third stage in sabotage might be called “minor sabotage”, that is, isolated acts of definite destruction, such as blowing up a bridge, an electric transformer, wrecking power lines, etc. These do, of course, entail very considerable risk to the perpetrators but they have definite nuisance value.

Lastly we come to sabotage on the grand scale – “major sabotage” let us call it. This might involve the destruction of whole lengths of railway, bridges and roads in any given area. Naturally, there can be no attempt at concealment of these once they had occurred, although they would, naturally, be prepared under extremely secret conditions. They can only be accomplished by organised saboteur squads and they would be timed to coincide with same big event, such as invasion. So much for sabotage.

Now is that all that sabotage can accomplish? No. Successful sabotage also has the effect of straining the enemy’s resources of man-power. This is effected in at least two different ways. All this faulty workmanship in factories which we have detailed needs putting right. It is not merely a question of duplicating labour – it may be far worse than that – a definite damage to the machine may have occurred by this careless lack of lubrication, for instance. Every attack which is made on rolling stock, and especially locomotives, must be the very devil for the enemy’s repair shops which are already congested. In this way the enemy’s resources of civilian man-power are being wasted.

But there is another aspect as well. Whenever a major act of sabotage occurs, the Gestapo swarm all over the district to make enquiries, and they nearly always result in recommendations for increased guards on these or other points. The more extra sentries we can get posted at points we do not intend to attack the better. If we can get whole police battalions diverted to certain areas it is better still.

How do we set about undermining the morale of enemy troops? Well, there are several methods of political subversion about which you will get details during the next few weeks. It is no good trying to plant downright falsehoods on enemy troops, you have no right to expect them to swallow them, but you can work on grievances which they already have. You can fan their dissatisfaction with their conditions, and also the anxiety they must feel for their relations in North German towns which have been heavily blitzed by the R.A.F. You can play on the feeling of loneliness some of their troops must experience in remote stations, and on the terror they must feel at the chance of being stabbed in the back by the foreign population they are holding in check when “the day” arrives. And you can make them almost sob at the thought of all they are being deprived of.

Lastly, you can raise the morale of the population of the occupied countries by various forms of propaganda which are being used at this moment in every German-Occupied country every day of the year. The object of this propaganda is to unify the population in a common hatred of the Boche. Arising out of this there should come the sort of non-co-operation with him which is so important to us. One can implant in them a conviction amounting to certainty that the Allies will win – from that should spring an active desire to help that victory forward.

These, then, are the objects which we seek to attain by subversion, and I have just detailed some of the methods by which they can be achieved. It is obvious, however, that all these effects will be haphazard, and therefore largely wasted, if they are not all bound up in a general plan, which covers all activities and times them all to fit in, like a railway schedule. Each single act of sabotage, of propaganda, or of political subversion ought to be part of a definite plan of attack.

The plan naturally varies with each country and there are several factors which govern it. There is first of all, naturally, military strategy, for all our subversive efforts are governed by what the main plan of attack may be – and subversion is only one part of a very large whole. It is no use, for instance, laying on an ambitious plan of sabotage for a country which the High Command has decided at the last moment not to attack – unless it is a deliberate plan of diversion.

It is naturally also influenced by the German economic situation. For instance, one of the main German weaknesses at the moment is communications, and that is why they are so constantly attacked both by the R.A.F. and saboteurs. Then there is the question of the political situation. The relations between the Allies and some so-called neutral countries are so delicate that no subversive operations can be contemplated in those countries for the time being, even though it is apparent that they may be the next on the list for attack by the Germans. There is also the nature of the country to be considered – the density of its population, and the degree of industrialisation. It is obvious that the plan for small densely populated and highly industrialised countries, such as Belgium and Holland, would be different from that for the deserts of Libya – if there is one.

Lastly the attitude of the civil population may make a considerable difference to the plan. In some countries secret organisations already exist in fairly large numbers and they may have to be taken into consideration. The attitude of some Occupied countries is far more virile than that of others, who are inclined to lie down and do nothing about it. In some parts of the country there may even be an active pro-Nazi element. All these factors have to be weighed.

The general policy in whatever country you may be sent to can be divided into two phases – the pre-invasion phase and the invasion phase. Let us take the pre-invasion phase first.

The first essential is to organise each country, area by area. Naturally the organisation in each country will vary enormously according to factors of geography, population and Industry, so that no two countries will be entirely alike. For the same reasons the organisation inside each area may be extremely simple, or, on the other hand, it may be a fairly complex organisation, closely knit together. In addition to the factors I have already mentioned, there is the dominating factor of the German counter espionage control. It is their activities which mostly dictate what kind of organisation one can stage. Then there is the question of the native organisations already working inside the country – the so-called secret armies. Here again the policy varies so much from country to country and according to the run of the war, that it is impossible to lay down any universal principle. In some countries organisers may be asked to go out as pioneers and organise some guerrilla bands, with various objectives to be attacked when the “day” comes. In other countries agents are sent out regularly to form part of the powerful secret organisations already existing, and to fill niches in those organisations, such as arms instructors, sub-area organisers, W/T operators, etc. Yet in other countries, the organisation of which you form a part functions entirely separately from these organisations, which are probably too well known to the Boche. But even in these cases some attempt must be made to take note of these local societies and to assess their value.

Naturally most of your activities will form a preparation for the great day when your countries come to be liberated, and the invasion phase should, therefore, see your activities at maximum stretch. Everything depends on the secrecy and efficiency with which these preparations are made. The more that each separate operation can be prepared, and even possibly rehearsed, the better it is likely to go off when the day comes.

Here again the operational orders naturally vary considerably for each country, so that it is impossible to lay down any universal plan to apply to all countries. Nevertheless the activities, some part of which you will probably be asked to prepare for, will include such things as:–

a). A whole series of combined attacks on the enemy’s rail, road and telecommunications. If, for instance, it were possible to isolate completely, for even 48 hours, a vital strategic centre 50 miles behind the enemy’s lines just at the moment when the Allies were landing, just think what a gift this would be to the Allied commander. If it were impossible for the enemy to get his troops up to the threatened spot at the right moment because his communications were temporarily sabotaged, it might make all the difference to the success or failure of the operations – in that sector at all events.

b). Demolishing important river bridges which are vital to the enemy’s communications. Or, conversely, preventing the enemy from doing so when he wishes to prevent the Allies from advancing. The campaign of 1940 in the Low Countries showed what tragic results to the defence can result from a single important bridge failing to be demolished. And it is about time that the Germans had some of their own medicine.

c). Attacks on enemy H.Q.’s, telephone installations, wireless vans, etc. A small gang of disciplined men can very soon deal with even an important enemy H.Q. if the operation is thoroughly studied and planned beforehand. If the sentries are attacked at exactly the right moment and the men in the guard-room overwhelmed, one can very soon over-run a whole H.Q. building by running down the corridors and throwing bombs or grenades in each room. They are fairly effective weapons in those conditions.

d). Blocking roads which must be used by the enemy’s transport, but care must be taken not to block roads which may be required by the advancing Allies. It has been rightly pointed out that it is impossible to block any road for more than a certain time. Nevertheless if the enemy had to vacate a town at a moment’s notice, with a large amount of transport, and then have to deal with road blocks, or possibly road craters, it might make all the difference to them, more especially if the sky was then filled with bombing aeroplanes which left them no respite.