Kappler still hoped he could win the argument that the deportation of the Jews should be abandoned. He had all the rings, bracelets and other gold items put into one box and sent off to Berlin. The package was marked for the attention of Obergruppenführer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, who was Himmler’s deputy in the Reich security empire. Kappler attached a covering letter. In his note he explained why he was against the planned deportation of Jews. Such a move, he wrote, would deprive him of the chance to exploit the Jewish community for intelligence purposes. He added that Field Marshal Kesselring had approved plans to use Roman Jews in labour gangs across the city.
When Kaltenbrunner opened the box he was indifferent to the gold and unconvinced by Kappler’s reasons for abandoning the deportation of Jews. The gold was of little consequence and would remain in Kaltenbrunner’s office untouched until the war ended. Kappler’s arguments he tackled head-on. He contacted Kappler and instructed him that the deportation must be his top priority: he must ‘proceed with the evacuation of the Jews without further delay’. Kaltenbrunner’s tone was equally direct as he told Kappler that ‘it is precisely the immediate and thorough eradication of the Jews in Italy which is the special interest of the present internal political situation and the general security in Italy’. He dismissed any suggestion that the operation should be delayed and added that ‘the longer the delay the more the Jews who are doubtless reckoning on evacuation measures have an opportunity by moving to the houses of pro-Jewish families’.
By now Kappler’s opposition to conducting the deportations was causing much anxiety in the corridors of power in Berlin. If the Final Solution was to be enacted in Rome, the Nazi leaders knew they had to put their own man in. In the first week of October an SS captain and a detachment of Waffen SS men were dispatched to Rome to hasten the rounding up of Jews. If Kappler was uncomfortable receiving questionable orders on the telephone, he probably felt even more uneasy hearing them in person in his own office.
At Villa Wolkonsky the newly arrived Captain Dannecker sat opposite Kappler. Even though Kappler outranked him, he knew his guest had to be taken seriously. Theodor Dannecker was a troubleshooter, sent from Berlin with Himmler’s blessing. He had a track record of carrying out Jewish deportations and twelve months earlier had organized round-ups of Jews in Paris.
Dannecker told Kappler that he required manpower of at least one motorized battalion and wanted the operation to be surrounded by secrecy. He also needed the names and addresses of Rome’s Jews. Kappler was running out of excuses and time. Realizing he had lost the argument, he simply handed over the list.
On Saturday, 16 October, as rain fell on the streets of Rome, lines of SS officers and military policemen made their way to the city’s Jewish ghetto. This time the Nazi policemen had not come for gold, money or documents. This time they wanted men, women and children. Kappler’s attempt to delay the deportations had failed. Armed with submachine guns, the SS police and Waffen SS ordered around 1,200 people out of their homes. Frightened, wet and cold, and clinging to what small possessions they could carry, the captives were placed into open army trucks.
Most of them were still in their nightclothes. As the children cried and screamed and the adults openly prayed, they were driven to the Italian Military College, close to the Tiber. It was a carbon copy of the raids Dannecker had led in Paris. By mid-afternoon the operation was over. Nearly 900 of those arrested were women and children. At the military college the prisoners were examined and interviewed and around 230 non-Jews were released.
The news of the deportations reached the Vatican very quickly. As the German raids began, Princess Enza Pignatelli Aragona Cortes, a young aristocrat well known on the Rome social scene and involved in charity work, was woken by a phone call from a friend. The caller lived near the Jewish ghetto and informed her of the German raids. The princess decided she must inform the Pope. She had known Pius XII for some time and had been received by him in the Holy See. The princess left her home and travelled to the Jewish ghetto to witness what was happening. She then went directly to the Vatican and, although she had no appointment to see the Pontiff, was quickly granted an audience. In his study the princess informed the Pope what was happening and told him he must act to stop the deportations. The Pope seemed genuinely surprised to hear the news. He said he had believed the Jews would remain untouched after the payment of gold. Then he made a phone call and, as he saw the princess out, promised that he would do all he could to help.
Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the Vatican’s Secretary of State and one of the Pope’s aides, summoned the German ambassador to attend the Vatican. Maglione asked Ernst von Weizsäcker to use his influence and intervene to stop the deportations, saying, ‘It is painful for the Holy Father, painful beyond words, that right here in Rome, under the eyes of the Common Father, so many people are made to suffer because of their particular descent.’ The ambassador considered Maglione’s comments and asked, ‘What would the Holy See do if these things continued?’ It was the key question and clearly referred to the morning raids. The cardinal replied, ‘The Holy See would not wish to be put in a situation where it was necessary to utter a word of disapproval.’
Weizsäcker responded with a series of compliments about the Vatican. He praised the Catholic Church for steering a neutral course in the war and then suggested it would be wise if the Holy See refrained from making a protest, telling the cardinal, ‘I am thinking of the consequences that a step by the Holy See would provoke …’ He added that these measures came from ‘the highest level’ and stressed that their conversation must be regarded as confidential. In response Maglione asked Weizsäcker to intervene by appealing to his ‘sentiments of humanity’.
The meeting was cordial and diplomatic. Even so, Weizsäcker’s reference to the ‘highest level’ was seen as a threat by an already nervous Vatican. The Pope did not want a showdown with Rome’s new rulers. There were too many uncertainties. If he protested too strongly about the deportations, would the relationship he had established with the Germans change for the worse? Would Berlin continue to respect the independence of the Vatican State? Such questions were considered against a backdrop of persistent rumours that the Germans would invade the Holy See and seize the Pope. Just as he had done since the start of the war in 1939, Pius XII knew he had a diplomatic game to play.
That night Kappler worked until late, as he had to file a report on the day’s events for Himmler. Just before midnight he finalized his dispatch and had it transmitted to the office of the Reichsführer-SS in Berlin. Kappler reported that the ‘action against the Jews started and finished today in accordance with a plan worked out as well as possible by the office’. Even though he stated that there were insufficient numbers of German police, he stated that 1,259 people had been arrested but those of mixed blood and foreigners had been released, leaving just over 1,000 still in custody. Kappler also noted that the operation had gone ahead without any opposition and that the use of firearms had not proved necessary.
Two days later all the prisoners were taken to a railway station and squeezed into trucks and transported to Auschwitz. Within a week 800 would be dead.
On the day the Jews left Rome’s Tiburtina Station on their one-way journey to Auschwitz, Sir D’Arcy Osborne met the Pope. There was only one topic of conversation. The British Minister told the Pope that he had ‘underestimated his own moral authority’ and talked of ‘the reluctant respect in which he was held by the Nazis because of the Catholic population of Germany’. Osborne was gently pushing the Pontiff to be more forceful. He asked him to consider that an occasion could arise that might involve his taking a ‘strong line’. They discussed the security situation in Rome and the behaviour of the German army and police. The Pope said he had no complaints about either organization and told Osborne that he would never leave Rome unless he was removed by force.
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