The Journal of Negro History, Volume 4, 1919

Such a justification of the West India Company's actions could scarcely be satisfactory to Downing or to those in charge of foreign affairs in England. The Royal Company was very much concerned also lest the Dutch would continue to interrupt the ships which it sent to the Gold Coast. To add to this adverse condition news arrived that, about the first of June, 1663,[253 - Ibid., 176, f. 121.] the Dutch had at last succeeded in regaining possession of Cape Corse. At this there was much satisfaction in Holland. Downing wrote that since the Dutch now had the two important castles of Elmina and Cape Corse, commanding the most important trade in all Guinea, they intended to prohibit all other nations from trading to that region.[254 - Ibid., 167, f. 284, Downing to Bennet, September 25, 1664 (O. S.).] Over this turn of events there was great disappointment among the members of the Royal Company, who had confidently expected to obtain Cape Corse from the natives. In fact, they had intended to make Cape Corse their main stronghold and at that place establish their principal trade.[255 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den Raadpensionaris, Cunaeus to DeWitt, November 2, 1663 (N. S.).]

Charles II decided that it was time to come to the assistance of the Royal Company, and on September 5, 1663, he lent three of his ships to it for a voyage to Africa.[256 - C. S. P., Col., 1661-1668, p. 159, warrant to duke of York, Sept. 5, 1663.] Later, he also ordered several additional royal vessels commanded by Sir Robert Holmes to accompany these ships. The preparation and departure of the fleet was short and remained a close secret with the officials immediately concerned.

The king instructed Holmes to protect the company's agents, ships, goods, and factories from all injury; and to secure a free trade with the natives. Also, he declared, "If (upon consultacon with such commandrs as are there present) you judge yourself strong enough to maintaine the right of his Matie's subjects by force, you are to do it, and to kill, sink, take, or destroy such as oppose you, & to send home such ships as you shall so take." If the two ships "Golden Lyon" and "Christiana," the first of which was the chief assailant of the company's ships "Charles" and "James" in November, 1662, were encountered. Holmes was instructed to seize them. All other ships which had committed such injuries on the vessels of the Royal Company[257 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 53. These instructions are not preserved in their complete form.] were likewise to be seized and taken to England. On his arrival at the mouth of the Gambia River in January, 1664, Holmes discovered that since his visit in 1661 the relations of the Dutch and English had been anything but friendly. The English commander on Charles Island had given Petro Justobaque and other Dutch factors from Cape Verde permission to trade up and down the river. Holmes heard that they had endeavored to stir up the native king of Barra against the English in December, 1661.[258 - C. O. 1: 16, f. 157, oath of William Quick and others at Charles Island, June 1, 1662.] On the 21st of June, 1662, Justobaque with a ship again appeared on the Gambia. In order to compel him to recognize the English rights on the river, the English commander at James Island fired at the ship. The Dutch ship paid no heed to the demand of the English and returned the fire until it was a safe distance away. A few days later when returning to Cape Verde the English shot away the main mast of the Dutch ship, but Justobaque managed to escape.[259 - C. O. 1: 18, f. 154, deposition of Stephen Ustick, June 7, 1664; S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 147, 148.]

Although these incidents had happened more than a year and a half before Holmes' arrival at James Island, he was incensed at the actions of the Dutch. When it was reported to him that a large Dutch vessel had arrived at Cape Verde, he assumed that it was the "Golden Lyon" which had sailed from Holland about the same time as he had departed from England. Several English ships were expected on the Gambia and for fear of their capture by the "Golden Lyon," Holmes sailed at once for Cape Verde where, according to his statement, without any provocation he was fired upon by the Dutch. Holmes returned the fire, and after suffering some damage withdrew from the attack. On the following morning he was surprised, he declared, to see that the Dutch had hung out a white flag and were sending a boat to him offering to surrender the fort. He called a council which, after considering the former hazards of the English trade on the Gambia, decided "that the better to protect our trade for a tyme and sooner to bring in Hollander's West India Compa to adjust our nation's damages sustained by them, and to that end we accepted the surrender of that place."[260 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 148, Holmes' narrative. After taking the island Holmes sent for as many men as could be spared by the Royal Company's factors on the Gambia. Accordingly they took possession of it in the name of the company. C. O. 1: 18, f. 24.]

Holmes' explanation of the taking of Cape Verde, although simple and direct, is probably incomplete. His whole career shows him to have been a man who was likely to take the initiative, so that it is not surprising to learn from the depositions of various Dutchmen that, previous to the battle of Cape Verde, Holmes had seized two Dutch vessels, and that after receiving an unfavorable reply to his demand to surrender, Holmes attacked the fort at Cape Verde, which capitulated together with several Dutch vessels.[261 - Aitzema, XI, 294, deposition of Andries C. Vertholen, June 9, 1664 (N. S.); Lias, West Indien, 1658 tot 1665, depositions, June 19 and July 19, 1664 (N. S.).]

From the conflicting statements made by the Dutch and the English it is difficult to ascertain the truth regarding the events immediately preceding the attack on Cape Verde, but the fact remains that Holmes had obtained a number of Dutch vessels and was master of one of their most important forts on the west coast of Africa. Since he had discovered the ease with which the Dutch possessions could be seized, Holmes next set out down the coast toward Elmina. On the way he despoiled the Dutch factory at Sestos, on the pretext that at that place the Dutch had stirred up the natives against the English.[262 - C. O. 1: 18, f. 90, resolution of the council of war on board the Jersey, April 9, 1664.] Shortly afterwards, he encountered and captured the "Golden Lyon" which had added to its notorious career by preventing the "Mary," a ship belonging to the Royal Adventurers, from trading on the Gold Coast in March, 1663.[263 - Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Engeland, deposition of John Denn, commander of the ship Mary, December 3, 1663 (O. S.).] Finally he seized the Dutch factory at Anta, on the ground that it was commanded by the former captain of the "Christiana," one of the Dutch ships designated for seizure in the king's instructions.[264 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, f. 149, Holmes' narrative.]

Before leaving the Gambia, Holmes had been apprised of what had taken place on the Gold Coast since the Dutch had captured Cape Corse in June, 1663. After the Dutch had taken possession of this fortress General Valckenburg despatched a very strong protest to the chief English factory at Kormentine, in which he maintained that the Dutch had a right to the exclusive possession of the whole Gold Coast by reason of their conquest of the Portuguese. He required the English to leave the lodge which they had recently built at Tacorary and demanded that they refrain from all trade on the Gold Coast. He even had the temerity to claim that the English had injured the Dutch trade at Cape Corse and Tacorary to the extent of sixty marks of gold per month, and that the Dutch had lost one thousand marks on account of the interference of English ships such as the "Charles" and the "James."[265 - S. P., Holland, 176, ff. 118-123, June 7, 1663 (N. S.). A mark of gold was supposed to be worth about £28. 16s.]

In answer to Valckenburg's sweeping assertions Francis Selwin, the English chief at Kormentine, and John Stoakes, commander of one of the English ships, replied that the English had more right to Cape Corse and other places on the Gold Coast than the Dutch, because they had first settled and fortified Cape Corse with the consent of the natives in 1649.[266 - Index op het Register der Contracten, letters dated June 13, 14, 1663. 1663.] As a further indication that they were not intimidated by the hostile attitude of Valckenburg the English commenced to build another factory at Anashan in the Fantin region. In September, 1663, this brought forth another vigorous protest from Valckenburg, who declared that he would not tolerate the continuance of this factory.[267 - S. P., Holland, 167, ff. 258-260, September 12, 1663. This protest with that of Valckenburg of June 7, 1663, was sent to England, where both were regarded as very important.] By way of enforcing these threats the Dutch prevented the "Sampson," another ship belonging to the Royal Adventurers, from engaging in any trade at the factory of Komenda.[268 - C. O. 1: 17, ff. 153, 154, Mr. Brett to the Royal Company, August 31, 1663; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal, Downing to S. G., September 15, 1664 (O. S.).] Thereupon Stoakes declared that, although the English greatly desired to live in peace with the Dutch, they would not under any circumstances abandon their factory at Anashan.[269 - Index op het Register der Contracten, September 17, 1663.]

At this time the English had factories and settlements at Kormentine, Komenda, Tacorary, Anto, Anashan, Ardra, and Wiamba. The forts and lodges of the two companies were all located within a few miles of one another and for either company to increase the number of its settlements only made the instances of friction between them more numerous.[270 - C. O. 1: 17, ff. 153, 154, contains a number of extracts of letters from factors of the Royal Company to the company dated from June to September, 1663. They mention many other conflicts with the Dutch, including the charge that the Dutch had hired the natives to attack the fort at Kormentine.] It seemed that whichever company was able to overcome the other would be sure to do so. It was under these circumstances that Sir Robert Holmes made his appearance on the Gold Coast. The fact that the Dutch had laid claim to the whole Gold Coast was sufficient excuse for his interference, although, if we may believe the Dutch version, Holmes exceeded their claims by reasserting the English right to the whole of the west coast of Africa, as he had done at Cape Verde in 1661.[271 - Aitzema, XI, 295, deposition of Andries C. Vertholen, June 9, 1664 (N. S.).]

Be this as it may, according to Holmes' account, Captain Cubitt of the Royal Company endeavored to induce Valckenburg to come to an amicable adjustment of the troubles on the Gold Coast. Holmes expected that his previous seizures would induce such a settlement, but Valckenburg obstinately refused Holmes' demand to evacuate Cape Corse.[272 - C. O. 1: 18, f. 39, order of the council of war held on board the Jersey, May 7, 1664.] Since he had failed to intimidate the Dutch, Holmes sailed to Cape Corse where he visited the Danish fort of Fredericksburg. The Dutch fired at him from Cape Corse, an act which Holmes regarded as the beginning of war.[273 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 51, 52, Holmes' examination. In his examination before the Privy Council Holmes asserted that in one of the ships captured from the Dutch, orders had been found from the States General commanding the Dutch factors to seize the English fort at Kormentine. There is no evidence to support this assertion and the States General afterwards characterized the statement as "an errand invention & a fowle lye." S. P., Holland, 181, f. 10.] He called a council of officers and factors of the Royal Company on May 7, 1664, where, after considering "theire (the Dutch) unjust possessing of that very castle of Cape Coast indubitably ours, … wee then resolved att that councell … for the better securitye of that trade, our interest in that countrye, and to regaine our nacion's rights, to reduce that castle of Cape Coast wch accordingly succeeded."[274 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 114, ff. 150, 151, Holmes' account; C. O. 1: 18, f. 39, order of the council of war held on board the Jersey, May 7, 1664.] On pretexts of much the same character Holmes seized the Dutch factories of Agga and Anamabo, together with several ships. By this time the Dutch were stripped of all their settlements on the African coast except the main fortress of Elmina. In finishing his account of the expedition Holmes blandly remarked, "I hope I have nott exceeded my instructions, they being to concerve our comerce."

Since it is not essential to follow Holmes across the Atlantic to New Amsterdam one may return to the negotiations which were proceeding in Europe subsequent to his departure from England. So closely had the secret of Holmes' expedition to Africa been guarded that it is even doubtful if Sir George Downing at The Hague was aware of it.[275 - S. P., Holland, 174, f. 32, Downing to Bennet, January 10, 1664/5 (O. S.). This letter, written over a year later, shows that Downing was not acquainted with Holmes' instructions.] As far as the purpose of the voyage was concerned nothing could have been nearer the advice which he had been urging for months. Moreover, Downing was not alone in his opinion that negotiation regarding affairs in Africa would be fruitless. The Danish resident at The Hague, Carisius, who was pressing the Danish claims for the possession of Cape Corse, confessed to Downing that nothing could be obtained from the Dutch unless it was "attended with some thing that was reall & did bite."[276 - Lister, Thomas Henry, Life and Administration of Edward, first Earl of Clarendon, III, 259, Downing to Clarendon, November 6, 1663 (O. S.).] Since this was the case Downing pointed out that the Danish fort at Fredericksburg would probably fall into the hands of the Dutch. To avoid this misfortune he advised the Royal Company to induce the Danes to transfer Fredericksburg to it, granting them in return a free commerce at that place. As the Royal Company did not see fit to follow this suggestion[277 - S. P., Holland, 168, f. 230, Downing to Bennet, December 18, 1663.] Downing began to form other plans. In order that Carisius might continue to worry the Dutch with his claims Downing submitted a memorial to the States General protesting against the Dutch treatment of the Danes in Guinea.[278 - Clar. St. Paps., 107, f. 101, Downing to S. G., February 8, 1663/4 (O. S.).] Indeed he was so friendly toward the Danish pretensions that the king of Denmark sent him a special letter thanking him for his services.[279 - Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 26, Schested to Downing, February 10, 1664; S. P., Denmark, 17, f. 150, Frederick III to Schested, December 15, 1663.]

In the main, however, Downing was persistently urging the Dutch to make a settlement of the cases of the Royal Company's two ships, the "Charles" and the "James," and of the right of the Dutch to blockade the Gold Coast on the pretext of war with the natives. In December, 1663, at the instigation of the West India Company, the States General maintained that only a few ships were necessary to blockade the small native states on the Gold Coast, since in each case there were but one or two outlets to the sea.[280 - Loketkas, Staten Generaal, Engeland, W. I. C. to S. G., read December 1, 1663 (N. S.); ibid., S. G. to Downing, December, 1663.] On February 1, 1664, Downing obtained a conference with DeWitt and the representatives of the States General and the West India Company. The company's representatives boldly admitted that they had hindered the English ships from trading at Komenda and Cape Corse, because the natives had burned their factory at the former place and had seized their fortress at Cape Corse. This irritating assumption of their ownership of Cape Corse aroused Downing. So far, he had contented himself in supporting the Danish and even the Swedish claims to Cape Corse. Now, notwithstanding the inconsistency of his position, he remarked that, if it was a question of the ownership of Cape Corse, the English could show more rights to the place than any one, since they had been the first to settle it and to trade there; and that even if the Dutch were in possession of it, the English still had a right to trade to the Danish fort of Fredericksburg which was located in the same harbor.[281 - S. P., Holland, 169, ff. 120, 121, Downing to (Bennet), February 12, 1663/4 (O. S.).]

When the discussion turned on the requirements of an effective blockade the Dutch advocate stoutly maintained that "it is nott for any other to prescribe how and in what manner the company shall proceed to retake their places, that if they think that the riding with a few shipps before a place and that att certaine times onely whereby to hinder other nations from trading with it, be a sufficient meanes for the retaking thereof, they have no reason to be att further charge or trouble." He further declared that a certain sickness in that region, known as "Serenes," caused by the falling dew, made it impossible for Europeans to engage in a blockade by land, and therefore "in this case itt was to be counted sufficient and to be called a besieging, though the place were onely blocked up by sea."[282 - Ibid., f. 121.] Downing scoffed at this as an unheard of theory and asked what would happen if the Royal Company instituted blockades of this character and pretended "Serenes" whenever it seemed convenient. With such a display of feeling it is no wonder little could be done toward adjusting the difficulties. DeWitt suggested a new treaty for the regulation of such affairs both in Europe and abroad. Downing flatly refused to consider such a proposition if it was meant thereby to dispose of the cases of the "Charles" and the "James." He remained firm in his demand for reparation for these two ships.[283 - Ibid., ff. 122, 124.] A few days after this conference Downing learned of the misfortunes which had befallen the Royal Company's ship, the "Mary," during the previous year. On February 16, he apprised the States General of this additional cause for complaint and demanded satisfaction as in the case of the other two vessels[284 - S. P. Holland, 169, f. 132, Downing to S. G., February 16, 1663/4 (O. S.).].

If Downing was becoming exasperated, the people in England were scarcely less so when they heard of the troubles of the "Mary" and other similar occurrences. Secretary Cunaeus declared that the animosity in England towards Holland was growing exceedingly among the common people. Led by the duke of York, governor of the Royal Company, the courtiers had also become exceedingly indignant at the treatment accorded the company's ships and factories in Africa[285 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, March 11/21, 1664.]. One of Valckenburg's statements regarding the Dutch ownership of the Gold Coast had been circulated on the Royal Exchange, where it became the chief topic of conversation. Indeed so great was the sensation it stirred up that Samuel Pepys declared on April 7, 1664, that everybody was expecting a war[286 - Pepys, Diary, IV, 103; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, (April 8/18, 1664, N. S.).]. On the 21st of April the members of the House of Commons resolved that the damages inflicted by the Dutch in India, Africa, and elsewhere constituted a very great obstruction to English trade. They, therefore, petitioned the king for redress for these various injuries, and promised to support any action he took with their lives and fortunes.

At last the Dutch realized that the African situation was becoming serious, and Downing therefore found it somewhat easier to bring them to a discussion of the subject. DeWitt proposed that the case of the three Royal Company's ships as well as that of two East India ships, the "Bona Esperanza" and the "Henry Bonaventure," should be included in the list of damages provided for by the treaty of September, 1662. Downing absolutely refused to consider such a makeshift on the ground that the ships of the Royal Company had been injured after the treaty had been signed, and therefore in accordance with its provisions these losses should be submitted to the Netherlands for compensation.[287 - Clar. St. Paps., 107, f. 147, Downing to Clarendon, April 1, 1664 (O. S.); Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, VI, part 2, p. 424, article XIV.]

Since he had failed to induce Downing to permit the three ships to be included in the list of damages, DeWitt had exhausted the last means of delay. On May 6, 1664, Downing announced in letters to Bennet and Clarendon that DeWitt had at last consented to accommodate the matter of the three ships. He was willing, moreover, to enter into an agreement, for the prevention of all such future troubles, along the lines which Downing had laid down. Regarding the two East India ships, however, whose case was quite different from those of the Royal Company, DeWitt would not alter his stubborn refusal of compensation. Downing was intent on gaining a complete victory and at once rejoined that no new commercial regulations could be considered until entire satisfaction had been rendered for the damages which the Dutch had committed.[288 - S. P., Holland, 170, ff. 16-18, Downing to Bennet, May 6, 1664 (O. S.); Clar. St. Paps., 107, ff. 195, 196, Downing to Clarendon, May 6, 1664 (O. S.).]

Although an attempt was made to suppress the first tidings of Holmes' actions on the Gambia, the rumor of them soon spread. It was not long until it was well known in London and Amsterdam that he had taken Cape Verde and captured several Dutch vessels.[289 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., Cunaeus to DeWitt, May 6/16, 1664; Secretekas, Engeland, no. 123, Cunaeus to the directors of W.I.C., May 6/16, 1664.] The West India Company bitterly accused the English of having covered their designs in Africa with a cloak of complaints regarding the Royal Company's ships. The company reminded the States General that this was the same Holmes who, in 1661, had set up a claim to the whole coast and who was to have been exemplarily punished on his return by the king of England. Since it was evident that all the Dutch factories and forts in Guinea were in danger of capture from Holmes, the company asked the States General for some vessels of war which should be sent to the African coast for the protection of its property[290 - Secretekas, Engeland, no. 123, W. I. C. to S. G., May 23, 1664 (N. S.).].

It was now the turn of the Dutch to seek compensation and restitution of their property. Since Downing was a very exasperating man with whom to deal they were undoubtedly pleased when toward the end of May, 1664, he suddenly returned to England[291 - S. P., Holland, 173, f. 129, Downing to Bennet, December 30, 1664 (O. S.).]. The Dutch, therefore, decided to send VanGogh to London, with the hope that he could obtain more satisfactory results there than had ever been possible with Downing at The Hague. VanGogh was instructed to seek for the restitution of the West India Company's property; to remind the king of the unfulfilled promises which he had made regarding Holmes and the voyage of 1661;[292 - Resolution of S. G., June 13, 1664 (N. S.).] and to seek for new commercial regulations which would prevent future trouble on the African coast[293 - Ibid., June 5, 1664 (N. S.).].

Very soon after his arrival in England VanGogh gained an audience with the king who, in reply to his demands, answered that as yet his knowledge of the Holmes' affair was very imperfect; that he had not given Holmes orders to seize Cape Verde; and that in case he had exceeded his instructions he would be punished upon his return, according to the exigency of the case[294 - S. P., Holland, 171, f. 174, VanGogh to S. G., June 24/July 4, 1664.]. Such a reply sounded too much like the king's former promise of August 14, 1661, to satisfy DeWitt. He instructed VanGogh to insist that his Majesty make these promises in writing[295 - DeWitt, Brieven (DeWitt, Johan, Brieven, geschreven ende gewisselt tusschen den Heer Johan de Witt), IV, 311, DeWitt to VanGogh, July 11, 1664 (N. S.).]. VanGogh answered DeWitt that it was hopeless to think of inducing the English to return Cape Verde, in view of the preparations then in progress for carrying on trade to the west coast of Africa. He declared that already they were boasting in London that a contract was to be made with the Spanish for the delivery of 4,000 slaves per annum[296 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., VanGogh to DeWitt, July 15/25, 1664.]. As early as the middle of June the Royal Company had eight ships loading in London with goods worth 50,000 pounds destined for the Guinea coast[297 - P. C. R., Charles II, 4: 122; S.P., Dom., Charles II, 99, f. 170, petition of the Royal Company for a convoy for its ships. It was also reported that the duke of York was fitting out a frigate at his own expense to send to Guinea. C. S. P., Dom., 1663-1664, p. 264, newsletter, September 2, 1663.].

In midsummer, 1664, Andries C. Vertholen and other Dutchmen, whom Holmes had carried from Cape Verde to the Gold Coast, returned to Holland, where they reported at length Holmes' actions at Cape Verde and on the way to the Gold Coast[298 - S. P., Holland, 171, f. 238, W. I. C. to S. G., July 21, 1664 (N. S.).]. These details did not tend to DeWitt's peace of mind. Hence it is no wonder, upon Downing's return to Holland, that the two men "fell very hard upon the busines of Cabo Verde" in their very first conversation. As he had instructed VanGogh to do, so DeWitt demanded of Downing that the English king make a written promise that no more hostilities would be committed on the Guinea Coast, or the Dutch would be in duty bound to assist their company. Downing, who now felt the advantage which the success of Holmes' expedition gave him, replied to DeWitt as follows: "I must say," that the West India Company has "ever since his Majtye's return played the devills & pirats, worse thn Argiers, taken 20 English ships, hindered others, putt out a declaration whereby they claymed al the coast to thmselves; & was it lawfull for thm so to demean thmselves & only lawfull for the English to suffer, tht yet his Majty did not intermeddle, but only the one company against the other, & no wonder if at last the English did stirr a little; & tht Holms was the companye's servt & tht should his Majty have given or lent thm an old ship or two, yet he had nothing to doe in the ordering their designe." Furthermore, he declared that if the Dutch took it upon themselves to assist the West India Company "his Majty would find himself equally obliged to assist his company."[299 - Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 39-41, Downing to Clarendon, July 22, 1664 (O. S.).]

To every one it now seemed as if an open conflict must come. Toward the last of July, Pepys declared that all the talk was of a Dutch war,[300 - Pepys, Diary, IV, 202.] although even Coventry, a director of the Royal Company, admitted that there was little real cause for it and that the damage done to the company, which had brought on Holmes' expedition, did not exceed the paltry sum of two or three hundred pounds.[301 - Ibid., 42, 143.] In Holland, also, the disposition toward war was increased by the realization that the next report from Holmes might bring news of the total loss of the Gold Coast, including the main fortress of Elmina. Under these circumstances the king's promise to punish Holmes according to the exigency of the case meant little or nothing. The maritime provinces, especially Holland, were determined to assist the West India Company against English aggression in Africa.

When Downing discussed the situation with DeWitt, however, he was surprised to hear him still express the possibility of giving satisfaction for the seizure of the Royal Company's ships, and not "so hott" for sending a fleet immediately to Guinea as he had been at first.[302 - Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 48, 49, Downing to Clarendon, July 29, 1664 (O. S.).] Even Downing was for the time being deceived. His spy, who was well within DeWitt's immediate circle, for once was not on duty to give his usual faithful report to his benefactor. DeWitt was accustomed to resort to the same trickery and deceitful diplomacy that was so characteristic of Downing. Indeed it would be difficult to decide which of these two men was the greater master of this questionable art. The English had sent Holmes to Africa totally unknown to the Dutch and had taken half the coast from them before they were even aware of the expedition. It is little wonder then that the idea occurred to DeWitt to retaliate in kind on the English and to keep his plans a profound secret.

In 1661 the Dutch had sent a fleet under Admiral DeRuyter to the Mediterranean Sea in conjunction with an English squadron commanded by Sir John Lawson, for the purpose of punishing the Algerian and other pirates who had been infesting Dutch and English commerce. DeRuyter and Lawson had succeeded in making a number of favorable treaties with the pirates, though the task of quelling them was by no means complete. DeWitt realized that a fleet could scarcely be dispatched to Guinea from Holland without being discovered. Therefore, he together with six of his councillors decided to send secret orders to DeRuyter to sail at once for the coast of Guinea. On account of a peculiarity of the Dutch government, however, it was impossible to dispatch these orders without first securing a resolution of the States General. DeWitt was well aware that somehow these resolutions of the States General usually became known to Downing and the English. He therefore determined that, while the States General should pass the order, he would arrange the matter so that no one would know of it, except those who were already in the plan. On August 11, 1664, the secretary of the States General read the resolution very quickly, during which time DeWitt and his six cohorts raised so much disturbance by loud conversation that no one in the room heard what was being read.[303 - Brandt, Gerard, La Vie de Michel de Ruiter, pp. 212-213.] The trick succeeded admirably. DeWitt was now in possession of the necessary authority, and orders were dispatched at once to DeRuyter to leave his post in the Mediterranean and to sail for the west coast of Africa without revealing his destination to Lawson, the English commander. He was instructed to recover for the West India Company those places which Holmes had seized and to deliver to Valckenburg, the Dutch general on the Gold Coast, all the effects of the English which were not necessary for the different factories of the company.[304 - Brandt, Vie de Ruiter, pp. 213, 214, 217.]

In order not to arouse Downing's suspicions by apparent apathy, the Dutch began to prepare several ships ostensibly for Africa. For the purpose of misleading Downing still further the Dutch agreed to accept an offer made by the French for mediation of the difficulties. DeWitt still insisted, however, that a written promise be given him that the forts and factories which Holmes had seized on the African coast would be restored to the West India Company.[305 - S. P., Holland, 171, ff. 23, 24, Downing to Bennet, August 4, 1664 (O. S.); ibid., ff. 124, 125, Downing to Bennet, August 26, 1664 (O. S.).] Later, in the same month of August, 1664, Downing submitted to the States General the draft of a proposed agreement for the settling of future disputes in the East Indies and in Africa.[306 - S. P., Holland, 171, ff. 119, 120, Downing to S. G., August 25, 1664 (O. S.).] Downing was of the opinion that, although the Dutch could never be depended on to keep such an agreement, it would be a good thing in the East Indies because "ye (the English) are the weaker ther." In Africa the situation appeared different to Downing, for there the English had the advantage. "I hope in the meantime," he declared, "while we are (negotiating) Holmes will doe the work ther," because there "never will be such a opportunity as this to make clear work in Affrica."[307 - Ibid., f. 25, Downing to Bennet, August 4, 1664 (O. S.).] A few days later he advised that everything on the African coast should be done "so as (the) king of England may not appeare in it, but only (the) Rll Company, & they takeing occasion from our affront."[308 - Ibid., f. 56, Downing to Bennet, August 12, 1664 (O. S.).] Still later he asserted that even in Holland everyone believed that since the king and the Royal Company had gone so far, they would seize the entire African coast so that the whole affair might be worth while.[309 - Clar. St. Paps., 108, ff. 75, 76, Downing to Clarendon, August 26, 1664 (O. S.).]

Although DeWitt had been successful in sending the secret orders to DeRuyter concerning his voyage to Guinea, he could not long hope to deceive the ever-watchful Downing. Indeed with all due respect to his crafty rival one is almost surprised that Downing's suspicions were not aroused for more than a month after the commands were despatched. When the possibility of DeRuyter's having been ordered to Africa dawned on Downing, he at once demanded of DeWitt where DeRuyter was going when he left Cadiz. Without hesitation DeWitt replied that he had returned to Algiers and Tunis to ransom some Dutch people.[310 - Lister, Life of Clarendon, III, 344, Downing to Clarendon, September 9, 1664 (O. S.).] The bald falsehood disarmed Downing's suspicions and, although he advised that Sir John Lawson keep a watchful eye on DeRuyter, he assured Bennet that the report that the latter had gone to Guinea was without foundation.[311 - S. P., Holland, 172, f. 171, Downing to Bennet, September 9, 1664 (O. S.).] The report continued to be whispered about,[312 - Clar. St. Paps., 108, f. 82, Downing to Clarendon, September 16, 1664 (O. S.).] however, and although two weeks later DeWitt repeated his falsehood, Downing began to fear that he was being deceived. He declared that although he was certain that the States General had given no orders in the usual way for DeRuyter's departure to Guinea, he was very well aware that the Dutch could find means to do those things which they deemed necessary. The more he considered the matter, the likelihood of secret orders having been given to DeRuyter seemed to him more and more probable. "I am sure if I were in their case, I would do it," he finally declared, and therefore he again advised Bennet to have Sir John Lawson watch DeRuyter closely.[313 - S. P., Holland, 172, f. 241, Downing to Bennet, September 23, 1664 (O. S.).]

The news of Holmes' success at Cape Verde had stirred up extraordinary activity in the Royal Company. In September, 1664, the company was busily enlisting factors and soldiers for the Guinea coast. A number of ships, several of which belonged to the king, and some of which the company hired, were being prepared for the voyage to Guinea.[314 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal, VanGogh to S. G., September 23/October 3, 1664.] To add to the company's bright prospects, a vessel from the Gold Coast arrived in England at the end of September,[315 - Pepys, Diary, IV, 254; Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal, VanGogh to S. G., September 30/October 10, 1664.] bringing the account of Holmes' capture of Cape Corse and other factories on the African coast. The Royal Company now saw itself master of West Africa. Pepys declared that the news from Holmes would certainly make the Dutch quite "mad."[316 - Pepys, Diary, IV, 254.] It did indeed create a very great impression in Holland, where many had believed that Cape Corse was impregnable. Downing, of course, rejoiced exceedingly. Oftentimes in the past he had supported the Danish and Swedish claims to Cape Corse, but now he found no difficulty in showing Carisius and Appleborne, the Danish and Swedish representatives at The Hague, that their claims were as before, against the Dutch. Omitting to say anything of the English claim to Cape Corse, Downing explained to them that since the Dutch had been in possession of Cape Corse, Holmes had seized it together with other places on account of the numerous injuries done to the Royal Company. "They both replied that they took it so."[317 - S. P., Holland, 172, f. 35, Downing to Bennet, October 7, 1664 (O. S.).]

In London, VanGogh lost no time in obtaining an interview with Charles II concerning Holmes' latest activities. Again the king asserted that Holmes' violent actions on the African coast were without his knowledge, especially the affair at Cape Verde, which place he declared was of no importance and not worth one hundred pounds.[318 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., VanGogh to DeWitt, October 3/13, 1664. A few days after this VanGogh very much annoyed the king by bringing up the Cape Verde incident again. The king burst out, "And pray, what is Cape Verde? A stinking place (using these very words): Is this of such importance to make so much adoe about! As much as I could ever yet learne of it, it is of noe use at all." S. P., Holland, 172, f. 158, VanGogh to Ruysch, October 24, 1664 (N. S.).] Regarding his responsibility for the capture of Cape Corse he refrained from committing himself so definitely, but he assured the Dutch ambassador that Cape Corse belonged to the English; that their claim to it would be satisfactorily established; and that he intended to preserve these new acquisitions by sending Prince Rupert with a fleet to the coast of Africa.[319 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten van H. en W. F., VanGogh to DeWitt, October 3/13, 1664.] On the 28th of October, after learning of Holmes' capture of New Amsterdam, Charles II boldly threw aside his reserve and declared that the taking of Cape Corse, as well as of New Amsterdam, "was done with his knowledge & by his order as being a business wch properly belonged to the English, that the ground was theirs & that they had also built upon the same, that the same was afterwards taken from the English by the Netherlands West India Compa, & … that the English will justify & demonstrate their right to all this."[320 - S. P., Holland, 173, f. 178, VanGogh to Ruysch, November 7, 1664 (N. S.); DeWitt, Brieven, IV, 387, 390, VanGogh to DeWitt, October 28/November 7, October 31/November 10, 1664.] If Holmes' actions in Guinea have so far seemed very extraordinary, they can hardly be so regarded any longer in view of the light which the king himself threw over the whole situation in this remarkable statement. To be sure he had not as yet assumed responsibility for the capture of Cape Verde. However, his direct responsibility for the other actions of Holmes, which were much more important, makes it a matter of little consequence whether the capture of Cape Verde is to be attributed to him or not.

It may have seemed to Downing that there was less excuse for the seizure of Cape Verde than for the other places. At any rate he held out some hope to DeWitt that it would be restored to the Dutch. This must have been a bitter sop to DeWitt, who was well aware that as for Cape Corse he need entertain no such hope.[321 - DeWitt, Brieven, IV, 390, DeWitt to VanGogh, November 14, 1664 (N. S.).] There was one feature of the situation, however, which somewhat pleased DeWitt,[322 - Clar. St. Paps., 108, f. 126, Downing to Clarendon, November 11, 1664 (O. S.).] Downing could no longer maintain that the troubles in Guinea were merely quarrels between two commercial companies in which the king had no direct interest or connection. DeWitt would not therefore be at a loss to find numerous reasons why DeRuyter had been sent to Africa when the time came for defending that action.

By this time every one in London and Amsterdam was in a state of extreme suspense as to whether or not DeRuyter was on the Guinea coast. On the 14th of October, 1664, news was received both in Holland and in England from Cadiz to the effect that DeRuyter intended to sail to Guinea upon his departure from that port.[323 - Ibid., f. 100, Downing to Clarendon, October 14, 1664 (O. S.); Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan de Staten Generaal, October 14/24, 1664.] In Amsterdam, encouraged by this vigorous rumor, the stocks of the West India Company began to rise from the low point where they had been for some time.[324 - Clar. St. Paps., 108, f. 108, Downing to Clarendon, October 28, 1664 (O. S.); ibid., f. 120, Downing to Clarendon, November 4, 1664 (O. S.).] When Downing chided DeWitt about DeRuyter, the latter replied in a bantering fashion that if he believed the report, notwithstanding what had been said to the contrary, to continue in the belief; it could do no harm.[325 - Ibid., f. 117, Downing to Clarendon, November 4, 1664 (O. S.).] In London, the apprehension of DeRuyter's expedition greatly checked the enthusiasm of the Royal Company, and caused the king to postpone Prince Rupert's departure to the African coast. VanGogh reported the cry that was heard everywhere in London, "Guinea is lost. What now is it possible to do with the Dutch."[326 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan der Raadpensionaris, VanGogh to DeWitt, October 17/27, 1664.] The Dutch ambassador, who did not cease to haunt the king's chambers over Holmes' seizures, found Charles II irritable and greatly displeased with affairs. When questioned as to whether he would punish Holmes, the king declared that Holmes did not need to fear punishment at home since the Dutch had evidently sent forces to do it themselves.[327 - S. P., Holland, 173, f. 19, VanGogh to Ruysch, December 5, 1654 (N. S.). The duke of York was known to be very favorable to Holmes at the same time. S. P., Dom., Charles II, 105, f. 176, Coventry to Bennet, November 27, 1664.]

The news concerning DeRuyter's successful expedition to the African coast, which arrived in England just before Christmas, 1664, showed, as Pepys expressed it, that the English had been "beaten to dirt at Guinea."[328 - Pepys, Diary, IV, 312.] Indeed DeRuyter's conquest of the coast in the end was as complete as that of Holmes.[329 - He arrived at Cape Verde October 22, 1664, and left the Gold Coast February 27, 1665.] With one exception DeRuyter captured all the English factories and forts, including Kormentine, which he delivered with their goods to the agents of the West India Company. The English retained only Cape Corse, which, because of its strong position and the loyalty of the natives, DeRuyter decided would offer a successful resistance.[330 - In this account it seems unnecessary to give the details of the capture of these places. They may be found at length in Brandt, Vie de Ruiter, pp. 223 to 265.]

Up to the time that DeRuyter departed for the African coast it is conceivable that by mutual concessions the troublesome questions existing between England and the United Provinces might have been amicably settled. The Dutch, however, had decided that this could not be done with honor and advantage to themselves, and therefore they chose to answer the warlike actions of Holmes in kind. When the English learned of DeRuyter's activities on the African coast the growing animosity between the two countries was so greatly intensified that war was inevitable. The members of the Royal Company who realized the gravity of the situation begged the king to come to the company's assistance.[331 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 110, f. 19; Condition of Co., Jan. 2 (1664/5).] The king, who considered the company to be of great importance to the colonial trade, and who realized his own intimate connection with its formation, declared on January 2, 1665, that he was resolved "to assist, protect & preserve the said company in the prosecution of their said trade,"[332 - P. C. R., Charles II, 5: 4.] a declaration which was tantamount to war.

The Anglo-Dutch war of 1665-7 was, therefore, as has long been known, a war over trade privileges. Furthermore, in the popular mind, it was the dispute over trading privileges on the West African coast which "became the Occasion, at least the Popular Pretence of the war with Holland."[333 - The Case of the Royal African Company of England and their Creditors, p. 6.] In international disputes some facts, although of minor importance, are often seized upon with great vigor by the contending parties. It is very probable that both England and the United Provinces greatly overestimated the value of the African forts and factories, but, at that time, the possession of them seemed very important. To many of these places plausible claims were advanced by both the English and the Dutch. There was plenty of opportunity therefore for disputes, and the representatives of the two great commercial companies did not fail to utilize it.

If the factors of the two companies in Guinea found it impossible to reconcile their differences, the same observation may be made concerning Downing and DeWitt at The Hague. One is not inclined to excuse the deceit of the latter nor to sympathize with the apathetic neglect with which he met all English claims. On the other hand, Downing was perhaps the match for DeWitt in cunning and his master in argument. His contempt for the Dutch made it impossible for him to deal with them without gaining a complete victory. Compromise is the basis of most diplomacy, but such a word was scarcely in Downing's vocabulary. There were men in England who realized that Downing was slowly but surely leading the two countries into war. Clarendon reproved him for overzealousness; and Lord Hollis, the English ambassador in France, informed him that he saw no "causam belli, onely litigandi," and asked him if he could not temper his speech "by pouring in oyle & not vinegar," and thus prevent a war if possible.[334 - Add. MSS., 22,920, f. 46, Lord Hollis to (Downing), September 2/12, 1664.] In Downing's behalf it may be said, however, that his attitude was the same as that of the mercantile interests in England which he so well represented. The increasing importance of the mercantile element, both in England and Holland, and their desire to encroach on the trade of one another in all parts of the world, especially in Guinea, was responsible for the war.[335 - On October 30, 1664 (N. S.), d'Estrades declared to the king of France that the real cause of the war then about to begin was the desire of the king of England to become master of Guinea. Mémoires d'Estrades, II, 517.] When the war was inevitable, representatives of the English commercial interests assured the government of their loyal support and assistance.[336 - See the paper of Sir Richard Ford, one of the prominent members of the Royal Company. Clar. St. Paps., 83, f. 374.] As for the Dutch they, too, entered the conflict with high hopes for they did not fear Charles II as they had feared Cromwell.

Sir Robert Holmes who had been so largely responsible for the difficulties which resulted in the Anglo-Dutch war arrived in England early in January, 1665. He was ordered to surrender the ships which he had taken from the Dutch in Guinea to the Royal Company.[337 - C. S. P., Dom., 1664-5, p. 154, warrant to Holmes, January 7, 1654.] On the 9th of January, by way of appeasing VanGogh, he was thrown into the Tower of London,[338 - S. P., Holland, 174, f. 138, VanGogh to Ruysch, January 9/19, 1665.] where he was to remain, the king declared, until he gave a satisfactory account of his actions at Cape Verde. Once more it appeared as if proceedings were to be taken against him "according to the exigency of the case."[339 - S. P., Holland, 174, f. 138, VanGogh to Ruysch, January 13/23, 1665.] It is interesting to note that his imprisonment resulted from the capture of the one place, mention of which was omitted in his instructions. However, Holmes was not long detained in confinement. Probably on account of the influence of the duke of York and of Prince Rupert he was again set at liberty toward the last of January,[340 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den Raadpensionaris, VanGogh to Ruysch, January 27/February 6, 1665.] and VanGogh reported that he was even enjoying royal favor.[341 - Ibid., VanGogh to Ruysch, January 30/February 9, 1665.] Apparently Holmes was unable to render a satisfactory account of his prizes to the Royal Company, however, and he was therefore reconfined in the Tower about the 24th of February.[342 - Ibid., Cunaeus to –, February 24/March 6, 1665.] On the third of March he was examined before the Privy Council in regard to his expedition. His explanation of the various events was found satisfactory and he was forthwith ordered to be discharged from the Tower.[343 - P. C. R., Charles II, 5:69.] This order was not executed at once because he had not even yet rendered a satisfactory account to the Company.[344 - Brieven van de Ambassadors in Engeland aan den Raadpensionaris, (VanGogh) to Ruysch, February 27/March 9, 1665.] Royal clemency was invoked and a warrant was issued March 23, 1665, releasing him from all criminal and pecuniary charges which might be brought against him.[345 - C. S. P., Dom., 1664-5, p. 268, order to release Holmes, March 23, 1664/5.] The king's intervention in his behalf brought to an end the connection of Sir Robert Holmes with the company's affairs on the African coast.

By concluding the account of the diplomatic relations of England and the United Provinces with the early part of 1665, it is not intended to convey the idea that all diplomatic intercourse between the two countries ceased at that time. Downing remained in The Hague until August of that year, but neither side thought seriously of attempting to prevent the struggle in which they were already engaged on the African coast. DeRuyter arrived at Cape Verde on October 11, 1664, where he found nine English vessels most of which were in the service of the Royal Company and had only recently arrived on the Guinea coast. In response to an inquiry made by the English as to his intentions DeRuyter replied that he had come to punish the Royal Company for Holmes' hostile actions. He demanded the surrender of the company's factors and goods on shore and on the several ships. Since the English were unable to resist they surrendered the goods of the Royal Company after which the vessels were permitted to depart. In this way DeRuyter attempted to show plainly that he was not carrying on hostilities against the English nation, but was only aiding the West India Company to recover its property and goods, and to punish the Royal Company for the actions of Sir Robert Holmes.

DeRuyter left a Dutch garrison at Cape Verde and started with his plunder for Elmina. On the way he despoiled the English factory on the Sierra Leone River. On December 25 he arrived on the Gold Coast and made an attack on Tacorary where he was temporarily repulsed, but later he succeeded in blowing up this English factory. He then proceeded to unload at Elmina the effects which he had taken from the English. While doing so he received orders from the States General, dated October 21, 1664, commanding him to seize all English goods and vessels, whether they belonged to the Royal Company or not. In accordance with these instructions DeRuyter captured several English vessels, but he considered his chief duty to be the taking of the English fort at Kormentine. An agreement was made with the natives of the neighboring region of Fetu, who acted in conjunction with the Dutch ships and with the forces which DeRuyter landed. Although many of the natives remained loyal to the English, Kormentine fell an easy prey to the attacking party about the first of February, 1665. The other English factories, with the exception of Cape Corse, were also occupied without much difficulty. Although DeRuyter had received special orders to reduce Cape Corse, he considered this impossible, on account of the ease with which it could be defended and the loyalty of the Negroes to the English cause in that territory. DeRuyter was therefore compelled to depart from the Gold Coast on his voyage to Barbadoes without having taken possession of Cape Corse[346 - The account of DeRuyter's voyage given here is a digest of what appears at much greater length in Brandt, Vie de Ruiter, pp. 223-265. A short contemporary English account may be found in C.O. 1: 19, ff. 88, 89.].

On April 18, 1667, Lord Hollis and Sir William Coventry, who were selected as the English envoys to treat for peace between England and the United Provinces, were instructed to propose that each country retain whatever places were in its possession on the 25th of the previous December. On the other hand, the English were also directed to induce the Dutch to give back Kormentine if possible[347 - S. P., Holland, 182, ff. 246, 247. The Dutch had entertained some hopes of inducing the English to surrender Cape Corse, as is evident from negotiations which they carried on with the Swedes and the Danes. In March, 1665, a treaty was drawn up between Sweden and the United Provinces in which the former country agreed to renounce her claims of damage against the West India Company and all her rights to any places on the African coast, for which renunciation the States General was to pay 140,000 rix dollars. The treaty failed of approbation on account of the reluctance of the king of Sweden to withdraw his interests from the coast of Africa. Aitzema, XI, 1102, 1103; S. P., Holland, 174, f. 148, Downing to Bennet, February 17, 1664/5 (O.S.); S. P., Holland, 179, f. 86, Downing to Bennet, March 10, 1665 (March 10, 1664/5. O. S.).With the Danes the Dutch had more success. On February 11, 1667, a treaty was entered into between Frederick III, of Denmark and the United Provinces, in which it was agreed that the Danes should surrender all their claims to Cape Corse, retaining, however, the adjacent fort of Fredericksburg. Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, VI, part 3, p. 74.]. How vigorously the envoys urged the return of Kormentine cannot be ascertained, but at any rate they were unsuccessful in obtaining it. When the treaty was concluded at Breda, July 21, 1667, it provided that each country should retain the territories which it held on the tenth of the previous May[348 - Dumont, Corps Universel Diplomatique, VI, part I, pp. 44, 45, article 3.]. Thus ended the war which had in so large a measure been caused by the troubles between the Royal Adventurers and the West India Company.

At the conclusion of peace between the two countries, the English cannot be said to have been in a better position on the Guinea coast than they were before the war. On the other hand, it would not be difficult to rebuild new factories at the places which they had lost during the war. Indeed at the time peace was made factories had already been settled in several places occupied before DeRuyter's expedition. Nicolas Villaut, a Frenchman who made a voyage down the coast of Guinea in the years 1666 and 1667 mentioned an English factory on one of the islands in the Sierra Leone River, another at Madra Bomba just north of Cape Mount, and still another just below Cape Miserado[349 - Villaut, A Relation of the Coasts of Africa called Guinee, pp. 49, 56, 75.]. He also mentioned the strength of the English fortress at Cape Corse, and declared that, although there was war in Europe between England and Denmark, the English factors at Cape Corse and those of the Danes at the neighboring fort of Fredericksburg made an amicable agreement to commit no acts of hostility against one another; and that this agreement was so punctually observed that the soldiers of the two nations mingled freely at all times[350 - Ibid., pp. 126, 131, 135. Villaut also speaks of an English fort at Eniacham (Anashan).]. Villaut failed to describe the condition of the company's fort in the Gambia River, but on October 30, 1667, an attack on it by the natives was reported to the general court of the company[351 - A. C. R., 75: 60.]. The Negroes succeeded in obtaining possession of the island but were presently dislodged by the company's factors after the loss of a number of white men[352 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 217, f. 76, John Lysle to Williamson, September 16, 1667.].

Inasmuch as there remain very scanty records of the company's trading activities and the manner of government instituted at its forts and factories on the African coast, it is impossible to describe fully these aspects of the company's history. When the company first sent agents to the head factory at Kormentine seven men each served a month's turn as chief factor. As might have been expected trouble resulted concerning the succession.[353 - C. O. 1: 17, f. 243, John Allen to (the Royal Adventurers), December 18, 1663.] The company therefore withdrew this order and directed that one of the factors be given charge of affairs with the title of chief agent and with a salary of one hundred pounds per year.[354 - A. C. R., 75: 3.] After the Dutch captured Kormentine in 1665, Cape Corse became the chief English factory, under the direction of Gilbert Beavis, who was replaced by Thomas Pearson in 1667. At the end of the Anglo-Dutch war the company's affairs on the African coast were at a low ebb, and the uncertainties of the Guinea trade were at once demonstrated when the former agent, Beavis, in conjunction with the natives, assaulted Cape Corse, carrying off Pearson and much of the company's goods. With the assistance of one of the Royal Company's ships the factors recovered the fort and replaced Pearson in charge of affairs, where he remained to the year 1671.[355 - S. P., Dom., Charles II, 380, f. 57; ibid., 381, ff. 138, 139.]

In addition to these difficulties there was also a repetition of the petty quarrels between the agents of the Royal Company and those of the West India Company, which had so characterized the years previous to the war. When the English began to build lodges at Komenda and Agga, the Dutch general, Dirck Wilree, at once objected, claiming that the possession of the adjacent fort of Kormentine gave them exclusive rights to those places.[356 - C. O. 1: 23, ff. 3, 4, 6, 7, Wilree to Pearson, January 23/February 2, and February 14/24, 1668.] The English denied this claim[357 - Ibid., 23, f. 5, Pearson to Wilree, n. d.] and sent home for more supplies to fortify Komenda. At the same time they advised the company that the licensed private traders who had appeared on the coast had very greatly injured the trade of the company's factories, because they sold their goods very much cheaper than the company's agents could afford to.[358 - C. O. 1: 23, f. 2, Pearson and others to the Royal Adventurers, February 18, 1667/8.] The renewal of the trouble between the two companies moved the general court on June 30, 1668, to ask for the king's assistance.[359 - A. C. R., 75: 75.] The information lately received from the company's agents was read in the Privy Council and referred to the committee for trade.[360 - C. O. 1: 23, f. 1, petition of the Royal Adventurers (July 3), 1668; P. C. R., Charles II, 7: 374, July 3, 1668.] This committee recommended the appointment of some persons to treat with the Dutch regarding the possession of the disputed places, and Secretary Morice was therefore instructed to sound the Dutch ambassadors in London about the matter. Instructions of a similar nature were to be given to Sir William Temple, who was about to depart for the United Netherlands as the English ambassador.[361 - P. C. R., 7: 378, July 8, 1668. The minutes of the general court for November 14, 1668, mention a letter intended to be dispatched to Sir William Temple. A. C. R., 75: 81.]At this point the matter seems to have been dropped without further discussion, and Komenda remained a subject of possible contention between the English and the Dutch for many years to come.

During the latter years of the history of the Company of Royal Adventurers the factories including Cape Corse fell into great decay, on account of the failure of the company to send out ships and supplies. Nearly all the English trade was carried on in the vessels of private traders, who in return for their licenses, agreed to take one-tenth of their cargoes free of all freight charges, which goods were to be used for the maintenance of the company's factories, especially Cape Corse.[362 - A. C. R., 100: 47, 48.] Even this provision was not sufficient, and in the latter part of November, 1670, it was found necessary to send some additional supplies for the immediate relief of Cape Corse.[363 - ibid., 75: 96.] The king, who was still indebted to the company for his subscription to the stock, was induced to pay a part of it, with which money two ships were despatched for the relief of Cape Corse[364 - C. O. 1: 25, f. 227, estimate of charges for supplies at Cape Corse, December 19, 1670; A. C. R., 75: 106, 107.] which had been in great distress.[365 - Foreign Entry Book, 176, minutes of the foreign committee, January 22, 1671/2.]

CHAPTER IV

The Royal Adventurers and the Plantations

The early trade of the English to the coast of Africa was very largely in exchange for products which could be sold in England. Among these may be mentioned elephants' teeth, wax, malaguetta and gold. As has been shown, the hope of discovering gold mines was the principal cause of the first expedition sent to Africa by the Royal Adventurers in December, 1660. When this scheme to mine gold was abandoned the company's agents traded for gold which was brought down from the interior or washed out by the slow and laborious toil of the natives. The other African products, especially elephants' teeth, were brought to London where they sold quite readily for very good prices.

Although this direct trade between England and Africa was never neglected, the slave trade with the English colonies in the West Indies was destined to absorb the company's attention because the supply of indentured servants[366 - These were people of the rougher and even criminal classes of the parent country who, in return for their ocean passage, agreed to work for some planter during a specified number of years, usually seven.] was never great enough to meet the needs of the rapidly growing sugar and indigo plantations. From the planters point of view, moreover, slaves had numerous advantages over white servants as plantation laborers. Slaves and their children after them were chattel property for life. The danger of rebellion was very small because often the slaves could not even converse with one another, since they were likely to be from different parts of Africa and therefore to speak a different dialect. Finally, neither the original outlay for slaves nor the cost of feeding and clothing them was great, and therefore slaves were regarded as more economical than indentured servants. Moreover, there was much to be said against encouraging the lower classes of England to come to the plantations, where they often engaged engaged in disturbances of one kind and another. Also, after a service of a few years, it was necessary to allow them to go where they pleased. Nevertheless, with all their disadvantages, it may be truly said that the planters preferred the white servants to any others. It was, however, impossible to obtain the needed supply of labor from this source and therefore it was always necessary to import slaves from Africa.

Previous to the accession of Charles II not many slaves were imported into the English possessions in the West Indies. Of this small number all but a few had been brought by the ships of the Dutch West India Company. The Dutch centered their West India trade at the island of Curaçao, whence they could supply not only their own colonies with slaves but those of the French, English and even the Spanish when opportunity offered. So great was the demand for slaves and other necessities procured from the Dutch that the English planters in the West Indies regarded this trade as highly desirable. For instance, when the island of Barbadoes surrendered to the Parliamentary forces, January 11, 1652, it stipulated that it should retain its freedom of trade and that no company should be formed which would monopolize its commodities.[367 - C. S. P., Col., 1674-1675, Addenda, p. 86, articles agreed on by Lord Willoughby and Sir George Ayscue and others, January 11, 1652.] Nevertheless, by the Navigation Act of 1660 colonial exports, part of which had to be carried only to England, were confined to English ships. This was a sufficient limitation of their former freedom of trade to incense the planters in the West Indies but, as a matter of greater importance to them, the king granted to the Company of Royal Adventurers the exclusive trade to the western coast of Africa, thus limiting their supply of Negro slaves to this organization. The company therefore undertook this task, realizing that in the Negro trade it would find by far its most lucrative returns. Not only did the company supply the planters with slaves, their greatest necessity, but in exchange for these it took sugar and other plantation products which it carried to England. It was natural that the company should endeavor to make a success of its business, but, on the other hand, it was to be expected that the planters would regard the company as a monopoly and a nuisance to be outwitted if possible.

In 1660 Barbadoes was in much the same condition as is true of every rapidly expanding new country. The settlers occupied as much land as they could obtain and directed every effort toward its cultivation and improvement. The growing of sugar had proved to be very profitable and every planter saw his gains limited only by the lack of labor to cultivate his lands. Every possible effort was therefore made to obtain laborers and machinery. Although the planters had little ready capital, they made purchases with a free hand, depending upon the returns from their next year's crop to pay off their debts. As a result, the planters were continually in debt to the merchants. The merchants greatly desired that Barbadoes should be made as dependent on England as possible in order that the constantly increasing amount of money which the planters owed them might be better secured. Moreover, they wished to prevent the planters from manipulating the laws of the island in such a way as to hinder the effective collection of debts.[368 - C. S. P., Col., 1661-1668, p. 14, petitions of merchants and planters, March 1, 1661.] The planters, on the other hand, appreciated very keenly the ill effects upon themselves of the laws which were passed in England for the regulation of commerce. They bitterly complained of the enumerated article clause of the Navigation Act of 1660, which provided that all sugars, indigo and cotton-wool should be carried only to England. Already the planters were very greatly in debt to the merchants and they saw in this new law the beginning of the restrictions by which the merchants intended to throttle their trade. Indeed it seemed to the planters as if they were completely at the mercy of the merchants, who paid what they pleased for sugar, and charged excessive prices for Negroes, cattle and supplies.[369 - C. S. P., Col., 1661-1668, pp. 29, 30, 45, 46, 47, petitions from Barbadoes, May 11, July 10, 12, 1661.] Among those who were regarded as oppressors were the factors of the Royal Company, which controlled the Negro supply upon which the prosperity of the plantations depended.

Sir Thomas Modyford, speaker of the assembly, also became the agent for the Royal Adventurers in Barbadoes. Modyford was very enthusiastic about the company's prospects for a profitable trade in Negroes with the Spanish colonies. The people of Barbadoes neither shared Modyford's enthusiasm for this trade nor for the company's monopoly because they believed that thereby the price of slaves was considerably increased. On December 18, 1662, the council and assembly of Barbadoes resolved to ask the king for a free trade to Africa or to be assured that the factors of the Royal Company would sell their slaves for the same price as other merchants.[370 - Ibid., p. 117, minutes of the council and assembly of Barbadoes, December 18, 1662.] Very shortly, the duke of York, the company's governor, informed Governor Willoughby that the company had made arrangements to provide Barbadoes and the Caribbee Islands with 3,000 slaves per annum and that the needs of the islands would be attended to as conditions changed. Moreover, the company pledged itself to see that all Negroes imported into the island should be sold by lots, as had been the custom, at the average rate of seventeen pounds per head or for commodities of the island rated at that price.[371 - The pieces of eight were to be accepted at four shillings each, and 2,400 pounds of muscovado sugar were to be accepted in exchange for a slave.] The duke of York also requested Governor Willoughby to ascertain if possible how many Negroes were desired by the planters at that rate, and to see that any planters who wished to become members of the company should be given an opportunity to do so.[372 - Answer of the Company of Royal Adventurers of England … to the Petition … exhibited … by Sir Paul Painter, His Royal Highness (the duke of York) and others to Lord Willoughby, January 10, 1662/3.]

When the company's factors, Sir Thomas Modyford and Sir Peter Colleton, began to sell Negroes to the planters they encountered endless trouble and litigation in the collection of debts. In a vivid description of their difficulties to the company they declared that Governor Willoughby did nothing to assist them until he received several admonitions from the king. To be sure the governor's power in judicial matters was limited by the council, which in large part was made up of landholders who naturally attempted to shield the planters from their creditors. In case an execution on a debt was obtained from a local court the property remained in the hands of the debtor for eighty days. During this time the debtor often made away with the property, if it was in the form of chattel goods. If the judgment was against real estate the land also remained in the hands of the debtor for eighty days, during which time a committee, usually neighbors of the debtor, appraised the land, often above its real value. If this sum exceeded the debt, the creditor was compelled to pay the difference. As the factors declared, therefore, it was a miracle if the creditors got their money.[373 - C. O. 1: 18, ff. 85, 86, Modyford and Colleton to the Royal Adventurers, March 20, 1664.]

In 1664, Sir Thomas Modyford was called from Barbadoes to become governor of Jamaica.[374 - A. C. R., 75: 13, 14, J5.] In his place the Royal Adventurers selected John Reid, who had resided for several years in Spain and was therefore conversant with the needs of the Spanish colonies concerning slaves. Reid also obtained the office of sub-commissioner of prizes in Barbadoes.[375 - Ibid., 75: 20.]