Studies in the Theory of Descent, Volume II

It is true that in neither case do we learn more than that there is something present which we do not perceive, but in both instances this knowledge is of the greatest value. The consciousness that behind that mechanism of the universe which is alone comprehensible to us there still lies an incomprehensible teleological Universal Cause, necessitates quite a different conception of the universe – a conception absolutely opposed to that of the materialist. Most correctly and beautifully does Von Baer say that “a purpose cannot be otherwise conceived by us than as proceeding from a will and consciousness; in this would the ‘aiming at a purpose,’ which appears to us as reasonable as it is necessary, have its deepest root.” If we conceive in this world a divine Universal Power exercising volition as the ultimate basis of matter and of the natural laws resident therein, we thus reconcile the apparent contradiction between the mechanical conception and teleology. In the same way that Von Hartmann, somewhere speaks of the immanent teleology of a machine, we might speak of the immanent teleology of the universe, because the single forces of matter are so exactly adjusted that they must give rise to the projected world, just as the wheels and levers of a machine bring forth a required manufactured article. I admit that these are grossly anthropomorphic ideas. But as mortals can we have any other ideas? Is not the notion of purpose in itself an equally anthropomorphic one? and is there any certainty that the idea of causality is less so? Do we know that causality is unlimited, or that it is universally valid? In the absence of this knowledge, should it not be permissible to satisfy as far as we can the craving of the human mind for a spiritual First Cause of the universe, by speaking of it in terms conceivable to human understanding? We can take up such a final position and still be conscious that we thereby form no certain conception, and indeed come no nearer to the reality. The materialist still makes use of the notion of “eternity,” and frequently handles it as though it were a perfectly known quantity. We nevertheless do not seriously believe that by the expression “eternal matter,” any true idea resulting from human experience is gained.

If it is asked, however, how that which in ourselves and in the remainder of the animal world is intellectual and perceptive, which thinks and wills, is ascribable to a mechanical process of organic development – whether the development of the mind can be conceived as resulting from purely mechanical laws? I answer unhesitatingly in the affirmative with the pure materialist, although I do not agree with him as to the manner in which he derives these phenomena from matter, since thinking and extension are heterogeneous things, and one cannot be considered as a product of the other. But why should not the ancient notion of “conscious matter” given out by Maupertuis and Robinet, not be again entertained, as pointed out in recent times by Fechner?[143 - See also Fr. Vischer’s “Studien über den Traum. Beilage zur Augsburger Allgem. Zeitung,” April 14th, 1876. Haeckel also includes this idea in his recent essay already quoted, “Die Perigenesis der Plastidule,” Berlin, 1876, p. 38 et seq.] Would there not thus be found a useful formula for explaining phenomena hitherto quite incomprehensible?

Von Hartmann in criticizing himself, designates the sensibility of atoms as an “almost inevitable hypothesis” (p. 62), “inevitable because if sensibility were not a general and original property of the constituent elements of matter, it would be absolutely incomprehensible how through its potentiality and integration that sensibility known to us as being possessed by the organism could have arisen.” “It is impossible that from purely external elements devoid of all internality (Innerlichkeit) there should suddenly appear, by a certain mode of combination, an internality which becomes more and more richly developed. The more certainly science becomes convinced that in the sphere of externality (Äusserlichkeit) the higher (organic) phenomena are only results of combination, or are the aggregate phenomena of the elementary atomic forces, the more surely, when she once seriously concerns herself with this other question, will she not fail to be convinced that the sensibility possessed by higher stages of consciousness can be only combination-results, or the aggregate phenomena of the elementary sensations of atoms, although these atomic sensations as such always remain below the level of the higher combinations of consciousness.” In confusing this double-sided nature of the objective phenomenon “lies the main error of all materialism and of all subjective idealism. Just as the attempt of the latter (subjective idealism) to construct the external phenomena of existence in space out of functions of internality and their combinations is impossible, so is the endeavour of the former (materialism) to build up internal sensation out of any combinations of force acting externally in space equally impossible.”

I have no intention of going any deeper into these questions. I mention them only in order to point out that even from this side there appears to me no obstacle in the way of a purely mechanical conception of the processes of the universe. The naturalist may be excused if he attempts to penetrate into the region of philosophy; it arises from the wish to be able to contribute a little towards the reconciliation of the latest knowledge of the naturalist with the religious wants of the human mind – towards the aim striven for by both sides, viz. a satisfactory and harmonious view of the universe, according with the state of knowledge of our time.

I believe that I have shown that the theory of selection by no means leads – as is always assumed – to the denial of a teleological Universal Cause and to materialism, and I thereby hope that I have cleared the way for this doctrine, the importance of which it is scarcely possible to over-estimate. Many, and not the most ill-informed, do not get so far as to make an unbiassed examination into the facts, because they are at the outset alarmed by the to them inevitable consequence of the materialistic conception of the universe. Mechanism and teleology do not exclude one another, they are rather in mutual agreement. Without teleology there would be no mechanism, but only a confusion of crude forces; and without mechanism there would be no teleology, for how could the latter otherwise effect its purpose?[144 - See Von Hartmann, loc. cit. p. 158.]

Von Hartmann correctly says: – “The most complete mechanism conceivable is likewise the most completely conceivable teleology.” We may thus represent the phenomenal universe as such a completely conceivable mechanism. With this conception vanish all apprehensions that the new views would cause man to lose the best that he possesses – morality and purely human spiritual culture. He who, with Von Baer, considers the laws of nature as the “permanent expressions of the will of a creative principle,” will clearly perceive that a further advance in the knowledge of these laws need not divert man from the path of increasing improvement, but must further him in this course – that the knowledge of truth, whatever may be its purport, cannot possibly be considered a backward step. Let us take our stand boldly on the ground of new knowledge, and accept the direct consequences thereof, and we shall not be obliged to give up either morality or the comforting conviction of being part of an harmonious world, as a necessary member capable of development and perfection.

Any other mode of interference by a directive teleological power in the processes of the universe than by the appointment of the forces producing them, is however, at least to the naturalist, inadmissible. We are still far removed from completely understanding the mechanism by means of which the organic world is evoked – we still find ourselves at the very beginning of knowledge. We are, however, already convinced that both the organic and the inorganic worlds are dependent only upon mechanical forces, for to this conclusion we are led, not only by the results of investigators who have restricted themselves to limited provinces, but also by the most general considerations. But although the force of these arguments may not be acknowledged, and although one might maintain that the inductional proofs against the existence of a “phyletic vital force” have been directed only against points of detail, or have never been completely demonstrated, i. e. for all points, it must nevertheless be conceded, that for the naturalist the mechanical conception of Nature is the only one possible – that he is not at all justified in abandoning this view so long as the interference of teleological forces in the course of the processes of organic development has not been demonstrated to him. Thus, it will not be immaterial whether a conception of Nature which to many seems inevitable is consistent with the idea of universal design, or a final directive universal principle, since the value which we may attach to our own lives and aims, essentially depends thereon. The final and main result of this essay will thus be found in the attempted demonstration that the mechanical conception of Nature very well admits of being united with a teleological conception of the Universe.

THE END

ERRATA

Page 81, line 8 from top, and throughout essay, for “Daphnidæ” read “Daphniidæ.”

Page 95, line 3 from bottom, for “Daphnoidea” read “Daphniacea.”

Page 166, line 7 from bottom (note), for “p. 438” read “p. 433.”

Page 245, line 17 from bottom (note), for “Ställ” read “Stoll.”

Page 263, after the word “insects” (bottom line of note), add, “but the whole marking is suggestive of distastefulness.”

Page 296, line 3 from bottom, for “Stähelina – collector” read “Stähelin – a collector.”

Page 305, line 5 from bottom (note), for “In 1869” read “In 1865.”

Page 434, bottom line of note, for “Geometræ” read “Bombycidæ.”

Page 494, line 2 from top, for “from which a larval form” read “from a larval form which.”

Page 542, line 12 from top, for “Dione Vanilla” read “Dione Vanillæ.”

Page 544, line 15 from bottom, for “Siderome” read “Siderone.”

notes

1

[The slight variability in the colour of this pupa, opens up the interesting question of the photographic sensitiveness of this and other species, which is stated to cause them to assimilate in colour to the surface on which the larva undergoes its final ecdysis. Some experiments upon this subject have been recorded by Mr. T. W. Wood, Proc. Ent. Soc. 1867, p. xcix, but the field is still almost unexplored. R.M.]

2

“Über den Einfluss der Isolirung auf die Artbildung.” Leipzig, 1872, p. 20.

3

In some instances Deilephila Lineata has also been seen by day hovering over flowers.

4

It is true that I only reared one brood, but from this fifty specimens were obtained. It would be interesting to know whether this variety of the caterpillar is distributed over the whole of Southern Europe.

5

In this sense Lubbock says: – “It is evident that creatures which, like the majority of insects, live during the successive periods of their existence in very different circumstances, may undergo considerable changes in their larval organization in consequence of forces acting on them while in that condition; not, indeed, without affecting, but certainly without affecting to any corresponding extent, their ultimate form.” – “Origin and Metamorphoses of Insects,” London, 1874, p. 39.

6

“Grundzüge der Zoologie,” 1875.

7

[Lepidopterists are of course aware that even these distinctions are not absolute, as no single character can be named which does not also appear in certain moths. The definition in this case, as in that of most other groups of animals and plants, is only a general one. See, for instance, Westwood’s “Introduction to the Classification of Insects,” vol. ii. pp. 330–332. Also some remarks by C. V. Riley in his “Eighth Annual Report” on the insects of Missouri, 1876, p. 170. With reference to the antennæ as a distinguishing character, see Mr. A. G. Butler’s article in “Science for All,” 1880, part xxvii. p. 65. R.M.]

8

The genus of Morphinæ, Discophora, possesses hairs very similar to those of the genus Cnethocampa belonging to the Bombycidæ.

9

[The larvæ of genera 14, Phyciodes, and 35, Crenis, are likewise spiny. See Edwards’ “Butt. of N. Amer.” vol. ii. for figures of the caterpillar of Phyc. Tharos: for notes on the larvæ of Crenis Natalensis and C. Boisduvali see a paper by W. D. Gooch, “Entomologist,” vol. xiv. p. 36. The larvæ of genus 55, Ageronia, are also spiny. (See Burmeister’s figure of A. Arethusa, “Lép. Rép. Arg.” Pl. V. Fig. 4). The larvæ of genus 98, Aganisthos, also appear to be somewhat spiny (see Burmeister’s figure of A. Orion, loc. cit. Pl. V. Fig. 6), and this raises the question as to whether the genus is correctly located in its present position. The larvæ of the following genera figured in Moore’s “Lepidoptera of Ceylon,” parts i. and ii., are all spiny: – 6, Cirrochroa (Pl. XXXII.); 7, Cynthia (Pl. XXVI.); 27, Kallima (Pl. XIX.); and 74, Parthenos (Pl. XXIV.). Many species of caterpillars which are spiny when adult appear to be spineless, or only slightly hairy when young. See Edwards’ figures of Melitæa Phaeton, Argynnis Diana, and Phyc. Tharos (loc. cit.) and his description of the larva of Arg. Cybele, “Canad. Entom.” vol. xii. p. 141. The spiny covering thus appears to be a character acquired at a comparatively recent period in the phyletic development. R.M.]

10

[The larvæ of the 110th genus, Paphia, Fabr. (Anæa, Hübn.) are also smoothed-skinned. See Edwards’ figure (loc. cit. vol. i. Pl. XLVI.) of P. Glycerium. Also C. V. Riley’s “Second Annual Report” on the insects of Missouri, 1870, p. 125. Burmeister figures the larva of a species of Prepona (genus 99) which is smooth (P. Demophon, loc. cit. Pl. V. Fig. 1). The horns on the head of Apatura, &c., may possibly be a survival from a former spiny condition. R.M.]

11

“Synopsis of the described Lepidoptera of North America.” Washington, 1862.

12

“Catalog der Lepidopteren des Europäischen Faunengebietes.” Dresden, 1871.

13

This group of moths (“Schwärmer”) is regarded as of very different extents by systematists; when I here comprise under it only the Sphingidæ proper and the Sesiidæ, I by no means ignore the grounds which favour a greater extension of the group; the latter is not rigidly limited. [The affinities of the Sesiidæ (Ægeriidæ) are by no means clearly made out: it appears probable that they are not related to the Sphingidæ. See note 160, p. 370. R.M.]

14

[For Mr. A. G. Butler’s observations on the genus Acronycta, see “Trans. Ent. Soc.” 1879, p. 313; and note 68, p. 169, of the present volume. R.M.]

15