Dio's Rome, Volume 3

[-54-] At this same period Antony came into Italy again from Syria. The reason he gave was that he intended to bear his share of the war against Sextus because of Caesar's mishaps; he did not, however, stay by his colleague, but, having come to spy upon his actions rather than to accomplish anything, he gave him some ships and promised to send others, in return for which he received heavy-armed infantry and set sail himself, stating that he was going to conduct a campaign against the Parthians. Before he departed they presented to each other their mutual grievances, at first through friends and then personally. As they had no leisure for war together they became reconciled in a way, chiefly through the instrumentality of Octavia. In order that they might be bound by still more ties of relationship Caesar betrothed his daughter to Antyllis, Antony's son, and Antony betrothed to Domitius, though he had been an assassin of Caesar and had been proscribed to die, his own daughter, borne to him by Octavia. This was all mutual pretence. They had no intention of carrying out any of these unions, but were acting a part in view of the needs of the existing situation. Furthermore Antony sent Octavia herself at once from Corcyra to Italy, that she might not share his danger while he was warring against the Parthians. Besides the above negotiations at that time they removed Sextus from his priesthood as well as from the consulship to which he had been appointed, and granted themselves chief authority for another five years, since the first period had elapsed. After this Antony hastened to Syria and Caesar gave his attention to the war. Nearly everything went as he wished, but Menas, who was naturally untrustworthy and always followed the fortunes of the stronger, and was further vexed because he held no office but had been made a subordinate of Sabinus, deserted again to Sextus.

DIO'S ROMAN HISTORY

49

The following is contained in the Forty-ninth of Dio's Rome.

How Caesar conquered Sextus and overthrew Lepidus (chapters 1-18).

How Ventidius conquered and slew Pacorus and expelled the Parthians, driving them across the Euphrates (chapters 19-21).

How Antony was defeated by the Parthians (chapters 22-33).

How Caesar subjugated the Pannonians (chapters 34-38).

How Antony by guile captured Artavasdes, the king of Armenia (chapters 39-41).

How the Portico of Paulus was consecrated (chapter 42).

How Mauritania Caesariensis became Roman property (chapters 43, 44).

Duration of time four years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

L. Gellius L. F. Poplicola, M. Cocceius Nerva. (B.C. 36 = a. u. 718.)

L. Cornificius L. F., Sextusi Pompeius Sexti F. (B.C. 35 = a. u. 719.)

M. Antonius M. F. (II), L. Scribonius L. F. Libo. (B.C. 34 = a. u. 720.)

Caesar (II), L. Volcacius L. F. Tullus. (B.C. 33 = a. u. 721.)

(BOOK 49, BOISSEVAIN.)

[B.C. 36 (a. u. 718)]

[-1-] This happened in the winter when Lucius Gellius and Cocceius Nerva became consuls. Caesar, when his fleet had been made ready and spring set in, started from Baise and coasted along Italy, having great hopes of encompassing Sicily on all sides. For he was sailing thither with many ships and those of Antony were already in the strait. Also Lepidus, though reluctantly, had promised to assist him. His greatest ground of confidence lay in the height of the vessels and the thickness of the timbers. They had been built unusually stout and unusually high so as to carry the largest number of marines possible; indeed, they were surmounted by towers, in order that the conflict might be waged from a higher point, as if from a wall: they were further intended to resist the rammings of antagonists and to bend aside their beaks by making the collision more violent. With such calculations Caesar was hastening to Sicily. As he was passing the promontory of Palinurus, so-called, a great storm fell upon him. This destroyed many ships, and Menas coming upon the rest in confusion burned a number and towed away the rest. And had he not again changed sides on the promise of immunity and through some other hopes, besides betraying the whole fleet that he commanded by receiving some triremes that simulated desertion, Caesar's voyage to Sicily on this occasion also would have proved fruitless. Menas's action was due to the fact that he was not allowed by Sextus to fight against Lepidus and was under suspicion in nearly every way. Caesar was then extremely glad to receive him, but trusted him no longer. He first repaired the damaged ships, freed the slaves that served on the triremes, and assigned the spare seamen, (many of whom when their vessels were destroyed in the wreck had dived and escaped by swimming) to Antony's fleet, which was short of men. Then he came to Lipara, and leaving there Agrippa and the ships, returned to the mainland with the intention of transporting the infantry across into Sicily, when an opportunity should arise.

[-2-] On learning this Sextus himself lay quietly at anchor off Messana, watching for his attempt to cross, and ordered Demochares to anchor opposite Agrippa at Mylae. This pair spent most of the time in testing each other's strength according as each one would temporarily give way a little; yet they did not dare to risk an engagement with their entire armaments. They were not acquainted with each other's forces and on both sides they figured everything about their opponents as being greater and more terrible than the reality. Finally Agrippa comprehended that it was not advantageous for him to delay,—for the adherents of Sextus, occupying a friendly position, had no need to hurry,—and taking the best of his ships set out for Mylae to spy out the numbers of the enemy. As he could not see them all and no one of them manifested any inclination to come out into the open sea, he despised them, and on his return made preparations to sail against Mylae on the following day with all his ships. Demochares came to much, the same conclusion. He had the idea that the ships which had approached him were the only ones, and seeing that they sailed very slowly by reason of their size he sent for Sextus by night and made preparations to assail Lipara itself. When day broke, they were sailing against each other, expecting to meet inferior numbers. [-3-] As they came near together and each contrary to his expectations saw that his opponents were many more than he had thought, they were at first both alike thrown into confusion, and some even backed water. Then, fearing flight more than battle, because in the latter they hoped to prevail, but in the former they expected to be utterly destroyed, they moved toward each other and joined in conflict on the sea. The one side surpassed in the number of its ships, the other in the experience of its sailors: to the first the height of the vessels, the thickness of the catheads and the towers were a help, but charges straight ahead furthered the progress of the second, and the strength of Caesar's marines was matched by the daring of their antagonists; for the majority of them, being deserters from Italy, were quite desperate. As a result, possessing the mutual advantages and deficiencies which I have mentioned, they had equal power contributed by their evenly balanced equipment, and so their contest was close for a very long period. The followers of Sextus alarmed their opponents by the way they dashed up the waves: and they knocked holes in some ships by assailing them with a rush and bursting open the parts outside the oars, but as they were struck from the towers in the combat and brought alongside by grappling irons, they suffered no less harm than they inflicted. The Caesarians, also, when they came into close conflict and had crossed over to the hostile ships, proved superior; but as the enemy leaped out into the sea whenever the boats sank, and by their swimming well and being lightly equipped succeeded easily in climbing upon others, the attackers were at a corresponding disadvantage. Meantime the rapidity with which the ships of the one party could sail proved an offset to the solidity of those on the other side, and the heaviness of the latter counterbalanced the agility of the former. [-4-] Late in the day, near nightfall, Caesar's party finally conquered, but instituted no pursuit: the reason as it appears to me and may be conjectured from probability was that they could not overtake the fleeing ships and were afraid of running aground in the shallows, with which they were unacquainted, near the coast. Some say that Agrippa because he was battling for Caesar and not for himself thought it sufficient merely to rout his adversaries. For he had been in the habit of saying to his most intimate associates that the majority of those holding sovereign power wish no one to display more ability than themselves; and that they attended personally to nearly all such matters as afford them a conquest without effort, but assign the less favorable and more complicated business to others. And if they ever are forced to entrust some choice enterprise to their assistants, they are irritated and displeased at the latter's renown. They do not pray that these subordinates may be defeated and fare badly, yet they do not choose to have them win a complete success and secure glory from it. His advice therefore was that the man who intended to survive must relieve his masters of the annoyance incident to such undertakings and still reserve for them the successful completion of the work. As for me, I know that the above is regularly true and that Agrippa paid attention to it, but I am not setting down that on that particular occasion this was the cause of his failure to pursue. For he was not able, no matter how much he might have desired it, to follow up the foe.

[-5-] While the naval battle was in progress, Caesar, as soon as he perceived that Sextus was gone from Messana and that the strait was destitute of guards, did not let slip this opportunity of the war but immediately embarked on Antony's vessels and crossed to Tauromenium. Yet this seizure of the opportunity was not accompanied by good fortune. No one prevented him from sailing or disembarking, and he constructed his camp, as he had done everything else, at leisure. When, however, the naval battle had ended, Sextus got back to Messana with speed, and learning of Caesar's presence he quickly filled the ships with fresh warriors and assailed him with the vessels and also with his heavy-armed men on land. Caesar did not come out to fight the latter, but sailed out against Sextus through contempt of the few opposing ships and because they had been previously defeated: then it was that he lost the majority of his fleet and barely avoided destruction himself. He could not even escape to his own men that were in Sicily but was glad to reach the mainland in safety. He was himself then in security, but was mightily disturbed at seeing his army cut off on the island. His confidence was not restored until a fish of its own accord jumped out of the sea and fell at his feet. By this incident his spirits were invigorated and he believed the soothsayers who had told him that he should make Sicily his slave.

[-6-] Caesar in haste sent for Agrippa to render aid to them, and meantime they were being besieged. When, provisions began to fail them and no rescuing force appeared, Cornificius their leader became afraid that if he stayed where he was he should in the course of time be compelled by hunger to yield to the besieging party; and he reflected that while he delayed there in that way none of the enemy would come into conflict with him, because he was stronger in point of heavy-armed infantry, but if he should go forward in any direction one of two things would happen,—either they would be attacked by the enemy and come off victorious, or, if their adversaries were unwilling to do this, they would retire to a place of safety, get a supply of provisions, and obtain some help from Caesar or from Agrippa. Therefore he burned all the vessels which had survived from the sea-fight and had been cast up against the ramparts, and started out himself as if to proceed to Mylae. Both cavalry and light-armed troops attacked him from a distance (not daring to come to close quarters) and proved frightfully troublesome to him. For the enemy came close, whenever there was good opportunity, and again turned back with rapidity. But his men, being heavy-armed, could not pursue them in any way owing to the weight of their armor, and were endeavoring to protect the unarmed, who had been saved from the fleet. As a result they were continually suffering disastrously and could do no damage in return; for, in case they made a rush upon any group, they would put the foe to flight, but not being able to pursue farther they found themselves in a worse plight on their return, since by their sortie they had been isolated. They endured the greatest hardship throughout their entire journey, but chiefly in crossing the rivers. Then their adversaries hemmed them in as they were going along rapidly, in disorder, a few at a time, as usual on such occasions, and struck them in favorable spots that they saw exposed. They were shot at, moreover, whenever they encountered places that were muddy or where the current was strong, and when they happened to be stuck for a moment or were carried down stream. [-7-] This the enemy did for three whole days and on the last demoralized them completely, especially since Sextus with his heavy-armed contingent had been added to their attacking force. Consequently the Caesarians no longer mourned such as were perishing but counted them fortunate to escape from further torment, and in their hopelessness wished that they, too, were among those already dead, wounded were far more in number than those died, and being struck from a distance with stones and javelins and receiving no blow from near at hand their wounds were in many places, and not as a rule favorably located. These men were themselves in great distress and they caused the survivors far more trouble than did the enemy. For if they were carried they usually brought about the death of the men supporting them, and if they were left behind, they threw the whole army into dejection by their laments. The detachment would have perished utterly, had not the foe, though reluctantly, taken their hands off them. Agrippa, after winning the naval battle, had sailed back to Lipara, but when he learned that Sextus had fled to Messana and Demochares had gone off in some other direction, he crossed over to Sicily, occupied Mylae and Tyndaris, and sent food and soldiers to the other party. Sextus, thinking that Agrippa himself would come likewise, became frightened and beat a hasty retreat before his approach, even abandoning some baggage and supplies in his fortifications. The followers of Cornificius obtained from these ample support and made their way in safety to Agrippa. Caesar received them back with praises and gifts, although he had treated them after the victory of Agrippa in a very supercilious manner, thinking the latter had finished the war. Cornificius, indeed, prided himself so much upon his preservation of the soldiers, that in Rome, whenever he went out of his house to dine, he always returned home on the back of an elephant.

[-8-] Caesar after this entered Sicily and Sextus encamped opposite him in the vicinity of Artemisium. They did not have any great battle at once, but indulged in a few slight cavalry skirmishes. While they were stationed there in hostile array Sextus received as an accession Tisienus Gallus, and Caesar Lepidus with his forces. Lepidus had encountered the storm which I mentioned, and also Demochares, and he had lost a number of ships: he did not come to Caesar immediately, but on account of his reverse or to the end that his colleague should face difficulties by himself or in the wish to draw Sextus away from him he had made an assault on Lilybaeum. Gallus was sent thither by Sextus and contended against him. From there both the contestants, as they accomplished nothing, went to Artemisium. Gallus proved a source of strength to Sextus, but Lepidus quarreled with Caesar; he claimed the privilege of managing everything on equal terms with Caesar as his fellow-commander, whereas he was employed by him entirely in the capacity of lieutenant: therefore he inclined to favor Sextus and secretly held communication with him. Caesar suspected this, but dared not give expression to his doubts and alienate him openly, nor could he safely conceal his thoughts: he felt it would look suspicious if he should not consult him at all and that it would be dangerous to reveal all his plans. Hence he determined to dispose of the uncertainty as quickly as possible, before there was any rebellion, though for most reasons there was no need of particular haste. He had as much food and as much money as Sextus, and therefore hoped to overthrow him without effort before a great while. Still, when he had once reached this decision, he himself led out his land force and marshaled it in front of the camp, while simultaneously Agrippa sailed close in and lay at anchor. Sextus, whose forces were far inferior to theirs, would not oppose them on either element. This lasted for several days. Finally, Pompey became afraid that he might be despised for his behavior and be deserted by his allies, hence he gave orders for the ships to weigh anchor; in these he reposed his chief trust.

[-9-] When the signal was raised and the trumpet gave the first call, all the boats joined battle near the land and the infantry force of both alike was marshaled at the very edge of the breakers, so that the spectacle was a most notable one. The whole sea in that vicinity was full of ships,—they were so many that they formed a long line,—and the land just back of it was occupied by the armed men, while that further removed, but adjoining, was taken up by the rest of the throng that followed each side. Wherefore, though the struggle seemed to be between the fighters on the ships alone, in reality the others too participated. For those on the ships contended more valiantly in order to exhibit their prowess to those beholding them, and the latter, in spite of being considerably separated from them, nevertheless in watching the men in action were themselves in a way concerned in the conflict. The battle was for a long time an even one, the fighting being precisely similar to that in previous encounters, and the men on shore followed it with minds equally intent. They were very hopeful of having the whole war settled by this engagement: yet they felt encouraged even should that not prove the case, the one party expecting that if they should conquer then no further labor of importance would be theirs, and that if they should prevail on this occasion they would incur no further danger of defeat. Accordingly, in order that they might keep their eyes fixed upon the action and not incommode those taking part in it they were silent or employed but little shouting. Their cries were directed to the combatants or were addressed by way of invocation to the gods; such as got the upper hand received praise and such as gave way abuse, and besides uttering many exhortations to their warriors they shouted not a little against each other, wishing their own men to hear more easily what was said, and their opponents to catch familiar words less frequently.

[-10-] While the two sides were equally matched, these were the conditions among both parties alike and they even tried to show by gestures of the whole body that they could see and understand. When, however, the adherents of Sextus were routed, then in unison and with one impulse the one side raised the paean and the others a wail of lamentation. The soldiers as if they too had shared defeat at once retired to Messana. Caesar took up such of the vanquished as were cast on shore and went into the sea itself to set on fire all the vessels that ran aground in shoal water; thus there was no safety for such as continued to sail, for they would be disabled by Agrippa, nor for such as tried to land anywhere, for they were destroyed by Caesar, except for a few that made good their escape to Messana. In this hard position Demochares on the point of being taken slew himself and Apollophanes who had his ship unscathed and might have fled went over to Caesar. The same was done by others,—by Gallus and all the cavalry that followed him and subsequently by some of the infantry. [-11-] This most of all caused Sextus to despair of the situation, and he resolved to flee. He took his daughter and certain other persons, his money and the rest of his chief valuables, put them by night aboard of such ships as sailed best out of the number that had been preserved, and departed. No one pursued him, for his sailing had been secret and Caesar was temporarily in the midst of great disturbance.

Lepidus had attacked Messana and on being admitted to the town set fire to some of it and pillaged other portions. When Caesar on ascertaining this came up quickly and withstood him, he was alarmed and slipped out of the city, but encamped on a strong hill and made complaints about his treatment; he detailed all the slights he had received and demanded all that had been conceded to him according to their first compact and further laid claim to Sicily, on the ground that he had helped subdue it. He sent some men to Caesar with these charges and challenged him to submit to arbitration: his forces consisted of troops which he had brought in from Libya and all of those who had been left behind in Messana; for he had been the first to enter it and had suggested to them some hopes of a change in the government. [-12-] Caesar made no answer to it, thinking that he had justice all on his side and in his weapons, since he was stronger than his rival. He immediately set out, however, against him with some few followers, expecting to alarm him by his suddenness,—Lepidus not being of an energetic nature,—and to win over his soldiers. On account of the fewness of the men accompanying him they thought when he entered the camp that he was on a peaceful errand. But as his words were not at all to their liking, they became irritated and attacked him, even killing some of the men: he himself quickly received aid and was saved. After this he came against them once more with his entire army, shut them within their ramparts, and besieged them. This made them afraid of capture, and without creating any general revolt, through dread of Lepidus, they individually, a few at a time or one by one, deserted him and transferred their allegiance. In this way he too was compelled on his own initiative to array himself in mourning garments and become a suppliant of Caesar. As a result Lepidus was shorn of all authority and could not even live in Italy without a guard. Of those who had been enlisted in the cause of Sextus, members of the senatorial or equestrian classes were punished, save a few, while in the case of the rank and file all free citizens were incorporated in the legions of Caesar, and those that had been slaves were given back to their masters for vengeance: in case no master could be found for any one of them, he was impaled. Of the cities some voluntarily opened their gates to the victor and received pardon, and others resisted him and were disciplined.

[-13-] While Caesar was thus occupied his soldiers revolted. Being so many they drew encouragement from their very numbers and when they stopped to think of their dangers and the hopes that rested on them they became insatiable in the matter of rewards, and gathering in groups they demanded whatever each one longed for. When their talk had no effect,—for Caesar since no enemy longer confronted him made light of them,—they became clamorous. Setting before him all the hardships they had endured and bringing to his notice any promise he had ever made them they uttered many threats besides, and thought to render him willy-nilly their slave. As they gained nothing this way, they demanded with much heat and deafening shouts to be relieved at least from further service, saying they were worn out. This was not because they really wished to be free from it, for most of them were in their prime, but because they had an inkling of the coming conflict between Caesar and Antony and for that reason set a high value upon themselves. And what they could not obtain by requests they expected they could secure by threatening to abandon him. Not even this, however, served their purpose. Caesar would not yield to them, even if he knew for an absolute certainty that the war was going to occur and clearly understood their wishes. He did not think it proper for a commander to do anything against his will under compulsion from the soldiers, because they would be sure, if he did, to want to get the advantage of him again in some other matter. [-14-] So he pretended that their request was a fair one and their desire only human and dismissed first those that had accompanied him in the campaign against Antony at Mutina, and next, since the rest were troublesome, all of them who had been ten years in the service. And in order to restrain the remainder he gave further notice that he would no longer employ any one of them, no matter how much such a person might wish it. On hearing this they uttered not another word, but began to exhibit great devotion toward him because he announced that he would give to the men that had been released,—not to all, save to the first of them, but to the worthiest,—everything that he had promised, and would assign them land. They were also influenced by the fact that he gave to all of them five hundred denarii and to those who had been victors in the sea-fight a crown of olive besides. After this he inspired them all personally with great hopes and the centurions with the idea that he would appoint them to the senatorial bodies in their native lands. Upon his lieutenants he bestowed various gifts and upon Agrippa a golden crown adorned with beaks of ships,—a decoration given to nobody before or since. And it was later ratified by a decree that as often as any persons celebrated a triumph, wearing[49 - Verb suggested by Leunclavius.] the laurel crown, Agrippa should always wear this trophy of the naval encounter. In this way Caesar calmed the soldiers temporarily. The money he gave them at once and the land not much later. And since what was still held by the government at the time did not suffice, he bought more in addition, especially considerable from the Campanians dwelling in Capua, since their city needed a number of settlers. To them he also gave in return the so-called Julian supply of water, one of their chief sources of pride at all times, and the Gnosian territory,[50 - This is the well known Gnosos in Crete. For further information in regard to the matter see Strabo X, 4, 9 (p. 477) and Velleius Paterculus, II, 81, 2.] from which they still gather harvests.

That took place later. At the time under discussion he administered the government in Sicily and through Statilius Taurus won both the Libyas without a struggle and sent back to Antony a number of ships equivalent to those lost. [-15-]Meantime conditions in Etruria which had been full of rebellion regained a state of quiet when the inhabitants heard of his victory. The people of the capital unanimously bestowed laudations upon him and images, the right to front seats and an arch surmounted by a trophy, as well as the privilege of riding into the city on horseback, of wearing the laurel crown on all occasions, and of holding a banquet with his wife and children in the precinct of the Capitoline Jupiter on the anniversary of the day that he had conquered, which was to be a perpetual day of thanksgiving. This is what they granted him directly after the victory. The persons to announce it were, first, a soldier stationed in the city, who on the very day in question had become possessed by some god and after saying and doing many unusual things finally ran up to the temple on the Capitol and laid his sword at the feet of Jupiter to signify that there would be no further use for it; after that came the rest who had been present at the action and had been sent to Rome by Caesar. When he arrived himself he assembled them according to ancestral custom outside the pomerium, gave them an account of what had been done, and renounced some of the honors voted him. He then remitted the tribute called for by the registered lists and everything else that was owing the government since before the period of the civil wars, abolished certain taxes, and refused to accept the priesthood of Lepidus, which was offered to him; for it was not lawful to take away the appointment from a man still alive. At this time they voted him many other distinctions. Some at once declared that this striking magnanimity of his at this time was due to the calumnies of Antony and of Lepidus and was intended to lay the blame of former unjust behavior upon them alone. Others said that since he was unable in any way to collect the debts he made of the people's impotency a favor that cost him nothing. In spite of this various talk that gained currency in different quarters they now resolved that a house be presented to him from the public treasury. He had made the place on the Palatine which he had bought to erect a structure public property, and had consecrated it to Apollo, because a thunderbolt descended upon it. Hence they voted him the house and protection from any insult by deed or word. Any one who committed such an offence was to be bound by the same penalties as prevailed in the case of a tribune. For he received permission to sit upon the same benches with them.

[-16-] These were the gifts bestowed upon Caesar by the senate. As for him, he enrolled among the augurs above the proper number, Valerius Messala, whom he previously in the proscriptions condemned to death, made the people of Utica citizens, and gave orders that no one should wear purple clothing except senators and such as held public office. For it had been already appropriated by ordinary individuals in a few cases. In this same year there was no aedile owing to a lack of candidates, and the praetors and the tribunes performed the aediles' duties: also no praetor urbanus was appointed for the Feriae, but some of the regular praetors discharged his functions. Other matters in the city and in the rest of Italy were under the charge of one Gaius Maecenas, a knight, both then and for a long time afterward.

[-17-] Now Sextus after taking ship from Messana was afraid of pursuit and suspected that there might be some act of treachery on the part of his retinue. Therefore he gave notice to them that he was going to sail seaward, but when he had extinguished the light which flagships exhibit during night voyages for the purpose of having the rest follow close behind, he coasted along Italy, then went over to Corcyra and from there came to Cephallenia. Here the remainder of his vessels, which had by chance been driven from the course by a storm, joined him again. Accordingly, after calling them together, he took off his general's uniform and made an address of which the substance was that while they remained together they could render no lasting aid to one another or escape detection, but if they scattered they could more easily make good their escape; and he advised each man to look out individually and separately for his own safety. The majority were led to give ear to his arguments and they departed in different directions, while he with the remainder crossed over to Asia with the intention of going straight to Antony. When he reached Lesbos and learned that the latter had gone on a campaign against the Medes and that Caesar and Lepidus had become estranged, he decided to winter in the country. The Lesbians, indeed, out of affectionate remembrance for his father were ready to receive and detain him. He ascertained, however, that Antony had met with a mishap in Media, and reflected further that Gaius Furnius, temporarily the governor of Asia, was not friendly to him. Hence he did not remain, but hoping to succeed to Antony's leadership because a number of men had come to him from Sicily and still others had rallied around him, some drawn by the glamour of his father's renown and some who were seeking a livelihood, he resumed the outfit of a general and continued his preparations to occupy the opposite shore. [-18-] Meantime Antony had got back again into friendly territory and on learning what Sextus was doing promised he would grant him amnesty and favor, if he would lay down his arms. Sextus wrote back to the effect that he would obey him, but did not do so, because he felt a contempt for the man, inspired by his recent disasters, and because he immediately set off for Egypt. Hence he held to his previous design and entered into negotiations with the Parthians. Antony ascertained this, but without turning back sent against him the fleet and Marcus Titius, who had formerly come to him from Sextus and was still with him. Sextus received information of this move in advance, and in alarm, since his preparations were not yet complete, abandoned his anchorage. He went forward then, taking the course which seemed most likely to afford escape, and reached Nicomedea, where he was overtaken. At this he opened negotiations with Antony, placing some hope in him because of the kindness which had been shown him. When the chieftain, however, refused to enter into a truce with him without first taking possession of the ships and the rest of his force, Sextus despaired of safety by sea, put all of his heavier baggage into the ships (which he thereupon burned) and proceeded inland. Titius and Furnius pursued him, and overtaking him at Midaeium in Phrygia surrounded him and captured him alive. When Antony learned this he at first under the influence of anger sent a despatch that the captive should be put to death, but again not long after repenting[51 - There is at this point a gap of one line in the MSS.] … that his life should be spared….[51] Now the bearer of the second letter came in before the first, and later Titius received the epistle in regard to killing him. Thinking, therefore, that it was really the second, or else knowing the truth but not caring to heed it, he followed the order of the arrival of the two, but not their manifest intention. So Sextus was executed in the consulship of Lucius Cornificius and one Sextus Pompeius.

[B.C. 35 (a. u. 719)]

Caesar held a horse-race in honor of the event, and set up for Antony a chariot in front of the rostra and images in the temple of Concord, giving him also authority to hold banquets there with his wife and children, this being similar to the decree that had once been passed in his own honor. He pretended to be still Antony's friend and was endeavoring to console him for the disasters inflicted by the Parthians and in that way to cure any jealousy that might be felt at his own victory and the decrees which followed it.

[B.C. 38 (a. u. 716)]

[-19-]This was what Caesar did: Antony's experience with the barbarians was as follows. Publius Ventidius heard that Pacorus was gathering an army and was invading Syria, and became afraid, since the cities had not grown quiet and the legions were still scattered in winter-quarters, and so he acted as follows to delay him and make the assembling of an army a slow process. He knew that a certain prince Channaeus, with whom he enjoyed an acquaintance, was rather disposed to favor the Parthian cause. Ventidius, then, honored him as if he had his entire confidence and took him as an adviser in some matters where he could not himself be injured and would cause Channaeus to think he possessed his most hidden secrets. Having reached this point he affected to be afraid that the barbarians might abandon the place where they customarily crossed the Euphrates near where the city Zeugma is located, and use some other road farther down the river. The latter, he said, was in a flat district convenient for the enemy, whereas the former was hilly and suited them best. He persuaded the prince to believe this and through the latter deceived Pacorus. The Parthian leader took the route through the flat district, where Ventidius kept pretending he hoped he would not go, and as this was longer than the other it gave the Roman time to assemble his forces. [-20-] So he met Pacorus when he had advanced to Cyrrestician Syria and conquered him. For he did not prevent them from crossing the river, and when they had got across he did not at once attack them, so that they imputed sloth and weakness to the Romans and therefore marched against the Roman fortification, although on higher ground, expecting to take it without resistance. When a sally was suddenly made, the attacking party, being cavalry, was driven back without effort down the slope. At the foot they defended themselves valiantly,—the majority of them were in armor,—but were confused by the unexpectedness of the onslaught and stumbling over one another were damaged most of all by the heavy-armed men and the slingers. The latter struck them, from a distance with powerful weapons and proved a very great annoyance. The fall of Pacorus at this critical juncture injured them most of all. As soon as they saw that their leader had perished, a few steadily contended over his body, but when these were destroyed all the rest gave way. Some of them desired to escape homeward across the bridge and were not able, being cut off and killed before they could reach it, and others fled for refuge to Antiochus in Commagene. Ventidius easily reduced the rest of the places in Syria, whose attitude had depended on the outcome of the war, by sending the monarch's head about through the different cities; their doubtful allegiance had been due to their extreme love for Pacorus because of his justness and mildness,—a love which had equaled that bestowed by them upon any previous sovereign. The general himself led an expedition against Antiochus on the plea that he had not delivered up the suppliants, but really because of his money, of which he had vast stores.

[-21-] When he had progressed so far Antony suddenly came upon him, and so far from being pleased was actually jealous of his having gained some reputation by his own efforts. Consequently he removed him from his command and employed him on no other business either at the time or later, though he obtained thanksgivings for both achievements and a triumph for his assistant's work. The Romans of the capital voted these honors to Antony as a result of his prominence and in accordance with law, because he was commander: but they voted them also to Ventidius, since they thought that he had paid the Parthians in full through the death of Pacorus for the disasters that Roman arms had incurred in the time of Crassus, especially since both events had befallen on the same day of the corresponding years. And it turned out that Ventidius alone celebrated the triumph, even as the victory had been his alone, for Antony met an untimely fate, and he acquired a greater reputation from this fact and the irony of fortune alike. He himself had once marched in procession with the other captives at the triumph of Pompeius Strabo, and now he was the first of the Romans to celebrate a triumph over the Parthians.

[-22-] This took place at a later period: at the time mentioned Antony attacked Antiochus, shut him up in Samosata and proceeded to besiege him. As he accomplished nothing and the time was spent in vain, and he suspected that the soldiers felt coldly toward him on account of his dishonoring Ventidius, he secretly opened negotiations with the foe, and made fictitious agreements with him so that he might have a fair appearing reason for withdrawal. In the end Antony got neither hostages (except two and these of little importance) nor the money which he had demanded, but he granted Antiochus the death of one Alexander, who had earlier deserted from him to the Roman side. After doing this he set out for Italy, and Gaius Sosius received from him the governorship of Syria and Cilicia. This man subdued the Aradii, who had been besieged up to this time and had been reduced to hard straits by famine and disease, and conquered Antigonus in battle after killing the Roman guards that he kept about him, and reduced him by siege when he took refuge in Jerusalem. The Jews had committed many outrages upon the Romans,—for the race is very bitter when aroused to anger,—but they suffered far more themselves. The first of them were captured fighting for the precinct of their god, and later the rest on the day even then called the day of Saturn. And so great still were their religious scruples that the men who had been first captured along with the temple obtained leave from Sosius when the day of Saturn came around again, and went up with the remaining population into the building, where they performed all the customary rites. These people Antony entrusted to one Herod to govern, and Antigonus he bound to a cross and flogged,—treatment accorded to no other king by the Romans,—and subsequently slew him.

[B.C. 37 (a. u. 717)]

[-23-] This was the course of events in the days of Claudius and Norbanus: the following year the Romans accomplished nothing worthy of note in Syria. Antony arrived in Italy and returned again to the province, consuming the entire season: and Sosius, because he would be advancing his master's interests and not his own, and furthermore dreading his jealousy and anger, spent the time in devising means not for achieving success and drawing down his enmity, but for pleasing him by remaining quiet. Parthian affairs with no outside interference underwent a severe revolution from the following cause. Orodes their king succumbed to age and grief for Pacorus combined, and while still alive delivered the government to Phraates, the eldest of his remaining children. He in his discharge of it proved himself the most impious of men. He treacherously murdered his brothers, sons of the daughter of Antiochus, because they were his superiors in excellence and (on their mother's side) in family: when Antiochus chafed under this outrage he killed him in addition and after that destroyed the noblest men in the remaining population and kept committing many other abuses. Consequently a number of the more prominent persons abandoned him and betook themselves to various places, some going to Antony, among whom was Monaeses. This happened in the consulship of Agrippa and Gallus.

[B.C. 36 (a. u. 718)]

[-24-] During the remainder of winter, when Gallus and Nerva were holding office, Publius Canidius Crassus made a campaign against the Iberians that inhabit this portion of the world, conquered in battle their king Pharnabazus and brought them into alliance; with this king he invaded Albanis, the adjoining country, and, after overcoming the dwellers there and their king Zober, conciliated them likewise. Antony was elated at this and furthermore based great hopes upon Monaeses, who had promised him to lead his army and bring over to him most of Parthia without conflict. Hence the Roman took up the war against the Parthians in earnest and besides making various presents to Monaeses gave him three Roman cities to govern until he should finish the war, and promised him in addition the Parthian kingdom. While they were so occupied Phraates became terrified, especially because the Parthians took the flight of Monaeses very much amiss, and he opened negotiations with him, offering him anything whatever, and so persuaded him to return. When Antony found this out, he was naturally angry, but did not kill Monaeses although the latter was still in his power; for he felt sure he could not win the confidence of any other of the barbarians, in case he should do such a thing, and he wanted to try a little trick against them. He accordingly released Monaeses, apparently supposing the latter was going to bring the Parthian affairs under his control, and sent envoys with him to Phraates. Nominally he was arranging for peace on the condition of getting back the standards and the prisoners captured in the disaster of Crassus, intending to take the king off his guard while the latter was expecting a pacific settlement; but in fact he was putting everything in readiness for war. [-25-] And he went as far as the Euphrates, thinking it was free of guards. When, however, he found that whole region carefully guarded, he turned aside from it, but led a campaign against Artavasdes, the king of the Medes, persuaded thereto by the king of Greater Armenia, who had the same name and was an enemy of the aforementioned. Just as he was he at once advanced toward Armenia, and learning there that the Mede had gone a considerable distance from his own land in the discharge of his duties as an ally of the Parthian king, he left behind the beasts of burden and a portion of the army with Oppius Statianus, giving orders for them to follow, and himself taking the cavalry and the strongest of the infantry hurried on in the confidence of seizing all his opponent's strongholds at one blow; he assailed Praaspa, the royal residence, heaped up mounds and made constant attacks. When the Parthian and the Medan kings ascertained this, they left him to continue his idle toil,—for the walls were strong and many were defending them,—but assailed Statianus off his guard and wearied on the march and slew the whole detachment except Polemon, king of Pontus, who was then accompanying the expedition. Him alone they took alive and released in exchange for ransom. They were able to accomplish this because the Armenian king was not present at the battle; but though he might have helped the Romans, as some say, he neither did this nor joined Antony, but retired to his own country. [-26-] Antony hastened at the first message sent him by Statianus to go to his assistance, but was too late. For except corpses he found no one. This outcome caused him fear, but, inasmuch as he fell in with no barbarian, he suspected that they had departed in some direction through terror, and this lent him new courage. Hence when he met them a little later he routed them, for his slingers were numerous, and as the latter could shoot farther than would the bows they inflicted severe injury upon the men in armor. However, he did not kill any remarkable number of them, because the barbarians could ride fast. So he proceeded again against Praaspa and besieged it, though he did no great damage to the enemy; for the men inside the walls repulsed him vigorously, and those outside could not easily be entrapped into a combat. Thus he lost many of his own men in searching for and bringing provisions, and many by his own discipline. At first, as long as they could get their food from somewhere in the neighborhood, they had no difficulty about either undertaking: they could attend to the siege and safely secure supplies both at once. When, however, all material at hand had been used up, and the soldiers were obliged to go to some distance, it happened to them that if few were sent anywhere, not only did they not bring anything, but they perished as well; if a number were sent, they left the wall destitute of besiegers and meantime lost many men and many engines at the hands of the barbarians, who would make a sortie against them. [-27-] For this reason Antony gave them all barley instead of wheat and destroyed every tenth man in some instances: indeed, the entire force which was supposed to be besieging endured the hardships of persons besieged. The men within the walls watched carefully for opportunities to make sallies; and those outside harassed fearfully the Romans that remained in position as often as they became separated, accomplishing this by making a sudden charge and wheeling about again in a narrow space: this force outside did not trouble the food trains while the latter were en route to the villages, but would fall upon them unexpectedly when scattered in the homeward march. But since Antony even under these conditions maintained his place before the city, Phraates, fearing that in the long run he might do it some harm either by himself or through securing some allied force, secretly sent some men to open negotiations with him and persuaded him by pretending that it would be very easy to secure peace. After this, when men were sent to him by Antony, he held a conference with them seated upon a golden chair and twanging his bowstring; he first inveighed against them at length, but finally promised that he would grant peace, if they would straightway remove their camp. On hearing this Antony was both alarmed at his boastfulness and ready to believe that a truce could be secured if he himself should shift his position: hence he withdrew without destroying any of his implements of siege but behaved as if in friendly territory. [-28-] When he had done this and was awaiting the truce, the Medes burned the engines and scattered the mounds, while the Parthians made no proposition to him respecting peace but suddenly attacked him and inflicted very serious damage. He found out that he had been deceived and did not venture to employ any further envoys, being sure that the barbarians would not agree to any reasonable terms, and not wishing to cast the soldiers into dejection by failing to arrange a truce. Therefore he resolved, since he had once started, to hurry on into Armenia. His troops took another road, since the one by which they had come they believed to have been blocked entirely, and on the way their sufferings were unusually great. They came into unknown regions where they wandered at random, and furthermore the barbarians seized the passes in advance of their approach, digging trenches outside of some and building palisades in front of others, spoiled the water-courses everywhere, and drove away the flocks. In case they ever got a chance to march through more favorable territory, the enemy would turn them aside from such places by false announcements that they had been occupied beforehand, and caused them to take different roads along which ambuscades had been previously posted, so that many perished through such mishaps and many of hunger. [-29-] As a result there were some desertions, and they would all have gone over, had not the barbarians shot down before the eyes of the others any who dared to take this course. Consequently the men refrained from this, and from Fortune's hands obtained the following relief. One day when they fell into an ambush and were struck with fast-flying arrows, they suddenly made by joining shields the testudo, and rested their left knees on the ground. The barbarians had never seen anything of the kind before and thought that they had fallen from their wounds and needed only one finishing blow; so they threw aside their bows, leaped from their horses, and drawing their daggers came close to put an end to them. At this the Romans rose to their feet, spread out the phalanx at a word, and each one attacked the man nearest and facing him; thus they cut down great numbers since they were contending armed against an unprotected foe, men prepared against men off their guard, heavy infantry against archers, Romans against barbarians. All the survivors immediately retired and no one followed them for the future.

[-30-] This testudo and the way in which it is formed deserve a word of explanation. The baggage animals, the light-armed troops, and the cavalry are marshaled in the center of the army. Those infantrymen who use the oblong, hollow, grooved shields are drawn up around the edges, making a rectangular figure; and, facing outward with spear-points projecting,[52 - Using Naber's emendation [Greek: probeblaemenoi].] they enclose the rest. The other infantrymen, who have flat shields, form a compact body in the center and raise their shields above themselves and above all the rest, so that nothing but shields can be seen in every part of the phalanx alike and all the men by the density of formation are under shelter from missiles. It is so marvelously strong that men can walk upon it, and when ever they get into a hollow, narrow passage, even horses and vehicles can be driven over it. Such is the method of this arrangement, and this shows why it has received the title of testudo,[53 - The Latin word testudo, represented in Greek by the precisely equivalent [Greek: chelonae] in Dio's narrative, means "tortoise."]—with reference to its strength and to the excellent shelter it affords. They use it in two ways: either they approach some fort to assault it, often even enabling men to scale the very walls, or where sometimes they are surrounded by archers they all bend together,—even the horses being taught to kneel and recline,—and thereby cause the foe to think that they are exhausted; then, when the others draw near, they suddenly rise, to the latter's great alarm.

[-31-] The testudo, then, is the kind of device just described. As for Antony, he suffered no further harm from the enemy, but underwent severe hardships by reason of the cold. It was now winter, and the mountain districts of Armenia, through which, as the only route open to him, he was actually thankful to be able to proceed, are never free from snow and ice. The wounds, of which the men had many, there created especial discomfort. So many kept perishing and were continually rendered useless for fighting that he would not allow reports of each individual case, but forbade any one to bring him any such news; and although he was angry with the Armenian king for deserting them, and anxious to take vengeance on him, he nevertheless humiliated himself before the monarch and paid court to him for the purpose of obtaining provisions and money from him. Finally, as the soldiers could not hold out to march farther, in the winter time, too, and were at any rate going to have their hardships for nothing since he was minded to return to Armenia before a great while, he flattered the prince tremendously and made him many attractive promises, to get him to allow the men to winter where they were; he said that in the spring he would make another campaign against the Parthians. Money also came to him from Cleopatra, so that to each of the infantrymen was given one hundred denarii[54 - The amount is not given in the MSS. The traditional sum, incorporated in most editions to fill the gap and complete the sense, is thirty-five. "One hundred" is a clever conjecture of Boissevain's.] and to the rest a proportionate allowance. But inasmuch as the amount sent was not enough for them he paid the remainder from his own funds, and though the expense was his own he gave Cleopatra the credit of the favor. For he both solicited contributions from his friends and levied a great deal of money upon the allies.

[-32-] Following these transactions he departed for Egypt. Now the Romans at home were not ignorant of anything that had taken place in spite of the fact that his despatches did not contain the truth; for he concealed all his unpleasant experiences and some of them he described as just the opposite, making it appear that he was progressing famously: but, for all that, rumor reported the truth and Caesar and his circle investigated it carefully and discussed it. They did not, however, make public their evidence, but instead sacrificed cattle and held festivals. Since Caesar at that time was still getting the worst of it against Sextus, the truth of the facts could not be rendered fitting or opportune. Besides his above actions Antony assigned positions of government, giving Gaul to Amyntas, though he had been only the secretary of Deiotarus, and also adding to his domain Lycaonia with portions of Pamphylia, and bestowing upon Archelaus Cappadocia after driving out Ariarathes. This Archelaus on his father's side belonged to those Archelauses who had contended against the Romans, but on his mother's side was the son of Glaphyra, an hetaera. It is quite true that for these appointments Antony, who could be very magnanimous in dealing with the possessions of other people, was somewhat less ill spoken of among the soldiers.

But in the matter of Cleopatra he incurred outspoken dislike because he had taken into his family children of hers,—the elder ones being Alexander and Cleopatra, twins at a birth, and the younger one Ptolemy, called also Philadelphus,—and because he had granted to them a great deal of Arabia, both the district of Malchus and that of the Ituraeans (for he executed Lysanias, whom he had himself made king over them, on the charge that he had favored Paccrus) and also a great deal of Phoenicia and Palestine together with parts of Crete, and Cyrene and Cyprus.

[B.C. 35 (a. u. 719)]

[-33-] These are his acts at that time: the following year, when Pompeius and Cornificius were consuls, he attempted to conduct a campaign against the Armenian prince; and as he placed no little hope in the Mede, because the latter was indignant at Phraates owing to not having received from him much of the spoils or any other honor, and was anxious to punish the Armenian king for bringing in the Romans, Antony sent Polemon to him and requested friendship and alliance. And he was so well satisfied with the business that he both made terms with the Mede and later gave Polemon Lesser Armenia as a reward for his embassy. First he summoned the Armenian to Egypt as a friend, intending to seize him there without effort and make away with him; but when the prince suspected this and did not obey, he plotted to deceive him in another fashion. He did not openly evince anger toward him, in order not to alienate him, but to the end that he might find his foe unprepared set sail from Egypt with the avowed object of making one more campaign against the Parthians. On the way Antony learned that Octavia was arriving from Rome, and went no farther, but returned; this he did in spite of having at once ordered her to go home and later accepting the gifts which she sent, some of them being soldiers which she had begged from her brother for this very purpose.

[-34-] As for him, he became more than ever a slave to the passion and wiles of Cleopatra. Caesar meantime, since Sextus had perished and affairs in Libya required settlement, went to Sicily as if intending to take ship thither, but after delaying there found that the winter made it too late for crossing. Now the Salassi, Taurisci, Liburni, and Iapudes had not for a long time been behaving fairly toward the Romans, but had failed to contribute revenue and sometimes would invade and harm the neighboring districts. At this time, in view of Octavius's absence, they were openly in revolt. Consequently he turned back and began his preparations against them. Some of the men who had been dismissed when they became disorderly, and had received nothing, wished to serve again: therefore he assigned them to one camp, in order that being alone they might find it impossible to corrupt any one else and in case they should wish to show themselves rebellions might be detected at once. As this did not teach them moderation any the more, he sent out a few of the eldest of them to become colonists in Gaul, thinking that thus he would inspire the rest with hopes and win their devotion. Since even then they continued audacious, some of them paid the penalty. The rest displayed rage at this, whereupon he called them together as if for some other purpose, had the rest of the army surround them, took away their arms, and removed them from the service. In this way they learned both their own weakness and Caesar's force of mind, and so they really experienced a change of heart and after urgent supplications were allowed to enter the service anew. For Caesar, being in need of soldiers and fearing that Antony would appropriate them, said that he pardoned them, and he found them most useful for all tasks.

[-35-] It was later that they proved their sincerity. At this time he himself led the campaign against the Iapudes, assigning the rest of the tribes to others to subdue. Those that were on his side of the mountains, dwelling not far from the sea, he reduced with comparatively little trouble, but he overcame those on the heights and beyond them with no small hardship. They strengthened Metulum, the largest of their cities, and repulsed many assaults of the Romans, burned to the ground many engines and laid low Octavius himself as he was trying to step from a wooden tower upon the circuit of the wall. Later, when he still did not desist but kept sending for additional forces, they pretended to wish to negotiate terms and received members of garrisons into their citadel. Then by night they destroyed all of these and set fire to their houses, some killing themselves and some their wives and children in addition, so that nothing whatever remained for Caesar. For not only they but also such as were captured alive destroyed themselves voluntarily shortly afterward.

[-36-] When these had perished and the rest had been subdued without performing any exploit of note, he made a campaign against the Pannonians. He had no complaint to bring against them, not having been wronged by them in any way, but he wanted both to give his soldiers practice and to support them abroad: for he regarded every demonstration against a weaker party as just, when it pleased the man whom weapons made their superior. The Pannonians are settled near Dalmatia close along the Ister from Noricum to European Moesia and lead the most miserable existence of mankind. They are not well off in the matter of land or sky, they cultivate no olives or vines except to the slightest extent, and these wretched varieties, since the greater part of their days is passed in the midst of most rigorous winter, but they drink as well as eat barley and millet. They have been considered very brave, however, during all periods of which we have cognizance. For they are very quick to anger and ready to slay, inasmuch as they possess nothing which can give them a happy life. This I know not by hearsay or reading only, but I have learned it from actual experience as their governor. For after my term as ruler in Africa and in Dalmatia,—the latter position my father also held for a time,—I was appointed[55 - Probably in A.D. 227.] to Upper Pannonia, so-called, and hence my record is founded on exact knowledge of all conditions among them. Their name is due to the fact that they cut up a kind of toga in a way peculiar to themselves into strips which they call panni, and then stitch these together into sleeved tunics for themselves.

They have been named so either for this or for some other reason; but certain of the Greeks who were ignorant of the truth have spoken of them as Paeones, which is an old word but does not belong there, but rather applies to Rhodope, close to the present Macedonia, as far as the sea. Wherefore I shall call the dwellers in the latter district Paeones, but the others Pannonians, just as they themselves and as the Romans do.