History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

The hill occupied by the Gauls rose with an easy slope above a marsh which, surrounding it on nearly all sides, rendered it difficult of access, although it was only fifty feet broad. They had broken the bridges, and, full of confidence in their position, drawn up according to tribes, and guarding all the fords and passages, they were ready to fall upon the Romans, if the latter attempted to overcome this obstacle. With the two armies thus in presence and so near to each other, one would have believed them, by their attitude, animated with the same courage, and offering the combat under equal conditions; but, when we consider the defensive strength of the position of the Gauls, we are soon convinced that the firmness of the latter was only one of ostentation. The Romans, indignant at being thus braved, demanded the order to fight; but Cæsar represented to them that the victory would cost the lives of too many brave men, and that the more they were bent upon daring everything for his glory, the more blamable would it be in him to sacrifice them. These words calmed their impatience, and the same day he led them back to the siege operations.

Vercingetorix, on his return to his army, was accused of treason, for having placed his camp nearer to that of the Romans, taken away with him all the cavalry, left his infantry without a head, and facilitated, by his departure, the sudden and so well-calculated arrival of the enemy. “All these incidents,” they said, “could not be the effect of chance; evidently Vercingetorix preferred owing the empire of Gaul to Cæsar than to his fellow-citizens.” As the improvised chief of a popular movement, Vercingetorix had to expect one of those fickle demonstrations of the multitude, who are rendered fanatical by successes, and unjust by reverses. But, strong in his patriotism and in his conduct, he justified easily to his followers the dispositions he had taken. “The scarcity of forage only has decided him, at their entreaties, to change the position of his camp; he has chosen a new position, which is impregnable; he has employed the cavalry, which is useless in a marshy place, to advantage. He has transferred the command to nobody, for fear that a new chief, to please bands without discipline, incapable of supporting the fatigues of war, might let himself be persuaded to give battle. Whether it were chance or treason which had brought the Romans before them, they ought to thank Fortune for it, since they had retired with disgrace. He has no desire to obtain the supreme authority from Cæsar at the price of a guilty defection: victory will soon give it him. It is now no longer doubtful. As to himself, he is ready to lay down an authority which would be only a vain honour, and not a means of delivery;” and, to prove the sincerity of his hopes, he brought forward slaves who had been made prisoners, whom he represents as legionaries, and who, at his instigation, declare that in three days the Romans will be obliged by want of provisions to raise the siege. His discourse is received by the acclamations of the army, and all signify their applause by the clang of their arms, according to the Gaulish manner. It is agreed to send 10,000 men to Avaricum, taken among the different contingents, so that the Bituriges alone should not have the glory of saving a town upon which depended in a great measure the fate of the war.

The Gauls, endowed with the genius of imitation, struggled by all means possible against the wonderful perseverance of the Roman soldiers. They turned away the rams with pointed heads (falces)[473 - See the quotation from Vegetius, p. 143, note (1).] by means of nooses, and, when they had once caught hold of them, they dragged them up by means of machines.[474 - We read in Vitruvius, on occasion of the siege of Marseilles: “When the tortoise approached to batter the wall, they let down a cord furnished with a slip-knot, in which they caught the ram, and raised its head so high, by means of a wheel, that they prevented its striking the wall.” (Vitruvius, X. 16.)] Accustomed to work in the iron mines, and to the construction of subterranean galleries, they skilfully countermined the terrace, and also provided their walls with towers of several stories, covered with leather. Day and night they made sallies, and set fire to the works of the besiegers. As the daily increase of the terrace heightened the level of the towers, the besieged raised theirs to the same height by means of scaffoldings; they stopped the progress of the subterranean galleries, prevented them from being advanced to the walls by trying to break them open with pointed stakes hardened in the fire (apertos cuniculos prœusta ac prœacuta materia … morabantur),[475 - Titus Livius expresses himself thus in speaking of the beseiged in Ambracia, who dug a mine to meet that of the enemies: “Aperiunt viam rectam in cuniculum.” (XXXVII. 7.)] and by throwing molten pitch and blocks of stone.

The Gauls constructed their walls in this manner: beams were placed horizontally on the ground, in a direction perpendicular to the line of the enclosure,[476 - Several authors have thought that these beams, instead of being placed perpendicularly to the direction of the wall, were placed parallel to that direction. This interpretation appears to us inadmissable. The beams so placed would have no solidity, and would easily have been torn down. We see on the Trajan Column walls constructed as we describe; moreover, the Latin expression trabes directæ can leave no doubt, for the word directus means always perpendicular to a direction. (See De Bello Gallico, IV. 17, directa materia injecta, and the dissertation in the Philologus, Jahrganges 19, Heft. 3.)] at intervals of two feet from each other; they were bound together on the side of the town; by cross-beams, usually of forty feet in length, firmly fixed in the ground, and the whole covered with a great quantity of earth, except on the exterior side, where the intervals were furnished with large blocks of rock, and formed a facing. After this first layer had been well fixed and rendered compact, they raised upon it a second, absolutely similar, taking care that the beams were not exactly above each other, but corresponded with the intervals filled in with stones, in which they were, as it were, enchased. The work was thus continued until the wall had attained the required height. These successive layers, in which the beams and stones alternated regularly, offered, by their very variety, an agreeable appearance to the eye. This construction had great advantages for the defence of places: the stone preserved it from fire, and the wood from the ram; held together by the cross-beams, the beams could be neither torn down nor driven in. (See Plate 20.)

Notwithstanding the obstinacy of the defence, and the cold and continual rains, the Roman soldiers surmounted all obstacles, and raised in twenty-five days a terrace 330 feet wide by 80 feet high. It already nearly touched the town wall, when, towards the third watch (midnight), clouds of smoke were seen issuing from it. It was the moment when Cæsar, according to his custom, was inspecting the works, and encouraging the soldiers at their labour; the Gauls had set the terrace on fire from the gallery of a mine. At the same instant cries arose from the whole extent of the rampart, and the besieged, rushing out by two gates, made a sally on the two sides where the towers were; from the top of the walls some threw dry wood and torches on the terrace, others pitch and various inflammable materials; nobody knew whither to run nor where to give help. As two legions, however, generally passed the night under arms in front of the camp, whilst the others relieved each other alternately for the work, they were soon able to face the enemy; meanwhile some drew back the towers, and others cut the terrace to intercept the fire; the whole army, in fact, hurried to put out the latter.

When day broke, they were still fighting on every point; the besieged had the more hope of conquering, as the penthouses which protected the approaches to the towers were burnt (deustos pluteos turrium),[477 - The name of pluteus was given generally to all kinds of covering with hurdles or with skins. (Festus, in voce Pluteus. – Vitruvius, X. 20.) – Vegetius (IV. 15) applies the name of pluteus to a kind of penthouse, of wicker-work or skins, mounted on three wheels, and protecting the men placed behind it, so that they might shoot at the defenders.] and as then the Romans, compelled to march without cover, could with difficulty arrive at the burning works. Persuaded that the salvation of Gaul depended on this critical moment, they replaced incessantly the troops which were weary. Then happened a fact worthy of notice: before the gate of the oppidum there was a Gaul who threw balls of grease and pitch into the fire opposite a Roman tower; a dart shot from a scorpion[478 - They gave this name to a small engine resembling the balistæ, which threw darts. These scorpions composed, as it were, the field-artillery of the ancients.] struck him in the right side and killed him. The next man immediately takes his place, and perishes in the same manner; a third succeeds him, then a fourth, and the post is only abandoned after the extinction of the fire and the retreat of the assailants.

After so many fruitless efforts, the Gauls resolved next day to obey the order of Vercingetorix, and evacuate the place. His camp not being far off, they hoped, by favour of the night, to escape without great loss, reckoning on a continuous marsh to protect their flight. But the women, in despair, struggle to retain them, and, seeing that their supplications had no effect, to such an extent does fear extinguish pity, they give warning to the Romans by their cries, and thus compel the Gauls to renounce their intended flight.

The day following Cæsar caused a tower to be advanced, and the works to be prosecuted with vigour; an abundant rain, and the negligence of the enemy in guarding the wall, engaged him to attempt an assault. He thereupon ordered the work to be slackened without entirely stopping it, in order not to awaken suspicions, assembled his legions under arms, sheltered behind the covered galleries (vineas), and informed them that they were going to reap the fruit of so many fatigues. He promised rewards to those who should be first to scale the wall of the town, and gave the signal. The Romans at once rushed forward from every side, and reached the top of the ramparts.

The enemies, terrified by this unexpected attack, and thrown down from the tops of the walls and towers, sought refuge in the public places, and formed in wedges, so as to offer a resistance on all sides; but when they saw that the Romans, instead of descending into the town, went round it on the ramparts, they were afraid of being shut in, and threw down their arms and fled towards the other extremity of the oppidum (where are at present the faubourgs Taillegrain and Saint-Privé). (See Plate 20.) Most of them were killed near the gates, the narrow passage of which they blocked up; the others by the cavalry outside the town. No one among the Roman soldiers thought of plunder. Irritated by the remembrance of the massacre of Genabum, and by the fatigues of the siege, they spared neither old men, women, nor children. Of about 40,000 combatants, scarcely 800 fugitives were able to join Vercingetorix. He, fearing that their presence, if they came in a body, might excite a mutiny, had, in the middle of the night, sent trusty men and the principal chiefs a long way out, to distribute them in fractions among the camps belonging to the different tribes.

The next day Vercingetorix sought, in a general assembly, to revive the courage of his countrymen, by ascribing the success of the Romans to their superiority in the art of sieges, which was unknown to the Gauls. He told them that this reverse ought not to dishearten them; that his advice, they well knew, had never been to defend Avaricum; that a signal revenge would soon console them; that, through his care, the countries separated from the common cause would enter into his alliance, animate Gaul with the one thought, and cement a union capable of resisting the whole world. Then this fearless defender of the national independence shows his genius in taking advantage even of a misfortune to subject his ill-disciplined troops to the rough labours of war, and succeeds in convincing them of the necessity of retrenching their camp in the manner of the Romans, so as to protect it from surprise.

The constancy of Vercingetorix, after so great a reverse, and the foresight which he had shown in recommending, from the beginning of the war, to burn, and afterwards to abandon Avaricum, increased his influence. So the Gauls, for the first time, fortified their camp, and their courage was so much confirmed, that they were ready to undergo all trials.

Vercingetorix, true to his engagements, exerted himself to the utmost to gain over to his cause the other states of Gaul, and to seduce the chiefs by presents and promises; and, for this purpose, he sent to them zealous and intelligent agents. He caused the men who had fled from Avaricum to be clothed and armed anew, and, in order to repair his losses, he required from the divers states a contingent at a stated period, and archers, who were very numerous in Gaul. At the same time Teutomatus, son of Ollovico, King of the Nitiobriges, whose father had received from the Senate the title of friend, came to join him with a numerous corps of cavalry, raised in his own country and in Aquitaine. Cæsar remained some time in Avaricum, where he found great store of provisions, and where the army recovered from its fatigues.[479 - De Bello Gallico, VII. 32.]

Arrival of Cæsar at Decetia, and March towards Auvergne.

V. The winter was drawing to a close, and the season was propitious for the continuation of military operations. As Cæsar prepared to march against the enemy, either in order to draw him from the woods and marshes, or to shut him up in them, the principes of the Ædui came to request him to put an end to dissensions among them which threatened to degenerate into civil war. “The situation was most critical. In fact, according to ancient customs, the supreme authority was only granted to a single magistrate, named for a year. At that moment, however, there were two, each claiming to have been legally elected. The first was Convictolitavis, a young man of illustrious birth; the second, Cotus, sprung from a very ancient family, powerful also by his personal influence, his alliances, and whose brother, Valetiacus, had the year before filled the same office. The country was in arms, the Senate divided like the people, each of the pretenders at the head of his clients. The authority of Cæsar alone could prevent civil war.”

The Roman general considered it essential to prevent troubles from arising in an important state, closely attached to the Republic, and where the weakest party would not fail to call in the aid of Vercingetorix. Consequently, notwithstanding the inconvenience of suspending the military operations and moving from the enemy, he resolved to repair to the Ædui, whose first magistrate, according to the laws, could not leave the territory. Having thus aimed at proving to them the respect which he entertained for their institutions, he arrived at Decetia (Decize, in the Nivernais), where he called before him the Senate and the two pretenders.[480 - It is very probably that Cæsar proceeded first to Noviodunum (Nevers), since he informs us that he had established in that town a great magazine and provisions of every kind.] Nearly the whole nation came thither. Cæsar, having acquired the conviction that the nomination of Cotus was the result of an intrigue of the minority, obliged him to resign, and maintained Convictolitavis, who had been chosen by the priests, according to the legal forms and customs of the country.

After this decision, he engaged the Ædui to forget their quarrels, and to devote themselves entirely to the war; Gaul once subjected, he would recompense them for their sacrifices. He exacted from them all their cavalry and 10,000 infantry, intending to distribute them in such a manner as to ensure the regularity of the victualling department. He next divided his army into two bodies. Labienus, detached with two legions and part of the cavalry, had instructions to take at Sens the two other legions which Cæsar had left there, and to repair, at the head of those four legions, to the country of the Parisii, who had been drawn by Vercingetorix into the revolt.

On his part, Cæsar resolved, with the six other legions and the rest of the cavalry, to invade the country of the Arverni themselves, the focus of the insurrection. He started from Decetia, and directed his march upon Gergovia, the principal oppidum of that people.

After the capture of Avaricum, Vercingetorix, suspecting Cæsar’s ulterior designs, had moved towards the Allier, which the Romans were obliged to pass in order to reach Gergovia; and, on the news of their march, he had caused all the bridges to be destroyed.

Cæsar, having arrived on the banks of the Allier, towards Moulins (see Plate 19), followed its downward course, on the right bank. Vercingetorix, on his part, marched along the opposite bank. The two armies were within sight of each other, the camps nearly opposite, and the Gaulish scouts, who watched the left bank, prevented the Romans from establishing a bridge. The position of the latter was difficult, for the Allier, which is fordable in the autumn only, might delay their passage a long time.[481 - At present the Allier is fordable almost everywhere in summer; but in the course of nineteen centuries the bed of the river must have been considerably raised.] In order to surmount this obstacle, Cæsar had recourse to a stratagem: he fixed his camp in a place covered with wood, opposite the remains of one of the bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be destroyed (probably at Varennes). There he remained hidden the following day with two legions, and made the rest of the troops, as well as the baggage, proceed in the usual order. But, that they might present to the enemy the appearance of six legions, he had divided into six corps the forty cohorts or four legions which he sent forward.[482 - The commentators are not agreed on this passage. I have adopted the version which seemed to me the best, and which MM. Köchly and Rustow have followed in their German translation, Stuttgart, 1862.] They received the order to march as long as possible, in order to attract Vercingetorix, and, at the time Cæsar presumed that they had arrived at their camp, he caused the bridge to be rebuilt on the old piles, the lower part of which remained untouched. The work being soon completed, the legions which remained with him passed the river, and, after having chosen a favourable position, he recalled the mass of his army, which rejoined him during the night.[483 - Dio Cassius, XL. 35.] When Vercingetorix was informed of this manœuvre, fearing lest he should be compelled to fight against his will, he took the start and marched in great haste to occupy the oppidum of the Arverni.

From the place he occupied, which we believe to have been Varennes,[484 - Cæsar, on leaving Decize, followed, no doubt the Gaulish road which led to the Allier, and the existence of which may be assumed from the later construction of the Roman road which goes from Decize to Bourbon-l’Archambault (Aquæ Borvonis), and which crossed the Allier a little below Moulins. Thence he followed the course of the river for some days, constantly in face of the enemy. In order to pass it by the help of a stratagem, he took advantage of the remains of a bridge; and, as this bridge indicates that there must have been a road, it becomes a question to find among the ancient roads which crossed the Allier that which Cæsar followed. Now we only know two Roman roads leading to the Allier below Moulins, one at Varennes, the other at Vichy. We adopt Varennes. That locality is seventy-seven kilomètres from Gergovia, reckoning them along the Allier, and Cæsar took five days to perform them; but, as the four legions sent forward to deceive the enemy returned during the night, in order to rejoin him, they must have suffered great fatigues; hence it is to be presumed that the next day the first march was very short. The fifth also was not long, for, according to the “Commentaries,” Cæsar had time on the day of his arrival to fortify his camp, to reconnoitre the place, and to engage in a cavalry combat. Besides, the country, interspersed with woods and marshes, was unknown to him; and we believe that we do not depart from the truth if we admit that the first and the last march were of no more than ten kilomètres, and the three others of nineteen, which gives a total of seventy-seven kilomètres, the distance from Varennes to Gergovia. When Cæsar left Gergovia, he crossed the Allier again, but at a point nearer to Gergovia, being in haste to place the river between him and the enemy. Indeed, on the second day after his check, he fought a successful cavalry engagement, broke up his camp, and the following day (tertio die) crossed the Allier again, according to our opinion, at Vichy, which is only fifty-five kilomètres from Gergovia.] Cæsar reached Gergovia in five days; on the very day of his arrival, after a slight skirmish of cavalry, he reconnoitred the position of the town. As it was built on a very high mountain of difficult access, he considered it impossible to take it by assault; he therefore resolved to blockade it, and not to begin investing it until he had assured his provisions. (See Plate 21.)

Blockade of Gergovia.

VI. The oppidum of the Arverni was situated at a distance of six kilomètres to the south of Clermont-Ferrand, on the mountain which has preserved the name of Gergovia. Its summit, elevated about 740 mètres above the level of the sea, and 380 above the plain, forms a plateau of 1,500 mètres in length by more than 500 mètres in breadth. The northern and eastern slopes present such abrupt declivities that they defy the escalade. The southern slope presents a very different character: it may be compared to an immense staircase, the steps of which would be vast terraces with very little inclination, and a breadth which in some places extends to as much as 150 mètres.

On the western side, the mountain of Gergovia is attached by a narrow defile of 120 mètres in width, called the Goules (see Plate 21, C), to the heights of Risolles, an irregular mass, the plateau of which is at a mean depth of about 30 mètres beneath that of Gergovia. To the west are the detached mountains of Montrognon and Le Puy-Giroux. This latter is separated from that of Risolles by a rather deep gorge, in which the village of Opme is built. Opposite the southern slope of Gergovia, at the very foot of the mountain, rises a very steep hill, called the Roche Blanche. Its culminating point is at about 108 mètres below the plateau. Two brooks, the Auzon and the Artières,[485 - The Artières receives, on the north of Gergovia, the little brook of Clémensat, marked on Plate 21.] tributaries of the Allier, flow, one to the south, the other to the north of Gergovia. Lastly, a low tract of ground, situated to the east, indicates the site of the ancient marsh of Sarlièves, which has been dry since the seventeenth century.

Cæsar established his camp near the Auzon, on the undulations of the ground which extend to the north-west of the village of Orcet, and as far as the ancient marsh of Sarlièves. These undulations form a natural glacis towards the plain, above which they rise about thirty mètres; on the side of the stream of the Auzon they terminate in almost imperceptible slopes. The camp occupied a part of the table-land and of the northern slope.[486 - It is by seeking the essential conditions required for the placing of troops that Commandant Baron Stoffel succeeded in finding the camps. Cæsar had to place from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the neighbourhood of water, at a convenient distance from Gergovia, and in such a manner as to preserve his line of operation upon Nevers, where his magazines were. These necessities indicated that the principal camp would be near the Auzon, and to the east. Moreover, it must be sufficiently near the oppidum, that from the top of the mountain of Gergovia could be seen what was going on in it; and yet sufficiently distant that the objects could not be clearly distinguished. The camp must be in the plain; Dio Cassius (XL. 36) formally says, “Cæsar remained in the plain, not having been able to take (for placing his camp) a place strong by its elevation;” and then the “Commentaries” inform us that the Romans only occupied one single hill, namely, the one they took by surprise (La Roche-Blanche). Lastly, it was indispensable that there should be in front of the camp a space sufficiently large to admit of cavalry engagements.] (See Plate 21.)

Vercingetorix had arranged the contingents of each country separately, at small intervals, on the southern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia and the mountain mass of Risolles which look towards the Auzun; they covered all the heights attached to the principal mountain, and presented, in the space which the eye could embrace, a formidable aspect.[487 - Vercingetorix, placed in the centre of a kind of semicircle, might easily be considered by Cæsar as surrounded by his numerous troops (collocaverat copias circum se).] His principal camps were situated between the outer wall of the oppidum and a wall of large stones, six feet high, which ran along the bend of the hill.

Every day, at sunrise, the chiefs who composed the council of Vercingetorix repaired to him in order to make their reports or to receive his orders. Every day, also, he tried in slight engagements[488 - The combats of cavalry took place in the plain which extends from the small eminence called Le Puy-de-Marmant to the marsh of Sarlièves.] the courage of his cavalry mixed with archers. The Gauls occupied, as an advanced post, but by a weak garrison, La Roche-Blanche, which, scarped on three sides, presented an extremely strong position; Cæsar judged that, by taking possession of this hill, he would deprive the Gauls almost entirely of forage and water, for they could no longer descend to the Auzon, the only considerable stream in the neighbourhood. He started from the camp in the silence of the night, drove away this post before it could be succoured from the town, took the position, and placed two legions upon it. The Roche-Blanche became his smaller camp;[489 - The hill is certainly the Roche-Blanche, for it is situated opposite the oppidum (e regione oppidi); it begins at the very foot of the slopes of the mountain of Gergovia (sub ipsis radicibus montis), is singularly fortified by nature, and, as it were, cut out from all sides (egregie munitus atque ex omni parte circumcisus). So long as the Gauls occupied it, they could go to the Auzon by the ravine of Merdogne, to obtain water and forage; but as soon as it was in the power of the Romans, the Gauls were compelled to draw their water from the springs on the mountain of Gergovia, and from the little brook of Artières.The excavations made in 1862 brought the two camps to light. The fosses of the little camp are clearly defined in the calcareous soil. They form an irregular outline, represented on Plate 22. The Roche-Blanche, which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by successive landslips, the last of which took place within memory of the inhabitants. The communication between the great and little camps was composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth of the two together is only twelve feet. If we wonder that the Romans should have dug two little ditches, each six feet broad and four feet deep, instead of making one eight feet wide by six feet deep, which would have given the same amount of soil to take out, it may be answered that the two little ditches were much more quickly made than one large ditch.] it was joined to the larger one by a double ditch of twelve feet, which allowed the troops to communicate in safety, even singly, without fear of being surprised by the enemy. (See Plate 22.)

During this time, the Æduan Convictolitavis, who, as we have seen, owed the supreme magistracy to Cæsar, seduced by the money of the Arverni, resolved to abandon the party of the Romans, and entered into communication with several young men, at whose head was Litavicus and his brothers, descended from an illustrious family. He shares with them the price of his treason; exhorts them to remember that, born free, they are made to command in their country; proves to them that the lukewarmness of the Ædui alone delayed the general insurrection; and that they ought to value above everything the independence of their country. Seduced by such discourses and by the bait of gold, those young men occupy themselves only with the means of executing their project; yet, mistrusting the inclination of the people to be drawn into war, they decide that Litavicus shall take the command of the 10,000 men who were to join the Roman army, and induce them to revolt on the road, whilst his brothers go before them to Cæsar.

Litavicus began his march. At thirty miles from Gergovia (probably at Serbannes), he halts his troops, assembles them, and, spreading the report that Cæsar has caused the Æduan nobility and knights who were in his pay to be massacred, among others Eporedorix and Viridomarus, he easily persuades them to go and join the Arverni at Gergovia, instead of proceeding to the Roman camp. But, before taking this determination, he gives up to plunder the convoy of provisions which marched under his guard, causes the Romans who conducted it to be put to death with tortures, and then sends messengers to raise the whole country of the Ædui, by means of the same imposture. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, whose death he had falsely announced, were with Cæsar, who, by special favour, had raised Viridomarus from a very low to a high dignity. The former, informed of the design of Litavicus, came in the middle of the night to acquaint the proconsul with it, imploring him not to allow the folly of a few young men to detach his country from the Roman alliance. It would be too late when so many thousands of men had embraced the contrary party.

Cæsar, more affected by this news as he had always favoured the Ædui, takes immediately four legions, without baggage, and all the cavalry; he waits not even to contract the compass of the two camps, for everything depends upon celerity. His lieutenant, C. Fabius, is left to guard them, with two legions. He orders the brothers of Litavicus to be placed under arrest, and learns that they have just passed over to the enemy. His soldiers, encouraged to support the fatigues of the march, follow him with ardour, and at about twenty-five miles from Gergovia (near Randan, on the road which Litavicus had to follow to join Vercingetorix) they meet the Ædui. The cavalry, sent in advance, have orders to stop them without using their arms. Eporedorix and Viridomarus, who had been reported as dead, step forth from the ranks, speak to their fellow-citizens, and are recognised. As soon as the deception practised by Litavicus is discovered, the Ædui throw down their arms, ask for pardon, and obtain it. Litavicus flies to Gergovia, with his clients, who, in Gaul, never abandoned their patrons, not even in their worst fortunes.

Cæsar sent to the Ædui to represent to them how generously he had acted towards men whom the laws of war authorised him to put to death; and, after having given his army three hours’ rest during the night, he returned to his quarters before Gergovia. Half-way, horsemen came to inform him of the perilous position of Fabius. The camps had been attacked by troops which were unceasingly renewed. The Romans were exhausted by unceasing labour, for the great extent of the enclosure obliged them to remain continually on the vallum. The arrows and missiles of all sorts thrown by the barbarians had wounded a great number; but, on the other hand, the machines had been of great help in supporting the defence. After the retreat of the enemies, Fabius, expecting to be again attacked next day, had hastened to block up the gates of the great camp, with the exception of two, and to add a palisade to the vallum. On receiving this information, Cæsar hurried his march, and, seconded by the ardour of his soldiers, arrived at the camp before sunrise (having thus performed fifty miles, or seventy-four kilomètres, in twenty-four hours).[490 - ]

While these events were taking place at Gergovia, the Ædui, also deceived by the news which Litavicus had spread, fall upon the Roman citizens, plunder their goods, kill some, and drag others to prison. It is Convictolitavis, also, who prompts these violences. The military tribune M. Aristius, who was on his way to join his legion, as well as the foreign merchants who resided in the country, are compelled to leave Cabillonum (Châlon-sur-Sâone). An escort is promised to protect them; but they have hardly started when they are attacked and stripped. They defend themselves, and their resistance, which lasts during twenty-four hours, calls a greater multitude to arms. However, as soon as the Ædui hear of the new submission of their troops, they exert themselves to the utmost to obtain their pardon; they have recourse to Aristius, throw the blame of the outbreak upon a few, order the plundered goods to be collected, and confiscate those of Litavicus and his brothers. They send deputies to Cæsar to excuse themselves. Their object, in acting thus, was to obtain the free disposal of their troops, for the consciousness of their treason and the fear of punishment made them, at the same time, conspire in secret with the neighbouring states.

Although informed of these secret plots, Cæsar received their deputies with kindness, declaring that he did not hold the nation responsible for the fault of some individuals, and that his feelings towards the Ædui were not changed. Nevertheless, as he foresaw a general insurrection of Gaul, which would surround him on all sides, he entertained serious thoughts of abandoning Gergovia, and again effecting the concentration of his whole army; but it was of importance that his retreat, caused by the sole fear of a general defection, should not appear to be a flight.

In the midst of these cares, the besieged offered him a favourable chance, of which he sought to take advantage. As he was visiting the little camp to inspect the works, he perceived that a hill (no doubt the hill marked A, which forms part of the mountain mass of Rissoles, see Plate 21), which was almost hidden from sight by the masses of enemies on the previous days, was clear of troops. Astonished at this change, he inquired the cause of the deserters, who came every day in crowds to surrender to him. All agreed in saying, as his scouts had already reported to him, that the mountain ridge to which this hill belonged (the top of the heights of Risolles) was almost flat, was connected with the town, and gave access to it by a narrow and wooded defile. (See Plates 21 and 22.) This point caused particular anxiety to the enemy; for if the Romans, already masters of La Roche-Blanche, gained possession of the mountain mass of Risolles, the Gauls would be almost entirely invested, and could neither escape nor go to forage. This was the reason why Vercingetorix had decided upon fortifying these heights, and had called thither all his troops.[491 - Plate 22 shows the places which Cæsar’s eye could embrace from the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor the country situated on the norther slopes of the mountains of Gergovia and Rissoles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (dorsum ejus jugi) was not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (ad alteram partem oppidi) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the Goules, which separates Rissoles from Gergovia). (See Plate 21 in C.) This defile leads to the gate P of the oppidum. The foundations, of masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile C is distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the oppidum. These latter would have been almost blockaded (pœne circumvallati), without any way out, and in the impossibility of producing forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern part of the town was difficult to access. Consequently, the words si alterum collem amisissent can only apply to the mountain mass of Rissoles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest either for the attack or for the defence.The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part D E of the heights of Rissoles which are opposite the village of Opme, because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion, which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps, on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides, two facts which result from the “Commentaries” prove that the Gauls were not very far from the oppidum. Cæsar sees the southern front abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in the place (primo exaudito clamore), have time to hurry to them, and drive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200 paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore, that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate O of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of Risolles.]

In accordance with this information, Cæsar sends in this direction, towards the middle of the night, several detachments of cavalry, with orders to scour with great noise the country in every direction at the foot of the heights of Risolles. At break of day, he sends out of the great camp many horses and mules without pack-saddles, and causes the muleteers to mount them, who put on helmets, so as to assume the appearance of mounted troopers. He enjoins them to wind round the hills, and a few cavalry who are joined with them have orders to spread wide over the country, so as to increase the illusion. Finally, they are all, by a long circuit, to move towards the spots which have just been mentioned. These movements were perceived from the town, which overlooked the camp, but at too great a distance to distinguish objects accurately. Cæsar sends towards the same mountain mass one legion, who, after having marched for a short distance, halt in a hollow, and pretend to hide in the woods (towards Chanonat), so as to feign a surprise. The suspicions of the Gauls increase; they take all their forces to the spot threatened. Cæsar, seeing the enemy’s camp deserted, orders the military ensigns (plumes, shields, &c.) to be covered, the standards to be lowered, and the troops to pass in small detachments from the great to the little camp, behind the epaulment of the double fosse of communication, so that they cannot be perceived from the oppidum.[492 - According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 9), the soldiers marched with their heads bent down, in order not to be seen.] He communicates his intentions to the lieutenants placed at the heads of the legions, recommends them to take care to prevent the soldiers from allowing themselves to be carried away by the ardour of the combat or the hope of plunder, and draws their attention to the difficulties of the ground. “Celerity alone,” he says, “can enable us to overcome them; in fact, it is to be an attack by surprise, and not a fight.” Having communicated these directions, he gives the signal, and, at the same time, sends the Ædui out of the great camp, with orders to climb the eastern slopes of the mountain of Gergovia, to effect a diversion to the right. (See Plate 21.)

The distance from the wall of the oppidum to the foot of the mountain, where the ground is almost flat, was 1,200 paces (1,780 mètres) in the most direct line; but the way was longer, on account of the circuits it was necessary to make to break the steepness.[493 - It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate O of the oppidum. This is the line which passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to climb it.] Towards the middle of the southern slope, in the direction of its length, the Gauls, taking advantage of the character of the ground, had, as we have said, built a wall of large stones, six feet high, a serious obstacle in case of attack. The lower part of the slopes had remained free; but the upper part, up to the wall of the oppidum, was occupied with camps placed very near together. When the signal is given, the Romans reach rapidly the wall, scale it, and take three camps with such promptitude, that Teutomatus, king of the Nitiobriges, surprised in his tent where he was taking his repose in the middle of the day, fled half naked; his horse was wounded, and he escaped with difficulty from the hands of the assailants.

Cæsar, satisfied with this success, ordered the retreat to be sounded, and made the tenth legion, which accompanied him, halt (from an examination of the ground, the spot where Cæsar stood is the knoll which rises to the west of the village of Merdogne). (See Plate 21, first position of the tenth legion.) But the soldiers of the other legions, separated from him by a rather wide ravine, did not hear the trumpet. Although the tribunes and the lieutenants did all they could to restrain them, excited by the hope of an easy victory, and by the recollection of their past successes, they thought nothing was insurmountable to their courage, and persisted in the pursuit of the enemy up to the walls and gates of the oppidum.

Then an immense cry arises in the town. The inhabitants of the most remote quarters believe that it is invaded, and rush out of the walls. The matrons throw from the top of the walls their precious objects to the Romans, and, with breasts bare and hands extended in supplication, implore them not to massacre the women and children, as at Avaricum. Several even, letting themselves down from the walls, surrender to the soldiers. L. Fabius, centurion of the 8th legion, excited by the rewards given at Avaricum, had sworn to be the first to mount to the assault; he is lifted up by three soldiers of his company, reaches the top of the wall, and, in his turn, helps them to mount one after the other.

Meanwhile the Gauls, who, as we have seen, had proceeded to the west of Gergovia to raise retrenchments, hear the cries from the town; repeated messages announce the capture of the oppidum. They immediately hurry towards it, sending their cavalry before them. As they arrive, each man takes his stand under the wall and joins the combatants, and their number increases every moment; while the same women who just before implored the pity of the besiegers, now excite against them the defenders of Gergovia, displaying their dishevelled hair and showing their children. The place as well as the numbers rendered the struggle unequal; the Romans, fatigued with their run and the length of the combat, resisted with difficulty troops which were still fresh.

This critical state of things inspired Cæsar with alarm; he ordered T. Sextius, who had been left to guard the little camp, to bring out the cohorts quickly, and take a position at the foot of the mountain of Gergovia, on the right of the Gauls, so as to support the Romans if they were repulsed, and check the enemy’s pursuit. He himself, drawing the 10th legion a little back[494 - General Gœler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to read regressus instead of progressus. The 10th legion, which acted as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the front.] from the place where he had posted it, awaited the issue of the engagement. (See Plate 21, second position of the 10th legion.)

When the struggle was most obstinate, suddenly the Ædui, who had been sent to divert the attention of the enemy by an attack from another side, appeared on the right flank of the Romans. The resemblance of their arms to those of the Gauls caused a great alarm; and although they had their right shoulders bare (dextris humeris exsertis), the ordinary mark of the allied troops, it was taken for a stratagem of the enemy. At the same moment, the centurion L. Fabius, and those who had followed him, are surrounded and thrown down from the top of the wall. M. Petronius, centurion of the same legion, overwhelmed by numbers in his attempt to burst the gates, sacrifices himself for the safety of his soldiers, and meets his death in order to give them time to join their ensigns. Pressed on all sides, the Romans are driven back from the heights, after having lost forty-six centurions; nevertheless, the 10th legion, placed in reserve on more level ground (see Plate 21, third position), arrests the enemies, who are too eager in their pursuit. It is supported by the cohorts of the 13th, who had just taken position on a commanding post (Le Puy-de-Marmant), under the command of the lieutenant T. Sextius. As soon as the Romans had reached the plain, they rallied, and formed front against the enemy. But Vercingetorix, once arrived at the foot of the mountain, ventured no further, but led back his troops within the retrenchments. This day cost Cæsar nearly 700 men.[495 - The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate O of the oppidum, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which, according to the “Commentaries,” prevented the legions from hearing the signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of the Merdogne. Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur, H, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur, they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards Merdogne; but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops, who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly the site of the Roman camp; but he does not place it sufficiently to the west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression circum se (VII. 36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too much towards the west.]

Next day, Cæsar assembled his troops, and reprimanded them for their rashness and for their thirst for plunder. He reproached them with having “wished to judge for themselves of the object to be attained, and of the means of attack, and not listening either to the signal of retreat or to the exhortations of the tribunes and lieutenants. He pointed out to them all the importance of the difficulties caused by the inequalities of the ground; and reminded them of his conduct at Avaricum, where, in presence of an enemy without chief and without cavalry, he had renounced a certain victory rather than expose himself to loss, though slight, in a disadvantageous position. Much as he admired their bravery, which had been checked neither by the retrenchments, nor by the steepness of the ground, nor by the walls, he blamed no less their disobedience and their presumption in believing themselves capable of judging of the chances of success and calculating the issue of the undertaking better than their general. He demanded of the soldiers submission and discipline, no less than firmness and bravery; and, to revive their courage, he added that their want of success was to be attributed to the difficulties of the ground much more than to the valour of the enemy.”[496 - De Bello Gallico, VII. 52.]

Observations.

VII. In the foregoing account, which is taken almost literally from the “Commentaries,” Cæsar skilfully disguises a defeat. It is evident that he hoped to take Gergovia by a sudden assault, before the Gauls, drawn by a false attack to the west of the town, had time to come back to its defence. Deceived in his expectation, he ordered the retreat to be sounded, but too late to be executed in good order. Cæsar does not appear to be sincere when he declares that he had attained his object the moment his soldiers reached the foot of the wall. This could not have been the case, for what use could it be to him to take camps almost without troops in them, if the consequence was not to be the surrender of the town itself? The defeat appears to have been complete, and, according to some, Cæsar was for a moment a prisoner in the hands of the Gauls; according to others, he had only lost his sword. Servius, indeed, relates the following rather incomprehensible anecdote: when Cæsar was taken away prisoner by the Gauls, one of them began to cry out Cæsar, which signifies in Gaulish let him go, and thus he escaped.[497 - “In the war of the Gauls, Caius Julius Cæsar was surprised by an enemy, who carried him off, armed as he was, on his horse, when another Gaul, who recognized Cæsar, called out, intending to insult him, “Cæcos, Cæsar!” which in the Gaulish language signifies, let him go, set him loose; and so he escaped. Cæsar says so himself, in his Ephemerides, in the passage where he speaks of his good fortune.” (Servius Maurus Honoratus, a grammarian of the fifth century, in his commentary on the 11th book of the Æneid, line 743, II. p. 48, edit. Albert Lion.)The manuscripts of Servius do not all present the same reading. The following are some of the principal variations: Cecos, Cæsar; Cæcos ac Cæsar; and Cæsar, Cesar.] Plutarch gives another version: “The Arverni,” he says, “still show a sword hung up in one of their temples, which they pretend to be a spoil taken from Cæsar. He saw it there himself subsequently, and only laughed at it. His friends engaged him to take it away, but he refused, pretending that it had become a sacred object.”[498 - Plutarch, Cæsar, 29.] This tradition proves that he was sufficiently great to bear the recollection of a defeat, in which he was very different from Cicero, whom we have seen stealthily taking away from the Capitol the brass plate on which was engraved the law of his banishment.

Cæsar leaves Gergovia in order to join Labienus.

VIII. Cæsar, after the check he had suffered before Gergovia, persisted all the more in his intentions of departure; but, not to have the appearance of flight, he drew out his legions, and placed them in order of battle on an advantageous ground. Vercingetorix did not allow himself to be drawn into the plain; the cavalry only fought, and the combat was favourable to the Romans, who afterwards returned to their camp. The next day the same manœvre was repeated with the same success. Thinking that he had done enough to abate the boasting of the Gauls, as well as to strengthen the courage of his men, Cæsar left Gergovia, and took his way towards the country of the Ædui.

His withdrawal did not draw out the enemies in pursuit; and he arrived on the third day (that is, his second day’s march, reckoning from the assault on Gergovia) on the banks of the Allier, rebuilt one of the bridges, no doubt that of Vichy, and crossed the river in haste, in order to place it between him and Vercingetorix.

There Viridomarus and Eporedorix urged upon him the necessity of their presence among the Ædui, in order to maintain the country in obedience, and to be beforehand with Litavicus, who had gone thither with all the cavalry to excite a revolt. Notwithstanding the numerous proofs of their perfidy, and the suspicion that the departure of those two chiefs would hasten the revolt, he did not think proper to detain them, as he wished to avoid even the appearance of violence or of fear. He confined himself to reminding them of the services which he had rendered to their country, and of the state of dependence and abasement from which he had drawn them, to raise them to a high degree of power and prosperity, and then dismissed them; and they proceeded to Noviodunum (Nevers). This town of the Ædui was situated on the banks of the Loire, in a favourable position. It contained all the hostages of Gaul, the stores, the public treasury, nearly all the baggage of the general and the army, and, lastly, a considerable number of horses bought in Italy and Spain. Eporedorix and Viridomarus heard there, on their arrival, of the revolt of the country, of the reception of Litavicus in the important town of Bibracte by Convictolitavis and a great part of the Senate, as well as of the steps taken to draw their fellow-citizens into the cause of Vercingetorix. The occasion appears favourable to them: they massacre the guards of the dépôt of Noviodunum and the Roman merchants, share amongst themselves the horses and the money, burn the town, send the hostages to Bibracte, load boats with all the grain they can take away, and destroy the rest by water and fire; then they collect troops in the neighbourhood, place posts along the Loire, spread their cavalry everywhere in order to intimidate the Romans, to cut off their supply of provisions, and to compel them through famine to retire into the Narbonnese – a hope which was so much the better founded, as the Loire, swollen by the melting of the snow, appeared to be nowhere fordable.

Cæsar was informed of these events during his march from the Allier towards the Loire. His position had never been more critical. Suffering under a severe defeat, separated from Labienus by a distance of more than eighty leagues, and by countries in revolt, he was surrounded on all sides by the insurrection: he had on his rear the Arverni, elated with their recent success at Gergovia; on his left the Bituriges, irritated by the sack of Avaricum; before him the Ædui, ready to dispute the passage of the Loire. Was he to persevere in his design, or retrograde towards the Province? He could not resolve on this latter course, for not only would this retreat have been disgraceful, and the passage of the Cévennes full of difficulties, but, above all, he felt the greatest anxiety for Labienus and the legions which he had entrusted to him. He therefore persevered in his first resolutions; and in order to be able, in case of need, to build a bridge across the Loire before the forces of the enemies were increased, he proceeded towards that river by forced marches day and night, and arrived unexpectedly at Bourbon-Lancy.[499 - There has always been a ford at Bourbon-Lancy.] The cavalry soon discovered a ford which necessity made them consider practicable, although the soldiers had only above water their shoulders and their arms to carry their weapons. The cavalry was placed up the stream, in order to break the current, and the army passed without accident before the enemy had time to recover from his first surprise. Cæsar found the country covered with the harvest and with cattle, with which the army was largely provisioned, and he marched towards the land of the Senones.[500 - De Bello Gallico, VII. 56.]

Expedition of Labienus against the Parisii.

IX. Whilst the centre of Gaul was the scene of these events, Labienus had marched with four legions towards Lutetia, a town situated on an island in the Seine, the oppidum of the Parisii. After leaving his baggage at Agedincum (Sens)[501 - A sling-ball of lead has been found at Sens, on which are stamped in relief the words “T. Labienus.” This ball forms part of the collection of the Museum of Saint-Germain.] under the guard of the troops recently arrived from Italy to fill up the voids, he followed the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine, wishing to avoid all important streams and considerable towns.[502 - MM. de Saulcy and J. Quicherat have already demonstrated in a conclusive manner that Labienus must have followed the left bank of the Yonne, after leaving Sens, and that he crossed over to the right bank of the Seine at Melun. In fact, Labienus, on the right bank, found himself, as Cæsar says, threatened on one side by the Bellovaci, on the other by the army of Camulogenus (VII. 59). On the opposite bank, on the contrary, Labienus would not have been placed between the two, since he would have had Camulogenus in front, and, at a greater distance, the Bellovaci coming from the north.“A very large river kept the legions separated from their reserve and their baggage.” This very great river cannot be the Marne, which Cæsar does not even mention in the whole course of this campaign: it was evidently the Seine, which Labienus has crossed once only, at Melodunum (Melun); by crossing over to the right bank, he was separated from his base of operations, which was at Sens. On the contrary hypothesis, no river would have separated Labienus from his line of retreat; unless we admit, with Dulaure and several others, the identity of Agedincum with Provius, which is no longer possible.The Captain of the Staff Rouby has made investigations on the spot, which prove that from Sens the most ancient ways leading to Paris passed on the left bank of the Yonne and of the Seine. Moreover, the discoveries of M. Carré have made us acquainted with the exact direction followed by the Roman road after quitting Sens towards Paris; it was entirely on the left bank of the Yonne. If Cæsar’s lieutenant had followed the right bank of the Yonne, he would, the day after his departure, have been arrested by the course of the Seine, and would have fallen in with the Gaulish town of Condate, built in the very angle of the two streams, in the midst of perhaps impassable marshes. If only a few thousand Gauls had occupied the heights which played so important a part in the campaign of 1814, Labienus, compelled to seek for a place to cross higher up the stream, would have been diverted considerably from his aim.It has been supposed wrongly that the Bièvre was the marsh where Labienus, in his march on the left bank of the Seine, had been arrested by the Gaulish army. Leaving out of consideration the fact that the Bièvre, which flows through a calcareous soil, can at no epoch have formed a marsh capable of arresting an army, how can we suppose that Labienus, if he had arrived at this stream, that is, close to Lutetia, would have retraced his steps as far back as Melun, to march from thence towards the oppidum of the Parisii by the right bank of the Seine, which would have obliged him to make a journey of twenty-four leagues? The manœuvre of Labienus can only be explained by his desire to turn the strong position of Camulogenus, and arrive at Paris before him. The text of the “Commentaries” says clearly that Labienus, stopped by the marsh which shelves towards the Seine, stole away by night, surprised the passage of the Seine at Melun, and marched upon Lutetia, where he arrived before Camulogenus. To allow of the success of this manœuvre, the marsh in question must necessarily not have been far from Melun. The Essonne alone fulfils that condition. The ground on the banks of this little river offers, even at present, by its nature, a very serious obstacle to an army. It is cut up by innumerable peat mosses; and it was behind this line of Essonne that, in 1814, the Emperor Napoleon I. established his army, whilst the enemy occupied Paris.] At the news of his approach, the enemy assembled in great numbers from the neighbouring countries. The command was entrusted to Aulercus Camulogenus, who was elevated to this honour, notwithstanding his great age, on account of his rare ability in the art of war. This chief, having remarked that a very extensive marsh sloped towards the Seine, and rendered impracticable all that part of the country which is watered by the Essonne, established his troops along the side of this marsh, in order to defend the passage. (See Plate 23.)