History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally, Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians, raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L. Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few, however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of this disaster.[428 - De Bello Gallico, V. 37.]

Attack on Cicero’s Camp.

XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately repairs with his cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades them.

These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence: they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii, with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans rush to arms, and mount the vallum; but that day they make head with difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this victory nothing further could resist him.[429 - De Bello Gallico, V. 39.]

Cæsar marches to the succour of Cicero.

XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the camp,[430 - The towers of the Romans were constructed of timber of small size, bound together by cross pieces. (See Plate 27, fig. 8.) They still raise scaffolding at Rome in the same manner at the present day.] and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great number of stakes hardened by fire, and pila employed in sieges; they establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.

Meanwhile, the chiefs and principes of the Nervii proposed an interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to Sabinus: “All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked.” They added: “Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country. The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes.” Cicero replied “that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would decide.”

Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in circuit.[431 - Although the text has passuum, we have not hesitated in substituting pedum, for it is very improbable that Gauls could have made, in three hours’ time, a countervallation of more than 22 kilomètres.] On the following days, they raised towers to the height of the vallum, prepared hooks (falces), and covered galleries (testudines), which they had similarly been taught by the prisoners.[432 - The siege machine called testudo, “a tortoise,” was ordinarily a gallery mounted upon wheels, made of wood strongly squared, and covered with a solid blindage. It was pushed against the wall of the place besieged. It protected the workmen employed either in filling the fosse, or in mining the wall, or in working the ram. The siege operations of the Gauls lead us to presume that the camp of Cicero was in a fort surrounded by a wall. (See, on the word falces, note (1) on p. 143.)]

On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of burning clay (ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes).[433 - In the coal-basin, in the centre of which Charleroy is situated, the coal layers crop out of the surface of the soil on different points. Still, at the present day, they knead the clay with small coal. But, what is most curious, people have found at Breteuil (Oise), as in the ruins of Carthage, a quantity of ovoid balls made of pottery.] The barracks, roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of ladders, to scale the vallum; but such were the courage and steadiness of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the vallum.[434 - It will be seen that we use indifferently the terms vallum and rampart.] The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be there, drew their men back, and, in bravado, invited, by their gesture and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.

Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for tending the wounded.[435 - Dio Cassius, XL. 8.] The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero’s danger.

Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of the day (four o’clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three legions – that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius, was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol.[436 - It has appeared to us that the movement of concentration of Cæsar and Fabius did not allow the winter quarters of the latter to be placed at Therouanne or at Montreuil-sur-Mer, as most authors have supposed. These localities are too far distant from the route from Amiens to Charleroy to have enabled Fabius to join Cæsar on the territory of the Atrebates, as the text of the Commentaries requires. For this reason, we place Fabius at Saint-Pol.] (See Plate 14.) He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night, and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C. Fabius, to direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their quarters.

Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and next day, towards the third hour (ten o’clock), his couriers announced his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus. He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken place among the Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in quitting his winter quarters.

Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter to him: it was written in Greek,[437 - The “Commentaries” say, Græcis conscriptam litteris; but Polyænus and Dio Cassius affirm that the letter was written in Greek.] in order that the enemy, if he intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter to the amentum (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words: θαῥῥεἱν βοἡθειαν προσδἑχου (“Courage! expect succour”).[438 - Polyænus, Strateg., VIII. xxiii. 6.] As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not daring to penetrate to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days’ march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000, marched to meet the legions.

Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of the Haine.[439 - We admit that Cicero encamped at Charleroi: all circumstances concur in justifying this opinion. Charleroi is situated on the Sambre, near the Roman road from Amiens to Tongres (Aduatuca), and, as the Latin text requires, at fifty miles from this latter town. On the high part of Charleroi, where the camp was, no doubt, established, we command the valley of the Sambre, and we can see, in the distance towards the west, the country through which Cæsar arrived. Moreover, the valley of the Haine and mount Sainte-Aldegonde, above the village of Carnières, agree perfectly with the details of the combat in which the Gauls were defeated.] Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops. Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march; he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching – mount Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men, without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.

That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with less danger. On the morrow, at daybreak, the enemy’s cavalry came up to the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.

The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had even abandoned the vallum, they approached nearer to it, threw their missiles over it from all sides, and caused their heralds to proclaim round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o’clock), every Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.

Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero, where he arrived the same day.[440 - From Amiens to Charleroi it is 170 kilomètres. Cæsar must have arrived on the territory of the Nervii, towards Cambrai, the morning of the third day, counting from his departure from Amiens, after marching ninety kilomètres. He immediately sends the Gaulish horseman to Cicero. This horseman has to perform eighty kilomètres. He can only take eight to nine hours, and arrive at the camp in the afternoon of the third day. He throws his javelin, which remains where it was fixed the third and the fourth day. The fifth day it was discovered, and the smoke of the fires is then seen. Cæsar, then, arrived on the fifth day (reckoning thirty kilomètres for a day’s march) at Binche, twenty kilomètres from Charleroi. That town is on a sufficiently elevated knoll to allow the smoke to be seen. The siege lasted about fifteen days.] The towers, the covered galleries, and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment. Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero’s legion, nine-tenths of whom were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt, and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans to be afflicted.[441 - De Bello Gallico, V. 53.]

We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle invoked by Cotta, not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in arms, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof, in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to him.[442 - “I have read with a lively joy what you tell me of the courage and strength of mind of Cæsar in this cruel trial.” (Cicero, Epist. ad Quintum, III. viii. 166.)] If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning, he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his lieutenants,[443 - Suetonius, Cæsar, 67. – Polyænus, Strateg., VIII. xxiii.] which only happened in the year following, by the destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.

Cæsar places his Troops in Winter Quarters. Labienus defeats Indutiomarus.

XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar’s victory reached Labienus, across the country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero’s camp, where Cæsar had only arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o’clock in the afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus, who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew during the night, and took all his troops with him.

These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen, along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that period.[444 - One is on the site of the citadel of Amiens; the second is near Tirancourt; the third is the camp of l’Etoile. (See the Dissertation sur les Camps Romains de la Somme, by the Comte L. d’Allonville.)] Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same positions. The gravity of the circumstances determined Cæsar to remain all the winter with the army. In fact, on the news of the disaster of Sabinus, nearly all the people of Gaul showed a disposition to take arms, sent deputations and messages to each other, communicated their projects, and deliberated upon the point from which the signal for war should be given. They held nocturnal assemblies in bye-places, and during the whole winter not a day passed in which there was not some meeting or some movement of the Gauls to cause uneasiness to Cæsar. Thus he learnt from L. Roscius, lieutenant placed at the head of the 13th legion, that considerable troops of Armorica had assembled to attack him; they were not more than eight miles from his winter quarters, when the news of Cæsar’s victory had compelled them to retreat precipitately and in disorder.

The Roman general called to his presence the principes of each state, terrified some by letting them know that he was informed of their plots, exhorted the others to perform their duty, and by these means maintained the tranquillity of a great part of Gaul. Meanwhile a vexatious event took place in the country of the Senones, a powerful and influential nation among the Gauls. They had resolved, in an assembly, to put to death Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for king. Cavarinus had fled; upon which they pronounced his deposition, banished him, and pursued him to the limits of their territory. They had sought to justify themselves to Cæsar, who ordered them to send him all their senators. They refused. This boldness on the part of the Senones, by showing to the barbarians some individuals capable of resisting the Romans, produced so great a change in their minds, that, with the exception of the Ædui and the Remi, there was not a people which did not fall under suspicion of revolt, each desiring to free itself from foreign domination.

During the whole winter, the Treviri and Indutiomarus never ceased urging the people on the other side of the Rhine to take up arms, assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army had been destroyed. But not one of the German nations could be persuaded to pass the Rhine. The remembrance of the double defeat of Ariovistus and the Tencteri made them cautious of trying their fortune again. Deceived in his expectations, Indutiomarus did not discontinue collecting troops, exercising them, buying horses from the neighbouring countries, and drawing to him from all parts of Gaul outlaws and condemned criminals. His ascendency was soon so great, that from all parts people eagerly sought his friendship and protection.

When he saw some rallying to him spontaneously, others, such as the Senones and the Carnutes, engaging in his cause through a consciousness of their fault; the Nervii and the Aduatuci preparing for war, and a crowd of volunteers disposed to join him as soon as he should have quitted his country, Indutiomarus, according to the custom of the Gauls at the beginning of a campaign, called together an assembly in arms. He pronounced Cingetorix, his son-in-law, who remained faithful to Cæsar, an enemy of his country; and announced that, in reply to the appeal of the Senones and Carnutes, he would go to them through the country of the Remi, whose lands he would ravage; but, above all, he would attack the camp of Labienus.

The latter, established on the Ourthe, master of a position naturally formidable, which he had further fortified, was in fear of no attack, but dreamt, on the contrary, of seizing the first opportunity of combating with advantage. Informed by Cingetorix of the designs of Indutiomarus, he demanded cavalry of the neighbouring states, pretended fear, and, letting the enemy’s cavalry approach with impunity, remained shut up in his camp.

While, deceived by these appearances, Indutiomarus became daily more presumptuous, Labienus introduced secretly into his camp during the night the auxiliary cavalry, and, by keeping a close watch, prevented the Treviri from being informed of it. The enemy, ignorant of the arrival of this re-enforcement, advanced nearer and nearer to the retrenchments, and redoubled his provocations. They were unnoticed, and towards evening he withdrew in disorder. Suddenly Labienus causes his cavalry, seconded by his cohorts, to issue by the two gates. Foreseeing the rout of the enemy, he urges his troops to follow Indutiomarus alone, and promises great rewards to those who shall bring his head. Fortune seconded his designs; Indutiomarus was overtaken just at the ford of the river (the Ourthe), and put to death, and his head was brought into the camp. The cavalry, in their return, slew all the enemies they found in their way. The Eburones and the Nervii dispersed. The result of these events was to give to Gaul a little more tranquillity.[445 - De Bello Gallico, V. 58.]

Observations.

XVI. The Emperor Napoleon, in his Précis des Guerres de César, explains in the following manner the advantage the Romans drew from their camps: —

“The Romans owe the constancy of their successes to the method, from which they never departed, of encamping every night in a fortified camp, and of never giving battle without having behind them a retrenched camp, to serve them as a place of retreat, and to contain their magazines, their baggage, and their wounded. The nature of arms in those ages was such that, in these camps, they were not only in safety from the attacks of an equal army, but even an army which was stronger; they were the masters to fight or to wait a favourable opportunity. Marius is assailed by a cloud of Cimbri or Teutones; he shuts himself up in his camp, remains there until the favourable day or occasion comes, then he issues with victory before him. Cæsar arrives near the camp of Cicero; the Gauls abandon the latter, and march to meet the former; they are four times more numerous. Cæsar takes a position in a few hours, retrenches his camp, and in it he bears patiently the insults and provocations of an enemy whom he is not yet willing to combat; but a favourable opportunity is not long in presenting itself. He then issues through all his gates; the Gauls are vanquished.

“Why, then, has a rule so wise, so fertile in great results, been abandoned by modern generals? Because offensive arms have changed its character; arms for the hand were the principal arms of the ancients; it was with his short sword that the legionary conquered the world; it was with the Macedonian pike that Alexander conquered Asia. The principal arms of modern armies are projectiles; the musket is superior to anything ever invented by man; no defensive arm is a protection against it.

“As the principal arm of the ancients was the sword or the pike, their habitual formation was in deep order. The legion and the phalanx, in whatever situation they were attacked, either in front, or in right flank, or in left flank, faced everywhere without disadvantage; they could encamp on surfaces of small extent, in order to have less labour in fortifying the line of circuit, and in order to hold their ground with the smallest detachment possible. The principal arm of the moderns is the projectile; their habitual order has naturally been narrow order, the only one which permits them to bring all their projectiles to bear.

“A consular army enclosed in its camp, attacked by a modern army of equal force, would be driven out of it without assault, and without being able to use their swords; it would not be necessary to fill up the fosses or to scale the ramparts: surrounded on all sides by the attacking army, pierced through, enveloped, and raked by the fire, the camp would be the common drain of all the shots, of all the balls, of all the bullets: fire, devastation, and death would open the gates and throw down the retrenchments. A modern army, placed in a Roman camp, would at first, no doubt, make use of all its artillery; but, though equal to the artillery of the besieger, it would be taken in rouage and quickly reduced to silence; a part only of the infantry could use their muskets, but it would fire upon a line less extended, and would be far from producing an effect equal to the injury it would receive. The fire from the centre to the circumference is null; that from the circumference to the centre is irresistible. All these considerations have decided modern generals in renouncing the system of retrenched camps, to adopt instead natural positions well chosen.

“A Roman camp was placed independently of localities: all these were good for armies whose strength consisted in arms used with the hand; it required neither experienced eye nor military genius to encamp well; whereas the choice of positions, the manner of occupying them and placing the different arms, by taking advantage of the circumstances of the ground, is an art which forms part of the genius of the modern captain.

“If it were said now-a-days to a general, You shall have, like Cicero, under your orders, 5,000 men, sixteen pieces of cannon, 5,000 pioneers’ tools, 5,000 sacks of earth; you shall be within reach of a forest, on ordinary ground; in fifteen days you shall be attacked by an army of 60,000 men, having 120 pieces of cannon; you shall not be succoured till eighty or ninety-six hours after having been attacked. What are the works, what are the plans, what are the profiles, which art prescribes? Has the art of the engineer secrets which can solve this problem?”[446 - Précis des Guerres de César, by Napoleon, Chapter V. 5.]

CHAPTER IX.

(Year of Rome 701.)

(Book VI. of the “Commentaries.”)

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI – SECOND PASSAGE OF THE RHINE – WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE TREVIRI

Cæsar augments his Army.

I. THE state of Gaul gave Cæsar cause to anticipate serious agitations, and he felt convinced of the necessity of new levies. He employed on this mission his lieutenants M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius; at the same time he asked Pompey, who had remained before Rome with the imperium, in order to watch over the public interests, to recall to their colours and send him the soldiers of Cisalpine Gaul enlisted under the consulate of the latter in 699. Cæsar attached, with a view to the present and to the future, great importance to giving the Gauls a high idea of the resources of Italy, and to proving to them that it was easy for the Republic, after a check, not only to repair its losses, but also to bring into the field troops more numerous than ever. Pompey, through friendship and consideration for the public good, granted his demand. Thanks to the activity of his lieutenants, before the end of winter three new legions (or thirty cohorts) were raised and joined to the army: the 1st, the 14th, which had just taken the number of the legion annihilated at Aduatuca, and the 15th. In this manner, the fifteen cohorts lost under Sabinus were replaced by double their number, and it was seen, by this rapid display of forces, what was the power of the military organization and resources of the Roman people. It was the first time that Cæsar commanded ten legions.

War against the Nervii, General Assembly of Gaul.

II. After the death of Indutiomarus, the Treviri took for their chiefs some members of his family. These in vain urged the nearest peoples of the right bank of the Rhine to make common cause with them; but they succeeded with some of the more distant tribes, particularly the Suevi, and persuaded Ambiorix to enter into their league. From all parts, from the Rhine to the Scheldt, were announced preparations for war. The Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii, all the Germans on this side of the Rhine, were in arms. The Senones persisted in their disobedience, and acted in concert with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states; everything urged upon Cæsar the counsel to open the campaign earlier than usual. Accordingly, without waiting for the end of winter, he concentrates the four legions nearest to Amiens, his head-quarters (those of Fabius, Crassus, Cicero, and Trebonius), invades unexpectedly the territory of the Nervii, gives them time neither to assemble nor to fly, but carries off the men and cattle, abandons the booty to the soldiers, and forces this people to submission.

This expedition so rapidly terminated, the legions returned to their winter quarters. At the beginning of spring, Cæsar convoked, according to his custom, the general assembly of Gaul, which met, no doubt, at Amiens. The different peoples sent thither their representatives, with the exception of the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri. He regarded this absence as a sign of revolt, and in order to pursue his designs without neglecting the general affairs, he resolved to transfer the assembly nearer to the insurrection, to Lutetia. This town belonged to the Parisii, who bordered on the Senones, and although formerly these peoples had formed but one, the Parisii do not appear to have entered into the conspiracy. Cæsar, having announced this decision from the summit of his prætorium (pro suggestu pronuntiata), started the same day at the head of his legions, and advanced by forced marches towards the country of the Senones.

At the news of his approach, Acco, the principal author of the revolt, ordered the population to retire into the oppida; but, taken by surprise by the arrival of the Romans, the Senones employed the Ædui, once their patrons, to intercede in their favour. Cæsar pardoned them without difficulty, preferring to employ the fine season in war than in the search of those who were culpable. A hundred hostages exacted from the Senones were entrusted to the Ædui. The Carnutes imitated the example of the Senones, and, by the intermediation of the Remi, whose clients they were, obtained their pardon. Cæsar pronounced the close of the assembly of Gaul, and ordered the different states to furnish their contingents of cavalry.[447 - De Bello Gallico, VI. 4.]

Submission of the Menapii.

III. Having pacified this part of the country, Cæsar turned all his thoughts towards the war with the Treviri and with Ambiorix, the chief of the Eburones. He was, above all, impatient to take a striking vengeance for the humiliation inflicted on his arms at Aduatuca. Knowing well that Ambiorix would not hazard a battle, he sought to penetrate his designs. Two things were to be feared: the first, that Ambiorix, when his territory was invaded, would take refuge among the Menapii, whose country, adjoining that of the Eburones, was defended by woods and vast marshes, and who, alone among the Gauls, had never made an act of submission; the second, that he might join the Germans beyond the Rhine, with whom, as was known, he had entered into friendly relations through the intermediation of the Treviri. Cæsar conceived the plan of first preventing these two eventualities, in order to isolate Ambiorix. Wishing, above all, to reduce to submission the Menapii and Treviri, and carry the war at the same time into the countries of these two peoples, he undertook in person the expedition against the Menapii, and entrusted that against the Treviri to Labienus, his best lieutenant, who had operated against them on several occasions. Labienus, after his victory over Indutiomarus, had continued in his winter quarters with his legions at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe.[448 - The “Commentaries,” after having informed us (V. 24) that Labienus established himself in the country of the Remi, on the confines of that of the Treviri, give us afterwards to understand that he encamped among the Treviri, where he had passed the winter, “Labienum cum una legione, quæ in eorum finibus hiemaverat.” (VI. 7.) We believe, with certain authors, that the country in which he encamped was either on the boundary of the two countries, or ground of which the Remi and the Treviri disputed the possession. Is it not evident, moreover, that after the catastrophe of Aduatuca and the insurrection of the people seduced by Ambiorix, everything dictated to Labienus the necessity of engaging himself no further in a hostile country, by separating himself from the other legions?] Cæsar sent him all the baggage of the army and two legions. He marched in person towards the country of the Menapii, at the head of five legions without baggage. He took with him Cavarinus and the Senonese cavalry, fearing lest the resentment of this king against his people, or the hatred which he had drawn upon himself, might raise some disorders, and, following the general direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay, and Brussels, he reached the frontier of the Menapii. The latter, trusting in the nature of the ground, had assembled no forces, but took refuge in the woods and marshes. Cæsar divided his troops with the lieutenant C. Fabius and the questor M. Crassus, formed them into three columns, and, causing bridges to be hastily constructed, to cross the marshy water-courses, penetrated at three points into their territory, which he ravaged. The Menapii, reduced to extremity, demanded peace: it was granted to them on the express condition that they should refuse all shelter to Ambiorix or to his lieutenants. Cæsar left Commius among them with part of the cavalry to hold them under surveillance, and marched thence towards the country of the Treviri.[449 - De Bello Gallico, VI. 6.]

Success of Labienus against the Treviri.

IV. On his part, Labienus had obtained brilliant successes; the Treviri had marched with considerable forces against his winter quarters. They were no more than two days’ march from him, when they learnt that he had been joined by two other legions. Resolving then to wait the succour of the Germans, they halted at a distance of fifteen miles from the camp of Labienus. The latter, informed of the cause of their inaction, and hoping that their imprudence would present an opportunity for giving battle, left five cohorts to guard the greatest part of the baggage, and, with the twenty-five others and a numerous cavalry, established his camp within a mile of the enemy.

The two armies were separated by the river Ourthe, the passage of which was rendered difficult by the steepness of the banks. Labienus had no intention of crossing it, but he feared that the enemy might imitate his prudence until the arrival of the Germans, who were expected immediately. To draw them to him, he spread a rumour that he should withdraw on the morrow at break of day, in order to avoid having to combat the united forces of the Treviri and the Germans. He assembled during the night the tribunes and centurions of the first class, informed them of his design, and, contrary to Roman discipline, broke up his camp with every appearance of disorder and a precipitate retreat. The proximity of the camps allowed the enemy to obtain information of this movement by his scouts before daybreak.

The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross the river and advance unhesitatingly upon unfavourable ground. Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy, forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the pila are thrown from all sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.