History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius Galba, with a part of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates, the Veragri, and the Seduni (peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper Valais), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges, Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (Martigny). This town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (the Drance). Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.

Several day had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (gæsa). Having to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the point that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus, the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain.[273] (#x_32_i46) In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered.[273a] (#x_32_i46)

CHAPTER VI.

(Year of Rome 698.)

(Book III. of the “Commentaries.”)

WAR OF THE VENETI – VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI – SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE – MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII

Insurrection of the Maritime Peoples.

I. WHILE Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli,[273 - Some manuscripts read Esuvios, but we adopt Unellos, because the geographical position of the country of the Unelli agrees better with the relation of the campaign.] M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T. Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean. The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus. Their example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be restored.

Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great: they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast; they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.

Their determination once taken, they fortified their oppida, and transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (See Plate 12.) They allied themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the Loire to that of the Scheldt,[274 - They leagued with the Osismii (the people of the department of Finistère), the Lexovii (department of Calvados), the Namnetes (Loire-Inférieure), the Ambiliates (on the left bank of the Loire, to the south of Angers), the Morini (the Boulonnais and bishopric of Saint-Omer), the Diablintes (Western Maine), and the Menapii (between the Rhine and the mouths of the Scheldt). (De Bello Gallico, III. 9.)] and demanded succour from the isle of Britain.[275 - Orosius (VI. 8) confirms this fact as stated in the Commentaries.]

In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter, possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean.[276 - “The Veneti fought at sea against Cæsar; they had made their dispositions to prevent his passage, into the isle of Britain, because they were in possession of the commerce of that country.” (Strabo, IV. iv., p. 162, edit. Didot.)]

War against the Veneti.

II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Cæsar divided his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T. Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri, with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli, the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus,[277 - We must not confound him with M. Junius Brutus, the assassin of Cæsar. Decimus Junius Brutus was the adopted son of A. Postumius Albinus. (See Drumann, IV. 9, and Appendix D.)] who had arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys,[278 - Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 40.] received the command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted. His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest of the land army.

The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against the Veneti.[279 - We suppose, in this enumeration, that the legion of Galba, cantoned the preceding winter among the Allobroges, had rejoined the army.]

We may admit that Cæsar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine. Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain possession of the principal oppida where the inhabitants took refuge. Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double obstacle to a siege.

The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for terraces (aggere ac molibus), and forming approaches towards the place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide; but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the oppidum, this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful in the attack.[280 - I borrow this interpretation of the Roman works from the very instructive book of General de Gœler.]

With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded in taking several of these oppida. But all their labours were thrown away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they evacuated the oppidum, embarked with all their goods on board their numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring oppida, the situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.

The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner. Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (See Plate 12.)

The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen, they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides, and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.

The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams (transtra), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen, or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support, with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the grappling-irons (copulæ).[281 - De Bello Gallico, III. 13. – Strabo, IV., p. 162.]

Naval Combat against the Veneti.

III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was at length enabled to set sail.[282 - The fleet of the Veneti, superior to that of the Romans in number, in the magnitude of their vessels, and in their rigging and sails, must have issued from the river Auray by the Morbihan entrance to the gulf, and met Brutus to fight him, instead of waiting for him at the head of the bay, where retreat would be impossible. This follows from Cæsar’s account: ex portu profectæ, nostris adversæ constiterunt. According to the memoir by M. le Comte de Grandpré, a post-captain, inserted in the Recueil de la Société des Antiquaires de France, tom. II., 1820, the wind must have been east or north-east, for it was towards the end of the summer. It appears that these winds usually prevail at that period, and that, when they have blown during the morning, there is a dead calm towards the middle of the day: it is just what happened in this combat; the calm came, probably, towards midday. It was necessary, indeed, that the wind should be between the north and the east, to allow, on one hand the Roman fleet to leave the Loire and sail towards the Point Saint-Jacques, and, on the other, to permit the fleet of the Veneti to quit the river Auray. These latter, in this position, could, in case of defeat, take refuge in the Bay of Quiberon, or fly to the open sea, where the Romans would not have dared to follow them.With winds blowing from below, it matters not from what point, the Romans could not have gone in search of their enemies, or the latter come to meet them. Supposing that, in one tide, the Roman fleet had arrived at the mouth of the Loire towards five o’clock in the morning; it might have been towards ten o’clock, the moment when the battle commenced, between Haedik and Sarzeau. Supposing similarly that, as early as five o’clock in the morning, the movement of the Roman fleet had been announced to the Veneti, they could, in five hours, have issued from the river Auray, defiled by the entrance of the Morbihan, rallied and advanced in order of battle to meet the Romans in the part of the sea above described.As to the place where Cæsar encamped, it is very probable, as we have said, that it was on the heights of Saint-Gildas; for from thence he could see the dispositions of the enemy, and perceive far off the approach of his fleet. In case of check, the Roman galleys found, under his protection, a place of refuge in the Vilaine. Thus, he had his rear secured; rested upon the towns of the coast which he had taken; could recall to him, if necessary, Titurius Sabinus; and lastly, could cross the Vilaine, to place that river between him and his enemies. Placed, on the contrary, on the other side of the Bay of Quiberon, he would have been too much enclosed in an enemy’s country, and would have had none of the advantages offered by the position of Saint-Gildas.] It quitted the Loire, and directed its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (See Plate 12.) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped, which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on the shore.

It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean. Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops, which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly, the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,[283 - Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 41.] when, to remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in 492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks (falces) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses (non absimili forma muralium falcium).[284 - We see, in fact, in Vegetius, that the word falces was applied to the head of a battering ram, armed with a point, and with a hook to detach the stones from the walls. “Quæ (trabes) aut adunco præfigitur ferro, et falx vocatur ab eo quod incurva est, ut de muro extrahat lapides.” (Vegetius, IV. 14.)] The falx was an iron with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which, suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the night.

The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without the means of defending any longer their oppida, they surrendered themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.

Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the insurrection.[285 - De Bello Gallico, III. 17.]

Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli.

IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined, a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops. Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier.[286 - This position is at the distance of seven kilomètres to the east of Avranches. The vestiges still visible of Chastellier are probably those of a camp made at a later period than this Gallic war, but we think that Sabinus had established his camp on the same site.] (See Plate 13.) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north, the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000 paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle, without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But, not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality, the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately submitted.

Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against the Veneti.[287 - De Bello Gallico, III. 19.]

Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus.

V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which, according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul.[288 - Cæsar, after having said, in the first book of his “Commentaries”, that Aquitaine was one of the three parts of Gaul, states here that it formed the third part by its extent and population, which is not correct.] He believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries, and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but, suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (in convalle), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the battle re-commenced with fury.

Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans. Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the oppidum of the Sotiates (the town of Sos), attempted to carry it by assault; but the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation, Adiatunnus,[289 - Nicholas of Damascus (in Athenæus, Deipn., VI. 249) writes in this manner the name of King Adiatomus, and adds that the soldurii were clothed in royal vestments.] supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty men of the class called soldures, attempted a sally from another side of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and, after a severe struggle, drove him back into the oppidum; nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.

When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an oppidum fortified by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.

At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate, the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more easy.[290 - This combat is remarkable as being the only one in the whole war in Gaul in which the Romans attack a fortified Gaulish camp.] He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in the battle, and to lead them by a long circuit to the place reported to be least defended. While the barbarians are solely occupied with the principal attack, these cohorts rush into the camp; on hearing the clamour which arises from this attack, the assailants, led by Crassus, redouble their efforts. The barbarians, surrounded on all sides, lose courage, rush out of the retrenchments, and seek their safety in flight. The cavalry overtook them in the open plain, and of 50,000 Aquitanians or Cantabrians, hardly one quarter escaped, who only reached the camp very late in the night.

At the news of this victory, the greater part of the peoples of Aquitaine[291 - Of this number were the Tarbelli, The Bigerriones, The Ptiani, the Vasates, the Tarusates, the Elusates, the Gaites, the Ausci, the Garumni, the Sibusates, and the Cocosates.] submitted to Crassus, and sent spontaneously him hostages; some, nevertheless, who were more distant, and reckoned on the advanced period of the season, refused to make their submission.[292 - De Bello Gallico, III. 27.]

March against the Morini and the Menapii.

VI. Towards the same time, Cæsar, in spite of the near approach of the end of the fine season, marched against the Morini and the Menapii, who alone, after the entire pacification of Gaul, remained in arms, and had not sent him deputies. These peoples had no towns: they dwelt in caverns[293 - Pliny, Hist. Nat., III. x. 6.] or under the tent.[294 - Dio Cassius, XXXIX. 44.] Taught by the example of their neighbours, they avoided engaging in pitched battles, and withdrew into the recesses of woods and marshes. Cæsar, when he arrived in their country, was attacked by surprise at the moment he was beginning to fortify his camp. He drove them back into the woods, but not without experiencing some loss; then, to open himself a wider road in the forest which had become their asylum, he caused the trees between him and the enemy to be cut down, and, heaping them up to the right and the left, he formed two ramparts, which secured him from attacks on the flank. This work was executed in a few days over a great space with incredible celerity. Cæsar had already reached the place of refuge of the Morini and the Menapii, who retired further and further into the thickness of the forests; already he had captured their herds and baggage, which they were obliged to leave behind, when rain falling in torrents, no longer permitting the soldiers to remain under tents, compelled him to retire.[295 - Cæsar never entirely subjugated the north-west of Gaul. (See Sallust, cited by Ammianus Marcellinus, XV., 15.) Still, under the reign of Augustus, in 724 and 726, there were triumphs over the Morini.] He ravaged the country, burnt the habitations, and withdrew his army, which he placed in winter quarters (between the Seine and the Loire), among the Aulerci, the Lexovii, and the other peoples recently vanquished.[296 - De Bello Gallico, III. 29.]

Observations.

VII. The war of 698, directed almost exclusively against the peoples on the shores of the ocean, shows clearly that Cæsar already, at that time, entertained the design of making an expedition into the isle of Britain, for he not only destroys the only important fleet that could be brought against him, that of the Veneti, but he subjugates, either in person or by his lieutenants, all the countries which extend from Bayonne to the mouth of the Scheldt.

It is worthy of remark how much the Romans were superior to the barbarians, by discipline, tactics, and the art of sieges; with what facility they raised terraces, made dykes, or promptly cut down a forest to clear themselves a passage through it. Truly, it is to the genius of Cæsar that the glory of all these brilliant successes belongs; but we must also acknowledge that he had under his orders the best army in the world, and the men most experienced in the military profession. Among these were the chiefs placed over the machines and siege operations, named præfecti fabrorum. They rendered him the most signal services. Mention is made of L. Cornelius Balbus,[297 - “In praetura, in consulatu præfectum fabrum detulit.” (Cicero, Orat. pro Balbo, 28.)] who prepared the material of his army during his consulate, and Mamurra,[298 - Mamurra, a Roman knight, born at Formiæ. (Pliny, Hist. Nat., XXXVI. 7.)] who, in spite of the bad character Catullus gives him in his satires, gave proof of his genius during the wars in Gaul.

CHAPTER VII.

(Year of Rome 699.)

(Book IV of the “Commentaries.”)

INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI – FIRST PASSAGE OF THE RHINE – FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN – CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII

Cæsar’s March against the Usipetes and the Tencteri.

I. THE Usipetes and the Tencteri, German peoples driven out of their place by the Suevi, had wandered during three years in different countries of Germany, when, during the winter of 698 to 699, they resolved to pass the Rhine. They invaded the territory of the Menapii (established on the two banks), surprised them, massacred them, crossed the river not far from its mouth (towards Cleves[299 - From Xanten to Nimeguen, for a length of fifty kilomètres, extends a line of heights which form a barrier along the left bank of the Rhine. All appearances would lead us to believe that the river flowed, in Cæsar’s time, close at the foot of these heights; but now it has removed from them, and at Emmerich, for instance, is at a distance of eight kilomètres. This chain, the eastern slope of which is scarped, presents only two passes; one by a large opening at Xanten itself, to the north of the mountain called the Furstenberg; the other by a gorge of easy access, opening at Qualburg, near Cleves. These two passes were so well defined as the entries to Gaul in these regions, that, after the conquest, the Romans closed them by fortifying the Furstenberg (Castra vetera), and founding, on the two islands formed by the Rhine opposite these entries, Colonia Trajana, now Xanten, and Quadriburgium, now Qualburg. The existence of these isles facilitated at that time the passage of the Rhine, and, in all probability, it was opposite these two localities just named that the Usipetes and Tencteri crossed the river to penetrate into Gaul.] and Xanten) (see Plate 14), and, after taking possession of the whole country, lived the rest of the winter on the provisions they found there.

Cæsar saw the necessity of being on his guard against the impression which this invasion would produce on the minds of the Gauls. It was to be feared they would be tempted to revolt, with the assistance of the Germans who had just crossed the Rhine.

To meet this danger, Cæsar crossed the mountains earlier than usual (maturius quam consuerat), and joined the army in the countries of the Aulerci and the Lexovii, between the Loire and the Seine, where it had wintered. His apprehensions were but too well founded. Several peoples of Gaul had invited the Germans to leave the banks of the Rhine and penetrate farther into the interior. Eager to respond to this appeal, the latter soon spread themselves far over the country, and already some of them had arrived at the countries of the Eburones and the Condrusi, the latter clients of the Treviri. On receiving news of this, Cæsar called together the Gaulish chiefs who had invited the Germans, feigned ignorance of their conduct, addressed kind words to them, obtained cavalry from them, and, after securing his provisions, began his march against this new irruption of barbarians. He foresaw a formidable war, for the number of the Tencteri and Usipetes amounted to no less than 430,000 individuals – men, women, and children. If we admit that among these peoples the proportion of the number of men capable of bearing arms was the same as in the emigration of the Helvetii, that is, one-fourth of the total population, we see that the Romans had to combat more than 100,000 enemies.[300 - The account of this campaign is very obscure in the “Commentaries.” Florus and Dio Cassius add to the obscurities: the first, by placing the scene of the defeat of the Usipetes and Tencteri towards the confluence of the Moselle and the Rhine; the second, by writing that Cæsar came up with the Germans in the country of the Treviri. Several authors have given to the account of these two historians more credit than to that of Cæsar himself, and they give of this campaign an explanation quite different from ours. General de Gœler, among others, supposes that the whole emigration of the Germans had advanced as far as the country of the Condrusi, where Cæsar came up with them, and that he had driven them from west to east, into the angle formed by the Moselle and the Rhine. From researches which were kindly undertaken by M. de Cohausen, major in the Prussian army, and which have given the same result as those of MM. Stoffel and De Locqueyssie, we consider this explanation of the campaign as inadmissible. It would be enough, to justify this assertion, to consider that the country situated between the Meuse and the Rhine, to the south of Aix-la-Chapelle, is too much broken and too barren to have allowed the German emigration, composed of 430,000 individuals, men, women, and children, with wagons, to move and subsist in it. Moreover, it contains no trace of ancient roads; and if Cæsar had taken this direction, he must necessarily have crossed the forest of the Ardennes, a circumstance of which he would not have failed to inform us. Besides, is it not more probable that, on the news of the approach of Cæsar, instead of directing their march towards the Ubii, who were not favourable to them, the Germans, at first spread over a vast territory, would have concentrated themselves towards the most distant part of the fertile country on which they had seized – that of the Menapii?]

Without knowing exactly the road taken by Cæsar, we may suppose that he promptly concentrated his army on the lower Seine to carry it towards the north, at Amiens, where he had convoked the Gaulish chiefs who had sought the support of the Germans. He followed, from Amiens, the road which passes by Cambrai, Bavay, Charleroy, Tongres, and Maestricht, where he crossed the Meuse. (See Plate 14.) He was only a few days’ march from the Germans, when deputies came to propose, in rather haughty language, an arrangement: – “Driven from their country, they have not taken the initiative in the war; but they will not seek to avoid it. The Germans have learnt from their ancestors, whoever may be the aggressor, to have recourse to arms, and never to prayers. They may be useful allies to the Romans, if lands are given to them, or if they are allowed to retain those they have conquered. Moreover, with the exception of the Suevi, to whom the gods themselves are not equal, they know no people capable of resisting them.” Cæsar imposed upon them, as a first condition, to quit Gaul; observing, “Those who have not been able to defend their own lands, have no right to claim the lands of others;” and he offered them a settlement among the Ubii, who were imploring his support against the Suevi. The deputies promised to bring an answer to this proposal in three days; meanwhile, they begged him to suspend his march. Cæsar considered that this demand was only a subterfuge to gain time to recall the cavalry, which had been sent a few days before to collect plunder and provisions among the Ambivariti,[301 - The Ambivariti were established on the left bank of the Meuse, to the west of Ruremonde, and to the south of the marshes of Peel.] beyond the Meuse. He rejected their proposal, and continued his advance.

At the appointed time, Cæsar, having passed the locality where Venloo now stands, was no longer more than twelve miles from the enemy; and the deputies returned as they had promised. They met the army in march, and earnestly entreated it should go no farther. When they found they could not prevail, they begged at least that the cavalry, which formed the vanguard, should not engage in action, and that they should be allowed a delay of three days, in order to send deputies to the Ubii; if the latter bound themselves by oath to receive them, they would accept Cæsar’s conditions. The latter was not the dupe of this new stratagem, yet he promised them to advance that day no more than four miles, for the purpose of finding water. He invited them, further, to send a more numerous deputation next day. His cavalry received the order not to provoke a combat, but to confine itself in case of being attacked, to remaining firm, and await the arrival of the legions.

When they learnt that Cæsar was approaching the Meuse and the Rhine, the Usipetes and Tencteri had concentrated their forces towards the confluence of those two rivers, in the most remote part of the country of the Menapii, and had established themselves on the river Niers, in the plains of Goch. Cæsar, on his side, after leaving Venloo, had borne to the right to march to the encounter of the enemy. Since, to the north of the Roer, there exists, between the Rhine and the Meuse, no other water-course but the Niers, he was evidently obliged to advance to that river to find water: he was four miles from it when he met, at Straelen, the German deputation.