History of Julius Caesar Vol. 2 of 2

IV. An attentive examination of the correspondence between M. Cœlius and Cicero, as well as the relations of the various authors, leads to the conviction that at that period it required great efforts on the part of the turbulent fraction of the aristocratic party to drag the Senate into hostility towards Cæsar. The censor Appius, reviewing the list of that body, noted Curio, that is, wished to strike him from the list; but at the instances of his colleague and of the Consul Paulus, he confined himself to expressing a formal reproof, and his regret that he could not do justice. On hearing him, Curio tore his toga, and protested with the utmost passion against a disloyal attack. The Consul Marcellus, who suspected the good understanding between Curio and Cæsar, and who reckoned on the feelings of the Senate, which were very unfavourable to both, brought the conduct of the tribune under discussion. While he protested against this illegal proceeding, Curio accepted the debate, and declared that, strong in his conscience, and certain of having always acted in the interests of the Republic, he placed with confidence his honour and his life in the hands of the Senate. This scene could have no other result but an honourable vote for Curio;[870 - Dio Cassius, XL. 63, 64.] but this incident was soon left, and the discussion passed to the political situation. Marcellus proposed at first this question: Ought Cæsar to be superseded in his province? He urged the Senate to a vote. The senators having formed themselves into two groups in the curia, an immense majority declared for the affirmative. The same majority pronounced for the negative on a second question of Marcellus: Ought Pompey to be superseded? But Curio, resuming the arguments which he had used so many times on the danger of favouring Pompey at the expense of Cæsar, demanded a vote upon a third question: Ought Pompey and Cæsar both to disarm? To the surprise of the consul, this unexpected motion passed by a majority of 370 against 22. Then Marcellus dismissed the Senate, saying with bitterness, “You carry the day! you will have Cæsar for master.”[871 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 30. – Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VIII. 4.] He did not imagine that he foretold the future so well. Thus the almost unanimity of the assembly had, by its vote, justified Curio, who, in this instance, was only the representative of Cæsar; and if Pompey and his party had submitted to this decision, there would no longer have been a pretext for the struggle which honest men feared: Cæsar and Pompey would have resumed their place in ordinary life, each with his partisans and his renown, but without army, and consequently without the means of disturbing the Republic.

Violent Measures adopted against Cæsar.

V. This was not what these restless men wanted, who masked their petty passions under the great words of public safety and liberty. In order to destroy the effect of this vote of the Senate, the rumour was spread in Rome that Cæsar had entered Italy; Marcellus demanded that troops should be raised, and that the two legions destined for the war in the East should be brought from Capua, where they were in garrison. Curio protested against the falsehood of this news, and interceded, in his quality of tribune, to oppose all extraordinary arming. Then Marcellus exclaimed, “Since I can do nothing here with the consent of all, I alone take charge of the public welfare on my own responsibility!” He then hurried to the suburb where Pompey had his quarters, and, presenting him with a sword, addressed him in these words: “I summon you to take the command of the troops which are at Capua, to raise others, and to take the measures necessary for the safety of the Republic.” Pompey accepted this mission, but with reserves: he said that he would obey the orders of the consuls, “if, at least, there was nothing better to do.” This prudent reflection, at a moment so critical, pictures the character of the man.[872 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 31. – Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VI. 9; VII. 1.] M. Marcellus understood all the irregularity of his conduct, and brought with him the consuls nominated for the following year (705); even before they entered upon office,[873 - Dio Cassius, XL. 64.] which was to take place in a few days, they had the right to render edicts which indicated the principles upon which they intended to act during the time of their magistracy. They were L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C. Claudius Marcellus, the last a kinsman of the preceding consul of the same name, both enemies to Cæsar. They entered into an engagement with Pompey to support with all their efforts the measure which their predecessor had taken at his own risk and peril. We see, they are the consuls and Pompey who revolt against the decisions of the Senate.

Curio could not oppose these measures regularly, the tribunes not having the right of exercising their powers outside Rome; but he attacked before the people what had just been done, and recommended them not to obey the levy of troops which had been ordered by Pompey, in contempt of the law.[874 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 31.]

State of Public Opinion.

VI. The following letter from M. Cœlius to Cicero shows what was the judgment of impartial Romans upon the public situation in September, 704: —

“The nearer we approach the inevitable struggle, the more we are struck with the greatness of the danger. This is the ground on which the two men of power of the day are going to encounter each other. Cn. Pompey is decided not to suffer Cæsar to be consul until he has resigned his army and his provinces, and Cæsar is convinced that there is no safety for him unless he keep his army; he consents, nevertheless, if the condition of giving up the commandment be reciprocal. Thus those effusions of tenderness and this so dreaded alliance will end, not in hidden animosity, but in open war. As far as I am concerned, I do not know which side to take in this conjuncture, and I doubt not but this perplexity is common to us. In one of the parties, I have obligations of gratitude and friendship; in the other, it is the cause, not the men, I hate. My principles, which no doubt you share, are these: in domestic dissensions, so long as things pass between unarmed citizens, to prefer the most honest party; but when war breaks out, and two camps are in presence, to side with the strongest, and seek reason where there is safety. Now, what do I see here? On one side, Pompey, with the Senate and the magistracy; on the other, Cæsar, with all who have anything to fear or to covet. No comparison possible, as far as the armies are concerned. May it please the gods to give us time to weigh the respective forces, and to make our choice.”[875 - Cœlius to Cicero, Epist. Familiar., VIII. 14.] Cœlius was not long in making his; he embraced the party of Cæsar.[876 - Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 3.]

This appreciation of a contemporary was certainly shared by a great number of persons, who, without well-defined convictions, were ready to side with the strongest. Cicero, who was returning to Italy,[877 - Cicero landed at Brundusium on the 7th of the Calends of December, 704. (Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 2.)] had the same tendency, yet he felt an extreme embarrassment. Not only was he on friendly terms with the two adversaries, but Cæsar had lent him a considerable sum, and this debt weighed upon him like a remorse.[878 - “I receive flattering letters from Cæsar; Balbus writes me as many in his name. I am firmly determined not to flinch a finger’s length from the road of honour; but you know how much I am under obligation to Cæsar. Do you think that I have not to fear that they will reproach me my debt, if I vote even quietly in his favour, and, if I speak strongly, that they will ask it loudly from me? What am I to do? Pay it, you will say. Well! I will borrow from Cœlius. But think of it, I beg of you, for I expect, if I happen to speak firmly in the Senate, your good friend from Tartessus will at once tell me: You, pay what you owe!” (Year 704, 9th December. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 3.)] After having ardently desired to leave his command for fear of the war against the Parthians, he fell into the midst of preparations for a civil war which presented a much greater danger. Hence, when on his arrival in Greece he believed, on false reports, that Cæsar had sent four legions into Piacenza, his first thought was to shut himself up in the citadel of Athens.[879 - “What will become of us? I have a good mind to shut myself up in the citadel of Athens, whence I write you this note.” (Year 704. Epist. ad Atticum, VI. 9.) – “Consequently, leaving to the fools the initiative of speech, I think that I shall do well to endeavour to obtain this triumph, were it only to have a reason not to be in Rome; but they are sure to find a means to come to wrest my opinion from me. You will laugh at me. How I wish I had remained in my province!” (Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 1.)] When at last he had returned to Italy, he congratulated himself on being in a condition to obtain the honours of a triumph, because then the obligation of remaining outside Rome dispensed him from declaring for either of the two rivals.

He wished above all for the triumph, and in his letters he pressed the influential personages to prevail upon the Senate to consent to it; but Cato considered, like many others, that the exploits of the proconsul in Cilicia did not deserve so much honour, and he refused to give him his support, whilst, at the same time, he greatly praised his character. Cæsar, less rigid on principles, forgetting nothing which could flatter the self-love of important men, had written to Cicero to promise him his assistance, and blame Cato’s severity.[880 - “He has borne witness, which I did not ask him, to my integrity, my equity, and my kindness, and he has refused me what I expected from him. You should see how Cæsar, in the letter in which he congratulates me and promises me everything, knows how to make the most of this abominable ingratitude of Cato! But this same Cato has caused twenty days to be granted to Bibulus. You must excuse me being spiteful; but this is a thing which I cannot bear, and which I will never forgive him.” (Year 704, November. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 2.)]

Meanwhile, the celebrated orator did not deceive himself as to the resources of the two parties. When he talked with Pompey, the assurance of that warrior tranquillised him; but when abandoned to his own meditations, he saw well that all the chances were on the side of Cæsar.

“To-day,” he wrote, “Cæsar is at the head of eleven legions (he forgot the two legions given to Pompey), without counting the cavalry, of which he can have as many as he likes; he has in his favour the Transpadan towns, the populace of Rome, the entire order of the knights, nearly all the tribunes, all the disorderly youth, the ascendant of his glorious name, and his extreme boldness. This is the man they have to combat.[881 - Year 704, December. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 7. – The words entire order of the knights are not in the text, but they result from what Cæsar says in the same letter.] This party only wants a good cause; the rest they have in abundance. Consequently, there is nothing which they must not do rather than come to war; the result of which is always uncertain, and how much the more is it not to be feared for us!”[882 - Year 704, December. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 3.]

As for his own party, he defined it in the following manner: “What do you mean by these men of the good side? I know none that I could name. I know some, if we mean to speak of the whole class of honest men; for individually, in the true sense of the word, they are rare; but in civil strife you must seek the cause of honourable men where it is. Is it the Senate which is that good party; the Senate, which leaves provinces without governors? Curio would never have resisted if they had made up their minds to oppose him; but the Senate has done nothing of the kind, and they have not been able to give Cæsar a successor. Is it the knights who have never shown a very firm patriotism, and who now are entirely devoted to Cæsar? Are they the merchants or the country people who only ask to live in repose? Shall we believe that they fear much to see one single man in power, they who are content with any government, so long as they are quiet?”[883 - Year 704, December. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 7.]

The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a visit.[884 - Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 4.] The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been generally blamed,[885 - “The situation of the Republic inspires me every day with more uneasiness. Honest people do not agree so well as is thought. How many Roman knights, how many senators, have I not heard inveighing against Pompey, particularly on account of this unfortunate journey! What we want is peace. All victory will be fatal, and cause a tyrant to rise up. Yes, I am one of those who think that it is better to grant all he (Cæsar) asks than to appeal to arms. It is now too late to resist him, when for the last ten years we have done nothing else but to give him strength against us.” (Year 704, December. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 5.)] but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.

“I have seen Pompey,” wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the Calends of December. “We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone from two o’clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of agreement. As far as I have been able to judge from what he told me in a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it. He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is, moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, Mars has equal chances for everybody, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands; he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, ‘What will Cæsar not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner?’ In short, far from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is, that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful to remain the debtor of a political adversary.”[886 - Year 704, December. Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 8.] By this declaration Cicero proves in the most positive manner that Pompey desired war, and rejected all reconciliation; he repeats it elsewhere with still more precision.

Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar’s just demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil war.

He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling, and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703, when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the day,[887 - “Senatus frequens in alia transiit.” (De Bello Gallico, VIII. 43.)] and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt; after many hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed; passions become inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes intercede: their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without obtaining a senatus-consultus, without appealing to the people, the consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.

CHAPTER X.

EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705

C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, Consuls.

I. IN the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival, for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel.[888 - “Neque senatu interveniente.” (De Bello Gallico, VIII. 4.)] In the winter between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul; presided there, according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at Ravenna, the last town in his command.[889 - Suetonius, Cæsar, 30.] He had only the 13th legion at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry;[890 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 22. – Plutarch, Cæsar, 41; Pompey, 85.] nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy.[891 - De Bello Gallico, VIII. 54.]

It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in December, 704,[892 - It ended before the consular year.] hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms, thanked him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come to an understanding. He engaged his friends[893 - Drumann is of opinion that the “Commentaries” are in error in mentioning Fabius.] at Rome to propose a plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero, and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions, until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion.[894 - Plutarch, Pompey, 59. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 32.] “He made the greatest efforts,” says Velleius Paterculus,[895 - Velleius Paterculus, II. 49.] “to maintain peace: the friends of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals.” “The appearance of justice,” says Plutarch, “was on the side of Cæsar.” When the negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to Cicero;[896 - Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 9.] well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to draw the multitude to Cæsar’s side.[897 - Plutarch, Pompey, 63.]

Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days, re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them, according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear that they should not communicate it; and, indeed, at first they opposed the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse.[898 - Plutarch (Pompey, 59) pretends even that they read it before the people.]

Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic, justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression, which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in the Senate. “It is war he declares,” they exclaimed, and the irritation rose to the greatest height.[899 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 32.] No deliberation could be obtained on any of his propositions.

Lentulus carries the Senate against Cæsar.

II. The Consul L. Lentulus, in a violent oration, engaged the Senate to show more courage and firmness: he promised to support it, and defend the Republic: “If, on the contrary, the assembly, in this critical moment, was wanting in energy – if, as in the past, it meant to spare Cæsar and to conciliate his good graces, there would be an end of its authority: as far as he was concerned, he should hasten to withdraw from it, and should in future consult only himself. After all, he also might gain the friendship and favour of Cæsar.” Scipio spoke in the same spirit: “Pompey,” said he, “will not fail the Republic, if he is followed by the Senate; but if they hesitate, if they act with weakness, the Senate will henceforth invoke his aid in vain.” This language of Scipio seemed to be the expression of the thoughts of Pompey, who was at the gates of the town with his army. More moderate opinions were also offered. M. Marcellus demanded that, before coming to any decision, the Senate should assemble troops from the different parts of Italy in order to ensure the independence of their deliberations; M. Calidius proposed that Pompey should retire to his province, in order to avoid all motive for a war; for Cæsar might justly fear to see used against him the two legions taken away from his command, and retained under the walls of Rome. M. Rufus gave his opinion nearly in the same terms. Lentulus immediately burst out into violent reproaches against the latter speakers; he upbraided them with their defection, and refused to put the proposal of Calidius to a vote. Marcellus, terrified, withdrew his motion. Then there happened one of those strange and sudden changes, so common in revolutionary assemblies: the violent apostrophes of Lentulus, the threats uttered by the partisans of Pompey, the terror inspired by the presence of an army under the walls of Rome, exerted an irresistible pressure upon the minds of the senators, who, in spite of themselves, adopted the motion of Scipio, and decreed that “if Cæsar did not disband his army on the day prescribed, he should be declared an enemy of the Republic.”[900 - Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 1.]

Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, oppose this decree.[901 - Cicero, Epist. Familiar., VIII. 8.] A report is immediately made of their opposition, invoking the decision taken by the Senate the year before; grave measures are proposed: the more violent they are, the more the enemies of Cæsar applaud. In the evening, after the sitting, Pompey convokes the senators in his gardens: he distributes praise and blame amongst them, encourages some, intimidates others. At the same time, he recalls from all parts a great number of his veterans, promising them rewards and promotion. He addressed himself even to the soldiers of the two legions who had formed part of Cæsar’s army.[902 - Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 3.]

The town is in a state of extreme agitation. The tribune Curio claims the right of the comitia which had been set aside. The friends of the consuls, the adherents of Pompey, all who nourished old rancours against Cæsar, hurry towards the Senate, which is again assembled. Their clamours and threats deprive that assembly of all liberty of decision. The most varied proposals follow each other. The censor L. Piso and the prætor Roscius offer to go to Cæsar, to inform him of what is going on; they only ask a delay of six days. Others desire that deputies be charged to go to make him acquainted with the will of the Senate.

All these motions are rejected. Cato, Lentulus, and Scipio redouble in violence. Cato is animated by old enmities and the mortification of his recent check in the consular elections. Lentulus, overwhelmed with debts, hopes for honours and riches; he boasts among his party that he will become a second Sylla, and be master of the empire.[903 - The Sibylline books had predicted the empire of Rome to three Cornelii: L. Cornelius Cinna had been consul; Sylla, dictator; Cornelius Lentulus was in hopes of being the third.] Scipio flatters himself with an ambition equally chimerical. Lastly, Pompey, who will have no equal, desires war, the only way to get over the folly of his conduct,[904 - Cicero, Epist. Familiar., XVI. 12.] and this prop of the Republic assumes the title, like Agamemnon, of king of kings.[905 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 34.]

The consuls propose to the Senate to assume public mourning, in order to strike the imagination of the people, and to show them that the country is in danger. Mark Antony and his colleague Cassius intercede; but no attention is paid to their opposition. The Senate assembles in mourning attire, decided beforehand on rigorous measures. The tribunes, on the other hand, announce that they intend to make use of their right of veto. In the midst of this general excitement, their obstinacy is no longer considered as a right of their office, but as a proof of their complicity; and, first of all, measures are brought under deliberation to be taken against their opposition. Mark Antony is the most audacious; the Consul Lentulus interrupts him with anger, and orders him to leave the curia, “where,” he says, “his sacred character will not preserve him any longer from the punishment merited by his spirit of hostility towards the Republic.” Mark Antony thereupon, rising impetuously, takes the gods to witness that the privileges of the tribune’s power are violated in his person. “We are insulted,” exclaims he; “we are treated like murderers. You want proscriptions, massacres, conflagrations. May all those evils which you have drawn down fall upon your own heads!” Then, pronouncing the forms of execration, which had always the power of impressing superstitious minds, he leaves the curia, followed by Q. Cassius, Curio, and M. Cœlius.[906 - Cicero, Epist. Familiar., XVI. 2. —Philippica, II. 21, 22.] It was time: the curia was on the point of being surrounded by a detachment of troops, which were already approaching.[907 - Plutarch, Antony, 7. – Dio Cassius, XLI. 2, 3.] All four left Rome in the night between the 6th and 7th of January, in the disguise of slaves, in an ordinary chariot, and reached Cæsar’s quarters.[908 - Plutarch, Antony, 7. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 33.]

The following days the Senate meets outside the town. Pompey repeats there what he had employed Scipio to say. He applauds the courage and firmness of the assembly; he enumerates his forces, boasts of having ten legions – six in Spain, and four in Italy.[909 - Cicero, Epist. Familiar., XVI. 12.] According to his conviction, the army is not devoted to Cæsar, and will not follow him in his rash undertakings. Besides, would he dare, with one single legion, to face the forces of the Senate? Before he will have had time to summon his troops, which are on the other side of the Alps, Pompey will have assembled a formidable army.[910 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 34.] Then the Senate declares the country in danger (it was the 18th of the Ides of January), an extreme measure reserved for great public calamities; and the care to watch that the Republic receive no harm is confided to the consuls, the proconsuls, the prætors, and the tribunes of the people. Immediately, all his party, whose violence has driven Pompey and the Senate into civil war, fell upon the dignities, the honours, the governments of provinces, as so many objects of prey. Italy is divided into great commands,[911 - Cicero, Epist. Familiar., XVI. 11.] which the principal chiefs divide amongst themselves. Cicero, always prudent, chooses Campania as being more distant from the scene of war. Scribonius Libo is sent to Etruria,[912 - Florus, IV. 11.] P. Lentulus Spinther to the coast of Picenum,[913 - Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 15. – Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 23.] P. Attius Varus to Auximum and Cingulum,[914 - Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 7. – Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 13.] and Q. Minucius Thermus to Umbria.[915 - Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 12. – Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 3. – Lucan, Pharsalia, II., line 463.] By a false interpretation of the law which allows proconsuls to be chosen among the magistrates who have resigned their functions within five years, the consular and prætorian provinces are shared arbitrarily: Syria is given to Metellus Scipio, Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cisalpine Gaul to Considius Nonianus, Sicily to Cato, Sardinia to M. Aurelius Cotta, Africa to L. Ælius Tuberno, and Cilicia to P. Sextius.[916 - Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 6, 30. – Cicero, Epist. Familiar., V. 20; XVI. 12; Epist. ad Atticum, X. 16. – Suetonius, Cæsar, 34.] The obligation of a curiate law to legitimate their power is regarded as useless. Their names are not drawn by lot; they do not wait, according to the established practice, till the people has ratified their election, and till they have put on the dress of war, after having pronounced the usual vows. The consuls, contrary to custom, leave the town; men, till then strangers to all high office, cause lictors to go before them in Rome and in the Capitol. It is proposed to declare King Juba friend and ally of the Roman people. What matters whether he be devoted or not to the Roman domination, provided he become a useful auxiliary for the civil war? A levy of 130,000 men in Italy is decreed. All the resources of the public treasure are placed at the disposal of Pompey; the money preserved in the temples is taken; and if that be not sufficient, the property of private persons themselves shall be employed for the pay of the troops. In the midst of this sudden commotion, rights divine and human are equally trampled under foot.[917 - Cicero, Epist. Familiar., XV. 11. – Appian, Civil Wars, II. 34. – Cæsar, De Bello Civili, I. 7.] And yet a few days had scarcely passed “when the Senate,” says Appian, “regretted not having accepted the conditions of Cæsar, the justice of which they felt at a moment when fear brought them back from the excitement of party spirit to the counsels of wisdom.”[918 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 36.]

Cæsar harangues his Troops.

III. Whilst at Rome all was confusion, and Pompey, nominal chief of his party, underwent its various exigencies and impulses, Cæsar, master of himself and free in his resolutions, waited quietly at Ravenna until the thoughtless impetuosity of his enemies should break itself against his firmness and the justice of his cause. The tribunes of the people, Mark Antony and Q. Cassius, accompanied by Curio and M. Cœlius, hasten to him.[919 - The “Commentaries,” it is true, say that the tribunes of the people rejoined Cæsar at Rimini: but it was more probably at Ravenna, as reported by Appian (II. 33), or in his camp between Ravenna and Rimini.] At the news of the events in Rome, he sends couriers to the other side of the Alps, in order to unite his army; but, without waiting for it, he assembles the 13th legion, the only one which had crossed the Alps; he reminds his soldiers in a few words of the ancient insults and the recent injustices of which he is the victim.

“The people had authorised him, although absent, to solicit a new consulship, and, as soon as he thought that he ought to avail himself of this favour, it was opposed. He has been asked, for the interest of his country, to deprive himself of two legions, and, after he has made the sacrifice, it is against him they are employed. The decrees of the Senate and the people, legally rendered, have been disregarded, and other decrees have been sanctioned; notwithstanding the opposition of the tribunes. The right of intercession, which Sylla himself had respected, has been set at naught, and it is under the garb of slaves that the representatives of the Roman people come to seek a refuge in his camp. All his proposals of conciliation have been rejected. What has been refused to him has been granted to Pompey, who, prompted by envious malignity, has broken the ties of an old friendship. Lastly, what pretext is there for declaring the country in danger, and calling the Roman people to arms? Are they in presence of a popular revolt, or a violence of the tribunes, as in the time of the Gracchi, or an invasion of the barbarians, as in the time of Marius? Besides, no law has been promulgated, no motion has been submitted for the sanction of the people; all which has been done without the sanction of the people is unlawful.[920 - The words of the proclamation of the Emperor Napoleon on landing in the gulf of Juan in 1815.] Let the soldiers, then, defend the general under whom, for nine years, they have served the Republic with so much success, gained so many battles, subdued the whole of Gaul, overcome the Germans and the Britons; for his enemies are theirs, and his elevation, as well as his glory, is their work.”

Unanimous acclamations respond to this speech of Cæsar. The soldiers of the 13th legion declare that they are ready to make the greatest sacrifices; they will revenge their general and the tribunes of the people for all these outrages; as a proof of his devotion, each centurion offers to entertain a horseman at his expense; each soldier, to serve gratuitously, the richer ones providing for the poorer ones; and during the whole civil war, Suetonius affirms, not one of them failed in this engagement.[921 - Suetonius, Cæsar, 68.] Such was the devotedness of the army; Labienus alone, whom Cæsar loved especially, whom he had loaded with favours, deserted the cause of the conqueror of Gaul, and passed over to Pompey.[922 - Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 12.] Cicero and his party thought that this deserter would bring a great addition to their strength. But Labienus,[923 - “Cæsar has received a terrible blow: T. Labienus, who had so much influence in his army, has refused to become his accomplice: he has left him and has joined us. This example will have numerous imitators.” (Cicero, Epist. Familiar., XVI. 12.) – “Labienus considers Cæsar as utterly unable to maintain the struggle.” (Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 16.)] though an able general under Cæsar, was only an indifferent one in the opposite camp. Desertions have never made any man great.

Cæsar is driven to Civil War.

IV. The moment for action had arrived. Cæsar was reduced to the alternative of maintaining himself at the head of his army, in spite of the Senate, or surrendering himself to his enemies, who would have reserved for him the fate of the accomplices of Catiline, who had been condemned to death, if he were not, like the Gracchi, Saturninus, and so many others, killed in a popular tumult. Here the question naturally offers itself: Ought not Cæsar, who had so often faced death on the battle-fields, have gone to Rome to face it under another form, and to have renounced his command, rather than engage in a struggle which must throw the Republic into all the horrors of a civil war? Yes, if by his abnegation he could save Rome from anarchy, corruption, and tyranny. No, if this abnegation would endanger what he had most at heart, the regeneration of the Republic. Cæsar, like men of his temper, cared little for life, and still less for power for the sake of power; but, as chief of the popular party, he felt a great cause rise behind him; it urged him forward, and obliged him to conquer in despite of legality, the imprecations of his adversaries, and the uncertain judgment of posterity. Roman society, in a state of dissolution, asked for a master; oppressed Italy, for a representative of its rights; the world, bowed under the yoke, for a saviour. Ought he, by deserting his mission, disappoint so many legitimate hopes, so many noble aspirations? What! Cæsar, who owed all his dignities to the people, and confining himself within his right, should he have retired before Pompey, who, having become the docile tool of a factious minority of the Senate, was trampling right and justice under foot; before Pompey, who, according to the admission of Cicero himself, would have been, after victory, a cruel and vindictive despot, and would have allowed the world to be plundered for the benefit of a few families, incapable, moreover, of arresting the decay of the Republic, and founding an order of things sufficiently firm to retard the invasion of barbarians for many centuries! He would have retreated before a party which reckoned it a crime to repair the evils caused by the violence of Sylla, and the severity of Pompey, by recalling the exiles;[924 - “Is that honourable … (in Cæsar) to think of nothing but abolition of debts, calling back exiles, and so many other outrages?” (Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VII. 11.)] to give rights to the peoples of Italy; to distribute lands among the poor and the veterans; and, by an equitable administration, to ensure the prosperity of the provinces! It would have been madness. The question had not the mean proportions of a quarrel between two generals who contended for power: it was the decisive conflict between two hostile causes, between the privileged classes and the people; it was the continuation of the formidable struggle between Marius and Sylla![925 - “A power after the manner of Sylla, that is what Pompey desires, and what all those wish who surround him.” (Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, VIII. 11.)]

There are imperious circumstances which condemn public men either to abnegation or to perseverance. To cling to power when one is no longer able to do good, and when, as a representative of the past, one has, as it were, no partisans but among those who live upon abuses, is a deplorable obstinacy; to abandon it when one is the representative of a new era, and the hope of a better future, is a cowardly act and a crime.

Cæsar crosses the Rubicon.

V. Cæsar has taken his resolution. He began the conquest of Gaul with four legions; he is going to commence that of the world with one only. He must first of all, by a surprise, take possession of Ariminum (Rimini), the first important fortress of Italy on the side of Cisalpine Gaul. For this purpose, he sends before him a detachment composed of trusty soldiers and centurions, commanded by Q. Hortensius; he places a part of his cavalry in échelon on the road.[926 - Appian, Civil Wars, II. 35. – Plutarch, Cæsar, 35.] When evening arrives, pretending an indisposition, he leaves his officers, who were at table, enters a chariot with a few friends, and joins his vanguard. When he arrives at the Rubicon, a stream which formed the limit of his government, and which the laws forbad him to cross, he halts for a moment as though struck with terror; he communicates his apprehensions to Asinius Pollio and those who surround him. A comet has appeared in the sky;[927 - Lucan, Pharsalia, I., line 526.] he foresees the misfortunes which are on the point of befalling Italy, and recollects the dream which the night before had oppressed his mind: he had dreamt that he violated his mother. Was not his country, in fact, his mother; and, notwithstanding the justness of his cause and the greatness of his designs, was not his enterprise an outrage upon her? But the augurs, those flattering interpreters of the future, affirm that this dream promises him the empire of the world; this woman whom he has seen extended on the ground is no other than the earth, the common mother of all mortals.[928 - Suetonius, Cæsar, 7. – Plutarch, Cæsar, 37.] Then suddenly an apparition, it is said, strikes the eyes of Cæsar: it is a man of tall stature, blowing martial airs on a trumpet, and calling him to the other bank. All hesitation ceases; he hurries onward and crosses the Rubicon, exclaiming, “The die is cast! Let us go where I am called by the prodigies of the gods and the iniquity of my enemies.”[929 - Suetonius, Cæsar, 32.] Soon he arrived at Ariminum, of which he takes possession without striking a blow. The civil war has commenced!

“The true author of war,” says Montesquieu, “is not he who declares it, but he who renders it necessary.” It is not granted to man, notwithstanding his genius and power, to raise at will the popular waves; yet, when, elected by the public voice, he appears in the midst of the storm which endangers the vessel of the state, then he alone can direct its course and bring it to the harbour. Cæsar was not, therefore, the instigator of this profound perturbation of Roman society: he had become the indispensable pilot. Had it been otherwise, when he disappeared all would have returned to order; on the contrary, his death gave up the whole universe to all the horrors of war. Europe, Asia, Africa, were the theatre of sanguinary struggles between the past and the future, and the Roman world did not find peace until the heir of his name had made his cause triumph. But it was no longer possible for Augustus to renew the work of Cæsar; fourteen years of civil war had exhausted the strength of the nation and used up the characters; the men imbued with the great principles of the past were dead; the survivors had alternately served all parties; to succeed, Augustus himself had made peace with the murderers of his adoptive father; the convictions were extinct, and the world, longing for rest, no longer contained the elements which would have permitted Cæsar, as was his intention, to re-establish the Republic in its ancient splendour and its ancient forms, but on new principles.

    NAPOLEON.

The Tuileries, March 20, 1866.

APPENDIX A.

CONCORDANCE OF DATESOF THEANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE JULIAN STYLE,FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709

Bases on which the Tables of Concordance are Founded.

BEFORE the Julian reform, the Roman year comprised 355 days, divided into twelve months, namely: Januarius, 29 days; Februarius, 28; Martius, 31; Aprilis, 29; Maius, 31; Junius, 29; Quintilis, 31; Sextilis, 29; September, 29; October, 31; November, 29; December, 29.

Every other year, an intercalation of 22 or 23 days alternately was to be added after the 23rd day of February.

The mean year being thus too long by one day, 24 days were to be subtracted in the last eight years of a period of 24 years. We shall not here have to take this correction into consideration.

The intercalation appears to have been regularly followed from A.U.C. 691 (that of Cicero’s consulship) until 702, when it was of 23 days. In the middle of the troubles, the intercalation was omitted in the years 704, 706, and 708.

Towards the end of the year 708, Cæsar remedied the disorder by placing extraordinarily between November and December 67 days, and by introducing a new mode of intercalation.