Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

Such was the result of the forciful feeble policy of James, striving to pose as the keeper of the peace of Europe, and to hold the balance between the rival forces of Catholicism and Protestantism already arming for the terrible struggle of the Thirty Years' War. After the marriage of his only daughter with the head of the Protestant Union in Germany, he was soon once more in eager pursuit of the phantasmal Spanish match, which was for so many years to make him follow a vacillating policy. The skilful diplomacy of Diego Sarmiento d'Acuña, Count of Gondomar, who represented Philip III in London after 1613, enabled him at this time to acquire a great ascendancy over James, which with brief intervals he maintained for some years. The Spanish envoy left no steps untried in the course of the disputes which arose with the United Provinces to prejudice the King's mind against the Dutch. He found the moment peculiarly favourable for making his influence felt, and he used his opportunities to the utmost. It must be remembered that the year 1612, in which first Robert Cecil, Lord Salisbury, died, and then six months later Henry, Prince of Wales, a youth of great promise and popularity, whose strong personality must have impressed itself on the history of his times, is a critical dividing point in the reign of James I. Ranke has in his account of this period laid considerable stress on this fact: —

'In the first years of his reign in England', he writes, 'so long as Robert Cecil lived, King James exercised no great influence. The Privy Council possessed to the full the authority, which belonged to it of old custom. James used simply to confirm the resolutions, which were adopted in the bosom of the Council under the influence of the treasurer. He appears in the reports of ambassadors as a phantom King, and the minister as the real ruler of the country. After the death of Cecil all this was changed. The King knew the party divisions which prevailed in the Council; he knew how to hold the balance between them, and in the midst of their divisions to carry out his views… Great affairs were generally transacted between the King and the favourite in the ascendant at the time in conferences to which only a few others were admitted, and sometimes not even these. The King himself decided, and the resolutions that were taken were communicated to the Privy Council, which gradually became accustomed to do nothing more than invest them with the customary forms.'[24 - Ranke, Hist. of England (Oxf. trans.), i. 473.]

It was at this very time, when King James, yielding himself more and more to the persuasive blandishments of Gondomar, began to take a more markedly personal part in the direction of foreign policy, that a succession of fresh difficulties with the Dutch arose. The execution of the proclamation, which had been deferred for two years in 1610, actually remained a dead letter until 1616. Not that there had been any removal of the causes which had originally called it forth. On the contrary, the first years of the truce were a period of marked activity and vigorous forward policy in the United Provinces. In every direction, through the energetic and vigilant statesmanship of Oldenbarneveldt, the commercial enterprise of the people was enabled to open out fresh outlets for trade, and finally to secure the recognition of the young Republic as an influential member of the European family of nations. Diplomatic missions were dispatched to Venice in 1609 and to Constantinople in 1612, which prepared the way for a great extension of Dutch trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. Even more important were the close relations established with Sweden and Russia. Göteburg became after 1609 virtually a Dutch town, and before the middle of the century all Swedish industries and Swedish commerce had passed more or less into Dutch management or under Dutch control. In the reign of Elizabeth the friendliest relations had subsisted with the Tsar, Ivan the Terrible and his successors, so that for some years the English Muscovy Company had almost a monopoly of Russian trade by the White Sea. But all this was now changed. A famous Dutch merchant, Balthazar de Moncheron, established a factory at Archangel in 1584, and from that time forward the Dutch, at first vigorous competitors with the English for the Russian market, gradually gained the supremacy. The appearance of a Russian embassy at the Hague in 1614 was the mark of the triumph of Dutch diplomacy at Moscow: henceforth Russia was practically closed to all but Netherlanders. In 1615 a treaty with the Hanse towns placed the Baltic trade even more completely than it had been in Dutch hands. In the East Indies the English Company could not compete with its far wealthier and more thoroughly organized rival.

There was, however, one element of weakness in the position of the United Provinces on which the English were never weary of insisting. By his possession of the cautionary towns the King of England appeared in the eyes of the world to be recognized as a protector of the Dutch Republic, who had certain rights over it. Oldenbarneveldt in his negotiations had doubtless been hampered by the plain evidence which the presence of English garrisons in Flushing, Brill, and Rammekens afforded, that the States did not exercise full sovereign authority within their own borders. In these circumstances he (Oldenbarneveldt) knowing full well the financial straits to which King James was reduced through the long-standing disagreement between him and his Parliament, made overtures in 1615 through the resident ambassador Caron to redeem the towns by the payment of a sum of ready money. The annual charge of £40,000 received from the States was barely more than sufficient for the maintenance of the garrisons. The total amount claimed by the English Government was £600,000; the Dutch offered £100,000 in cash, and three further sums of £50,000 in half-yearly instalments, or £250,000 in all. The offer was accepted and in June, 1616, the cautionary towns were transferred into the hands of the Dutch.

It was, however, agreed that, for the sake of maintaining good relations between the two countries, the new English ambassador, Sir Dudley Carleton, should like his predecessor, Sir Ralph Winwood, retain his seat in the Council of State. This was the more important, as the King had (as already stated) for the past three years been steadily moving towards a Spanish alliance. What were his precise aims and what his ultimate purpose it was difficult even for the practised and penetrating insight of a statesman of Oldenbarneveldt's experience to discover. Perhaps James scarcely knew himself. But the retention of fortresses like Flushing and Brill at the mouths of two most important Dutch waterways by a foreign sovereign, who was intriguing to win the favour of the Spanish foe, was for the Republic a most serious danger. Their redemption therefore at so trifling a cost was a stroke of policy by which the aged Advocate did a great service to his country. Certain it is that James felt a grudge against Oldenbarneveldt, and that, when shortly afterwards civil strife broke out in the United Provinces, Sir D. Carleton, acting on the King's instructions, did his utmost to bring about the great statesman's downfall and to support his enemies in compassing his death.

But to return. Sir Dudley Carleton, when entering upon his duties at the Hague in January, 1616, found, in addition to the negotiations for the 'reddition' of the cautionary towns, several thorny questions requiring delicate handling. In his instructions[25 - Dated Jan. 6/16. Letters to and from Sir Dudley Carleton during his embassy in Holland from January 1615/16, to December 1620. London, 1757.] the following somewhat enigmatical passage occurs: —

'Some two years since there did arise between the Company of our Muscovy Merchants and the Merchants of Amsterdam a great difference concerning the navigation of Greenland[26 - Greenland here stands for Spitzbergen. All through these disputes, owing to geographical ignorance, the two terms are used almost interchangeably.] and the fishing of whales in those parts. Our desire is that all good correspondence may be maintained, as between our Crowns and their Provinces, so between our and their subjects. Therefore, whenever the subject shall fall into discourse, either in public or in private, you may confidently relate, when this question was debated before the lords of the Council, between Sir Noel Caron their embassador and the Governor of our Muscovian Company, it was evidently proved, and in a manner without contradiction, that our subjects were first discoverers of that negotiation and that trade of fishing; that privately they were possessed of that island, and there had planted and erected our standard, thereby to signify and notify to the world the property, which we challenge; which our subjects, by their industries, having appropriated to themselves, did not hold it reasonable they should be forced to communicate to others the fruits of their labours.'

The origin and cause of this new fishery dispute requires to be briefly told, as it is characteristic of the times and of the way in which, in almost every part of the world, the English trader and the Dutch trader met in rivalry, and with the inevitable result that their interests clashed and bad feeling arose. Certain English fishing vessels as early as 1608 made their way to the Arctic Ocean to fish for whales off the shores of Spitzbergen. The adventure was successful, and was repeated. The news of it attracted some Biscayans, then other foreigners, and in 1612 two Dutch ships to try their fortune in the same waters. But King James in the following year (1613) granted to the Muscovy Company an exclusive monopoly of the Greenland, meaning thereby the Spitzbergen, whale fishery. He claimed these northern waters as the property of the British Crown, because, so it was averred, Hugh Willoughby had in 1553 discovered Spitzbergen. The conferring of this monopoly caused in 1613 a numerous fishing fleet, some of the vessels strongly armed, to set sail from England for Spitzbergen. A landing was made, and the whole archipelago formally annexed and named King James' Newland. The next step of the Muscovy Company's fleet was to clear the ground of intruders, whether foreigners or English 'interlopers.' Among the foreigners were several Dutch boats. These were attacked, boarded, plundered, and then sent home.

Such an act of violence naturally aroused resentment in Holland. The States-General took the matter up, and refused to admit the right of James to interfere with the fishermen. They denied that Hugh Willoughby had sighted Spitzbergen at all in 1553, and confidently affirmed that the discovery of the island was made by Jacob van Heemskerk in 1596, who named it Spitzbergen, planted the Dutch flag upon it, and spent the winter on its shores. If, then, any people had preferential rights in the waters surrounding Spitzbergen, it was the Dutch, but the States did not claim or admit any such rights. They held that the sea was open to all to navigate and to fish in without let or hindrance. To Winwood, who in August, 1613, quitted the Hague to become Secretary of State in London, was entrusted the mission of bringing the complaints and the protest of the States to the notice of James, and further, of asking for reparation to the Amsterdammers, whose vessels had been seized and plundered. The King at this time was anxious to be on friendly terms with the Dutch, and an answer was returned (October 25) that 'not only reparation should be made, but that steps should be taken to prevent a recurrence of such disorders.' The States were not satisfied, however, with so general a reply, and wished that the English claim to exclusive rights in the fisheries should be abandoned. The ambassador Caron was instructed to present to the King an argument from the pen of the geographer Plancius, in which this claim was shown to be without foundation. It produced no effect upon James, always unwilling to yield in a matter affecting his sovereign prerogatives, however shadowy. But the States were equally determined. Their reply to the non-possumus attitude of the King was the granting of a charter, early in 1614 (January 27), to a company, generally known as the Northern (sometimes as the Greenland) Company, which conferred on a group of merchants the exclusive privilege of fishing for whales and walrus, and of trading and exploring in the Northern seas between the limits of Nova Zembla and Davis's Straits; Spitzbergen, Bear Island, and Greenland therein included.[27 - Aitzema Saken van Staet en Oorlog, ii. 356.] The States-General likewise consented that warships at the charges of the company should be allowed to accompany the fishing fleet for their protection (April 4). The effect of these strong measures was seen in the changed attitude of the Muscovy Company, who in the summer of 1614 (July 2) made an agreement with their rivals, that they should each of them use a portion of the island as a basis for their fishery, and should unite in keeping out all intruders. The extraordinary mission of Sir Henry Wotton in February, 1615, to the Hague to treat for a settlement of the Jülich-Cleves question, gave an opportunity for proposing that he should, while in the Netherlands, meet Commissioners of the States to discuss also other important matters, and among these the dispute about the so-called 'Greenland' fisheries. In April the conference took place. The Dutch, while laying stress upon their primary rights as discoverers, disclaimed any desire to exclude the English; on the contrary, they endeavoured to arrive at a friendly arrangement by which the two nations should share the fishery 'in unity and security' together. Nothing, however, was effected. The language of King James in his ambassador's instructions, in which mention is made of the differences that had arisen 'on account of the fishery in the North Sea, near the shores of Greenland, of right solely belonging to us and our people, but interrupted by the Hollanders', showed that he approached the subject in an irreconcilable spirit. All that Wotton could say was that he would report the matter to the King, who would inform Caron later of his decision. The affair was, in other words, hung up, and the dangerous spectacle was again witnessed of two fishing fleets carrying on their trade in close proximity, each under the protection of warships.

The Dutch force in 1615 was, however, far stronger, and no hostilities took place. For the same reason an armed peace was maintained in 1617, but in the following year acts of aggression were committed, and loud complaints were raised on both sides. An attempt was now made by the King to strengthen the hands of the Muscovy Company by sanctioning for the purposes of the whale fishery an alliance with the East India Company. The two companies were, as far as regards the Spitzbergen enterprise, to be regarded as one, thus making a larger amount of capital available for the outfit of the fishing fleet and for the maintenance of the storage huts and so-called 'cookeries' on shore. Thirteen well-equipped ships sailed for Spitzbergen in 1618, and an even superior number from Holland and Zeeland, accompanied by two war vessels. Neither the English nor the Dutch sailors were in the mood to brook interference, and from the outset it was almost certain that if they met there would be mischief. The English were the first aggressors, but were in their turn attacked by the Dutch with the result that their fleet was dispersed and many of their vessels plundered. The 'Greenland' fisheries question had reached an acute stage. Such a condition of things could not continue, and Sir Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador, appeared in person before the States-General (October 3, 1618) to utter a strong remonstrance and to urge the States, if they wished to remain on good terms with the King, to dispatch a special embassy to deal with the disputes that had arisen between the two countries, not only concerning the 'Greenland' fishing, but in the East Indies, and about the herring fishery and the cloth trade also.

At this point, before giving an account of the embassy of 1618, we must turn back and bring up to date the history of the herring fishery question from 1610, when the execution of the proclamation requiring a licence from the fishermen was postponed, and also briefly touch upon the two other causes of grievance in regard to the cloth trade and the disputes between the two East India Companies.

For several years after the return of the embassy of 1610 the Dutch herring fishery appears to have been quietly carried on as usual without let or hindrance from the English Government. No attempt was made to enforce the proclamation until 1616. The cause of the alteration of James's policy at that date was due to the refusal of the States-General to admit English dyed cloths into the United Provinces. The manufacture of woollen cloth had long been the chief of English industries, and the monopoly of the trade in wool and woollen goods in the Netherlands, Northern France and Western Germany had been in the hands of one of the oldest of English Chartered Companies, the Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers[28 - See Note D.], whose first charter was granted by Henry VI in 1462. The Adventurer's Court and Staple were for many years placed at Antwerp. But in 1568 they were driven away from the Netherlands by Alva, and forced to settle elsewhere. They went first to Emden, then to Hamburg. But the Hanse towns were jealous of their trade and prosperity, and the Emperor was induced in 1597 to banish them from Germany. At this date the authority of Spain was no longer recognized north of the Scheldt. The Adventurers accordingly in 1598 moved to Middelburg in Zeeland, and extensive privileges were conferred upon them by the States-General, the States of Zeeland, and the town of Middelburg, including freedom from duties on imports or exports, as well as from charges for staple rights and harbour dues, and the right to be tried in their own courts.

The trade of the Adventurers consisted entirely in undyed cloths. The English, though the best weavers of woollen cloth in the world, had not learnt as yet the art of dyeing, and the unfinished cloths were imported into the Netherlands, there to be dressed and dyed for the continental markets. The consequence was that a great industry sprang up in the provinces, especially in Holland, and many thousands of skilled hands were employed in this work.

When James I came to the throne, he listened eagerly to every one who could point out to him any means of raising money by the sale of monopolies or patents. Among the proposals that attracted him was one made by Alderman Sir William Cockayne, who represented to his Majesty the great profit which might be derived from finishing and dyeing English cloth before exportation. The Merchant Adventurers naturally used their utmost influence on the one hand to persuade the King not to grant to Cockayne a patent, which would be subversive of the rights granted to their Company under their Charter, and on the other to obtain the help of the States in preventing such a breach of existing privilege to the injury of the Dutch dyers and finishers. The monopoly of the Adventurers had, however, many enemies among the English merchants who did not belong to the Fellowship, and who already, under the name of 'Interlopers'[29 - See Note E.], carried on an extensive illegitimate trade through the ports of Amsterdam and Flushing. Cockayne and his adherents prevailed. A patent was granted to him in 1608, his Majesty reserving to himself the monopoly of the sale of all home-dyed goods. It was clear, however, that the existence of the two monopolies side by side could not continue. After much friction and constant complaints, James, in 1615, took decisive action. He forbade the export of undyed and unfinished cloth from England, and commanded the Merchant Adventurers to return their Charter. Cockayne immediately formed a company, but his hopes of creating a new and lucrative English industry were speedily dashed to the ground. The States of Holland passed a resolution forbidding the importation of dyed cloths into their province, and their example was followed by the other provinces separately, and by the States-General. The English woollen trade was stricken fatally by such a prohibition, Cockayne's Company failed, and James was at last compelled in 1617 to renew the Charter of the Adventurers.

It is needless to say that the King, who had hoped to replenish his empty treasury through his active promotion of Cockayne's scheme, was sorely disappointed at the issue, and deeply resented the strong measures taken by Holland and the United Provinces generally to checkmate his plan for the creation of a new English industry to their injury. Baulked in this direction, James, on his side, turned his thoughts to reprisals, and in so doing had on this occasion the full approval of his subjects. Secretary Winwood wrote, September 14, 1616, to Sir Dudley Carleton, at the Hague: —

'It is in the mouth of every true-hearted Englishman that as a reprisal for the publication of the rigorous placard against English dyed and dressed cloths, that his Majesty with justice and equity and in reason of state ought to forbid the Hollanders, by a fresh revival of former proclamations, to continue their yearly fishing on our coast.'

But Winwood had had long personal knowledge of the Dutch, and he did not like the prospect of the two nations, so long and closely bound together by ties of friendship and alliance, thus drifting apart through trade rivalries into enmity.

'If we come', he writes, 'to these extremities I know both we and they shall suffer and smart for it'. And then he continues in words rendered weighty by the experience which lay behind them: 'I know well the nature of that people and the humour of those masters, who sit at the stern of that State. They will not be willingly crossed in their courses —et quod volunt, valde volunt. Yet it is never too late to be wise, and no counsel is evil but that which cannot be changed. I profess unto you I am in great anguish of spirit, how to accommodate these differences to the full contentment of all parties. This is most certain —couste que couste– and though coelum terris misceatur, his Majesty is resolved not to swallow, much less to digest, these indignities. As before I have said, only the Spaniards have cause to triumph and to make bonfires of joy and gladness.' He requests Carleton to see Oldenbarneveldt and urge accommodation for the mutual good of both countries. 'If the States', he adds, 'do persist in their resolutions, actum est de amicitia.'[30 - Carleton's letters during his embassy in Holland, January 1615/16, to December 1620, p. 111.]

But although Winwood speaks in this letter, dated September 24, as if the King was only considering the question of a revival of the proclamation of 1609, steps had already been taken (apparently with his knowledge) to levy a toll upon the fishers on the Scottish coast. As early as June 16, the Duke of Lennox, in his capacity as Admiral of Scotland, had received instructions from the Scottish Council to take from every fishing 'buss' a payment either in money (an angelot) or in kind (one ton of herring and twelve codfish). Accordingly, on August 7, a vessel appeared in the midst of the fishing fleet, having on board a certain John Browne, the Duke's Secretary. The Dutch envoy (Caron) had been induced, under a misconception of the purpose for which it was required, to write a commendatory letter for this man to show to the captains of the Dutch convoy-ships. Browne demanded in the name of the King from the skippers of each 'buss' the above-named toll or excise, and he proceeded to make a list of all their names and the names of the boats, giving receipts to those who paid, and informing those who did not do so that they would have to pay double the following year. The greater part paid without opposition, until the two convoy-ships arrived on the scene. Browne was seized and requested to produce his commission. At the sight of Caron's letter, however, they dismissed him, as he had used no violence, but they would not allow him to collect any more toll.

The two captains, as in duty bound, reported the matter at once to the home authorities. Great was the surprise and indignation at Enkhuysen and other centres of the fishing industry at the reception of the news. On August 27 it was discussed by the States-General, who denounced the attempt to levy a toll as 'an unheard-of and unendurable novelty, conflicting with previous treaties'. Two dispatches were sent, one to Caron telling him 'that the States had taken the matter extremely to heart, and desired him to seek for redress by every possible means'; the other to the captains of the convoy bidding them 'not to permit any toll to be exacted'. In obedience to his instructions Caron made repeated representations to the King, to Lennox, to the Scottish Council, but his arguments and remonstrances fell on deaf ears, and his efforts to obtain satisfaction proved fruitless. In these circumstances the opening of the fishing season of 1617 was awaited in Holland with anxiety, and by those acquainted with the temper of the Dutch seamen, with apprehension. Their fears were justified.

Browne again visited the fishing fleet, and began his task of levying toll, which according to all testimony he carried out in a tactful and considerate manner. Arriving at the Rotterdam convoy-ship he met with a flat refusal from the captain, Andries Tlieff of Rotterdam, in his own name and that of the other Dutch fishermen. After having received this refusal in writing, Browne was preparing quietly to go away to visit the other fishing boats, mostly French, when Jan Albertsz, captain of the Enkhuysen convoy-ship, stepped on board. He was one of the two captains who had in the previous year forcibly compelled Browne to stop his collection of toll. Albertsz now declared that he had orders to arrest Browne, and, despite his protests, the Scottish official was made a prisoner and carried to Holland.

The indignation of James, when he heard of what had taken place, knew no bounds. Two captains of Dutch vessels in the Thames were seized, as hostages, and Carleton was instructed to go in person to the States-General and demand satisfaction for the insult and injury done to his Majesty's honour by the 'exemplary punishment and in a public and open fashion of those, who had committed such an act: a satisfaction such as may hold a just proportion unto the insolency of the grievance.'[31 - Carleton's Letters, pp. 156-7. Report of the Lords of the Council with the King in Scotland, to the Lords of the Council in England, Aug. 4/14, 1617.] On August 23, Carleton, describing the result of an interview with the Advocate, spoke of 'Barneveldt not knowing what to say, but that the taking of Browne was ill-done, and desiring me with his hat in his hand (much differing from his use) to make report thereof to his Majesty.' Both he and also Maurice disavowed Albertsz's action, and the States-General in their turn declared that the captains had acted without instructions, and ordered Browne to be released. At the same time they respectfully insisted that their fishermen were specially exempted from paying any toll for their fishing. They ask Carleton to beg James, as Browne had been set free, to release the hostages that he had seized. But Winwood peremptorily informed Carleton (August 27, O.S.), 'His Majesty will take no satisfaction, but to have the captains and chief officers of the ships sent over prisoners to England.' This demand, however, was most unpalatable in Holland. The States of that province stood upon their privileges. The captains should be tried, they said, but only by their own courts and laws. James, however, would not give way. In Winwood's words 'he insisted, fort et ferme, on the offenders being delivered into his hands'. Thus for many months the obstinate dispute continued. At last (February 1) the States of Holland, the opposition of the towns of Rotterdam and Enkhuysen to deliver up their citizens having been overcome, consented that Albertsz and Tlieff should be sent to Noel Caron to submit themselves to his Majesty's mercy, 'for which,' says Carleton,[32 - Carleton's Letters, October 11.] 'in a letter they sue, and' he adds 'they also ask for the freedom of fishing on the coast of Scotland, to which they lay claim, without molestation.' Not till April did Tlieff actually set sail for England, and then without the worse offender, Albertsz, who was very ill, and in fact died shortly afterwards. James now, however, professed himself satisfied, the hostages were set free, and the Browne incident closed without a breach of the peace.

The fishery dispute meanwhile remained an open sore. Loud complaints were made by the Scottish Council that the Dutch not only claimed the right to fish free from any toll, but they under the protection of their armed convoy hindered the Scottish boats from fishing, and took away their nets and otherwise treated them 'with daily outrages and insolences'. This was the state of affairs in 1617. Carleton made many and strong remonstrances, but in 1618 the complaints of the Scotch that they were driven away from the fishing grounds by acts of violence were louder than ever. Instructions had been given to Carleton (April 10, 1618) that, as a means for avoiding these disputes and encounters, he should request the States to order their fishermen to ply their trade out of sight of land, as had been, so he averred, their former custom. After a delay of two months the States, while promising to punish severely all who could be shown to have committed such acts as those complained of, declared that after examination of witnesses on oath they could not discover that any offences such as those spoken of by the King had taken place. As to the Netherlanders fishing out of sight of land, they denied any knowledge of such a custom, and prayed the King not to disturb their countrymen in the exercise of that right of free fishing granted them from time immemorial by a succession of treaties.

Thus in the summer of 1618 we have seen that no less than three burning questions – the Greenland or Spitzbergen fishery, the Great or Herring fishery, and the refusal to admit English dyed or dressed cloths into the Netherlands – were causing the relations between England and the United Provinces to be very strained. A fourth question, that of the disputes of the rival East India Companies as to trading rights in the Banda Islands, Amboyna, and the Moluccas, where the Dutch, being in far stronger force, prevented the English from sharing in the lucrative commerce in spices, was also becoming acute. Several islands – among them one named Pulo Run, which the English, by the consent of the natives, had occupied – were seized by the Dutch, and actual hostilities between the fleets representing the two nations in those waters were only avoided because the English were not in a position to offer effective resistance to their superior adversaries. Negotiations had therefore been set on foot as early as 1615 to effect a friendly understanding by which the English should be allowed a fair share in the spice trade, and the companies co-operate for their common interest. So far, however, in 1618, were matters from being arranged, that a strong fleet had been dispatched from London in that year under Sir Thomas Dale to restore the balance of power in the Bunda archipelago.

When, therefore, as has been already related, Carleton on October 3 appeared in the States-General to protest in the strongest possible language against the acts of hostility committed against the fishing fleet of the Muscovy Company off Spitzbergen, he did not confine himself to this one cause of embittered dispute, but demanded that the States should send at once, promptly and without delay, the special embassy, which had been often spoken of but never taken seriously in hand, to discuss in London all the points of difference between the two nations – the East Indian spice trade, the herring fishery, and the dyed cloth question – and to strive to arrive at a friendly arrangement. Otherwise, he warned them that the King, though he had shown himself willing to bear much at their hands, had now reached the limit of his endurance.

III: 1618-1623

In the Netherlands the minds of all men were throughout the year 1618 preoccupied with the fierce political and religious discords that had brought civil strife into the land. The sword of Maurice had, in the name of the States-General of the Union, overthrown the power of the provincial oligarchies, and despite the strenuous opposition of the States of Holland under the leadership of Oldenbarneveldt, had made good the claim of the States-General to sovereign authority in the Republic. The aged Advocate of Holland, so long supreme in the administration of public affairs, with his chief adherents, lay in prison awaiting trial and condemnation. Anxious, therefore, at such a crisis, to avoid a breach with King James, or to provoke on his part measures of reprisal (especially in view of the approaching meeting of the Synod of Dort, at which James was to be officially represented), the States announced their readiness (October 18) to accede to Carleton's request for the speedy dispatch of a special embassy. But they wished to confine the subjects of discussion to the East Indian and Greenland disputes. In vain Carleton pressed upon the States the urgency of including the Great (Herring) Fishery and dyed cloth questions in the instruction. The reply was that it would be dangerous in the disturbed condition of the country to touch matters of such great importance affecting the interests of so large a portion of the population of the maritime provinces. A clear indication was moreover given that on these two points there was little possibility of concession.

The ambassadors arrived in England (December 7) accompanied by five commissioners of the East India Company. The King received them with expressions of friendliness (December 20), but the examination of their instructions by the Privy Council at once revealed that the subject of the Great Fisheries, which had most interest for the English, was omitted. The Dutch envoys accordingly were informed that the King was very astonished that the warnings of Carleton had been without effect, and that their mission would be fruitless unless this point, which concerned the King's sovereign rights, were placed in the forefront of the negotiations. James, indeed, refused to proceed unless the instructions were altered, and held out the threat of an alliance with Spain if his wishes were not complied with. Carleton, indeed, in a long and angry representation made to the States-General, January 12, 1619, practically demanded, not only that the ambassadors should be instructed to deal with the Great Fishery question, but to admit that their rights under ancient treaties and their contention as to the freedom of the sea were claims that could not be sustained in face of the King's 'lawful title and exclusive sovereign rights and property in the fisheries upon the coasts of his three kingdoms'. In case of delay, England would maintain her rights with the armed hand. The King was resolved that the grievances of which his subjects complained must cease.

The States-General, however, dared not in the midst of the crisis through which the country was passing, interfere with the fishery question. Maurice, as Captain-General of the Union, had by military force overpowered the resistance of the Province of Holland to the will of the States-General. Its leaders had been incarcerated, and the town magistracies throughout Holland changed. Feelings were very embittered, and the position of the new magistrates would have been seriously endangered had the dominant party consented to yield to English threats the rights of free fishing, an industry on which some 50,000 persons in Holland depended for their livelihood. Both Maurice and his cousin and trusted adviser, William Lewis of Nassau, Stadholder of Friesland, were agreed that such a course was at the moment unwise, if not impracticable. These considerations were laid before James, who had throughout the discussions in the Republic strongly sympathized with the triumphant Contra-Remonstrant party. The result was a modification in his unbending attitude. The King agreed to defer the discussion of the 'Great Fishery' question until the internal state of the Netherlands had become more settled, and to proceed with the Greenland fishery and East Indian matters first, on condition that the delay was to be as short as possible and not to extend beyond the end of the year. Indeed, September 1 was named as the actual limit of time. The States were quickly informed (January 21) of the English concession, and now that the tension was relieved, took more than three weeks in which to consider carefully the terms of their answer to Carleton. They were in a difficult position, and they finally (February 13) gave in general terms a non-committal undertaking that 'so soon as the affairs of this land, political and religious, shall be brought into a better state – if possible within a year', they will send ambassadors to treat of the Great Fishery, the cloth trade, and other points, as a preliminary to the revision of the treaties of intercourse. Meanwhile they trusted that all should go on as before, and that the English would make no innovation in contravention of the ancient customs and treaties. So the matter rested, the States being warned that the King demanded that the placard of June 5, 1618, forbidding the Dutch fishermen to commit further outrages and excesses 'on pain of severe penalties', or to approach within sight (the English said within 14 miles, but to this the Dutch objected) of the Scottish coast, should be rigidly enforced during the intermediate period of delay.

The efforts of the Dutch ambassadors to settle the two questions which according to their instructions were the chief object of their mission nevertheless encountered serious difficulties, and it was soon apparent that the views of the two parties were almost irreconcilable. The scheme for a working union of the two East India Companies was speedily given up. For months, however, the rights and wrongs of the two nations with regard to the Greenland (Spitzbergen) fisheries were the subject of many conferences and interchanges of notes. The English maintained that they, on the ground of first discovery and of being the first to fish in the Spitzbergen waters, had exclusive rights of sovereignty both on the land and the seas that surrounded it. The Dutch set up the counter-claim that they had not only first discovered, but first occupied the land, and they held firmly that the sea was free to all nations. For the damages suffered by the English fishing fleet at the hands of the Netherlanders in 1618 an indemnity was demanded by the English Government amounting to £43,800, and this did not include the amounts due to private ship-owners for the loss of their trade, and to the relatives of those who had been killed or wounded. The Dutch replied by pointing to the repeated provocations the Hollanders and Zeelanders had had year by year to endure, and to the losses they on their side had suffered not only through being hindered in their fishing, but through actual plundering of their goods. The ambassadors promised to give reparation, if the English would do the same. Tired at last of fruitless discussions, prolonged month after month, the Dutch envoys sought a personal interview with the King, July 10, at Greenwich, to see if any modus vivendi could be arrived at. All the old arguments on both sides were repeated, and neither would yield on the point of their several 'rights'; the utmost the King would concede was a suggestion that, as a favour, he might connive at the Netherlanders fishing in his waters. This did not satisfy the ambassadors, and they fell back on the familiar device of asking that the question should be put off for later settlement. To this finally James agreed, and it was arranged that the matter should be deferred for further negotiations for a period of three years, and that meanwhile the English and Dutch were to fish peaceably together. The King insisted that restitution should be made for the damage done by the armed attack on the English fleet in 1618 within three months, and for all other losses inflicted by the Dutch within the three years. As soon as the full English claims were settled (such was the ultimatum), the question of the satisfaction due to the Netherlanders should be considered. With this decision, however unpalatable to them, the envoys had perforce to be content. They sailed from Gravesend, on August 1, without having really effected anything but a postponement of disputes, which mere delay was more likely to aggravate than to appease.

The results then of the embassy of 1618 were disappointing to both parties. The English resented the continued presence of the Dutch fishermen both in the home waters and in the Northern Seas, for they not only carried off the profits from what were regarded as British industries, but behaved with overbearing arrogance as if in their own domain. The Hollanders found themselves permitted, as it were on sufferance, to continue an occupation which supplied a large part of their population with sustenance and was the basis of their prosperity. The States-General, though they were committed by their envoys to send a fresh embassy to deal with the question of the Great Fisheries, as soon as the internal troubles of the country were settled, were in no hurry to move in the matter. It was in vain that Carleton in the early months of 1620 reminded them of their undertaking. The general opinion in Holland, and in this Prince Maurice himself shared, was that there could be no surrender of the treaty right to free fishing, even though it should be at the cost of war.

Their position was greatly strengthened by the momentous events that had been occurring in Germany. The Elector Palatine, Frederick – King James's son-in-law – had accepted the Crown of Bohemia (November, 1619) but a year later his forces were crushed by the Imperial army at the White Hill near Prague (November 5). Meanwhile his hereditary dominions had been invaded and conquered by a Spanish force under Spinola. Frederick was head of the Protestant Union, but the forces of the Union were disunited (indeed it was soon afterwards dissolved), and although Sir Horace Vere, at the head of a fine body of 2,000 English volunteers, escorted by a strong Dutch force, made his way to the scene of conflict, he was unable to prevent the Spanish conquest of the Lower Palatinate. The unfortunate King of Bohemia, a homeless fugitive, was compelled with his wife, Elizabeth of England, to seek refuge with his uncle, the Prince of Orange, at the Hague. The Dutch were greatly disturbed, as the twelve years' truce was drawing to an end, at the prospect of the Spaniards being able through their alliance with the Emperor to march from their post of vantage on the Rhine straight upon the Netherlands, and were therefore anxious to secure the goodwill and help of England in the serious struggle which they saw before them. They felt confident that, despite his love of peace, James would be forced to take active steps to defend his son-in-law's lands from conquest, and the cause of Protestantism in Germany from ruin. The news of the complete defeat of Frederick at the White Hill therefore, together with the necessity of renewing the treaty between the two countries, which expired in April, 1621, at the end of the truce, had more effect than Carleton's remonstrances and threats in hastening a renewal of negotiations. The English ambassador was instructed to assure the States that James would lend assistance for the recovery of the Palatinate, and it was resolved by them that a special mission should be dispatched as soon as possible. It was well known that the King was still on the most confidential terms with Gondomar, and that the Spanish envoy continued to exercise a strong influence upon the royal policy, and that the project of a Spanish marriage had not been abandoned. It was felt therefore that a strong effort should be made to counteract this secret leaning of James to listen to the subtle counsels of the Spaniard, and to persuade him to break with Spain and to take decisively the Protestant side in the war against the allied forces of the House of Habsburg.

The ambassadors set sail from Veere, January 28, 1621, and arrived in London on February 1. They were six in number, representing the three maritime provinces of Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland, in itself a proof that though the affairs of the Palatinate were the principal subject that filled their instructions, the fishery questions, for the moment placed in the background, had in reality lost none of their importance. The names of the special envoys were Jonkheer Jacobus van Wijngaerden, Johan Camerling, Albert Sonck, Albert Bruyninck, Jacobus Schotte, and Jonkheer Frederik van Vervou tot Martenahuys, and with them was associated the resident in London, Noel Caron. At their first audience with the King (February 7) the situation in Germany was almost exclusively referred to. They laid stress upon the extent of the Spanish conquests on the Rhine, and after pointing out that the States had been paying monthly subsidies to certain of the Protestant princes and had collected a great army on the frontier, expressed their gratification at the information that had been received through Sir Dudley Carleton to the effect that the King would, if diplomacy failed, restore his children in the possessions by force. Should he indeed be prepared to take steps for military intervention, they were commissioned to assure him that the States would be ready to second his action and to go to war.

The embassy had arrived at a critical moment in the reign of James I, and after some words of friendly compliment their conference with the Privy Council was deferred until February 15. In the interval James's third Parliament had met (February 9). The King's financial necessities had forced him to summon a Parliament, and the session was to prove a very stormy one. The leaders of the Commons at once demanded the redress of many grievances and proceeded to attack those whom they charged with being the cause of the abuses they denounced, more especially the omnipotent favourite, Buckingham himself. The sojourn of the Dutch mission therefore coincided with a period of political stress and anxiety. But the envoys had the satisfaction of knowing that the English Parliament, which in this was thoroughly representative of public opinion in the country, was enthusiastically in favour of active support being given to the King of Bohemia for the recovery of the Palatinate. Subsidies were without delay voted for that purpose, and the vote was accompanied by a petition urging the King to make war with Spain and to break off the negotiations for the Spanish marriage.

But Gondomar found no difficulty in trading upon James's habitual preference for peaceful methods. According to the testimony of the Venetian, Girolamo Lando, the Spanish ambassador 'had access to the King at any hour, and found all doors open to him which were accustomed to be shut to others', and he is described as 'with ever-increasing boldness carrying on a campaign against these kingdoms with unspeakable intrigues and corruption.' Through his counsels the King entered upon a series of negotiations with the Courts of Madrid and Vienna in the interests of Frederick, which were perfectly futile and merely afforded the Catholic powers time to strengthen their position upon the Rhine. At the same time James, by opposing himself to the expressed wishes of his Parliament and people in this matter of the Palatinate, only heightened the determination of the House of Commons to assert their privileges and insist upon their demand for a redress of grievances. In foreign no less than in domestic affairs, the views of the King and those of the representatives of his people proved to be diametrically opposed. In December accordingly, no compromise being possible, Parliament was dissolved, and James, left in desperate financial straits, was unable to carry out any policy that involved expenditure. In considering the course of the negotiations with the Dutch, these facts must be borne in mind, for they are vitally important for a right understanding of the situation.

The embassy, delayed by the opening of Parliament, had a conference with the Privy Council on February 15. Once more they impressed upon their audience the seriousness of the dangers which threatened both the United Provinces and England from the war in Germany, and urged, now that the truce with Spain was almost expired, the renewal of the treaty of alliance between the two countries to defend the Protestant cause against a common enemy. In the words of the contemporary historian Aitzema, 'they laid strong emphasis upon this last point as if it were the only object and aim of the embassy.' But the Council had no desire, so immediately after the meeting of Parliament, to commit themselves on the subject of military intervention, for they were well aware of the King's disinclination to break with Spain. The question was accordingly put to the Dutchmen as to whether there were no other points in their instructions, mention being specially made of the fisheries, the cloth, and the East Indian disputes. The reply was that in the present critical condition of European affairs the interest of both States required that secondary questions should be allowed to rest and continue on the same footing as before in the presence of the grave danger (now the truce was drawing to an end) from a mighty enemy. Some lesser differences which had arisen about the 'tare' in the cloth trade, and the 'mint', they were ready to discuss, but nothing more.

The matter was referred to the King, and on March 2 the envoys had a second conference with the Council, when it was made clear to them that the fisheries questions must be settled as a preliminary to any treaty of alliance. The Dutch could only answer (March 10) that they had received no powers to negotiate upon the fisheries, but in accordance with their instructions they pointed out the difficulty and the danger of trying to interfere with an industry in which so large a part of the population were interested, while civil discords were scarcely appeased and a renewal of the war with Spain was on the point of breaking out. So much was this the case that though the value of the fishing (so they said) was steadily decreasing, the States were granting large subsidies for convoys in order to provide the means of sustenance for so large a number of their subjects. The smallest toll or charge, they argued, would either cause 'their fishery to be entirely destroyed and ruined, or possibly stir up this rude sea-faring population to fresh commotions to the manifest peril of the repose of the Republic, scarcely cured of the wounds of its late infirmity.' They begged therefore that the consideration of the matter might be put off to a more fitting time, and meanwhile that the old privileges should continue in force. As to the Greenland fishery, it was pleaded that the three years' delay that had been granted in 1619 was not yet expired. Similarly in the East Indian disputes, which continued with no less frequency and bitterness, although an accord between the two companies had been agreed upon in June, 1619, the Netherlanders met the complaints of the representatives of the English Company with excuses and counter-protests. There was much talking, but practically no progress made. After several interviews with the Council and the King himself it was finally arranged that things should remain as they were for a short time longer, but the King insisted (April 8) that 'the fishery questions concerned his right and his honour and that he could not allow them to be any longer in debate and suspense', and that a special Commission must be sent by the States to deal with these disputes, and further, that he would not wait longer than May 31. He also demanded a settlement of the quarrels in the East Indies, and a withdrawal of the 'tare' edict, which was declared to be the ruin of the cloth industry in England. So soon as these matters were satisfactorily arranged, he promised that he would conclude an alliance with the States. The Dutch envoys left London on their return journey on April 26.

As a proof of the very close relations subsisting at this time between England and the United Provinces, it may be mentioned that in the very same months that the Wijngaerden embassy was thus holding ineffectual conferences in London with the King of England and his Privy Council, the Fellowship of the Merchant Adventurers were transferring their Court to the Prinsenhof at Delft.

Driven from Antwerp in 1582 the Adventurers had, as already related, set up their Great Court first at Emden, then at Hamburg and Stade. But in 1598 the enmity of the Hanse towns compelled them to leave Stade, and to establish themselves at Middelburg in Zeeland. Until the suppression of the Adventurers' Charter in 1615, this town was the staple for English cloth and wool in the Netherlands, though the 'interlopers' as they were called, succeeded in carrying on an active smuggling trade through Amsterdam and Flushing. After the renewal of the Charter in 1617 the Adventurers returned to Middelburg, but on account of the unhealthiness of the place, and other reasons, they determined to remove to Delft. To effect this involved elaborate negotiations with the Town Corporation, with the States of Holland, and with the States-General. Moreover, the consent of the King was necessary as a preliminary step. Sir Dudley Carleton was largely instrumental in bringing the matter to a successful issue. James gave his consent that the Court should move from Zeeland within the borders of Holland, 'to show his Majesty's great affection for that Province'. On April 21, 1621, the contract with Delft was signed, just as the Dutch envoys were leaving England. But Amsterdam, with whose cloth merchants the 'interlopers' had been engaged in a profitable trade, sent in to the States of Holland a very strongly worded remonstrance. They objected to the privileges which the Delft Corporation had granted to the Adventurers as injurious to themselves and the interests of the province. The States of Holland on receiving this remonstrance resolved that the contract made by Delft and the monopoly of the Adventurers should be examined by a commission. Against this Delft and a number of other towns sent in a counter-remonstrance, but the influence of Amsterdam outweighed theirs in the provincial States, who by a majority of votes persisted in their determination. The Merchant Adventurers, however, appealed from the provincial authorities to the States-General, who had always been their protectors. And now began one of those curious struggles so common in Dutch history between the town of Delft, the States of Holland, and the States-General, all of them claiming independent authority to deal with the matter. The Corporation of Delft refused to hand over their contract with the Merchant Adventurers to be examined by the Commission of the States of Holland. At last, however, it was agreed by both parties that it should be placed in the hands of Prince Maurice and some impartial persons, who should then confer with the States, and draw 'a good regulation for the preserving of the common industries'. Maurice appointed a commission on which the ten towns interested in the cloth trade (of which naturally Delft was one) were represented, to take the matter in hand, and on June 19, 1621, the 'Regulation' was drawn up which defined the privileges and conditions under which the Adventurers henceforth for many years carried on their trade in Holland. Its terms therefore deserve to be briefly indicated. The old privileges giving freedom from import and export duties, harbour and market tolls, &c., originally granted in 1598, were not revoked, but defined afresh and modified. Art. i gave the Fellowship permission to have their Court at Delft, but only with the licences 'which we [the States of Holland] and the States-General shall be pleased to accord, in trust that the Netherlanders shall enjoy their old privileges in England.' This last clause clearly referred to the fishing rights, with which at that very moment the English Government were proposing to interfere. Art. ii reminded the Adventurers that when residing in Holland 'they would be subject to all our edicts and enactments made or still to make.' Art. iii dealt with the excise recently imposed on foreign woollen cloth. On this no concession was made; it must be promptly paid. Art. iv insisted on the strict carrying out of the edict of 1614 forbidding the importation of dyed or prepared cloth, and also of the edict on the 'tare', which had been renewed in 1617. Both these edicts were regarded as grievances by the English, and had in 1618 and in 1621 been among the subjects on which negotiations had proved fruitless.

Before this 'Regulation' of June 19, 1621, had come into force the time fixed by King James for the dispatch of another embassy to settle all outstanding disputes had passed by. Through the representations of Carleton at the Hague, and the letters of their own ambassador Caron from London, it was made clear, however, to the States that a temporizing policy was no longer possible. Indefinite delay would not be brooked. Steps were accordingly taken to approach certain of those who claimed damages against the Greenland Company with an offer to compound with them by a cash payment. Nor did the States confine themselves to words, but gave practical proof of their desire for peace, for when the Greenland Company applied for a convoy of warships to accompany the whale-fishing fleet to Spitzbergen, the States-General, after consultation with the States of Holland, declined to grant the request, April 28. The determined attitude of Carleton, who threatened reprisals in the Channel upon the ships returning from the East Indies had its effect, and the slow-moving Netherlanders were at last stirred to action. The new envoys were appointed early in October, and though even after their nomination there was further delay while the instructions were being drawn up, within two months all preliminaries were completed, and the embassy finally arrived in London, December 8, 1621.

Its arrival coincided with the final rupture between James and his Parliament, and the situation was far from favourable to a really friendly settlement. The King was in bad health, worried and embittered in temper by the affronts which he had just been enduring from what he regarded as the insolent demands of a House of Commons which neither by threats nor by persuasion had he been able to bend to his will. Both Philip III of Spain and the Archduke Albert of the Netherlands had recently died. A young king reigned in Madrid, but his favourite, the Count of Olivares, held the reins of power, a man filled with the ambition of raising Spain once again to her old position of ascendancy in Europe. His policy, as stated in the Cortes of Castile, was to assist the Emperor to crush the Protestant cause in Bohemia and in Germany, to attack the Dutch rebels now that the truce was expired, and to defend with all the power of the monarchy 'the sacred Catholic faith and the authority of the Holy See'. Yet in spite of so clear a declaration James fell more and more under the spell exercised over him by Gondomar, who had Buckingham and other English councillors in his pay, and who continued to dangle before the eyes of the infatuated King, still dreaming of a Spanish match for his son, the hope that by the friendly intervention of Philip IV at Vienna, he might be able to secure without hostilities good terms for his son-in-law, and a settlement of the Dutch and other questions in a manner satisfactory to all parties. It was, of course, a purely visionary project, nevertheless it is probable that James was sincere in his aims, and thought that he was acting nobly in playing the part of arbiter of peace and war. But he was really a puppet in the hands of those who were far more astute than himself, and who, while he was negotiating, were grimly preparing for the prosecution in real earnest of the longest and most cruel war Europe has ever seen. It was well known moreover to the statesmen, who treated him as their dupe, that the breach between James and his Parliament effectually prevented him, even if he wished it, from serious intervention.

The Dutch Embassy, which was accompanied by three Commissioners on behalf of the East India Company, had at its head Francis van Aerssen, Lord of Sommelsdijk. Aerssen, already distinguished as a diplomatist and noted for the prominent part he had taken in the recent overthrow of Oldenbarneveldt, was for many years to be the trusted councillor of the Stadholders Maurice and Frederick Henry. Richelieu, at a later time, spoke of him as one of the three ablest statesmen of his time. He had now before him a long and difficult task. Aitzema lays special emphasis on the duration and the expense of this special mission. It lasted, he tells us, 454 days, and cost 80,850 guilders. 'In the course of it', he further remarks, 'King James at the audiences made very particular and most remarkable discourses, which were replied to by the Lord of Sommelsdijk with exceptional prudence, he being a man of great sharp-sightedness, eloquence, and experience.'

The skill of Aerssen is shown in the instructions for the embassy, which, once more according to Aitzema, were drawn up by himself. The following are the important points. Art. vii deals with the 'questions which have arisen on the whale fishery between the English nation and the Greenland Company of their lands and their differences concerning the pretended losses suffered on either side.' The envoys are instructed, if possible, to come to a friendly understanding, 'if not, by authoritative decision to draw up for the future a Regulation of the aforesaid fishery' on the lines of the previous negotiations, but 'not so as to cause any disadvantage to the land's service or to the rights of the privileged company,' Above all, nothing is to be concluded on this matter without awaiting the orders of the States-General, should time and opportunity permit. The next five articles treat of the affairs of the two East India Companies, which were, in fact, the main object of the mission. The cloth trade disputes are next dealt with. If complaints should be made about the raising by the States of Holland of the duty on foreign woollen goods, the lines of defence are laid down in Arts. xiv and xv. In Art. xvi the envoys are bidden to avoid any reopening of the 'tare' question, but should the placard enforcing an examination of the goods by the tare-masters be denounced, it must be shown to be necessary in the interests of the cloth trade, and for the prevention of fraud. If English subjects pretend to suffer any injury through the 'tare', let them bring their grievances before their High Mightinesses, who will see that justice is done. Likewise on the subject of the 'interlopers' (Art. xvii) silence is enjoined. The reply, however, to any complaint is that his Majesty has the remedy in his own hands by forbidding the 'interlopers' to trade. It would be far easier to prevent their egress from England than their ingress into the United Provinces. Art. xviii deals with the question of the Mint. Last of all, the instructions arrive at the Great Fisheries difficulty. The envoys are carefully to avoid any reference to this matter. If compelled to speak about it, they are to say that they have received no instructions thereon,

'as their High Mightinesses had hoped that the King would leave this matter untouched, as His Majesty had thought good to delay this whole question for a further period still and a more fitting season. In any case this industry is necessary for the subsistence of many thousands of the sea-faring folk of their Lands, and to consent to a course that would ruin them is impossible, and there is no hope that such consent would be given either now or hereafter.'

Conferences were held with the Privy Council on January 15, February 17, and March 14, the Dutch trying to concentrate attention on the East Indian differences, about which public opinion in England as well as in Holland had been much stirred, and about the renewal of the treaty of alliance, urging that the King should take sides with his old allies against the Spaniards and active steps to recover the Palatinate for his son-in-law. Buckingham's efforts to discuss the alleged acts of violence by the Dutch fishermen to the King's Scottish subjects only led to the reply that the States had issued a strong edict against such acts and would punish them if proved. As no progress to any agreement was being reached, the envoys suggested a personal audience with the King. This was granted on April 27. James was far from well, and in a very irritable humour. He received them alone, and, contrary to his habit, sat in his chair during the interview with his hat on, while the ambassadors stood the whole time with uncovered heads. Aerssen, after the usual compliments, spoke at considerable length, in accordance with the terms of his instructions, upon the East Indian and other matters on which the States desired to treat. The effect of this speech is best told in the words of the original report of the proceedings: —

'They [the envoys] noted that His Majesty was entirely prejudiced and prepared by his Council to set his heart against them. To their compliments he gave no reply, letting them pass unnoticed. When they (through their spokesman Aerssen) were entering into the business, he said, "Make an end of your long harangue. I will give a short and good answer. You are a good orator, I know it well; when I was younger, so was I also; now my memory fails me." Six times with great discourtesy did he interrupt them.'

The violence of the 'short and good answer' in which he finally poured forth the pent-up vials of his wrath upon the Dutchmen is at least a proof that James, despite his age and infirmities, still possessed considerable powers of invective. Speaking of the East Indian disputes, he exclaimed: —

'You have taken away the goods of my subjects, have made war on, murdered and mishandled them, without once thinking of what you have enjoyed from this Crown, which has made you and maintained you. You must give them satisfaction… I hold that you ought to show respect to my nation. You are speaking of the accord (of 1619), I decline to treat with you on equal terms. You have in the Indies a Man[33 - The Governor-General, Jan Pietersz Coen.] who well deserves to be hanged. Your people over there represent everywhere your Prince of Orange as a great King and Lord, and hold me up as a little kinglet, as if I stood under him, thus misleading the barbarian kings.

Tell me what you are thinking of doing, whether you will take action and give me satisfaction or not? Will you do it, then do it the sooner the better; it will be best for you; when will you begin? Surely you are like leeches, bloodsuckers of my realm, you draw the blood from my subjects and seek to ruin me; there are six points that show it clearly; take the great fishery– you come here to land against the will of my subjects, you do them damage, you injure them, you desecrate the Churches, doing filthy acts in them, you hinder them from fishing; the Greenland whale fishery you wish to dispute with me, without making good the loss; France and Spain have ceded it to me, with Denmark I have come to an agreement, you alone wish to maintain it against me. I would not endure it either from France or from Spain, do you think I either can or will bear it from you? In the Cloths you are playing at passe-passe, as if you were laying a burden on your inhabitants, and yet this is the cause; these (the Cloths) are no more carried, therefrom as you may have heard a mutiny and wellnigh a rebellion exists in my Realm.'

Having mentioned these three points, the other three appear to have escaped his Majesty's memory. After this outburst the negotiations were renewed, the East Indian questions being taken first. This admirably suited the Dutch, who knew they had the upper hand in the Indies and were anxious to shelve the fishery dispute as long as possible. For months the weary negotiations proceeded, until in August there was once more a deadlock. The King again granted an audience (August 16), was again angry, and with small result. An event now occurred which gave rise to fresh complaint. The Dutch fishermen off the Scottish coast had encountered an Ostend vessel with some Dutch prisoners on board. The Ostender was attacked and an attempt made to set the captives free. A conference was held on the matter in the King's presence, September 25, and the Hollanders were accused of a breach of neutrality. The envoys rejoined that it was the Ostender which had committed a breach of neutrality by bringing prisoners into Scottish waters, and pointed out 'that no one had so great an interest as his Majesty to prevent Spain from sharing the sovereignty of the sea on which his Majesty was so mighty and whereon his chief security lay'. This reference to James's relations with Spain was more than the testy King could brook.