Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

'It is you', he said, 'who are masters of the sea, far and wide, you do just what you like, you hinder my own subjects from fishing on my coasts, who at any rate according to all Rights ought to enjoy the first benefit, but when I raise the question, and urge you to observe my rights, to listen to what I have to say, you will not agree to a single word being spoken about it; yes, my ambassador writes to me that he might just as well speak to you of the rights of my fishery, as of a declaration of war with you. When you are at war, you say that your Government has not yet been granted time for your community to get on its legs. In peace, you have other excuses. The long and the short is, you don't want to enter into it.'

The ambassadors were, however, not to be entrapped into a discussion of the Great Fisheries; remarking that his Majesty had agreed to defer speaking about this question, they skilfully turned his attention to other subjects. One result of this conference was the resolve of the Privy Council to make a serious effort to accommodate the Greenland fishery dispute. A formal statement of the English grievances was set forth in a letter to the ambassadors, and they were requested, now that far more than the three months' delay which the King had conceded was past, to pay up the indemnity of £22,000 for the losses that had been suffered. The Netherlanders at once replied that they were ready to consider the Greenland differences as soon as the East Indian were settled, but not before. Unless the East Indian negotiations were pushed on, they threatened to return home (October 3). For some two months accordingly the Indies held the field. When, however, the middle of December had arrived the Council once more repeated their demand that the indemnity, which had been promised in 1619, should now be handed over. The envoys denied having any knowledge of such a promise. They would make inquiries about it, meanwhile their instructions only allowed them to discuss the Greenland question as a whole and without prejudice. They asked for proofs of the alleged promise. None were forthcoming. So by raising this side-issue the Dutch achieved their object of gaining time. An accord at last having been reached on East Indian affairs, the envoys announced that after fourteen months' sojourn in London they were unable to remain longer. Caron, they said, would have full powers to carry on negotiations about the Greenland matter. So far as any real settlement of disputes was concerned, the embassy was again a complete failure. Even the accord in the East was a sham. The English Company had obtained a nominal position of equality with its Dutch rival in the Indies, and a definite share of the coveted trade in the Spice islands. But all the power was in the hands of the Dutch, and such an artificial arrangement was more likely, as events were speedily to show, to breed fresh discords than to allay the old ones.

IV: 1623-1629

The embassy of 1622 returned to the Netherlands early in February, 1623. A few weeks later Prince Charles, accompanied by the Duke of Buckingham, was on his way to Madrid to woo in person his prospective Spanish bride. No more conclusive proof could have been shown of the lack of success of Aerssen in obtaining any assurance of armed support from King James for the States in their renewed war with Spain or for the recovery of the Palatinate.

Yet, strangely enough, at this very time of increasing political alienation, four English and two Scottish regiments formed (as indeed was the case throughout the remainder of the eighty years' war) the very kernel of the States army, and campaign after campaign bore the brunt of the fighting. When the Spaniards laid siege to Bergen-op-Zoom in July, 1622, Maurice had reinforced the garrison by fourteen English and Scottish companies. The gallant defence of the town first by Colonel Henderson, then, after this officer fell mortally wounded, by Sir Charles Morgan, excited general admiration in Europe. In October, Spinola, after making repeated and desperate efforts to capture the place, was compelled to raise the siege. These troops were recruited by royal permission in England and Scotland, remained British subjects, and were distinguished by their national uniforms and colours, by the beat of the drum and the march. They were, however, in Dutch pay, and took an oath of allegiance to the States-General, from whom the officers received their commissions.[34 - See special note F.]

This same period saw also the beginnings of rivalry in the West as well as in the East. In 1621 a Charter was granted to the Dutch West India Company. This Charter was framed on the model of that of the East India Company, and it was hoped that the new venture might be attended by the same good fortune and phenomenal success as had followed Dutch enterprise in Java and the Malayan Archipelago. Far from being a mere commercial undertaking, it was intended from the first that the West India Company should be required to equip considerable armed forces, naval and military, wherewith to strike a blow at the Spanish power in America, and cut off those sources of revenue which supplied King Philip with the sinews of war. In carrying out such projects of aggression in the Spanish main there was less risk of disputes arising between the Dutch and English than had been the case in the East Indies. Nevertheless, the colonists and traders of the two nationalities were in America also rivals and competitors in the same localities. Netherlanders and Englishmen had already for some years before 1621 been carrying on traffic with the natives and setting up trading posts side by side in the estuary of the Amazon, and in the various river mouths along the coast of Guiana. In 1609, by letters patent, a grant was made by James I to Robert Harcourt, of Stanton Harcourt, in the county of Oxford, for the planting and inhabiting of the whole coast of Guiana between the rivers Amazon and Essequibo, and this grant was renewed to Roger North in 1619, and again by Charles I to the Duke of Buckingham in 1626. Yet within the limits of these grants the Dutch in 1616 established themselves permanently on the river Essequibo, and in 1627 on the river Berbice, while a number of abortive attempts were made to set up trading posts and colonies at other points of this coast. More important than any of these, a settlement had been made in 1614 on the island of Manhattan at the mouth of the Hudson river, a grant having been given at that date by the States-General to a body of Amsterdam merchants of all unoccupied land between Chesapeake Bay and Newfoundland. This settlement and those in Guiana were in 1622 taken over by the newly erected West India Company. Thus in North America the Dutch took possession of the best harbour on the coast, and their colony of New Netherland with its capital New Amsterdam (afterwards New York) was thrust in like a wedge between the English colonies of Virginia and New England. In the West Indian islands and on the Gold Coast of West Africa the keen traders of the two nations also found themselves side by side, with the result in almost all cases, as has been well said, that the Dutch extracted the marrow, leaving the English the bone.[35 - Cambridge Modern History, iv. 758.] It will at once be seen therefore that the activities of the Dutch West India Company, though it came into being primarily for the purpose of 'bearding the King of Spain in his treasure house', were certain, sooner or later, to come into conflict with English enterprise and to enlarge the area within which their respective interests and claims were divergent.

But to return to my immediate subject. The ill-success of the embassy of 1622 in effecting any settlement except the accord relating to the East Indies, an accord which was not regarded in Holland with much favour and which was speedily to prove a failure, caused considerable disquietude to the States. It was resolved therefore to make another real effort to accommodate the old grievances of the English in regard to the acts of violence charged against the Dutch fishermen both on the coast of Scotland and off Spitzbergen. It was hoped that by so doing, any further raising of the question of fishing rights might be avoided. The news of the journey of Prince Charles to Madrid changed disquietude into genuine alarm, lest James, irritated as he was by a succession of fruitless negotiations and long-protracted disputes, might be tempted to cement the Spanish marriage by an alliance with the hereditary foe, and to seek redress against the United Provinces by force of arms. Steps were accordingly taken to enforce strictly the placards by which the skippers of the herring-busses were forbidden under heavy pains and penalties to interfere with or to disturb the Scottish fisherfolk in their industry (April 20, 27, May 6, 1623), and they were also warned not to approach too near to the coast. Caron was requested to inform the English Council of these measures of precaution. The States-General were likewise anxious in their desire to arrive at a friendly understanding that the claims for damages against the Greenland (Northern) Company should be paid. But the old difficulties supervened. The directors of the Greenland Company reminded them of the counterclaim for damages suffered at the hands of the English. To pay therefore the English claim before demanding from the Muscovy Company a simultaneous settlement of Dutch grievances would be, they pointed out, playing into King James's hands. It would be regarded as an admission of his exclusive and particular rights in the Spitzbergen fishery, rights which the Greenland Company and the States had repeatedly refused to acknowledge. So, despite pressure both from Carleton and Caron, the matter dragged on. At last, December 14, a letter was sent to Caron, denying that any promise had been given by the embassy of 1618-9 of a one-sided payment of damages, as stated by the English, but expressing the willingness of the Dutch to make a mutual settlement. As, however, so often before in these negotiations, delay had served its purpose.

When this letter reached Caron, a dramatic change in the English policy had taken place to the advantage of the Netherlands. The negotiations with Spain for the restitution of the Palatinate had broken down. Philip IV and Olivares had never intended to purchase the friendship of England at such a price, and the marriage prospect, on which for so many years his heart had been set, had to be reluctantly abandoned by King James. 'I like not', he said, 'to marry my son with a portion of my daughter's tears.'

The return of the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham, October 5, angry at the treatment accorded to them at Madrid, led to the overthrow of the party at Court which had favoured a Spanish alliance. Parliament was summoned, and Buckingham in advocating an anti-Spanish policy found himself for once a popular favourite. Pressed by his son, by Buckingham, by Parliament, and by public opinion, the aged King with a heavy heart saw himself compelled to abandon his cherished scheme of recovering the Palatinate by peaceful negotiations, and to take steps for armed intervention. The States-General, on seeing the turn that events were taking, wisely determined to send another embassy to London to take advantage of the opportunity for concluding the wished-for offensive and defensive alliance between England and the United Provinces. There was this time no delay in drawing up the instructions, and Aerssen and Joachimi, the two best men they could have chosen, departed on their mission February 24.

There can be little question that the moving cause for the sending of this embassy with such unusual dispatch is to be found in an interview between Sir Dudley Carleton and Prince Maurice, which the former records in a letter to the Duke of Buckingham dated December 9, 1623.

'I have thought fit', wrote the ambassador, 'to set down at large (whilst it is fresh in my memory) an opportunity as properly given unto me this day by the Prince of Orange (who is the only person of power and confidence we have here to treat withal) as I hope your Grace will think it seasonably taken.'

Some business at the Council of State, at which both were present, having been got through more quickly than was expected, Maurice, so Carleton informed his correspondent,

'gave me a long hour's leisure afterwards in his garden, which he himself desired of me … he asked me bluntly (after his manner) Qui at'il de vostre mariage?[36 - The orthography of the original.] I told him it was now at a stay upon this point, that the restitution of the Palatinate must be first concluded. And that the Queen of Bohemia was not only well comforted with this assurance, but pleased herself with a further conceit that the opportunity was never fairer for this State to regain the King her father's favour, and return to the ancient support of his Crowns, which by way of gratitude for her good usage, since she had her refuge into these parts, she could not but admonish his Excellency of and advise him not to let it slip. Here I took occasion to play my own part, and to remember unto him how things had passed within the compass of my experience from the beginning, letting him know what friendship his Majesty had shewed this State in making their truce; what sincerity in rendering their cautionary towns according to contract when they were demanded; what affection in supporting their affairs during their late domestic disputes; what care in settling our East-Indian differences; finally, what patience in conniving at all the misdemeanours and insolences of their seamen without seeking revenge.'

Carleton then proceeds to defend the King's attitude to the Dutch, 'whose ill course, pursued through some years' continuance, bred a deserved distaste in his Majesty'; and his listening on the part of Spain to 'fair overtures of friendship, being continually made and confirmed by the tender of a match… But (he is careful to add) now the cause is removed, the effect may possibly cease in like manner.' The reply of Maurice was 'that nothing could be more certain than the affection of this State to a Prince embracing their cause of opposition to Spain. And if his Majesty could take that resolution, he might dispose of these their lives and fortunes.' A further discussion led finally to the Prince's declaration, 'When the King would be to this State as Queen Elizabeth was, this State would be to him as it was to Queen Elizabeth.' The advice of Carleton to the Duke is to seize the chance of effecting a good understanding with the Netherlands. 'The present opportunity [to quote the actual words] of the Prince of Orange's good affection, and strength of these provinces both by sea and land as it yet stands, but not possible so long to continue, being seasonably laid hold of, his Majesty may have with this State a firm and fruitful alliance.'

The embassy then, which reached England on February 26, 1624, had a comparatively easy task before it. It was received by the populace with acclamations, and by the King, now completely under the influence of Buckingham, with friendliness and distinction. Even the news of the (so-called) massacre of Amboina in the far East, which was to arouse in England for many years a bitter feeling of resentment against the Dutch, did not now lead to any delay in the negotiations, which proceeded smoothly from the first. Aerssen and Joachimi had English public opinion with them, and a treaty for a defensive alliance between the two countries was signed on June 15. By this treaty James allowed an additional force of 6,000 men to be raised in England, the pay to be at his charges, the States undertaking to refund the amount advanced on the conclusion of a peace or truce. So quickly was the enlistment carried out, that four regiments of 1,500 men each, commanded by the Earls of Oxford, Essex, and Southampton and Lord Willoughby de Eresby, landed in Holland ready for service on July 23. The contingent arrived at an opportune moment, as Spinola had just invaded Dutch Brabant at the head of an army of 24,000 foot and 3,000 horse, and had laid siege to Breda.

This treaty of alliance of June 15, 1624, was followed as a matter of course, by negotiations for a settlement of the long-standing disputes about the Greenland fisheries indemnity and other questions, but despite the efforts of the States-General and the two residents Carleton and Caron, but little progress was made. The directors of the Greenland (Northern) Company had the powerful influence of Amsterdam behind them, and they raised, with the same obstinacy as on previous occasions, strong opposition to making any payment for damages, unless the English agreed to satisfy their counter-claim for losses sustained in 1613 and 1617. Matters were still further delayed by the illness and death of Noel Caron, December 11, 1624. Caron was a real loss at this moment, for he had during fourteen difficult and anxious years filled the post of ambassador of the United Provinces in London with conspicuous industry, ability, and tact. The selection of Albert Joachimi, Lord of Ostend, as his successor was probably the best that could have been made, and met with general approval. He was a man of proved experience, and had been recently in England with Aerssen with the mission that so successfully concluded the treaty. It was intended that he should at once enter upon his duties and take with him to England instructions for a prompt settlement of the Greenland indemnity, if possible by a friendly agreement; if not, in any case 'decisively and authoritatively', and in their turn the other pending disputes and complaints.

Events, however, occurred which effected so complete a change in the political situation that his departure was perforce delayed. On March 27, 1625, James I died. A month later, Maurice, Prince of Orange, breathed his last, April 25, 1625. Charles I ascended the throne of England, and it was hoped this would mean a more decisive intervention of England in foreign politics. The new King was embittered against Spain, and it was known that the Duke of Buckingham, who at this time professed friendship for Holland, and through private pique was even more hostile to the Spaniards than his master, held an influence over him greater even than that which he had exercised over his father. It was largely through his efforts that, after the rupture of the Spanish match, a marriage had been arranged between the Prince of Wales and the sister of Louis XIII. The accomplishment of this union was one of the very first acts of the new reign. Charles and Henrietta Maria were married at Paris by proxy, May 11, and at Canterbury, June 12, with Anglican rites.

Richelieu was now firmly established in power, and in his hands Henry IV's policy of hostility to the ascendancy in Europe of the house of Habsburg was revived. Charles was therefore not without hopes of obtaining armed assistance from France in that war with Spain for the recovery of the Palatinate on which his heart was set. In the United Provinces, Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, succeeded to all the posts and to more than the influence of his brother. He was, as a general, the equal of Maurice, and was far superior to him as a statesman. During his Stadholderate, strong in the support and affection of all parties and classes, Frederick Henry was able for many years, despite the cumbersome and intricate machinery of government in the Dutch Republic, to exercise a control over the conduct of foreign affairs that was practically undisputed. He, as the son of Louise de Coligny, had throughout his life strong French leanings, and the aim of his diplomacy was from the first to secure the goodwill of Richelieu and the help of French troops and subsidies for the Netherlands. To send Joachimi at such a juncture to London to discuss the settlement of a fishery indemnity was clearly inadequate. It was resolved accordingly that with the newly appointed resident ambassador a special embassy should go to England to congratulate the King upon his accession and his marriage, and, in view of the strained relations between Charles and Spain, to negotiate a treaty between the two countries on the basis of an offensive and defensive alliance. Francis van Aerssen and Rienck van Burmania were chosen as envoys extraordinary for this mission. They set sail, accompanied by Joachimi, on June 16. All the circumstances were favourable to the success of their mission, no difficulties supervened, and on September 17 the treaty of Southampton was signed. By this time a great expedition was being prepared in England for the destruction of the port of Cadiz and the capture of the Plate fleet. Already, efforts had been made by Buckingham to persuade the States to allow 2,000 seasoned English troops in their pay to serve on the great fleet he was equipping, in exchange for 2,000 recruits. But although the 2,000 recruits were sent over (June 19) to Rotterdam, the States-General would not part with their veterans, whose services they sorely needed. Sickness carried off numbers of the raw levies, who were not allowed to land, and the remains had to return in miserable plight to Plymouth at the end of August. Being without pay, these unhappy men had lived during the interval at the personal charges of Sir Dudley Carleton. In a letter to Sir F. Nethersole, secretary to the Queen of Bohemia, dated August 30, the ambassador wrote:

'I have had no small trouble with 2,000 soldiers sent hither out of the North of England to be exchanged with the States for so many old musquettiers, which the weakness of the States' army, especially in the English nation, could not admit, and, having understood his Majesty's intention to use these 2,000 in the service of the fleet, I caused them three weeks since to be embarqued at Rotterdam, where they have layn ever since, attending the wind, but I hope they will now get away.'

Charles, having already quarrelled with his first Parliament, which was dissolved August 12, had failed to obtain the subsidies he required for carrying out his ambitious foreign policy. The States, however, consented to allow General Sir Edward Cecil and several other officers of experience in their service to absent themselves for three months and take part in the expedition against Spain, provided that they took none of their soldiers with them. Cecil, although a land soldier without any naval experience, was induced by Buckingham to take command of the great armada, a post for which he was quite unfitted. The fleet, after many delays, at last set sail October 5, badly equipped, with victuals only for six weeks, foredoomed to failure. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, a squadron of twenty Dutch ships under William of Nassau, a natural son of Maurice, took part in the expedition. There is no need to follow its fortunes further here. 'One by one,' says Dr. Gardiner, 'all through the winter months the shattered remains of the once powerful fleet came staggering home, to seek refuge in whatever port the winds and waves would allow.'

Such an ignominious issue to this great enterprise was of evil omen to the new reign. It was wounding to English pride and roused public indignation against Buckingham to a high pitch. In these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the alliance between Great Britain and the United Provinces did not prevent a fresh crop of differences arising between them. The massacre of Amboina rankled in the mind of Charles, and it had not been forgotten or forgiven by his people. The right of the English ambassador at the Hague to a seat on the Council of State had strictly ceased when the treaty which granted it came to an end with the close of the truce in 1621. But Dudley Carleton had continued without gainsaying, so long as Maurice lived, to enjoy his former privileges. By a resolution of the States, June 5, 1626, however, he was informed that henceforth he was permitted to take part in the deliberations of the Council not as a right, but simply by courtesy. Carleton attempted to obtain a withdrawal of the resolution, but in vain. As the most important affairs were at this time no longer transacted in the Council of State but in the States-General, the loss of influence was not really great, nevertheless the mere passing of such a resolution when the treaty of Southampton was not yet a year old was resented by the English as a slight. Difficulties had also arisen over the restrictions placed and the duties levied upon the Merchant Adventurers, who had the staple of the English cloth trade at Delft. Worse than all, a number of Dutch merchant vessels had been seized and searched on the ground that they were carrying contraband and trading with the Spanish enemy. The Hollanders throughout the War of Independence had always insisted on the right to freedom of commerce even with their foes, and by supplying the Spaniards not only with food but with arms and munitions, had made immense profits, which helped largely to fill the rebel war-chest. It was the attempt of Leicester to stop this commerce, which chiefly caused his unpopularity in the Netherlands. The treaty of Southampton (arts. 20-23) had forbidden all such traffic, but the keen traders of Amsterdam could not be restrained from the secret evasion of a restriction, to which they had so long refused to submit. Hence acts of reprisal on the part of the English Government, and bitter complaints on both sides.

Once again it was necessary to send a special envoy to London. The chosen ambassador this time was Jacob Cats, better known as the People's Poet of the Netherlands than as a statesman, though he was far from being undistinguished in the latter capacity, seeing that he was to fill for a number of years the important post of Grand Pensionary of Holland. He departed upon his mission March 9, 1627. His object was to negotiate a Navigation Treaty (traité de Marine) dealing with the various thorny questions regarding contraband of war and right of search at sea which had been causing so much trouble. But no sooner had the conferences with the Privy Council begun than the Dutch envoy was confronted with complaints that the old outstanding disputes, the indemnities claimed in reparation for the Amboina massacre, and for the acts of violence committed by the herring fishers off the coast of Scotland, and by the whale fishers at Spitzbergen, had never been settled. Cats had to plead that these matters were not included in his instructions, and after some controversy he succeeded in securing the postponement of these obtrusive and troublesome matters. They were at the first suitable opportunity to be discussed with the resident ambassador, Joachimi, who would be furnished with special instructions from the States. The policy of delay, which had proved so successful in the past, once more gained for the Netherlanders all that they required. The fisheries went on, under protest indeed, but undisturbed. The indemnities continued to be claimed, but remained unpaid. The main purpose of Cats's mission was, however, not achieved. No agreement about contraband and right of search and seizure was reached. The comment of Aitzema upon the negotiations is worth reproducing; it is scarcely possible to describe what took place more pithily or with greater acuteness:

'With these and such-like proposals, with plaints and counterplaints, was the time spent, without either the one or the other being made any the wiser. Each one thinks that he is most in the right; everybody looks outwards, nobody homewards, and for much of the time each was taxing the other with offences in which they themselves were the more guilty. The big fishes eat the small ones. He who has the might uses it; every one speaks merely of uprightness, of sincerity, of affection, and there is nothing but deception and hypocrisy on all sides. The English thought also (as was quite true) that they had done much for the common cause and for the Reformed Religion: and that it behoved this State likewise to suffer some inconvenience in their commerce; because otherwise all business which was in England, would find its way to the United Provinces, if these with too great and undisturbed freedom should use the sea, and not the English. Thus the Ministers of this State did not accomplish much. To Heer Cats, however, an honourable farewell was accorded with the usual present, and the dignity of Knighthood. He returned to the Hague August 30.'

The spring of 1627 had found the Government of Charles I involved in so many difficulties that it is not surprising that the King should not have found it possible to take any decisive line in his negotiations with the Dutch. He had quarrelled with his Parliament, and knew not where to turn to raise the money to meet the heavy liabilities in which he had involved himself. The attack on Cadiz had utterly miscarried, and had failed to give any help to the cause of the Palatinate. At this moment of sore disappointment he had seen with misgiving that the new Stadholder, Frederick Henry, and his minister Aerssen, had turned to France with friendly overtures, and had found Richelieu willing to receive them. France had promised to the States a yearly subsidy, and a loan of troops on condition that the Dutch would send a squadron to assist in the blockade of La Rochelle, and would undertake not to conclude a peace or truce with Spain without the knowledge and consent of the French King. Charles felt that his strenuous efforts to increase his fleet and render it more efficient, with the aim of making the English navy supreme in the Channel and the North Sea, were directly threatened by such an alliance. It was known that it was the policy of Richelieu to strengthen the position of France as a maritime power, and the traditional English jealousy of French aggrandizement was increased rather than diminished by the close bond which united the royal families. The French marriage had always been unpopular in England, great resentment being felt at the concessions that had been made with regard to the public performance of Roman Catholic rites. Charles himself found the position of things at Court so difficult that he was obliged finally to take the strong step of sending back the French attendants of the young Queen. This gave great offence at Paris, and the soreness between the two countries was aggravated by the high-handed action of the English on the sea during the Spanish war. French ships had been searched and seized, and in reprisals an embargo had been laid upon English vessels and goods at La Rochelle and other places. Finally, the countries drifted into war. Charles hoped that he might secure the friendly neutrality of Spain, but his efforts failed, and Spain allied herself with France.

In June a great expedition sailed under the command of Buckingham to relieve La Rochelle. To meet its cost without the help of his Parliament, Charles had been compelled to have recourse to forced loans and other unpopular expedients, and the issue was to be a disaster even more humiliating than that of Cadiz. In these circumstances, while this fleet in the spring of 1627 was being prepared, but its destiny still unknown, it was necessary for the King to keep on good terms with the United Provinces, and to pursue a temporizing policy with regard to the grievances that he had against them. While therefore Jacob Cats, as special ambassador from the States, was busily engaged in negotiations with the English Government in London, Charles sent on his part an envoy extraordinary to the Hague, nominally for the presentation of the Order of the Garter to the Prince of Orange, in reality to sound the disposition of the Dutch Statesmen and to make proposals to them.

The man selected to carry out this commission was the former ambassador at the Hague, Sir Dudley (now Lord) Carleton, who had returned to London in the previous year. In his secret instructions (dated May, 1627) are several interesting passages.[37 - Sir Dudley Carleton's State Letters, 1627, pp. 5-15.] The document opens thus: —

'The mayne scope of your imployment consisting of two points; the one to prevent the practices of the French, who seeke by presentation of new treatyes, and profers of summes of money, to make, as it were, a purchase of the affection of that State, and to gaine it from us; the other, to provide that no misunderstanding growe upon such overtures of pacification as are made unto us by the Spanyard; we may well consider that in cases of this nature, with people so composed as they are, there is required a very cautious proceeding… We would have you begin with declaration of our purpose constantly to continue our preparations against Spayne, as against a common enemie, in conformity to the league, offensive and defensive, betwixt us and that State, and to make the same more manifest, you shall have a list of the Shipping now sett out under our High Admiral, the Duke of Buckingham, with such as we are now further preparing for the security of these seas; and hereupon you are to require them to arme, in like manner extraordinarely to sea, according to treaty…'

Thus was Carleton to attempt to blind the Dutch statesmen as to the overtures that had been made to Spain and as to the purpose of the fleet gathered at Portsmouth. With regard to the second point, the instructions proceed: —

'We would have you take knowledge of such griefs and discontentments, as their resident Ambassador Joachimi, and Catz their extraordinary deputy, have complained of against our seamen, and thereupon make knowen the charge (wherewith you are well acquainted) we have given certaine select persons of our Council to treate with them, of all due and reasonable satisfaction for what is past, and a reglement for the future; but with all you are to remember unto them, that, as we are to have a care of their contentments, so we are not to neglect the protection we owe to our own subjects.'

And then follows a setting out of the old grievances, the Amboina affair and the differences between the East India Companies generally, and the exactions upon the Merchant Adventurers now having their Court in the staple town of Delft under the title of tare. There is no mention here of the fisheries. As regards the choice of friendship with France or with England, the instruction, after a recitation of all that the Republic has owed to English goodwill in the past, thus presents the alternative: —

'Therefore, as things may growe to greate extremity betwixt us and the French King, in case you find no disposition in the States to joyne with us in assistance, as their enemys do with France, we like well you should persuade them to hold themselves neutrall, whereby to reserve to themselves the liberty of mediation of attonement, to which we shall be at all times ready to lend a willing ear to them, as common friends. And as they may apprehend danger to their State, by want of such pecuniary ayde as is verbally presented to them by the French King as the price of their affections; or may be prest to the renewing of the triennial treaty of Compiegne, let them in their wisdomes, waigh what is the less of evils, in forbearing for a while the acceptation of the weak and faltering friendship of France, which, being in warre with England, cannot have meanes to assist them, though never so willing and constant; or provoking England to the necessity of conjoyning with their enemies, for which they cannot but know the doore is allways open to us; and then consider that when the flame betwixt France and us hath no such fewell from this country as is ministered to the French from Spayne, it will be the sooner extinguished and these crownes may be quickly reunited, not only to their ayde as formerly, but likewise to the support and restitution of such friends in Germany, in whose welfare they, with us, have common interest…'

Finally, Carleton is requested to remonstrate with the States for the difficulties they had raised to the admission of his successor at the Hague – a nephew, named Dudley Carleton like himself – to a seat in the Council of State, which had always hitherto been granted to all English ambassadors and agents since 1585.

Carleton had his first audience in the assembly of the States-General, June 14/24, and a second five days later. In the first he read an address setting forth the various objects of his diplomatic mission; in the second he asked permission of the States for the Prince of Orange to accept the Garter. In a letter dated June 27 (o.s.), to Lord Killultagh, the ambassador gives an account of a conference that he had with a deputation of the States-General, consisting of one member representing each province. 'He laid open to them', he writes, 'all that had passed from the beginning to the end', and tried to persuade them of the advantage of clinging to the English in preference to the French alliance. He found it, however, a difficult task to remove the apprehensions that were felt that Charles's quarrel with France meant a drawing nearer to Spain. Carleton, at the same time, does not scruple to point out that the fact that he has gone to Holland without any money to pay even interest on the expenses that had been incurred by the States for the maintenance of Mansfeld's English levies in 1625, or for the creditors of the Queen of Bohemia, or for preventing the forfeiture of 'His Majesty's Jewells, which are in pawn at Amsterdam', would be ruinous to his mission, and begs for the necessary cash to be sent. The money, it is needless to say, was not forthcoming, and such was the suspicion against England that, despite Carleton's efforts to secure for the English resident ambassador a seat on the Council of State, the proposal was rejected by the vote of every province separately. Nevertheless there was genuine alarm in the Netherlands that the continuance of the war between France and England would be injurious to their interests by forcing one of the combatants to seek the alliance of Spain. The missions of Cats to England and of Carleton to the Hague, though they failed in bringing about any real settlement of the differences between the two powers, at least effected an understanding that, for a time at any rate, grievances were not to be pressed. The interests of Dutch trade rendered the undisturbed passage of the Channel, free from interference by hostile fleets or cruisers, a consideration of the very utmost importance.

It was resolved, therefore, to send yet another special embassy to England to offer the mediation of the States between the belligerent powers, and to negotiate for the release of the many Dutch ships which had been seized on the high seas and kept in English harbours. The lord of Randwijk and Adrian Pauw, pensionary of Amsterdam, were accordingly sent. They arrived in London, January 25, 1628, and stayed in England some fourteen months. Carleton meantime remained at the Hague. In May of this same year the Earl of Carlisle joined him, bringing further instructions from the King. By these instructions he was bidden to assist Carleton in pressing upon the States the advantages of friendship with England in preference to France, and the necessity, if they wished to obtain it, of forbidding the construction of French war-vessels in the Dutch ports, and of punishing adequately the perpetrators of 'the foule and bloody fact' of Amboina. It will thus be seen that diplomacy during these years 1627 and 1628 was indeed busy, so busy that it is by no means easy to see light clearly amidst such a tangled web of negotiations. This is certain, that they had small result. The Prince of Orange, and his chief adviser Francis van Aerssen, had made the French alliance the sheet-anchor of their policy. They wished to be on friendly terms with England, and to bring the war, which was so injurious to Dutch interests, to a speedy conclusion, but they distrusted the intentions of Charles I, and knew that the breach with his Parliament in any case must deprive him of the resources for carrying out any bold and active intervention in the German war. They suspected, moreover, that it was not unlikely that Charles might follow in his father's footsteps and strive to help his relatives in the Palatinate by means of negotiations with Spain rather than by hostilities against that power. The efforts of Carleton and Carlisle met therefore with little or no success. The influence of Amsterdam in the States of Holland was too strong for any steps to be taken to punish those who had been concerned in the Amboina tragedy, and the English demands were met by evasion and delay. But though Carleton was unsuccessful, the envoys in London, in carrying out their task as mediators between England and France, were helped by the pressure upon Charles of the financial difficulties in which, after the assassination of Buckingham (August 23, 1628), he was becoming more and more involved. The dissolution of March, 1629, was a final breach with his Parliament. The King had therefore little or no alternative but to bring his war with France to a speedy conclusion. The Dutch envoys, on their part, did their best to remove the obstacles to an Anglo-French understanding, and peace was signed April 24, 1629.

V: 1629-1641

The foreign policy of Charles I during the eleven years of autocratic rule which followed the dissolution of Parliament in 1629, was conditioned by his lack of money. His schemes were ambitious and were obstinately pursued, and the charge that has frequently been preferred against him of inconstancy and fickleness, though it has a basis of truth, is on the whole unjust. Charles's projects had to be frequently modified, because he found himself without the means for carrying them out. In November, 1630, peace was concluded with Spain. It was his dearest desire to see the Palatinate restored to the Elector Frederick, and his sister, to whom he was much attached, freed from the necessity of living as an exile in Holland; but the cost of a military expedition to the aid of the Protestants in Germany was prohibitive. He was also suspicious of French motives and of the policy underlying their alliance with the Dutch. Perhaps at this time the predominant idea before Charles's mind was the restoration of the navy to a position of supremacy in the British seas. His most earnest endeavours were for some years directed to this end, but its attainment was seriously threatened by the close bonds which united the powerful fleets of the Dutch Republic with the growing naval strength of France.

In these circumstances, he attempted to pursue his father's policy of seeking to counterbalance the Franco-Dutch alliance by a good understanding with Spain, through whose intervention with the Emperor he hoped he might be able to secure for Frederick V some portion at any rate of his ancestral possessions. In 1631 a treaty with Spain for the partition of the Netherlands was actually drawn up, but it came to nothing, and its failure was followed by negotiations with Gustavus Adolphus. These also were fruitless, for Charles was unable to offer the Swedish King the military assistance without which the proffered alliance had no value. Hopes, however, no doubt lingered in Charles's mind that the phenomenal success of Gustavus would lead to the restoration of the Elector Palatine to his rights, but Gustavus was slain at Lützen (November, 1632), and the disastrous defeat of the Swedes and their Protestant allies at Nördlingen (August, 1634) gave a decisive superiority in Germany to the Hispano-Imperialist forces. The Habsburg family alliance had for the time completely gained the upper hand.

Charles, who had been tentatively making overtures to France, now turned once more to Spain (October, 1634) with a fresh scheme for the partition of the Netherlands, and though the time was now past for any real change in Spanish policy, a treaty was actually signed (May 1, 1635) by which the English King agreed to assist the Spaniards with a naval force against the Dutch. He had been impelled to take this step from fear of French designs. The battle of Nördlingen had had the effect of drawing the French and Dutch nearer together in the common dread of a Habsburg predominance. A treaty of subsidies was at once agreed upon, and it was followed (February, 1635) by an offensive and defensive alliance between the two powers. Both France and the United Provinces bound themselves not to make a separate peace, and it was provided that the Spanish Netherlands – the southern provinces, by the death of the Archduchess Isabel, had in 1633 reverted to Spain – should be conquered and partitioned between the two contracting parties. Charles had therefore looked to a Spanish alliance as a counterpoise to a Franco-Dutch supremacy in the 'narrow seas'. He hoped also that he might at the same time secure favourable terms for his nephew – Frederick V had died in November, 1632 – in the Palatinate. He was soon to learn by the publication of the Treaty of Prague (May 30, 1635) that the Emperor had transferred the territory and the electoral dignity of the Palatinate to the Duke of Bavaria. Direct negotiations with Vienna, backed, as they were, by no force, were barren, and Charles was compelled to see in the aid of France, who had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Swedes, two months after that with the States, his only hope for the furtherance of his nephew's interests. Richelieu had now definitely ranged himself with the two leading Protestant powers in a league against the house of Austria, and had pledged all the military and financial resources of France to the task of carrying out the policy of Henry IV, which a quarter of a century before had been rendered abortive by the dagger of Ravaillac.

The States judged this to be a fitting time to send over to England a special envoy, and Cornelis van Beveren, lord of Strevelshoek, was selected for the post. He set out for London, March 19, 1636. His instructions were to act in concert with Joachimi and the French ambassador De Senneterre, in urging Charles to join in a triple bond with the United Provinces and France for the purpose of making a combined attack upon Spain. Van Beveren was to point out that only by such a course could he lend any effectual assistance to his nephew. It was hoped that Charles Lewis, who was now residing at the English Court, would use all his influence in forwarding the objects of the mission.

The negotiations, however, were doomed to take a very different direction from what had been intended. On April 5 the Secretaries of State, Windebank and Coke, came to Van Beveren with a communication from the King. It was to the effect that Charles was preparing to send out a fleet 'to preserve and maintain his sovereignty and hereditary rights over the sea, and for the preservation and protection of commerce', and the Dutch envoy was informed that no one would in future be allowed 'to fish in the King's seas without express licence and suitable acknowledgement.' So long a time had elapsed since the last attempt at interference with the Dutch fishing that all mention of it had been omitted from the instructions of Van Beveren; it was hoped, indeed, that the question would not be revived. On Van Beveren expressing his astonishment at this sudden change of policy, and asking for the reasons which had prompted it, he was referred to the recently published Mare Clausum seu Dominium Maris, by John Selden, in which he would find a complete exposition of the King's rights and of the object he had in asserting them. This famous work, written originally, as the author himself tells us, at the command of James I, to establish the claims of the King to the exclusive sovereignty of the British seas, had for some years remained unprinted. The attention of Charles having been drawn to it, he read it carefully, and immediately commanded its publication. Its appearance in December, 1635, had thus an official character, for its principles and policy were henceforth adopted by Charles, as matters demonstrated by irrefutable proofs, and they were endorsed by English public opinion wherever Selden's treatise, which rapidly passed through two editions, was read.

Van Beveren, seriously disturbed, at once wrote home for further instructions, and his fears were not allayed when at an audience, April 15, the King declined the proffered alliance, and expressed his wish for a discussion of the question of maritime rights. His dispatch at this very time of Thomas Howard, Earl of Arundel, on a special mission to Vienna, showed indeed that he still trusted to the result of direct negotiations with the Emperor. Arundel had to pass through Holland, where his presence on such an errand warned the Dutch that the attitude of Charles was anything but friendly, and that grave dangers might be threatening them. In these circumstances the States-General, leaving Van Beveren to continue his negotiations in England, summoned Joachimi to the Hague to consult with them as to the course it was best to take should Charles persist in his purpose. They had need of his advice, for May 10/20, 1636, a proclamation was issued by the King – 'for restraint of Fishing upon His Majesty's Seas and Coasts without licence' – which plainly stated the King's intention 'to keepe such a competent strength of shipping upon Our Seas, as may by God's Blessing be sufficient, both to hinder further encroachments on Our Regalities, and assist and protect those our good Friends and Allies, who shall, henceforth, by vertue of Our Licences (to be first obtained) endeavour to take the benefit of Fishing upon our Coasts and Seas, in the places accustomed.'[38 - See note G.]

For some weeks no steps were taken to enforce the proclamation, but on July 20 news reached Van Beveren that an English fleet of fifteen vessels was ready to sail to the fishing-grounds with orders to seize as prizes any boats that refused to pay the toll. To plead for delay was the only course open to the Dutch envoy. He had an interview with the King in person at Windsor, July 27, but was able to effect nothing. Charles assured him that the object of the fleet, so far from being hostile, was intended for the protection of the fisher-folk especially against the Dunkirk pirates (from whose daring attacks they had as a matter of fact suffered much during the past few years), and that the payment of a small toll was but a recognition of the benefit they would receive. With this doubtful assurance he had perforce to rest content. On July 31 twelve ships under Vice-Admiral Pennington actually sailed northwards, and compelled the fishermen that they encountered – most of the boats had already returned home, it being late in the season – to pay the toll. No opposition was made. One of the captains of the Dutch guard-ships had, however, in consequence of his protest against these proceedings, been taken prisoner.

The Dutch Government on hearing this news took decided action. Joachimi was ordered at once to return to England, and as soon as possible to seek an audience with the King. Armed with instructions, Joachimi accordingly left Holland, August 18, convoyed by a fleet under Lieutenant-Admiral Van Dorp. He landed at Southwold, and finding that Charles was at Woodstock he made his way at once to that place. The interview took place September 3.

In accordance with his instructions the ambassador expressed their High Mightinesses astonishment that an Armada should have appeared in the midst 'of the poor fishers and herring-catchers of these lands', and had seized one of the captains of the guard-ships and caused such terror among the fisher-folk that the larger part of them had fled and dared no longer pursue their avocation. His Majesty was courteously requested to withdraw his demand for a licence and to allow the fishers to ply their trade as heretofore, and it was proposed that a conference should be held to consider the fishery question in its entirety. Joachimi did not neglect the opportunity of pointing out how closely the questions of the fisheries and of the Palatinate hung together. Charles was unmoved by these representations, and finally, September 9, declined the proposal of a conference. 'There could be no debating', he said, 'about his Majesty's rights already confirmed publickly before all the world'. The recognition of his rights was a condition which must precede negotiation. After discussion with Van Beveren, seeing that the situation was serious, Joachimi determined to return to the Hague. His start was, however, delayed by various causes, and he did not make his appearance before the States-General until November 22.

Meanwhile the aspect of affairs had not improved. Admiral Van Dorp, who had in the middle of August convoyed Joachimi to England, also had his instructions. He was first to sail with his fleet to the fishing grounds to prevent any injury being done to the fishermen. This accomplished, he was to blockade Dunkirk, and to destroy any privateers or Spanish ships cruising in the Channel. His orders were strict, that he was not to allow his ships to be visited or searched, and during his blockade of Dunkirk he was to keep a watchful eye upon the fisheries of the land and to protect them against the Spaniards or any others who should wish to molest them. These instructions were in fact a direct reply and challenge to the proclamation of King Charles.

The Dutch herring fleet having recovered from their alarm had ventured out, as was their custom, about the middle of September, to the English coasts for a second catch of fish. The Earl of Northumberland had been charged with the collection of the toll from them. He had, however, at this time but three ships with him, and learning that a Dutch squadron of sixteen sail was near at hand he promptly sent for reinforcements. In response, twelve vessels were dispatched from the Thames, October 8. Actual hostilities, however, did not take place. One large detachment of 'busses', not having a sufficient convoy, was made to pay, the rest were left unmolested. The English commander finding himself in the presence of thirteen Dutch war-ships did not venture to attack them. Both sides showed in fact more caution than aggressiveness. The authorities in Holland, however, did not approve Van Dorp's attitude and conduct, and he was requested to resign his command.

The course of events was fortunately to relieve a strain that was rapidly approaching the breaking point. Charles's negotiations with the Emperor had led to no satisfactory result. It was at last made clear to him that by this means there was no hope of obtaining a restoration of the Palatinate. Van Beveren seized the opportunity of placing himself in communication with Charles Lewis, at this time residing in London, with the hope of securing through his aid a better understanding between England and the States. Charles Lewis was only too willing in his own interests to act as intermediatory, and his influence with his uncle was great. His mother, the Queen of Bohemia, was at this time writing pressing letters to her brother begging for his active intervention, and it was urged upon King Charles that the assistance of the Dutch army and navy would be far more valuable to him than any sum of money that could be extracted in the shape of toll from the fisher fleet. On the point of the toll the King showed himself not unwilling to yield, but not one inch would he concede of his claims to the undisputed sovereignty of the sea. If he withdrew his proclamation and allowed the Dutch, as heretofore, freedom of fishing without licence, it would be in compensation for services rendered in the cause of the Palatinate, not as a right based upon ancient treaties and long usage. The Dutch, on the other hand, were keenly alive to all that was involved in any admission of such a dominion of the sea as that claimed by the English King, and were determined not to grant it. On Charles's side, however, financial difficulties at this time rendered any straightforward course impracticable. The King had not the means to fit out an expedition for the help of his nephew, and he hovered hither and thither between divergent policies in the vain hope that without recourse to a Parliament he could find some way of furthering the cause of Charles Lewis, without involving himself in an outlay that he was unable to meet. Scheme after scheme floated before his mind, all of them equally visionary when confronted with the stern realities of impecuniousness. From Ferdinand and Philip he turned to Richelieu. The French armies were advancing in Lorraine and Elsass, and were co-operating with the Dutch in the Netherlands, and with the Swedes and their Protestant allies in Germany. For awhile it appeared as if Richelieu were inclined to an English alliance. In February and March, 1637, a treaty was indeed actually drawn up. It is strongly suspected, however, that the Cardinal was never in real earnest, and only wished to amuse the English King with negotiations, and thus at any rate keep him back from purchasing Spain's goodwill on the Rhine by an offer to take part in a joint naval attack upon the United Provinces. Charles was quite aware of the solidarity of the bond which united France and the States, and that a French alliance implied friendly relations with the Dutch. On February 13 therefore he sent the Secretary of State, Coke, to Van Beveren, who was still in London, to reopen direct negotiations. It was now proposed that there should be a combined Anglo-Dutch naval expedition in which a French squadron should be invited to participate, which, after driving the Spanish fleets from the sea, should effect a landing in the Peninsula and dictate terms to Philip IV. Meanwhile the King expressed his willingness to allow the Dutch fishermen to pursue their industry along the coasts of his kingdoms freely and without hindrance. During the following season the English fleet would blockade the Flemish ports, but would not appear on the fishing grounds nor make any demands for licences. But with this latter concession the States were not satisfied. Such an act of toleration implied that Charles maintained to the full his claim to the undisputed sovereignty of the sea. He would not during the time of the allied operations press his rights to issue licences and exact toll, he only waived them as a favour. Further than this he could not go. On the question of the dominium maris, despite the earnest entreaties of Charles Lewis, he refused any compromise. But on the other side there was no less obstinacy. The Prince of Orange himself wrote (March 1) to Van Beveren, that he was on no account to commit himself or assent to any terms unless the proclamation concerning the fishing licences was first withdrawn. With France the negotiations for an alliance appeared to be proceeding smoothly, the treaty lay ready for signature, and on March 4 Charles sent full powers to his ambassador at Paris to conclude the matter. On the 23rd came the news that difficulties had arisen, and that France also required that the proclamation should be withdrawn, at least during the period of the treaty. But Charles, though the negotiations still dragged on, absolutely declined to discuss a question which concerned his rights and honour, and so he now once more lent a not unwilling ear to the tempting offers made to him by the Spanish ambassador. Spain was willing in return for an offensive and defensive alliance against the United Provinces to recognize the King's sovereign rights on the seas, and to hand over at once the Lower Palatinate. They even went so far as to promise the surrender of certain towns in Flanders as pledges for the ultimate restitution of the Upper Palatinate and the electoral dignity to Charles Lewis. It is extremely doubtful whether these proposals were serious, in any case they were not seriously entertained.

The mere prospect of an Anglo-Spanish agreement had, however, the effect which Charles probably intended it to have in making the French and Dutch more conciliatory. Negotiations were resumed, and the fishery question by mutual consent was relegated to the background. It was finally arranged that a conference should be held at Hamburg at the end of June to settle the terms of a quadruple alliance between France, England, the United Provinces, and Sweden. Terms of peace were to be laid before the Emperor by the four powers conjointly. In case of their rejection the King of England was to declare war against Austria and Spain. Everything now seemed to be working smoothly, and no one doubted that the conference would meet and that its issue would be favourable. The Dutch fishermen had not been interfered with, and such was the confidence in the States that England had now finally thrown in her lot with the coalition against the house of Austria, that instructions were sent to Van Beveren to return home where his presence was required.

Nevertheless the Dutch after his recall did not show any eagerness to proceed. Reflection made them doubtful about Charles's bona fides. They misliked the high pretensions of the English to the sovereignty of the seas, for in his insistence on this point the King was but voicing the sentiment of his people. It was becoming a really grave issue of practical politics. With astonishment the Dutch learnt that Charles had even given a patent granting exclusive rights of fishing off the shores of Newfoundland, and had forbidden foreigners to fish in those waters without his licence, April, 1637. If he claimed the right to do this, where was the line to be drawn? Under pressure from their French allies, Charles van Cracauw, the ambassador of the States in Denmark, was at length appointed to represent the United Provinces at the Hamburg Conference, but his instructions were not drawn up, and he continued to reside for some time longer in Copenhagen. Throughout the whole of 1637 the Dutch could not be moved to take any further steps in the matter. In the letters of Hugo Grotius (at this time Swedish resident ambassador at Paris) to the Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna many interesting references are made to the attitude of the States, and it must be remembered that Grotius not only had access to the best sources of information, but had an unrivalled acquaintance with the question which was uppermost in the minds of all Dutch statesmen, the freedom of the sea and of the fisheries. On June 4, the very day after the nomination of Cracauw as delegate for the conference, Grotius writes: —

'The ambassador of the States in England informs me that the Spaniards there have great power – that they wish that the restitution of the Palatinate should be regarded as a certain thing; that they promise aid for the safeguarding of the possession of the sea against the Dutch. Would that these things were not true! The same adds that proposals were made by the Spaniards that after the death of this Bavarian the electoral law should be altered, conditions were even offered by the Spaniard to the English, if they could be dragged into war against the Dutch Republic, which however I do not fear. For I see that the action of the English is principally directed to the aim of having their commerce into all nations free and to deprive others of theirs. The Dutch had formed a hope that the contest about the fishery would this year be at rest; but I see that the English envoys, who are here [at Paris] hold that for uncertain.'