Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

A fortnight later (June 18) occurs the following passage: —

'After I had written this there came to me the English Envoy Extraordinary, Lord Leicester… He says, that Northumberland (to whom he is nearly related) is again about to disturb the Dutch in their liberty of using the sea, unless the Dutch purchase it by great services to the Palatine house and by declarations not injurious to English rights. I, restraining myself from a definite declaration about the controversy, have been content to demonstrate, how necessary liberty of fishing was to that Republic and how necessary the Republic itself to the security of all Europe.[39 - Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstierna's Skrifter och Brefvexling, Hugo Grotii bref, ii. 1633-9, pp. 335-58.]

Such being the feelings and the relations subsisting between the two countries, it can excite no astonishment that the States were exceedingly cautious before committing themselves to an alliance, which might entail further sacrifice upon them, and tie their hands in a matter of primary importance to their welfare. According to Grotius, proposals were made for holding the conference at the Hague instead of Hamburg, in order to make sure of Dutch co-operation. But they came to nothing. Charles, however, in the spring of 1638 appears to have been really in earnest. Again and again the English Resident at the Hague appeared before the States-General to urge them to send a representative to the conference. Not, however, until fresh pressure had been put upon them in the name of France and Sweden by the French ambassador, D'Estampes, were definite orders sent to Van Cracauw to go to Hamburg, April 8. Even now he did not have any powers given to him to negotiate as plenipotentiary, but was required to refer all matters to the States-General for their decision. Already, on March 4, a new treaty had been concluded between France and Sweden for the joint prosecution of the war, but the quadruple alliance was never accomplished. Difficulties and intrigues prevented the ratification either of the Anglo-French or Anglo-Swedish Treaties, and the States were more than half-hearted in the business. The ill success of the young Elector Palatine, who had taken the field in the spring of this year at the head of a force raised by the help of his uncle Charles I, virtually brought the conference to an end. Charles Lewis's army was completely defeated at Lemco on October 8. Differences, which had been for some little time endangering the friendly relations of England and France, now came to a head.[40 - Grotii bref, April 9, 1639, p. 595, 'video cum dolore inter Anglos et Gallos veteres recrudescere inimicitias.'] The representatives of the powers gathered at Hamburg, only to disperse without result. The long drawn out negotiations gave birth to nothing but sterile discussions. The outbreak, indeed, of the troubles in Scotland regarding 'Laud's Liturgy', and the resistance that was being offered to the collection of ship-money, effectually crippled Charles's efforts on behalf of his nephew in Germany. Richelieu no longer saw any advantage in tying his hands by entering into an alliance which promised so little. He preferred therefore to cut himself adrift from the English connexion, and to trust to his alliances with Sweden and the United Provinces[41 - Grotii bref, April 23, 1639, p. 602, 'Haud equidem affirmaverim, quod suspicantur Angli, Gallicis pecuniis sustentari Scoticam factionem pauperiorem ceteroqui quam ut bello diu sufficiat. Creduntur autem id facere Galli, non tantum ex aemulatu vetere, verum etiam quod cum Batavi nunc consilia socient ad capienda Flandriae oppida maritima, quod cum solus prohibere possit Anglus, domestico ob id negotio distinendus sit.'] for pushing on the war vigorously. It was not for Protestantism that he was fighting, but for the aggrandizement of France at the cost of the House of Habsburg.

This failure of his efforts to bring about, in conjunction with France, a coalition of the Protestant powers for the reconquest of the Palatinate and the restoration of his nephew to his electoral dignity and possessions, made Charles turn his eyes once more to Spain. The presence at the English Court of Mary de Medicis and the Duchess de Chevreuse in 1638 gave fresh life to that party, who had always favoured a Spanish alliance. The news that the Spaniards were making great preparations for a determined attack upon the United Provinces led the King to hope that, despite previous disappointments, he might be able to forward by friendly negotiations with Spain the cause of Charles Lewis. The help of the English fleet could not but be serviceable to a Spanish naval expedition, and possibly Charles had visions of being able to attain through this means that undisputed sovereignty of the British seas which, since the publication of Selden's book, he had set before himself, as we have seen, as one of the chief and unchangeable objects of his policy, and at the same time, perhaps, the pecuniary assistance he so much needed for the suppression of the Scottish rebellion against his authority. With characteristic uncertainty and wavering, however, while negotiating with Spain, the King did not cease his endeavours to gain French support for his nephew. The Spanish preparations caused uneasiness in Paris, as well as at the Hague, and the English fleet was an asset not to be despised in the event of a Spanish armada threatening to dominate the Channel. The death of Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar in July, 1639, left the powerful force of mercenaries which he had commanded without a leader. Charles wished to buy their services for the Elector Palatine, but he could only do this through the good offices of Richelieu, who was already offering good terms to the 'Bernardines' to enter the French service. A treaty between the French Government and the chief officers of the 'Bernardine' army was in fact on the point of being concluded, when Charles Lewis made his appearance at the head-quarters with a supply of English money and tried to induce the leaders to place themselves under his command, as an independent force. The result was his immediate arrest by Richelieu's command, October, 1639. He was imprisoned at Vincennes for several months. This act was a final breach of good relations between France and England.

Meanwhile Charles's approaches to Spain had been equally unfortunate. The Cardinal Infant, Ferdinand, the victor of Nördlingen, had, as Governor-General of the Netherlands, been successful in the conduct of the war against the Dutch and French in the years 1638 and 1639. In the latter year Olivares determined to dispatch a powerful Spanish reinforcement by sea to the Netherlands to take part in the next campaign. Accordingly, early in September, a fleet left the Spanish ports consisting of seventy-seven vessels, many of them of the largest size, commanded by a veteran admiral who had seen much service, Antonio de Oquendo. Its object was to disembark at Dunkirk an expeditionary force of 10,000 men. A Dutch squadron had been cruising in the Channel all the summer, keenly on the look-out for the Spaniards, under the command of Lieutenant-Admiral Martin Harpertzoon Tromp. On September 16 he sighted the armada. He had with him at the moment only thirteen ships. But without hesitation he fiercely attacked the Spaniards, and after a tremendous fight he forced Oquendo to fly for refuge to the English coast. Oquendo, after passing through the Straits of Dover, anchored under the lee of the Downs, side by side with an English squadron of ten ships under Vice-Admiral Pennington. Tromp sent at once urgent messages to Holland for reinforcements. With a squadron that joined him from Dunkirk he lay in the offing blockading the Spanish fleet in the Downs. In all the harbours of Holland and Zeeland the greatest efforts were now made to send every available ship to sea at the earliest moment. Day by day Tromp's fleet increased in number. His orders were uncompromising. He was to attack the Spaniards wherever he found them, as soon as he was in a position to do so with success. Accordingly, on October 21, being now at the head of a fleet of 105 sail with 12 fireships, the Dutch admiral, although the Spaniards still lay in English waters, resolved to take the offensive. Detaching thirty ships under Vice-Admiral De With to watch Pennington, he sailed straight for the enemy's galleons as they sheltered under the cliffs between Dover and Deal. The contest was sharp, but decisive. Under cover of a fog, Oquendo himself with seven vessels made his way to Dunkirk. All the rest were captured or destroyed. Some 15,000 Spaniards perished, about 1,800 were taken prisoners. The Dutch only lost two ships and about 100 killed and wounded. Tromp had won one of the most crushing of naval victories, and had annihilated the power of Spain upon the sea.

This daring infringement of English neutrality could not but give deep offence to King Charles, and be hurtful to the feelings of the English people. It was at once felt in the States that an explanation must be offered for the instructions given to Tromp, which had been so successfully carried out. It was accordingly resolved to dispatch a special envoy to London, and Francis van Aerssen (now generally known as Lord of Sommelsdijk) was himself chosen to undertake the difficult mission. His instructions were that he should complain of the help frequently afforded to the Spaniards by the English, and plead that the attack of Tromp at the Downs was a necessary sequel to the previous encounter from which the Spanish fleet had fled to seek refuge in English waters, and that it was justified by Art. 15 of the Treaty of Southampton. He was further to express the readiness of the States to conclude with the King a fresh treaty of alliance. Sommelsdijk found everything against him. The King was very angry at the gross affront to his honour and his sovereignty of the seas, and the most influential of his counsellors, among them Strafford and Laud, were strongly anti-Dutch. The affair was made an excuse for pressing forward the collection of ship-money, and the Spanish party continually gained strength. The Queen-Mother of France and Madame Chevreuse, who were then at the English Court, did their utmost to further the cause of Spain, and there was talk of cementing an alliance by the marriage of the Princess Royal with the heir to the Spanish crown.

Sommelsdijk, finding he could effect no good result, asked permission to return to Holland.[42 - Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau, 2nd ser., iii. 171, 'dès aussitôt que j'auray endormi le faict des Duyns, qui est le seul object de ma commission.'] He probably knew that Charles was anxious not to break with the States, for his request brought about a change in the King's demeanour. Charles requested him to remain, and showed himself more friendly. On January 16 the ambassador, whose correspondence with Frederick Henry at this time is of great interest, wrote to the Stadholder that he was not without some hopes now of soothing the resentment of the King by abstaining as far as possible from the irritating topic of the Downs, and letting it fall into oblivion by drawing his attention to other subjects of discussion. Sommelsdijk had persuasive manners, and by the exercise of patience, tact, and conciliation, he did succeed to a large extent in his aim. He was much helped in his task by another negotiation which was now set on foot. Frederick Henry, in this same month of January, 1640, sent over a secret envoy, Jan van der Kerkhoven, Lord of Heenvliet, to propose a marriage between his only son and an English princess. The matter had been first suggested by Marie de Medicis during a visit to the Hague in 1638. The proposal was favourably received, and became the ground for a long-continued struggle between the Spanish and the Franco-Dutch factions at Court. In the meantime, gradually 'the bitterness of the pill' of the Downs was 'sweetened' by marriage negotiations, and the 'scandal' of the infringement of the King's sovereignty over his own waters was, if not forgiven, at least overlooked.

The King saw in fact that it was wiser to keep silence. Spain was clearly a broken reed, and the Dutch had given a signal proof of their possession of a naval strength that it would be dangerous to challenge. Sommelsdijk was quite content on his part to let the matter drop. On February 8, 1646, he wrote to the Stadholder[43 - Archives de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau, 2nd ser., iii. 200, 201.]: —

'The scandal of the Downs has been so thoroughly justified, that the greater part of the Council, in the presence of the King, has sustained that we both could and were obliged to do it; so it is sufficiently lulled to sleep, seeing that up to now there has not been made any further complaint. As long as I remain I will take good care that neither on one occasion nor another shall it be revived.'[43] (#cn_42)

And two days later (February 10) he wrote again: —

'It is not our business to stir up again the affair of the Downs. If we were to press for an answer, it could be none other than condemnation after so much noise and menaces; silence then must suffice us, as a kind of answer, in place of an open approval, which neither the state of the time or of men's minds permits one to hope.'

Sommelsdijk had judged rightly that his mission, so far as the matter of the Downs was concerned, had achieved all the success that was necessary.

The truth is that Charles, though his pride had been so deeply hurt by the destruction of the Spanish fleet in the presence of an English squadron close to the English shore, was secretly displeased with the Spaniards for having, so to speak, forced his hands in the matter. It was generally assumed at the time, and the statement has frequently been made in histories since, that Charles was aware of the intention of the Spanish admiral to make use of the anchorage at the Downs, should it be necessary for him to seek a place of refuge either from storms or hostile attacks, and that he had previously given permission for him to do so before the fleet left the Spanish harbours. This was not the case. A dispatch[44 - Clarendon State Papers, ii. 71.] from the Secretary of State, Windebank, to Sir Arthur Hopton, the English ambassador at Madrid, dated September 29 (o.s.), that is nearly three weeks after the arrival of Oquendo at the Downs, is conclusive testimony to the contrary. It runs as follows: —

'Your lordship's dispatch of the 3/13 September gives account of a message delivered to you by the Secretary of the Council of War in the King's [Philip IV] name, that he was resolved to put his great fleet to sea for the transportation of his forces to Dunkirk, with intention to chastise the insolences of the French and Hollanders; and thereupon desired his Majesty to afford the fleet a good passage in his seas and accommodations in his harbours, with supplies of the necessary commodities, if it should happen to put into any of them. These letters though they came in extraordinary diligence, yet they arrived not until the fleet had been here in the Downs some days. Now that so great a force of near seventy vessels should put into any of his Majesty's ports, with such numbers of men of war, without his Majesty's leave at all, or so much as his knowledge until they were actually in the ports, besides the neglect and disrespect, is beyond the articles of the peace, and gives occasion enough of jealousy, and would no question be taken highly by them, had his Majesty done the like within their dominions. I am sure it has cast his Majesty into some difficulties and jealousies with the French and Hollanders, and what prejudice it may bring upon his treaties with them is much to be apprehended. It is very true that Don Alonso [the Spanish ambassador, de Cardenas] gave some intimation when his Majesty was in the North that some vessels were preparing in Spain for the transportation of forces into Flanders, and desired his Majesty would not take apprehension at it, but that they might have a friendly reception and treatment in his ports, as occasion should be presented. But he spoke not of so great a number nor such a strength; and it was to be presumed he had meant no other than those English merchant ships that first transported the 1,400 or 1,500 soldiers, and were intercepted and visited by the Hollanders… When the fleet was come in, notwithstanding they were in distress, having been shrewdly torn and beaten by only seventeen of the Holland ships in their first encounter (a shameful thing, considering the number of the Spanish ships and their vastness, and their ostentation before to chastise both the French and the Hollanders), they refused to do the usual duties by striking to the King's ships; insomuch as Sir John Pennington, our Vice-Admiral, was enforced to threaten to shoot them, if they did it not, and then, after some dispute and much unwillingness, it was yielded to.'

Nothing can be more clear from this whole statement of the situation than the two facts that the Spaniards were not expected, and that they were unwelcome guests.

Why then, it may well be asked, did Charles endure their presence so long in English waters, when it was known that the Dutch were collecting a great fleet in the offing? or why, having endured, did he not take steps to secure his guests from attack by a plain declaration that any breach of neutrality would be treated as a declaration of war and would be resisted by the English admiral? It was because he hoped to be paid for his protection. 'It must be money that must carry the business', wrote Windebank to Hopton. Charles in fact asked for £150,000 sterling, of which £50,000 was to be paid at once; and the Cardinal Infant was busily engaged in obtaining the required sum from the Antwerp money-lenders, when the blow fell and there ceased to be any longer a Spanish fleet to protect. As a striking instance, however, of the diplomatic double-dealing of the times, and one peculiarly characteristic of Stuart policy, it may be mentioned that a dispatch of the French ambassador, Bellievre, dated October 9, testifies to the fact that the Queen was at this very time in the name of the King promising the French Government that, if they would consent to the Palatine prince assuming command of the late Duke Bernhard's army, 'le roi feroit tout ce que nous et les Hollandois pourrons souhaiter en leur faveur contre la flotte d'Espagne, sans néanmoins se déclarer ennemi, en sorte toutefois que les Hollandois auroient lieu d'entreprendre et de faire tout ce que bon leur sembleroit.'[45 - Ranke, Englische Geschichte, ii. 362.] Hence the explanation of Pennington's inactivity. Charles was in reality far more angry that Tromp had marred his prospects of striking a good bargain with one or other of the belligerents than at his venturing to infringe a neutrality which was actually in the market. He had not reckoned on the Dutch being able to put so formidable a fleet to sea in so short a time, or bold enough to strike home with such tremendous energy and effect.

Charles, however, should not be altogether blamed for not pursuing at this crisis of his reign a firmer and more consistent policy. Scotland was in rebellion, and he had no funds to raise an army strong enough to restore order. He was face to face with seething disaffection in England. In April, 1640, he found himself compelled, after an interval of ten years, to summon a Parliament in the hopes of obtaining a grant of supplies. Supplies were refused until grievances were amended, and the Short Parliament, as it was called, was dissolved after sitting three weeks. The Long Parliament was to meet in November. It is no wonder that in such circumstances the King became a pure opportunist in his conduct of foreign policy. His domestic troubles and his financial bankruptcy made it exceedingly difficult for him to steer a straightforward course. The bitter pill of the battle of the Downs had to be swallowed, however disagreeable it might be. It was an accomplished fact, the results of which could not be undone save by war against France and the States, which was in 1640 absolutely impossible. His high pretensions to the sovereignty of the seas, and his claims to demand licences for the fisheries could no longer be insisted upon, his whole interest and attention henceforward were concentrated on the struggle with his own subjects and the maintenance of his sovereign rights within his own Kingdoms.

The proposal therefore for a marriage between the young prince William of Nassau and one of the English princesses was not unwelcome. The Princes of Orange were not of royal rank, but they filled a position of so much dignity and influence in the United Provinces, that it was felt that a union between the families might be advantageous to Charles in securing to him the goodwill of the Dutch in the dangers and difficulties which were thickening round his throne. William was only fifteen years of age, and at first the hand of the younger princess Elizabeth was proposed, that of the Princess Royal being assigned to a Spanish Infant. But Elizabeth was only five years old, the prospect of a Spanish match fell through, and at last in February, 1641, it was arranged that Mary the Princess Royal should be the bride.

The greater part of one of the volumes of the archives of the House of Orange-Nassau, edited by Groen van Prinsterer, is filled with the negotiations concerning this marriage, and the study of the endless notes and dispatches on the subject is replete with interest both for the student of the manners of the times, and because they contain many passages giving lifelike and charming touches concerning the Court of Charles I and Henrietta Maria, and their intimate domestic life. Here it is not possible to treat the subject in greater detail.

The proposed marriage was very popular in England, whose people saw in it the definite adhesion of the King, after many tergiversations, to the Protestant cause. On May 2, Prince William disembarked at Gravesend and proceeded to London in great state to meet his fiancée. He was convoyed from Holland by a strong squadron under the command of Admiral Tromp; and was accompanied by the special envoys, Brederode, Aerssen van Sommelsdijk, Heenvliet, and the resident ambassador, Joachimi. In their report to the Stadholder of the reception (May 2, 1641), the envoys write:

'We had to pass through so many people, it was almost impossible to reach the Court, except for the good order which was kept from street to street. Your Highness could not imagine with what blessings and acclamations his Highness was received, and we would venture to say that not for a century has a reception taken place in which great and small have testified so much joy and satisfaction.'

It was to be the last glimmer of brightness in the life of Charles and Henrietta Maria. The boy and girl, aged respectively fifteen and ten years, were married in state on May 12, 1641, in the chapel at Whitehall – a marriage destined to sorrow, but which was to have such important results upon the future relations of England and the United Provinces. Nine years later William was suddenly cut off by an attack of small-pox in the midst of a promising career. A week after his death Mary gave birth to a son, who was to be famous in history as William III, Prince of Orange and King of England.

VI: 1641-1653

The marriage of the Princess Royal with the son of Frederick Henry, Prince of Orange, on May 12, 1641, took place at an ominous time. Ten days later Strafford was executed. There can be little or no doubt, that the eagerness of the King and Queen for the accomplishment of this union was due to the desire to secure the goodwill of the Stadholder, and through him of the States, in the troublous times which they saw before them. It fulfilled two objects. It gave satisfaction to the Puritan party in England as being a Protestant alliance, and it was accompanied by secret assurances on the part of Frederick Henry of friendly support to the King in his coming conflict with his subjects. These assurances, we may well believe, were very guarded and strictly personal, for no one knew better than the Stadholder the limitations of his actual power. The following passage from a letter in the hand of Sommelsdijk, written March 5 in the name of the envoys to Frederick Henry, puts the matter very clearly:

'We have found so much frankness and affection on the part of the King and Queen for the furtherance of the marriage, that we have no fear in recommending your Highness to hasten the departure of Monseigneur the Prince your son, as much as possible, so as to put everything in security; for their Majesties have resolved to push forward without allowing themselves to be stopped by any machinations to the contrary from whatever part they come, and whatever they write to you, upon the good faith and confidence of Mr. de Heenvliet, remains secret without anything of it escaping either here or there, for fear lest the cognizance of it should come to the knowledge of the Parliament.'[46 - Archives, 2nd series, iii. 381.]

William returned to Holland at the end of May alone, leaving his child-bride for awhile in her parents' home. But the Grand Remonstrance, the impeachment of the five members, and other events now followed in rapid succession, and soon it was seen that the issues which divided King and Parliament admitted of no accommodation by peaceful means. Heenvliet, who was still in England, became the trusted confidant of the distracted King and Queen, and his letters to Frederick Henry at this time show how anxious Charles was to avoid a civil war, if by any concessions that did not utterly despoil him – 'le dèpouiller tout-à-fait' – he could come to terms with the Parliament. In private interviews Henrietta Maria was urgent with Heenvliet to use his good offices, and many times expressed the hope that should matters come to an extremity 'the Prince would not allow the King to perish'. In reply the Stadholder impressed upon their Majesties not to have recourse to arms, for victory was uncertain. A reconciliation on whatever terms could not but be to the profit and advantage of the King. Unfortunately such advice was already too late to be of any avail (February, 1642).

At the beginning of March Henrietta Maria accompanied the Princess Royal to Holland. Her real object was to collect funds and to secure, if possible, the active assistance of the Prince of Orange. She was received with much distinction and magnificence, but her thoughts were not upon the shows of state. Letter upon letter passed from her to the Stadholder in his camp, begging him to help her in procuring supplies of money, arms, men, and munitions of war for her husband's service. She tried to borrow upon her jewels, but the Jews would give her nothing without the guarantee of the Prince. Lords Jermyn and Digby hurried backwards and forwards upon her confidential missions, and she had many interviews with Heenvliet, with whom she had become so intimate during his sojourn in London. What a picture of the feverish state of anxiety to which her troubles had brought the once gay and buoyant Henrietta Maria, is contained in a report of one of her conversations with him sent by Heenvliet to the Prince of Orange.

'I confess that this interview has troubled me not a little. The Queen did not speak to me on the subject without trembling, and she kept asking me so piteously, if there were not any hope that by any means your Highness could be persuaded to assist her, that I am still troubled at it.'

Frederick Henry did his very best to give all the help he could, both in his private and official capacity. He allowed the English officers serving in his army to return home and join the King's forces, where their services were of great value. He gave the guarantee she required for a loan upon the Crown jewels, he advanced a considerable sum of money out of his private purse, and he connived at arms and ammunition being secretly bought and sent to England from Dutch ports; but he was unable to promise any assistance from the States, nor indeed could he venture even to suggest it. The bulk of the Dutch people in the opening stages of the Civil War took the side of the Parliament, more especially the Hollanders. The Prince's influence could still command the support of a majority in the States-General, but he, like all the Stadholders of his House, had constantly to struggle with the opposition of the aristocratic burgher-regents of the towns of Holland, who controlled the States of that dominant province. Maurice had crushed by force in 1618 the attempt of Oldenbarneveldt to claim for each province of the Union independent sovereign rights, but the spirit of Oldenbarneveldt survived, and the Hollanders, conscious of the power of the purse that they possessed, were ready to thwart the plans and policy of the Stadholders, though these were supported by the other provinces, and indeed did thwart them by raising difficulties in the way of obtaining supplies. Frederick Henry, during the first decade of his Stadholderate, exercised a larger personal authority in the direction of the affairs of the Republic than any of his predecessors or successors. But during the last years of his life, prematurely worn out by constant campaigning, he had continually to confront the bitter opposition of the town corporations of Holland to that vigorous prosecution of the war that he desired. The Prince of Orange then was not his own master, and could not in face of the strong leanings of a large part of the population, in Holland particularly, towards the Parliamentary cause in the Civil War give effect to his own inclination to lend the King active support in his efforts to suppress rebellion by armed force.

Matters came to a crisis when, at the end of August, a special envoy from the Parliament, Walter Strickland, appeared at the Hague with instructions to protest against the dispatch of warlike stores to the King from Dutch ports, and the permitting of officers in the Dutch service to join his army. The Queen was highly indignant. The English resident ambassador, Boswell, at her bidding immediately presented himself before the States-General to protest and demand that Strickland should not be received or acknowledged. To the Prince she wrote, September 6, 1642, begging him to prevent such an affront being offered to the King, 'for assuredly', to quote her actual words, 'it would be so great, that he could never have any friendship with these States after this; and, God be thanked, he is not yet in such a state as to be despised.' But although the majority of the States-General were ready to refuse Strickland any audience, they were forced by the insistance of the States of Holland to make a compromise. They would not admit him to the assembly of the States-General, but they agreed to send two deputies to confer with him. The result was, again by the pressure of Holland, that the States-General declared for strict neutrality, and forbade the export to either side in the Civil War of arms or munitions of war. Despite this prohibition, by the connivance of the Stadholder, friends of the royal cause contrived to dispatch ammunition and other stores to Dunkirk, and from thence to ship it to England. Strickland, having heard of this, ventured to make a written complaint to the States-General of the Prince's conduct. Frederick Henry thereupon declared that such an aspersion was an insult to his person and demanded satisfaction. The States-General, May 7, 1643, declared thereupon the accusation of Strickland to be false, and broke off all relations with him.

Henrietta Maria had returned to England the previous February, never ceasing to the end her tireless efforts on her husband's behalf. Before leaving she had broached the project of a second alliance between the families, that of the Prince of Wales with the eldest daughter of the Stadholder. It was not a mere ephemeral project, for the following year a certain Dr. Goff, who had been chaplain to one of the English regiments in the Dutch service, was sent over by the Queen, with a letter in which she says 'from me you will only know that the King my lord has given me full and authentic powers to negotiate and to conclude the marriage of my son the Prince of Wales with Mademoiselle d'Orange.' With these powers Dr. Goff was entrusted. In his instructions were contained the onerous conditions, which must be the price paid for the honour of such a match. The States were to break with France unless the latter would consent to give armed assistance to the King, or in default of this to make peace with Spain, one of the conditions of such a peace being a promise of help to Charles. It is needless to say that the proposal was not acceptable, for the simple reason that Frederick Henry had no power to comply with the conditions, even if he had wished. The negotiations, however, went on all through 1645, although the desperate state of the King's affairs after the battle of Naseby rendered any successful issue impossible. Louise of Nassau became shortly afterwards the wife of the Great Elector.

In 1644 two envoys, William Boreel and Jan van Rheede, were sent to England to attempt to mediate between the King and the Parliament. Their instructions, containing fifty-seven articles, are dated October 6, 1643, but they did not actually set out until January 15 following. They had interviews with Lord Denbigh, Sir Harry Mildemay, and Sir William Strickland, representing the Parliament, and afterwards, February 19, an audience with the King in the hall of Christ Church at Oxford. During the whole of the year 1644 they remained in England, and took part in the abortive negotiations of Uxbridge, which came to an end February 22, 1645. It became now evident to the ambassadors that they could do no further good, more especially as the Parliament more and more showed a disinclination to accept foreign mediation. After farewell audiences they reached the Hague again, May 4, 1645, and made their report to the States-General. It was unfavourable to the attitude of the Parliament. On being informed of this by their representative, Strickland, who was again at the Hague, the Parliament requested him to appear before the States-General and offer a justification on their behalf in reply to Boreel and Van Rheede. The States-General, by the votes of Utrecht, Groningen, Zeeland, and Overyssel against Holland, Gelderland, and Friesland, refused him admission, while at the same time they permitted the King's resident, Boswell, to appear in their assembly and address them. The Parliament on this had their justification printed in English and Dutch, and secretly distributed throughout the Provinces. It was eagerly read, the mass of the people being in favour of what they regarded as the cause of civil and religious freedom against despotic rule, especially as there were many points of resemblance between the struggle in England and their own long drawn out struggle against Spanish tyranny. This marked division of opinion in the Netherlands effectually prevented any further steps being taken to interfere in English affairs during the two next years.

Events, however, had been moving fast during that interval. On March 14, 1647, Frederick Henry died. At the very end of his life he had deserted the French alliance, of which he had so long been a strong advocate, and had joined his great influence to that of the Province of Holland in bringing about a separate peace with Spain. With the increasing growth of the military strength of France, the project of a division of the Spanish Netherlands with that power ceased to have attractions for him. At the time of his death all the conditions of peace with Spain had been practically settled, the terms being virtually those dictated by the Dutch. By the treaty which was actually signed at Munster, January 30, 1648, Spain, after eighty years of strife, was at last compelled to recognize the independence of the United Provinces, and all the conquests made by Frederick Henry in Flanders, Brabant, and Limburg remained in the hands of the Dutch, as prizes of war. At this proud moment in commerce, in sea-borne trade, in finance, in colonial expansion and enterprise, in arts and in letters, the Dutch Republic had reached the zenith of its prosperity. The Civil War in England had paralysed the energies of its chief rival upon the seas, and left the way clear for the United Provinces to step into the very first rank of maritime powers.

Frederick Henry was succeeded in his posts and dignities by his son. William II, Prince of Orange, had only reached his twenty-second year at the time of his father's death, but he was full of talent and energy, fired with ambition, eager to emulate the great deeds of his ancestors, and, if possible, to excel them. His wife, Mary of England, was still a girl. Haughty in manner, and exceedingly tenacious of her royal rank, she preferred always to be styled the Princess Royal, rather than Princess of Orange. The relations between the youthful pair were, however, thoroughly sympathetic, and William was ever ready to lend a helping hand to his English relations and never made any secret of his zeal in their cause. His hospitality to them was unbounded, and his purse open. First, the Duke of York made his escape from England to Holland, April, 1648, and he was followed by the Prince of Wales in July. As the Queen of Bohemia was still residing at the Hague with her daughters, quite a family party were assembled at the Court of William and Mary. The Prince of Wales, who was courteously received by a deputation of the States-General, found a loyal squadron assembled at Hellevoetsluys, of which he assumed command. He also raised some troops for his service in the islands of Borkum and Juist. There was at one time danger of a collision in Dutch waters between the royal ships and a Parliamentary squadron under the Earl of Warwick. The Parliament dispatched an envoy, Dr. Doreslaar, a native of Enkhuysen, who had settled in England and had become Professor of History at Cambridge, to protest against the protection and assistance accorded to the royalists. The States-General refused to grant him an audience. Towards the close of the year, Walter Strickland was again sent to the Hague, furnished with fresh credentials, to join Dr. Doreslaar and demand in the name of the Parliament that the royal fleet should not be furnished with arms and stores in Dutch harbours. He was escorted by Lord Warwick, with a fleet of twenty-one ships. The States-General took steps to prevent a hostile encounter between the rival fleets, but could not be moved even to give a hearing to the Parliament's request. The States of Holland, however, received Doreslaar, and passed a resolution forbidding the royal ships and stores to remain in the harbours of that province.

The news of the impending trial of Charles I for high-treason caused consternation in the States, and especially in Orangist circles. The Prince of Wales himself, who had now handed over the command of his fleet to Prince Rupert and was residing with his brother-in-law at the Hague, appeared in person before the States-General to ask them to intercede for his father. All parties concurred in granting his request, and it was unanimously resolved that an extraordinary embassy should be sent to London, and in order to strip it of any appearance of partisanship, the chosen envoy was not an Orangist, but Adrian Pauw, lord of Heemstede, the veteran leader of the Aristocratic-Hollander party. With him was associated Albert Joachimi, who through the whole of the Civil War had remained at his post, as resident ambassador in London. Besides his credentials, Pauw carried with him letters for Fairfax, Cromwell, and other Parliamentary leaders. The embassy was received with courtesy Feb. 5/Jan. 26, 1649, and Pauw pressed for an immediate audience. It was too late. On the following day the death sentence was pronounced. The envoys now approached, Sunday, Feb. 7/Jan. 28, Fairfax, Cromwell, and others privately, asking for a respite of the sentence, but failed to get any definite answer. On the Monday they were granted an audience at a special sitting of the House of Commons, and in the name of the States-General, Pauw and Joachimi read an address interceding for the King's life, and setting out the reasons for the course for which they were pleading. A general answer was given, that what they had said should be considered. In reality the decision had already been taken for the public execution of the King the next morning, Tuesday, Feb. 9/Jan. 30. The ambassadors had their address translated from French into English, and on seeing the preparations in Whitehall, again made an effort to obtain an immediate audience, but they found the way barred by troops, and knew that the object of their mission could no longer be achieved.

Not till February 25/15 was an official answer given to Pauw and Joachimi, in which, after thanking the States for their friendly intentions, the Parliament declined to discuss the question of the King's execution. But at the same time an earnest desire was expressed for the establishment of a firm peace, a right understanding and good correspondence between the governments of the two countries, which had so many common interests. 'We shall', they said, 'be ever ready not only to hear but to contribute with them all good means and offices to fulfil such works as shall be necessary for the general good of Christendom, as well as our own.' There can be no doubt that Cromwell's influence may be seen in this friendly overture. Cromwell had already given Pauw an assurance in a private interview of his wish for the establishment of close relations of friendship with the Dutch, and had spoken of a proposal being made for giving the Netherlanders the same commercial privileges in England as the inhabitants of the country. Already there was floating before his eyes that idea, which he was afterwards in a position to try and realize, of effecting such a close union between the two republics as would make them into one State.

In 1649 any thought of such a thing was a mere dream. The news of the King's execution caused a wave of horror and indignation to sweep over the Netherlands without distinction of class or party. The States-General decided unanimously to offer their condolences to the Prince of Wales and also to congratulate him on his accession. The Orangists would have liked his full title to have been given to him of King of Great Britain and Ireland, but the States of Holland and Zeeland, who were the most interested in trade and shipping, opposed this, as they were afraid of the resentment of the new government in England. So it was agreed that he should be addressed simply as King Charles II. To this title he had an undoubted right, as he had been proclaimed king in Scotland on his father's death. The States of Holland separately also sent a deputation to him for the same purpose. The number of broadsheets and pamphlets that issued from the press are a proof of how deeply moved the whole country was at the tragic death of the English King. What was most remarkable was the fact recorded by Clarendon[47 - History of the Rebellion, v. 418.] as to the change of attitude among the preachers, who had hitherto been strongly on the side of the Parliament. 'The body of the clergy', he writes, 'in a Latin oration delivered by the chief preacher of the Hague, lamented the misfortune in terms of as much asperity, and detestation of the actors, as unworthy the name of Christians, as could be expressed.' Nevertheless, in order to avoid an open breach with the Commonwealth, as it was now styled, Joachimi was allowed to remain, as the States' resident ambassador in London.

The English Council of State, on their part, determined to send over once more Dr. Isaac Doreslaar to join Strickland at the Hague, with instructions to propose to the States-General the knitting together in closer relations of the common interests of the two countries. He arrived May 9. Doreslaar was especially hateful to the royalists, who were gathered at that time in large numbers in the Dutch capital, as he had taken part in the King's trial, and rumour had even designated him as the masked headsman. It was an unhappy choice, which had serious consequences. Three days after his arrival, Doreslaar, as he sat at table in his hotel, was attacked by five or six men, and assassinated. The assassins, their work accomplished, walked off undisturbed. The body was sent back to England, and was honoured with a public interment in Westminster Abbey. 'Though all who were engaged in this enterprise', writes Clarendon, 'went quietly away, and so out of the town, insomuch as no one of them was ever apprehended or called in question, yet they kept not their own counsel so well (believing they had done a very heroic act) but that it was generally known that they were all Scottish men, and most of them servants or dependents upon the Marquis of Montrose.'

The States of Holland, as soon as news reached them of what had happened, made great efforts to track the murderers, but in vain, and Joachimi was commissioned to express their horror at the act, and to try and appease the Parliament. The Parliament, on their side, did not feel themselves sufficiently secure to take decisive action, and Strickland was instructed to approach the States-General once more with offers of friendship. But the influence of the Prince of Orange in the States-General was paramount, and Strickland was refused an audience. On the other hand, despite Strickland's protest, the Scottish envoy, Macdowell, sent by Charles II to announce his accession to the throne of the northern kingdom, was received by them. The English Council of State were unable to regard this conduct in any other light than as a deliberate insult to them and their representative. Strickland was recalled, and Joachimi was informed that unless he was provided with fresh letters of credit to the Republican Government within a fixed time he must leave the land. Strickland left Holland, July 22, 1650. Joachimi received orders to quit London, September 26. All this time the States of Holland had been doing their utmost to effect an accommodation. The trade interests of the province with England were so great that they were most anxious to avoid a breach with the new Commonwealth. They on their own authority received Strickland in a public audience, and even ventured so far as to send a commissary, Gerard Schaep by name, to London, January 22. This high-handed act of independence only had the effect, however, of stiffening the backs of the States-General. All the efforts of Holland to change their attitude towards England failed.

The acute differences of view in regard to this particular line of policy between the self-willed province and the Stadholder were but the signs of a general estrangement; and the struggle for predominance was destined to come to a head at the very time of the return of Joachimi. The Prince of Orange had been altogether opposed to the abandonment of the French alliance and the conclusion of a separate treaty with Spain in 1648. The peace of Munster had carried into effect the policy of the States of Holland, and William II was determined, as soon as he got the reins of power firmly into his hands, to reverse it. He entered into secret negotiations with Mazarin for a renewal of a French alliance against Spain, with the aim of conquering and partitioning the Spanish Netherlands. Devotedly attached to the Stuart cause, it was his intention with French help to try to overthrow the English Commonwealth and establish Charles II on his father's throne. His generosity to his wife's exiled relations was so great that he impoverished himself and had to raise large loans on his estates. With ambitious schemes of war and conquest filling his brain, he found himself speedily in disagreement with the merchant burghers of the Province of Holland. The chief interest of the Hollanders was peace, which would reduce taxation and increase commerce. They had long grudged the heavy charges of the war, and the Provincial States, as soon as peace was concluded, clamoured for the disbanding of a large number of the regiments, which, though they formed part of the federal army, were in the pay of the Province of Holland. William, as Captain-General of the Union, opposed this, and was supported by the States-General. Into the details of this contest for supremacy it is needless to enter here. It was to a certain extent a repetition of that between Maurice and Oldenbarneveldt. Armed with the authority of the States-General, William in the summer of 1650, at the head of a strong body of troops, forced the States of Holland to submission. In the previous year Charles, on his departure for Scotland, had begged the support of the States-General, and had promised in return to settle favourably the long-standing differences about Amboina and Pulo Run in the East Indies, and other questions, but owing to the opposition of Holland and Zeeland no active assistance was given. The States-General, however, as a mark of sympathy and goodwill, assembled in a body to bid him farewell. The royal cause had at first prospered in Scotland, until September 13/3, 1650, when the battle of Dunbar shattered Charles's fair prospects. But at this very time his brother-in-law had just brought his contest with the Province of Holland to a triumphant issue. William II was now in a position to bring about that active intervention of the States in alliance with France in support of the Stuart cause, and for the expulsion of the Spaniards from the Southern Netherlands, on which his heart was set. To the Prince of Orange therefore the eyes of the English royalist party were turned, as their chief hope in the hour when it seemed as if nothing could stem the tide of Cromwell's victories. They were doomed to a terrible disappointment. William, in the very midst of secret negotiations with France, suddenly fell sick of the small-pox, and after a week's illness died, November 6, 1650. He was but twenty-four, and in him Charles II lost a chivalrous and true-hearted friend. Eager for fame, gifted with uncommon abilities, William, had he lived, was undoubtedly prepared to have put his far-reaching plans into execution, and to have risked much for the upholding of his kinsman's rights.

His decease brought about a revolution in the United Provinces. He left no one of his family to take his place. His only child was not born until a week after his death. The Province of Holland straightway seized the opportunity to assert that predominance in the Union for which it had been striving so long. Its leaders at once took steps to call an extraordinary assembly, known as the 'Great Gathering', to take into consideration the state of the Union, of religion, and military affairs. The Great Gathering met at the Hague, January 18, 1651. The office of Stadholder was abolished, in all the provinces but Friesland, as were also the posts of Captain-General and Admiral-General of the Union. The population and the wealth of Holland gave henceforth to the States of that province a position of supremacy in the federation, and, as in the days of Oldenbarneveldt, all the threads of administration and the conduct of foreign affairs passed during the Stadholderless period into the hands of its chief functionary, the Raad-Pensionaris or Grand Pensionary.

This complete change in the system of government of the United Provinces caused much satisfaction in London. The aristocratic burgher oligarchy, who were now in power at the Hague, had no special sympathy for Charles II. Indeed it was embittered against him at this time, since Prince Rupert's ships from their head-quarters in the Scilly Islands had been plundering Dutch merchantmen in their passage up channel. The Parliament therefore determined to send a special embassy to propose that close alliance between the two neighbouring republics, almost amounting to a political union, which Cromwell had already set before him as an end to be aimed at for the mutual advantage of both States. The States-General on their side had, on the proposal of the States of Holland, determined, January 28, 1651, to recognize the English Commonwealth as a free republic, and to receive its envoys, and Joachimi again went to London to take up his old post as the resident ambassador of the States.

The English ambassadors were Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland, the latter of whom, as we have seen, had spent many years in Holland without being able to obtain an audience with the States-General. The Parliament were now determined that their representatives should make their state entry into the Hague with a splendour befitting the envoys of so mighty a power. They were accompanied by a suite of some 250 persons in brilliant uniforms and liveries, and travelled in twenty-five state coaches. On March 27, 1651, the solemn entry took place. The ambassadors were, however, to pass through the ordeal of an unpleasant experience. As the procession made its way through the crowded streets, St. John and Strickland were greeted with loud cries of 'Regicides', 'Executioners', 'Cromwell's bastards', and other abusive epithets. No doubt there were many royalist refugees in the Hague, but though these may have given the lead to the mob, there can be little question of the general hostility at this time of the masses of the people, even in Holland itself, to the Parliament. It is a common mistake to suppose that the Orangist was the aristocratic, the republican, or so-called 'States' party, the popular party in the United Provinces. The States of Holland, which was the stronghold of the republican party, was entirely in the hands of the close oligarchic corporations of the chief towns of the province. In each town a few aristocratic burgher families monopolized all offices and authority, the rest of the townsmen had no votes or representation, and the country people were ignored altogether. The great influence and executive powers of the Stadholders of the house of Orange were therefore a check upon the domination of these burgher oligarchies, and so by them resented accordingly. On the other hand, the Princes of Orange were loved and respected by the people, alike for their high qualities and the great services they had rendered to the country, and there was scarcely any time when they had not the enthusiastic support of the great majority of those classes, the bulk of the population, who were excluded from any share in the government of the State. A knowledge of these facts is absolutely necessary to a right understanding of what the 'Stadholderless' régime in the time of John de Witt really meant.

The parliamentary ambassadors were really alarmed, remembering the fate of Doreslaar, at this hostile reception. Neither they nor their attendants dared to venture into the streets but in parties of five or six and sword in hand; and everywhere they were followed by the cry of 'Regicides'. On March 29, St. John and Strickland presented their credentials before the 'Great Gathering', and in a long speech expressed the desire of the English Government for the establishment of good relations of enduring friendship between the two republics. 'It is the wish of the Parliament to conclude', they said, 'a closer union of the two States, which would be for both more advantageous than heretofore, since it would not be dependent upon the life and will and private interests of a single individual.' Six commissioners were appointed by the Assembly to discuss their proposals, and a conference was opened on April 4. The grounds on which the English proposed to the Netherlanders that 'a more strict and intimate Alliance and Union bee entred into by them, whereby there may bee a more intrinsecall and mutual interest of each other, than hath hitherto beene for the good of both', were: (1) community of religion, (2) community of political liberty, (3) community of interest in freedom of trade and navigation. The Dutch, however, showed themselves very wary. They had no intention of giving their consent to any general propositions before informing themselves of their precise meaning. There was considerable variety of opinion in the different provinces and much indecision. On April 6, the commissioners were only empowered to reply, that the States were willing 'not only to renew the ancient friendship between the two nations, but also to conclude a treaty for common interests'. This response did not satisfy the English envoys, who rejoined that 'the union for common interests' they had in view 'was one closer than at any previous time'. These words required explanation, but it seemed that they could only point to an alliance so intimate and binding as to be another term for coalition. Such was indeed its meaning in the minds of those who proposed it, and so the Dutch interpreted it. To them, however, not unnaturally, the only idea suggested by a coalition with the English Commonwealth was the loss by the smaller republic of its independence, and its practical absorption in the larger. Such an idea was simply unthinkable to men who had just won the recognition of their independence after eighty years of heroic struggle. The reply of the Assembly was not hurriedly given. At last, on April 26, it came, and was so far unsatisfactory that, while expressing their readiness for a closer union, the reservation was made that it must be one 'in which both States could better promote their interests for themselves and for the common welfare'. St. John and Strickland now went a step further, and gave a hint that if an offensive and defensive confederation such as they had in mind could be accomplished, it would be accompanied by many advantageous concessions to the Dutch. At this point the negotiations came to an end. The Parliament did not believe that in the present temper of the Dutch their proposals were likely to be received in the spirit in which they were offered, and the ambassadors were recalled. They and their attendants were constantly insulted by Royalists and Orangists whenever they showed themselves out of doors, and though the provincial authorities strictly forbade such outrages on pain of severe penalties, and urged the citizens to assist in the protection of the representatives of a foreign power, they effected little. Some of the offenders were of high rank[48 - Among them Prince Edward, son of the Queen of Bohemia.], and they openly braved the threats of the magistracy and remained unpunished. Earnest representations were now made to the English Parliament on behalf of the States of Holland by their agent, Gerard Schaep, who was still residing in London, that they would allow the envoys of the Commonwealth to remain awhile longer and continue the negotiations. The Parliament, however, would only consent to do this on condition that full satisfaction be made to St. John and Strickland for all that they had endured, and that the attacks upon them should cease. The States of Holland promised to do this. Prince Edward of the Palatine and other prominent offenders were summoned before a court of justice, and warned; some of their servants were punished. It was a sorry piece of business. But it was an index to the real feeling of the populace that such a state of things should have been possible in a town like the Hague.

The negotiations were accordingly renewed by the presentation of fresh proposals, May 10, by St. John and Strickland. There was now no mention of coalition, only of an offensive and defensive alliance, but there was an ominous addition: both States were required to bind themselves severally not to permit the sojourn on their soil of declared enemies of the other. This was especially directed against the adherents of the Stuarts and the members of the Orange and Palatinate families. The great desire of the party now in power in the Netherlands was the maintenance of peace. The Hollanders were willing to conclude a treaty extending their trade privileges, but they were anxious not to be drawn into the war in Scotland, and in face of the popular affection for the house of Orange they dared not venture at the dictation of a foreign power to treat the young prince and his mother harshly. They responded therefore, after some delay, by counter proposals for the renewal of the Treaty of 1496, the Magnus Intercursus, but revised in favour of the Dutch to suit present-day conditions. Complete freedom of trade, navigation, and fishery without pass, toll, or other hindrances in each other's domains was what was aimed at. No mention was made of the English proposal to banish from the Netherlands those who gave help to the Stuart cause. With such differences of view there was of course no prospect of any agreement being reached. The English embassy accordingly left the Hague, July 31, 1651, and returned home.

The report made to Parliament created a bad impression in England, and led to all the old complaints against the Dutch being raked up once more: the massacre of Amboina, the seizure of Pulo Run and other high-handed acts in the East Indies, their monopoly of the fisheries on the British coasts, their attacks on the English whalers off Spitzbergen, and their attempts to drive out English trade from the Baltic, from Russia, and elsewhere. Then on the top of this the shameful treatment to which the parliamentary envoys had been persistently exposed was angrily recalled, the refusal of the States-General for years to admit Strickland to an audience, the murder of Doreslaar, and lastly the insults offered to the latest embassy. All these things formed a formidable bill of indictment. As the efforts of the Parliament to effect a close union between the republics for their common interest had failed, it became the clear duty of the English Government to take measures to protect the national interests against unscrupulous rivals. There was no delay in taking drastic action.

On October 9, 1651, the famous Navigation Act was passed, which forbade the importation of foreign goods and products into English harbours save in English bottoms, or those of the countries from whence the goods and products came. A deadly blow was thus struck at the Netherlanders, who had at that time almost a monopoly of the most important branches of sea-borne trade and were the carriers of the world. Scarcely less serious was the prohibition to foreigners to fish in British waters. Every infringement of this edict would be punished by the confiscation of the offending vessels. It has already been seen in previous lectures of what vital importance these fisheries were to the welfare of Holland.

The States-General now determined to make a serious effort to resume the negotiations which had been broken off, and Jacob Cats, Gerard Schaep, and Paulus van der Perre were sent on a special embassy to England. They reached London, December 27. Their task was a difficult one. They pressed for the revocation of the Navigation Act and of the embargo upon fishing, and for the release of the confiscated ships, and proposed that negotiations should again be set on foot for the conclusion of a treaty based upon the Magnus Intercursus. The news at this critical moment that the Dutch were fitting out 150 new war vessels for the protection of free navigation did not tend to smooth the way to an understanding. It was regarded in England as a threat. The English now formulated their demands. These were such as they must have known would never be conceded. They required the payment of the arrears of toll due for the fishing on the British coasts, the surrender of the Spice Islands, the punishment of the survivors of those concerned in the Amboina massacre, satisfaction for the murder of Doreslaar, and the payment of the indemnities due for losses sustained by Englishmen at the hands of the Dutch in various parts of the world. It is clear that these demands were practically an ultimatum. The Netherlanders were required to choose between coalition or humiliation, and in case neither were accepted, war. Both sides were, however, averse to taking the final step, and conferences and negotiations still dragged on for some months, while strenuous preparations were at the same time being made on both sides of the Channel for hostilities. It was a dangerous situation, and was made wellnigh desperate by a conflict which took place off Folkestone, May 19, 1652, between the Dutch fleet under Tromp and an English squadron under Blake, through a misunderstanding about the question of striking the flag. This event excited public opinion in England to fever pitch, and made war practically inevitable. The Dutch Government, however, knew that they were not prepared for such a mighty conflict. The peace party in Holland had insisted on the disbanding of a large part of the land forces after the death of William, and the navy had been neglected and was far from being as formidable as a few years before. In all haste therefore the experienced Adrian Pauw, now holding the important post of Grand Pensionary of Holland, was sent over to London to join Cats, Schaep, and van Perre, and endeavour even at the last moment to avoid a final breach between the two nations. His efforts proved vain, for the English would not give way in their demands for conditions too humiliating for the Netherlanders to accept. The 'States' party in power had, in fact, not a free hand, even had they been inclined to preserve peace at the cost of submission to English dictation, for the Orangists were delighted at the thought of trying conclusions with the hated Commonwealth, and they had strong support throughout the country. The fear of a revolution compelled the States-General to refuse the only terms by which war could be avoided. The die was cast. The Dutch ambassadors left England, June 30, and the struggle between the two maritime powers for supremacy, which had been so frequently imminent but so long delayed, at last began.

APPENDIX

A. The Great or Herring Fishery