Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

Source.—The Times, August 1

Mr. Parnell and his special friends greatly distinguished themselves in the House of Commons last night by the multiplicity of the motions in committee on the South Africa Bill. The Government adopted special means to wear out the tenacity of the members who thus consume hour after hour, for it had arranged that the House should sit until the work should be done, even if the discussion should last till breakfast time. But it does injustice to Mr. Parnell. He is the most misunderstood and most ill-used man in the House of Commons. Such is the burden of the long letter from him which we printed on Monday. He has been accused of trying to stop public business by floods of irrelevant speech. He has been charged with something like open disrespect for the authority of Mr. Speaker. He has been suspected of a wish to make Irish members intolerable, in the hope that weary Englishmen and Scotchmen would bid them begone to enjoy the beatitudes of Home Rule. He has made the Leader of the House, although the mildest of men, propose to banish him to the penal settlement of silence, and the House has done him the honour of framing two new rules to impede the flow of his speech during the rest of the Session… The incorrectness of that accusation, he replies, is proved by the comparatively small use he has made of almost boundless opportunities. If his enemies speak of what he has done, he appeals to what he might have done. Has he obstructed every clause of every Bill? Has he even obstructed every Bill? Has he exhausted all the forms of the House even yet? These questions oppress us with a sense of his moderation. If he has done so much, he might have done so much more! As most Bills have at least ten clauses, as most clauses contain at least a hundred words, and as at least one amendment might be moved after each word, Mr. Parnell could have opposed each Bill with at least a thousand amendments, and he himself, Mr. Biggar, and Mr. O'Donnell could each have delivered at least a thousand speeches.

PLEVNA AFTER THE SIEGE (1877)

Source.—The Times, December 15

From Our Special Correspondent. – Plevna, December 11

As I rode up the slope of the hill east of Plevna towards the redoubt defending the road between the town and the village of Radicheve, a ghastly scene was presented. Hundreds of Russian skeletons lay glistening on the hillsides, where they had fallen during the assault of September. The bones were generally completely bare. Those nearest to the earthwork had been covered with a few inches of earth, which had been washed off by the first shower, and now they lay as naked as the others. The Moslem outpost pits were among these skeletons, many of them not being more than a yard distant. Singular as it may seem, many of these skeletons had distinct expressions, both in the attitude in which they had fallen and in the position of the fleshless jaws. I could distinguish those who had fallen without suffering from those who had died in agony, and the effect was such as I shall never forget. The Russian soldiers who marched into Plevna in the rear of Osman's sallying force passed among these remains of their unburied comrades… On entering the town I was surprised to find it so little injured by the cannonading…

Within a short time after Osman's surrender at the bridge over the Vid, on the Sofia road, the 16,000 prisoners were turned back into the town, with the artillery and transport trains… The Turks were well fed in appearance, but were generally ragged, and were all wearing sandals. No boots were to be seen, though most of them had overcoats… The contrast between these tatterdemalion battalions and the well-dressed men guarding them made the war appear a one-sided affair, until the reflection came that a ragged man shot as well as one perfectly equipped. Later in the day, standing on the Sofia road, in the Gravitza valley west of Plevna, I surveyed the whole basin forming Osman's position. The herbage and all other growing things had so effectually disappeared that the earth's surface looked as if a conflagration had swept over every square foot of it. The colour was a dull brown, and I never gazed upon a more dismal-looking region. The sides of the basin were serried by ravines, all centering in the valley where I stood, and upon the surrounding edges of the basin were the Turkish and Allied batteries planted in irregular line, but commanding every vantage-point of the neighbourhood… Where the Gravitza chaussée crosses the elevation the Turkish redoubts were weakest, and here the Russian artillery fire had been chiefly concentrated. The front and rear of the earthworks were ploughed up by shells, and in truth there was scarcely a square yard which had not been struck. Thousands of such missiles, varying from 3 inches to 6 inches in diameter, lay unexploded upon the surface of the earth. In a previous telegram I said that these redoubts were battered to pieces; but I now discover that this was a curious error of vision. The works are practically uninjured. So far as the earthworks are concerned, the Russian artillery ammunition has been absolutely wasted, and from an inspection of the trenches I do not believe that the garrison has suffered more than their defences. Neither do I believe that any artillery could have accomplished more. The fact is that shells against earthworks are useless at a greater distance than 500 or 600 yards, and then the guns cannot be worked on account of the enemy's sharpshooters. The Turkish soldiers in the redoubts had bomb-proof abodes in the back walls of the pits… I was very much surprised to find the Turkish lines of fortification so weak, as far as the quantity of earthwork is concerned. The redoubts are much smaller than I supposed them to be… There are no double lines of infantry trenches – in fact, no interior lines of any sort; neither are there trenches on the hillsides below the redoubts. There are no lines of intrenchments for the reserves; indeed, there were apparently no reserves. When I saw this technically weak line I could not but admire the efficiency of the weapons with which it had been defended, and the stubborn tenacity of the men who could hold it against such assaults as the Allies have delivered against it. The Allies had double and treble lines around Plevna. Their works are much better constructed than those of the Turks, so far as finish is concerned; but for safety I would rather trust myself to the latter… The Roumanian trenches, however, were well constructed and capacious. The best trench is within 25 feet of the Turkish counterscarp [of a redoubt]. From the bottom of this trench two shafts were sunk about 15 feet in depth, and from the bottom two galleries had been pushed under the Turkish parapet, and the mines were nearly ready when the Moslems evacuated their positions. But the strangest part of the history of this siege is the fact that the Turks had also mined the Gravitza redoubt opposite, and before leaving their earthwork they had fired the mining fuse. The Roumanians, discovering their departure, entered their ditches, found the gallery, and reached the fuse in time to quench it before it had burned to the explosive charge; so that each was prepared to blow the other up without knowing, apparently, that counter-operations were in progress…

At noon to-day the Emperor arrived at the redoubt defending the approach to Plevna by the Gravitza chaussée… [After a religious service] the whole party rode into Plevna, taking the less frequented streets, lest some assassin might fire upon the Emperor. In a small house, surrounded by a high stone wall, lunch was served, after which there was a sudden hush, and Osman Pasha was carried into the yard and through the portico by a Cossack officer and one of his own attendants. As he passed through the crowd of staff officers, every one saluted him, and shouted, "Bravo, Osman!" He then passed into the presence of the Emperor, who shook hands with him, and informed him that, in consideration of his gallant defence of Plevna, he had given orders that his sword should be returned to him, and that he could wear it.

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA (1878)

I

Source.—Hansard, Third Series, vol. 237, cols. 1,326, 1332 (Questions, February 8, 1878)

The Chancellor of the Exchequer: Mr. Speaker, the Government have received a telegram to-day from Mr. Layard, containing a summary of the articles of the armistice… The telegram ends by saying that the Turks have begun to remove their guns from the Constantinople lines. Now it is quite evident that, whatever may have been the arrangements with regard to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, a neutral zone has been declared, which includes the lines of Tchekmedje, which protect Constantinople; and according to the terms of the armistice the Turks are bound not to retain those fortresses, and accordingly are bound to remove – and are quietly beginning to remove – their guns and armaments from the fortifications by lines and to specified places… The consequence is that, although the Russians do not occupy those lines themselves, they occupy an outpost close to them, while the lines themselves are being thoroughly disarmed. They have the power, therefore, at any moment, subject to the necessity of giving three days' notice of the termination of the armistice, of advancing on Constantinople without hindrance… I may perhaps venture to call the attention of the House to one of the papers which we laid upon the table yesterday. That contains a copy of a Memorandum which was communicated to the Russian Ambassador by Her Majesty's Government on the 28th of July last, in which they say they "look with much anxiety at the state of things in Constantinople, and the prospect of the disorder and bloodshed, and even anarchy, which may occur as the Russian forces draw near to the capital. The crisis which may at any time arrive in Constantinople may be such as Her Majesty's Government could not overlook, while they had the means of mitigating its horrors. Her Majesty's Government are fully determined (unless it should be necessary for the preservation of interests which they have already stated they are bound to maintain) not to depart from the line of neutrality which they have declared their intention to observe; but they do not consider that they would be departing from this neutrality, and they think that Russia will not consider they are doing so, if they should find themselves compelled to direct their fleet to proceed to Constantinople, and thus afford protection to the European population against internal disturbance." The Government, I may add, feel that the state of affairs disclosed by the armistice has given rise to the danger which they thus apprehended, and they have, in the circumstances, thought it right to order a portion of the fleet to proceed at once to Constantinople for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of British subjects.

Cols. 1622-1623 (Questions, February 13, 1878)

The Chancellor of the Exchequer: I stated, I think, or at all events referred on Monday to the fact, that communications had been made to the Porte to ascertain whether permission would be given, or a firman be granted, for the British fleet to enter the Dardanelles. That permission was refused, but Her Majesty's Government thought it right to direct the ships to proceed, and they have proceeded accordingly. No material opposition was offered, and they are by this time, I presume, anchored in the neighbourhood of Constantinople. I may perhaps mention that a communication has been made by the Russian Government to the effect that, in view of the intended sending of the fleet by Her Majesty's Government to the neighbourhood of Constantinople, it would be a matter for the consideration of the Russian Government whether they should not themselves occupy the city. In answer to that Her Majesty's Government have sent a communication which will be laid on the table of the House to-night, in which they protest against that view, and state that they cannot acknowledge that in the case of the two countries the circumstances are parallel, or that the despatch of the British fleet for the purpose indicated justifies the Russian Government in the step which they announce it to be their intention to take.

II

Source.—The Times, March 29, 1878

The uncertainty which has prevailed during the last few days respecting the course which our Government would pursue, in view of the difference respecting the Congress which had arisen between ourselves and Russia, has received a startling and momentous solution. When the House of Lords met yesterday, Lord Derby no longer occupied his seat on the Ministerial Bench, and he at once announced that he had resigned the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs… The explanations given yesterday remove all doubt respecting the relative positions assumed by our Government and Russia in regard to the Congress. Sir Stafford Northcote stated in the House of Commons the import of the communications which have passed between ourselves and Russia… Russia's reply amounted to a clear intimation that she claims to withhold from the cognizance of the Powers any articles of the preliminary Treaty she may choose. Such a reserve as she asserts is tantamount to a definite claim to alter an existing Treaty by force of arms without consulting the other Powers who signed it, and towards whom she is under honourable obligations. There being this imminent danger that the Congress may not meet – it being, as Lord Beaconsfield said, "the belief" of the Government "that the Congress would not meet," it became necessary for the Government to consider what further course they would take… We do not know what course Lord Derby would have advised, and it is possible he would not immediately have taken any fresh steps. But the rest of the Government decided that in the interests of peace, and for the due protection of the rights of the Empire, it was their duty "to advise Her Majesty to avail herself of those powers which she has for calling for the services of her Reserved Forces." As subsequently explained by Mr. Hardy in the House of Commons, this step is one which is rendered necessary by the new organization of the Army… Its result will be to raise our regular forces to their utmost efficiency. In other words, it will place the land forces which actually exist in readiness for prompt action; and it is thus a plain declaration – a declaration rendered emphatic by Lord Derby's resignation – that we are prepared to act promptly if the course on which Russia has entered directly injures our honour or our interests. Such a declaration of our being determined to adhere to the claims we have put forward is perhaps the most momentous step which has yet been taken by this country.

PEACE WITH HONOUR (1878)

Source.—The Times, July 17

The Premier alighted at his official residence in Downing Street, and was met on the threshold by General Ponsonby, bearing a bouquet of rare flowers, sent to him by the gracious forethought of Her Majesty the Queen… The ground was well kept by the police, till the Prime Minister appeared at a window and began to speak. Then a rush swept the police away. Three cheers for Lord Beaconsfield were given. For the second time in the day the Prime Minister was visibly affected. He had to wait long for silence, but when an approach to quiet had been obtained Lord Beaconsfield said: "I can assure you that no recognition of neighbours could be more gratifying to my feelings than these expressions of the sentiments of those among whom I see many of my oldest and most cherished friends. Lord Salisbury and myself have brought you back peace, but a peace, I hope, with honour, which may satisfy our Sovereign, and tend to the welfare of the country."

THE SECRET AGREEMENTS IN BEACONSFIELD'S POCKETS (1878)

Source.—Hansard, Third Series, vol. 242, col. 344 (House of Lords: Debate on the Protocols of Berlin, August, 1878)

The Earl of Rosebery rose to call attention to a memorandum purporting to have been signed by the Marquis of Salisbury and Count Schouvaloff on May 30, 1878, and to ask if it was the intention of the Government to lay it on the table of the House… The course the Government had pursued with respect to their policy was, he would venture to say, one of obscurity enlivened with sarcasm. In the whole history of the negotiations there were five cardinal points – points which became salient to everyone who had studied the history of these transactions. First, there was the San Stefano treaty; the second was the circular of the 1st of April; the third, the alleged secret agreement of May 30th; the fourth, the secret convention of June 4th with Turkey; and the fifth was the treaty signed at Berlin on the 30th of July. As to the secret agreement between Russia and England, it would be well to recall how they came to have any cognizance of it at all. The substance of it appeared in the Globe within, he thought, three or four days after it was signed, and it was on the 14th of June, he thought, that the entire text was given in the columns of the same journal… They had all heard that the agreement was not to be laid on the table, because there were documents in connection with it which it would be necessary to present at the same time; but other Powers would not allow us to produce them. What he gathered from all this was that, if it had not been for the ill-advised conduct of a very subordinate clerk in the Foreign Office, who was entrusted with the copying of the agreement at the rate of 10d. an hour, the English public would not at this moment have the faintest conception of such an agreement, and the keystone of the whole purpose of the Government would be wrapped in obscurity. This was alarming in itself, because, if these subterranean methods were employed as a rule, they would give the public some little dismay in regard to the course of further negotiations… Having signed this agreement, and having signed another secret agreement within two or three days with Turkey, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiaries proceeded, fortified with them, to the Congress. Now came the most extraordinary point in all the history of these negotiations, so far as they knew it. Eight days after the signature, or alleged signature, of this agreement, in which, if the House would remember, we consented to the abandonment of Batoum and other Russian conquests in Armenia, the Foreign Secretary addressed a despatch to our Resident Plenipotentiary in Berlin, in which he urged him to use his exertions to the utmost on behalf of Batoum. The words were so remarkable that he might be pardoned for quoting them to their lordships. On the 8th of June the noble Marquis wrote to Lord Odo Russell: "There is no ground for believing that Russia will willingly give way in respect to Batoum, Kars, or Ardahan; and it is possible that the arguments of England urged in Congress will receive little assistance from other Powers, and will not be able to shake her resolution in this respect." Well, that was not likely under the circumstances. The noble Marquis continued in this letter of June 8th: "You will not on that account abstain from earnestly pressing upon them and upon Russia the justice of abstaining from annexations which are unconnected with the professed object of the war, and profoundly distasteful to the populations concerned, and the expediency, in regard to the future tranquillizing of Asia, of forbearing to shake so perilously the position of the Government of Turkey…" Now, the great point with regard to this was, was Lord Odo Russell, when he received that communication, cognizant of the agreement which had been signed on the 30th of May? Because what they wanted to know was this, was Lord Odo Russell one of a company, or was he a simple actor put up to recite the arguments of Batoum, with a prompter by to keep him to his part?.. Then, on the same day, Mr. Secretary Cross addressed a despatch to the Plenipotentiaries of Her Majesty, urging them to make great exertion on behalf of Greece. He should say that the position of a Plenipotentiary who entered the Congress to struggle on behalf of Batoum, Kars, Ardahan, and Greece must have been a somewhat melancholy one in the retrospect; because, when the questions came up, the Turkish positions were abandoned, and Greece was ignored… He did not pretend that secret understandings were unknown to us, but he believed this was the first time we had called a European Congress with the view of discussing great treaties, and standing forth on behalf of public law, we ourselves having, at the same time, bound ourselves in private to consent to those stipulations which we had denounced, and which we continued to denounce.

GLADSTONE INDIGNANT AGAIN (1878)

Source.—The Times, December 2

Mr. Gladstone (at Greenwich): I want to ask you, and I think after these two years it is about time, who are the true friends of Russia? Is it we, gentlemen, who met two years and a half ago on Blackheath, and said it was most mischievous to leave to any single country the settlement of the Eastern question?.. Who brought Russia back to the Danube? Those very men who are continually denouncing us as the friends of Russia. We had in 1856 by the fortune of war driven Russia back from the Danube; the present Government have brought Russia back to the Danube. They made a secret memorandum with Count Schouvaloff by which they engaged – unless they could convert him by their arguments – to vote in the Congress for bringing Russia back to the Danube… Who gave Russia the fortress of Kars? The present Government. These people say they want to keep down the power of Russia. Want to keep down the power of Russia! Why, they have left it in her power to make herself the liberator of Bulgaria, and secure for herself the influence which always follows upon gratitude.

RUSSIAN INTRIGUE AT CABUL (1878)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,190 of 1878, p. 228

Telegram dated August 2, 1878. From Viceroy, Simla, to Secretary of State, London

Further confirmation received of presence of Russian mission at Cabul headed by General Abramoff, Governor of Samarkand, who is mentioned by name. We desire to point out that present situation requires immediate correction. It will soon be known throughout India that Russian officers and troops have been received with honour, and are staying at Cabul within short distance of our frontier and our largest military garrison, while our officers have been denied admission there. We have further reports of Russian officers having visited and been well received at Maimena. To remain inactive now will, we respectfully submit, be to allow Afghanistan to fall as certainly and as completely under Russian power and influence as the Khanates. We believe we could correct situation if allowed to treat it as question between us and the Ameer, and probably could do so without recourse to force. But we must speak plainly and decidedly, and be sure of your support. We propose, therefore, in the first place, to insist on reception of suitable British mission at Cabul. To this we do not anticipate serious resistance; indeed, we think it probable that Ameer, adhering to his policy of playing Russia and ourselves off against each other, will really welcome such mission, while outwardly only yielding to pressure…

From Secretary of State, August 3, 1878 (Extract)

Assuming the certainty of Russian officers at Cabul, your proposals to insist on reception of British envoy approved. In case of refusal you will telegraph again as to the steps you desire to take for compelling the Ameer to receive your mission.

Telegram from Viceroy, September 21, 1878

Chamberlain[1 - General Sir Neville Chamberlain.] reports from Peshawur that it is quite evident Ameer is bent on utmost procrastination, and determined on making acceptance of our mission dependent on his pleasure and choice of time… To await at Peshawur Ameer's pleasure would be to abandon whole policy and accept easy repulse at outset… Consequently mission moved this morning to Jamrud; thence Cavagnari advances to Ali Musjid with small escort to demand passage…

Telegram from Viceroy, September 22, 1878

Following telegram received last night from Sir Neville Chamberlain. Message begins: Cavagnari reports that we have received a decisive answer from Faiz Mahomed, after personal interview, that he will not allow mission to proceed. He crowned the heights commanding the way with his levies, and though many times warned by Cavagnari that his reply would be regarded as reply of the Ameer, said he would not let mission pass…

Telegram from Secretary of State, October 30, 1878

Text of letter, as approved, to be sent to the Ameer… In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank. Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory… Unless these conditions are accepted, fully and plainly, by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government.

SHERE ALI (1878)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,190 of 1878, p. 225

Extract from a Memorandum by Lord Napier of Magdala

We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected. First, we stood aloof in his struggles for life and empire, ready to acknowledge whoever might prove the master of Afghanistan. Then, when Shere Ali had subdued his enemies, he came forward to meet us with an alliance, but we were willing to form only an imperfect alliance with him. He was willing to trust us, provided that we would trust him; but we felt that we could not bind ourselves to unreserved support of a power whose ideas of right and wrong were so different from ours. We therefore proposed to bind him, leaving ourselves (according to his idea) free, and he recoiled from this bargain. His friendly feelings, however, were not entirely alienated by that experience of us; he abstained from any action towards Seistan at our desire, and he believed that the mediation which we pressed upon him would have ended by the restoration of the portion of Seistan that Persia had occupied in his days of trouble. And not only Shere Ali, but the whole Afghan people, believed that we should restore to them what they had lost. When they found that we had allowed Persia to obstruct and ill-treat our arbitrator, and to retain much of her encroachments, they looked upon us as a weak and treacherous people, who, under the guise of friendship, had spoiled them in favour of Persia. This I believe to be the root of Shere Ali's discontent with us.

DEATH OF SHERE ALI (1879)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,401 of 1879, p. 12

Translation of a Letter, dated February 26, 1879, from Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari

… I now write a second time in accordance with former friendship to inform you that to-day a letter was received by post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon 29th Safar (21st February, 1879), obeyed the call of the summoner, and, throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the divine mercy.

THE GANDAMAK TREATY (1879)

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,362 of 1879

Article III. – His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government… The British Government will support the Ameer against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for the purpose.

Article IV. – With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established … it is agreed that a British Resident representative shall reside at Cabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact…