Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

I have now to indicate to you the views of the Egyptian Government on two of the points to which your special attention was directed by Lord Granville. These are (1) the measures which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in the Soudan, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum. (2) The best mode of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan. These two points are intimately connected, and may conveniently be considered together. It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartoum is very small, but it has been estimated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move northwards from Khartoum only when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are native Christians, Egyptian employés, their wives and children, etc. The Government of His Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss of life. As regards the most opportune time and the best method for effecting the retreat, whether of the garrisons or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you should receive detailed instructions… You will bear in mind that the main end to be pursued is the evacuation of the Soudan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of Her Majesty's Government. It meets with the full approval of His Highness the Khedive, and of the present Egyptian Ministry. I understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and that you think it should on no account be changed. You consider that it may take a few months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that "the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest, and whose families still exist"; and that an endeavour should be made to form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely concur. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be kept in the Soudan merely with a view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of the country. But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, your knowledge of the country, and in your comprehension of the general line of policy to be pursued. You are, therefore, given full discretionary power to retain the troops for such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the country may be accomplished with the least possible risk to life and property.

Sir E. Baring, in forwarding the copy of the instructions to Lord Granville, wrote:

I read the draft of the letter over to General Gordon. He expressed to me his entire concurrence in the instructions. The only suggestion he made was in connection with the passage in which, speaking of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, I had said, "I understand also that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy." General Gordon wished that I should add the words, "and that you think it should on no account be changed." These words were accordingly added.

III

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 428. (Macmillans.)

Looking back at what occurred after a space of many years, two points are to my mind clear. The first is that no Englishman should have been sent to Khartoum. The second is that, if anyone had to be sent, General Gordon was not the right man to send. The reasons why no Englishman should have been sent are now sufficiently obvious. If he were beleaguered at Khartoum, the British Government might be obliged to send an expedition to relieve him. The main object of British policy was to avoid being drawn into military operations in the Soudan. The employment of a British official at Khartoum involved a serious risk that it would be no longer possible to adhere to this policy, and the risk was materially increased when the individual chosen to go to the Soudan was one who had attracted to himself a greater degree of popular sympathy than almost any Englishman of modern times.

DIFFICULTIES OF GORDON'S CHARACTER (1884)

I

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 432. (Macmillans.)

I must, for the elucidation of this narrative, state why I think it was a mistake to send General Gordon to Khartoum. "It is impossible," I wrote privately to Lord Granville on January 28, 1884, "not to be charmed by the simplicity and honesty of Gordon's character." "My only fear," I added, "is that he is terribly flighty and changes his opinions very rapidly…" Impulsive flightiness was, in fact, the main defect of General Gordon's character, and it was one which, in my opinion, rendered him unfit to carry out a work which pre-eminently required a cool and steady head. I used to receive some twenty or thirty telegrams from General Gordon in the course of the day when he was at Khartoum, those in the evening often giving opinions which it was impossible to reconcile with others despatched the same morning. Scarcely, indeed, had General Gordon started on his mission, when Lord Granville, who does not appear at first to have understood General Gordon's character, began to be alarmed at his impulsiveness. On February 8 Lord Granville wrote to me: "I own your letters about Gordon rather alarm. His changes about Zobeir are difficult to understand. Northbrook consoles me by saying that he says all the foolish things that pass through his head, but that his judgment is excellent." I am not prepared to go so far as to say that General Gordon's judgment was excellent. Nevertheless, there was some truth in Lord Northbrook's remark. I often found that, amidst a mass of irrelevant verbiage and amidst many contradictory opinions, a vein of sound common sense and political instinct ran through General Gordon's proposals. So much was I impressed with this, and so fearful was I that the sound portions of his proposals would be rejected in London on account of the eccentric language in which they were often couched, that, on February 12, I telegraphed to Lord Granville: "In considering Gordon's suggestions, please remember that his general views are excellent, but that undue importance must not be attached to his words. We must look to the spirit rather than the letter of what he says."

II

Source.– Lord Cromer's Modern Egypt, vol. i., p. 488. (Macmillans.)

On February 26th, thirty-nine days had elapsed since General Gordon had left London, thirty-one days since he had left Cairo, and eight days since he had arrived at Khartoum. During that period, leaving aside points of detail, as to which his contradictions had been numerous, General Gordon had marked out for himself no less than five different lines of policy, some of which were wholly conflicting one with another, whilst others, without being absolutely irreconcilable, differed in respect to some of their most important features. On January 18 he started from London with instructions which had been dictated by himself. His wish then was that he should be merely sent to "report upon the best means of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He expressed his entire concurrence in the policy of evacuation. This was the first and original stage of General Gordon's opinions. Before he arrived in Egypt, on January 24, he had changed his views as to the nature of the functions he should fulfil. He no longer wished to be a mere reporter. He wished to be named Governor-General of the Soudan with full executive powers. He supplemented his original ideas by suggesting that the country should be handed over to "the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest." This was the second stage of General Gordon's opinions. Fifteen days later (February 8) he wrote from Abu Hamed a memorandum in which he advocated "evacuation but not abandonment." The Government of Egypt were to "maintain their position as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-General and Moudirs, and act as a supreme Court of Appeal." This was the third stage of General Gordon's opinions. Ten days later (February 18) General Gordon reverted to the principles of his memorandum of the 8th, but with a notable difference. It was no longer the Egyptian but the British Government which were to control the Soudan administration. The British Government were also to appoint a Governor-General, who was to be furnished with a British commission, and who was to receive a British decoration. Zobeir Pasha was the man whom General Gordon wished the British Government to select. This was the fourth stage of General Gordon's opinions. Eight days later (February 26), when General Gordon had learnt that the British Government were not prepared to approve of Zobeir Pasha being sent to the Soudan, he proposed that the Mahdi should be "smashed up," and that, to assist in this object, 200 British Indian troops should be sent to Wadi Halfa. This was the fifth stage of General Gordon's opinions. In thirty-nine days, therefore, General Gordon had drifted by successive stages from a proposal that he should report on the affairs of the Soudan to advocating the policy of "smashing up" the Mahdi. It would, he said, be "comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi."

ZOBEIR PASHA (1884)

I

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884

P. 71. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Telegraphic, Khartoum, February 18, 1884

I have stated that to withdraw without being able to place a successor in my seat would be the signal for general anarchy throughout the country, which, though all Egyptian element was withdrawn, would be a misfortune and inhuman… I distinctly state that if Her Majesty's Government gave a Commission to my successor, I recommend neither a subsidy nor men being given. I would select and give a Commission to some man, and promise him the moral support of Her Majesty's Government and nothing more… As for the man, Her Majesty's Government should select one above all others – namely, Zobeir. He alone has the ability to rule the Soudan, and would be universally accepted by the Soudan. He should be made K.C.M.G., and given presents… Zobeir's exile at Cairo for ten years, amidst all the late events, and his mixing with Europeans, must have had great effect on his character…

II

P. 72. Extract from Sir E. Baring's Despatch commenting on the Above

I believe Zobeir Pasha to be the only possible man. He undoubtedly possesses energy and ability, and has great local influence. As regards the Slave Trade, I discussed the matter with General Gordon when he was in Cairo, and he fully agreed with me in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's presence or absence would not affect the question in one way or the other. I am also convinced from many things that have come to my notice that General Gordon is right in thinking that Zobeir Pasha's residence in Egypt has considerably modified his character. He now understands what European power is, and it is much better to have to deal with a man of this sort than with a man like the Mahdi… I cannot recommend that he should be promised the "moral support" of Her Majesty's Government. In the first place, he would scarcely understand the sense of the phrase, and, moreover, I do not think that he would attach importance to any support which was not material. It is for Her Majesty's Government to judge what the effect of his appointment would be upon public opinion in England, but except for that I can see no reason why Zobeir Pasha should not be proclaimed Ruler of the Soudan with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

III

P. 95. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring. February 22, 1884

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the gravest objections exist to the appointment by their authority of a successor to General Gordon. The necessity does not, indeed, appear to have yet arisen of going beyond the suggestions contained in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 22nd ultimo, by making special provision for the government of the country. In any case the public opinion of this country would not tolerate the appointment of Zobeir Pasha.

SOME OF GORDON'S TELEGRAMS (1884)

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884

P. 156. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Khartoum, March 3, 1884

… I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Soudan, but I think we ought to leave it with decency, and give the respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally, and we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to Berber. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could not recall me, nor could I possibly obey, until the Cairo employés get out from all the places. I have named men to different places, thus involving them with Mahdi: how could I look the world in the face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but that having been done I have no option but to see evacuation through, for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so.

P. 161. The Same to the Same. Khartoum, March 9, 1884, 11.30 p.m

If you mean to make the proposed diversion to Berber [of British troops], and to accept my proposal as to Zobeir, to install him in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth while to hold on to Khartoum. If, on the other hand, you determine on neither of these steps, then I can see no use in holding on to Khartoum, for it is impossible for me to help the other garrisons, and I shall only be sacrificing the whole of the troops and employés here. In this latter case your instructions to me had better be that I should evacuate Khartoum, and, with all the employés and troops, remove the seat of Government to Berber. You would understand that such a step would mean the sacrificing of all outlying places except Berber and Dongola. You must give a prompt reply to this, as even the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in a few days; and even if carried out at once, the retreat will be of extreme difficulty.

P. 161. Same Date, 11.40 p.m

If the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is determined upon, irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send all Cairo employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he would await your orders. I would also ask Her Majesty's Government to accept the resignation of my commission, and I would take all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the Belgians.

[P. 160. Sir E. Baring comments that, owing to interruption of the telegraph line, these and other messages did not reach him till March 12. He instructed Gordon to hold on at Khartoum until he could communicate further with the British Government, and on no account to proceed to the Bahr Gazelle and Equatorial provinces.]

P. 152. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, March 13, 1884

If General Gordon is of opinion that the prospect of his early departure diminishes the chance of accomplishing his task, and that by staying at Khartoum himself for any length of time which he may judge necessary he would be able to establish a settled Government at that place, he is at liberty to remain there. In the event of his being unable to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber without delay.

CROSS PURPOSES (1884)

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," No. 13 of 1884, C 3,970

P. 9. Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville. Cairo, April 8, 1884

In a telegram from Khartoum, General Gordon says: I wish I could convey to you my impressions of the truly trumpery nature of this revolt, which 500 determined men could put down. Be assured, for present, and for two months hence, we are as safe here as at Cairo. If you would get, by good pay, 3,000 Turkish infantry and 1,000 Turkish cavalry, the affair, including crushing of Mahdi, would be accomplished in four months.

P. 12. Sir E. Baring to Earl Granville. Cairo, April 18, 1884

Lately I have been sending telegrams to Berber to be forwarded to Gordon. Since communication between Berber and Khartoum was cut, his telegrams to me have taken from a week to ten days. My telegrams to him appear to have taken even longer, and some, I think, have not reached him at all.

The Same, Later

I have received another telegram from Gordon… It is most unfortunate that of all the telegrams I have sent to him only one very short one appears to have reached him. He evidently thinks he is to be abandoned, and is very indignant.

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," C 3,998 of 1884

P. 1. Gordon to Baring. Telegraphic. Khartoum, April 16, 1884, 5.15 p.m

As far as I can understand, the situation is this: you state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zobeir. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator, and leave you indelible disgrace of abandoning garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will be eventually forced to smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties if you would retain peace in Egypt.

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Egypt," C 3,970 of 1884

P. 15. Earl Granville to Mr. Egerton, April 23, 1884

Gordon should be at once informed, in cipher, by several messengers at some interval between each, through Dongola as well as Berber, or in such other way as may on the spot be deemed most prompt and certain, that he should keep us informed, to the best of his ability, not only as to immediate but as to any prospective danger at Khartoum; that to be prepared for any such danger he advise us as to the force necessary in order to secure his removal, its amount, character, route for access to Khartoum, and time of operation; that we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond the scope of the commission he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; that if with this knowledge he continues at Khartoum, he should state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues. Add expressions both of respect and gratitude for his gallant and self-sacrificing conduct, and for the good he has achieved.

Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Egypt," No. 21 of 1884, C 4,005