Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

To the Administrator of the Transvaal

Excellency,

In the name of the people of the South African Republic we come to you to fulfil an earnest but unavoidable duty. We have the honour to send you a copy of the Proclamation promulgated by the Government and Volksraad, and universally published. The wish of the people is clearly to be seen therefrom, and requires no explanation from us. We declare in the most solemn manner that we have no desire to spill blood, and that from our side we do not wish war. It lies in your hands to force us to appeal to arms in self-defence. Should it come so far, which may God prevent, we will do so with the utmost reverence for Her Majesty the Queen of England and her flag. Should it come so far, we will defend ourselves with a knowledge that we are fighting for the honour of Her Majesty, for we fight for the sanctity of treaties sworn by Her, but broken by Her officers. However, the time for complaint is past, and we wish now alone from your Excellency co-operation for an amicable solution of the question on which we differ… In 1877 our then Government gave up the keys of the Government offices without bloodshed. We trust that your Excellency, as representative of the noble British nation, will not less nobly and in the same way place our Government in the position to assume the administration.

We have, etc.,

S. J. P. Kruger (Vice-President).

M. W. Pretorious.

P. J. Joubert.

(Triumvirate.)

J. P. Mare.

C. J. Joubert.

E. J. P. Jorissen.

W. Edward Bok (Acting State Secretary).

Heidelberg,

December 16, 1880.

Proclamation

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Transvaal," C 2,838 of 1881, p. 11

In the name of the people of the South African Republic. With prayerful look to God we, S. J. P. Kruger, Vice-President, M. W. Pretorious, and P. J. Joubert, appointed by the Volksraad in its session of the 13th December, 1880, as the Triumvirate to carry on temporarily the supreme administration of the Republic, make known:

We thus give notice to everyone that on the 13th day of December of the year 1880 the Government has been re-established; the Volksraad has resumed its sitting…

And it is further generally made known that from this day the whole country is placed in a state of siege and under the stipulations of the War Ordinance…

BEFORE MAJUBA (1881)

Source.—The Times, January 17

We give this morning an account from our correspondent at Pretoria of the meeting held by the Boers last month for the purpose of protesting against the annexation of the Transvaal. The report of the proceedings leaves no doubt of the extent and nature of Boer disaffection… That the annexation of the Transvaal may have been necessary when the step was taken may be admitted without prejudice to the question whether its permanent occupation and administration by British authority is desirable or not. When Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed the territory, the Government was disorganized, the Treasury was bankrupt, the Republican troops were hopelessly demoralized, and the whole district was threatened by two powerful native chiefs, the weaker of whom had proved his superiority to any force which the Boers could bring against him. Now Cetywayo and Secocoeni are captives, and the whole border is tranquil. We have done for the Boers what it is certain they could not have done for themselves, and we have placed the security of the South African Colonies beyond all reasonable fear. Hence it might be argued that the reasons which compelled the temporary annexation of the Transvaal are no longer applicable in favour of its permanent occupation. It may be argued that we cannot recede where we have once advanced; certainly we cannot, where we have good reason to believe that our security requires that we should maintain our hold. But when our presence is manifestly unwelcome, and when the question of the best mode of guarding our security in future is at least an open one, it would be a very contemptible piece of national vanity to refuse to recede, simply because we had once found it necessary to advance in very different circumstances.

AFTER MAJUBA

I

Source.—Parliamentary Papers, "Transvaal," C 2,998 of 1881

Convention for the Settlement of the Transvaal Territory, signed at Pretoria, 1881

Preamble: Her Majesty's Commissioners for the settlement of the Transvaal Territory, duly appointed as such by a Commission passed under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet, bearing date the 5th of April, 1881, do hereby undertake and guarantee on behalf of Her Majesty that, from and after the 8th day of August, 1881, complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal upon the following terms and conditions, and subject to the following reservations and limitations.

II

Source.—The Times, August 5, 1881

England can now have no desire to intrude herself upon the Transvaal. The more completely its people can get on without interference of any kind, the better pleased we shall be… The occasion may come which will call for all the knowledge and discretion which our Government will have at its command. The Boers, if they are so disposed, may give trouble in a thousand ways. The question may be continually arising whether the point has yet been reached at which active interference is called for, or whether it may be the prudent and better course to let things be. The fact is that between England and the Transvaal there is no natural connection whatever. The bond which unites them is an artificial one, and though it is too early to anticipate the time at which it will be severed, we are sure that at no time will it be found strong enough to bear a violent strain. The strain may never come. The Convention, which has been entered upon in due form, and with all solemnity, may remain to all intents and purposes a dead letter as to the chief part of its provisions, and may thus pass quietly into the great limbo to which all monstrous political births must some day come. It will be by the fault of the Boers that we can be driven to put an active interpretation upon it. It contains terms which we cannot suffer to be disregarded.

RITUAL CONTROVERSY (1881)

Source.—The Times, January 12

Extract from a Memorial to the Archbishop of Canterbury, signed by various Deans, Canons, etc

… The immediate need of our Church is, in our opinion, a tolerant recognition of divergent ritual practice; but we feel bound to submit to your Grace that our present troubles are likely to recur, unless the Courts by which ecclesiastical causes are decided in the first instance and on appeal can be so constructed as to secure the conscientious obedience of clergymen who believe the constitution of the Church of Christ to be of Divine appointment, and who protest against the State's encroachment upon Rights assured to the Church of England by solemn Acts of Parliament…

A SHORT WAY WITH OBSTRUCTION (1881)

Source.—The Times, February 3

About nine o'clock in the morning Mr. Gladstone, Mr. W. E. Forster, Mr. Dodson, Sir Stafford Northcote, and Sir R. Cross entered the House amid cheers. While Mr. Biggar was continuing his observations on the Land League the Speaker resumed the Chair amid loud cheering. The Speaker, without calling on the hon. member to proceed with his remarks, at once said: "The motion for leave to bring in the Person and Property Protection (Ireland) Bill has now been under discussion for five days. The present sitting, having commenced on Monday last, has continued till Wednesday morning, a period of no less than forty-one hours, the House having been occupied with discussions upon repeated motions for adjournment. However tedious these discussions were, they were carried to a division by small minorities in opposition to the general sense of the House. A necessity has thus arisen which demands the interposition of the Chair (cheers). The usual rule has been proved powerless to insure orderly debate. An important measure, recommended in Her Majesty's Speech, and declared to be urgent in the interests of the State by a decisive majority, has been impeded by the action of an inconsiderable minority of members who have resorted to those modes of obstruction which have been recognized by the House as a Parliamentary offence. The credit and authority of this House are seriously threatened, and it is necessary they should be vindicated. Under the operation of the accustomed rules and methods of procedure the legislative powers of the House are paralyzed. A new and exceptional course is imperatively demanded, and I am satisfied that I shall best carry out the wish of the House if I decline to call upon any more members to speak, and at once put the question to the House."

The Speaker then put the question, when there appeared —

The Speaker then put the main question, that leave be given to bring in the Bill, when Mr. J. McCarthy rose to speak, but the Speaker declined to hear him, and there were loud cries of "Order" on the Ministerial side of the House. The Home Rulers stood up, and for some time, with raised hand, shouted, "Privilege!" and then, having bowed to the Chair, left the House.

THE DEATH OF BEACONSFIELD (1881)

I

Source.—The Times, April 20

The end really corresponded to the beginning, and both were alike exceptional… It must have been an ideal and living world that home life introduced Benjamin Disraeli to. It was in this that he acquired his repertory of parts and character; his caps fit for wearers; his motley for those it suited; his titles of little honour; his stage tricks and artifices; his gibes and jests that Yorick might have overflowed with in the spirit of his age; and his unfailing consciousness of a knowledge and power ever sufficient for the occasion… The new deliverer of the Conservatives presented himself as a magician, master of many spells, charged with all the secrets of the political creation, ready to control the winds and the tides of opinion and faction, sounding the very depths of political possibility, and with a touch of his wand able to leave a mark on any foe or wanton intruder. The plea was necessity. Fortunately for Lord Beaconsfield, the age of consistency is no more. Sir Robert Peel destroyed that idol, and in doing so sacrificed himself. Lord Beaconsfield advanced to power over his body.

II

Source.—The Times, April 22, 1881

It is finely said by Bacon of death that "it openeth the gate to good fame and extinguisheth envy…" It is singularly true of Lord Beaconsfield, whose fate it was to interest all men, to puzzle most, and to provoke the antagonism of many. Certainly no English statesman, since the death of Lord Palmerston, has occupied so prominent a position or excited so deep an interest on the Continent of Europe. His secret lay perhaps in the magnetic influence of a dauntless will, in his unrivalled powers of patience, in his impenetrable reserve and detachment. If we compare the beginning of his political life with its close, and note how its unchastened audacity was gradually toned down into the coolest determination and the most dispassionate tenacity, we shall see how the magnificent victory he achieved over himself gave him power to govern others, to withstand their opposition, and to bend their wills to his own. This is what Continental observers saw in him – unrivalled strength of will and dauntless tenacity of purpose – and this is why they admired him. The sense of mystery engendered the sense of power, and foreigners freely admired where Englishmen were often puzzled and at times almost bewildered.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CANDAHAR (1881)

Source.—Hansard, Third Series, vol. 259, C 49-74 (House of Lords debate on the withdrawal from Candahar, March 3, 1881)

The Earl of Lytton: … And now, my Lords, allow me to recapitulate the conclusions which appear to me established by the facts to which I have solicited your attention. On the strength of these facts I affirm once more that Russian influence at Cabul did not commence with the Stolieteff mission, and that it did not cease with the withdrawal of that mission. I affirm that for all practical purposes the Ameer of Cabul had ceased to be the friend and ally of England, and that he had virtually become the friend and ally of Russia at least three years before I had any dealings with His Highness, or any connection with the government of India. I affirm that the sole cause of the late Afghan war was a Russian intrigue of long duration, for purposes which it was the imperative duty of the Government of India to oppose at any cost. And, finally, I affirm that the establishment of Russian influence was caused by the collapse and paralysis of British influence at Cabul, and that this was the natural result of the deplorable policy to which Her Majesty's Government are now so eagerly reverting… Surely, my Lords, prevention is better than cure. Surely it is wiser and safer to stay at Candahar, whence we can exclude Russian influence from Herat by peaceably extending our own influence in that direction, than to retire to the Indus, and there passively await an event which is to involve us in a great European war, for the purpose of undoing what could not otherwise have been done in a remote corner of Asia. The noble Duke, the Lord Privy Seal, has expressed his astonishment at the prodigious importance I now attach to the retention of Candahar, because, he says, I did not hold that opinion till a late period of my Viceroyalty. That is true – I did not. But in the statement which elicited this remark I thought I had explained the reason why. I can sincerely assure your Lordships that the late Government of India was not an annexationist Government. As long as we had any reasonable hope of loyalty on the part of Yakub Khan, or of the observance of the Gandamak Treaty, which gave us moral guarantees of adequate control over Afghanistan, our wish was not to weaken but to strengthen the Cabul Power. But the whole situation, and our duty concerning it, were changed irrevocably by the atrocious crime which compelled us to occupy Cabul, and by the revelations discovered at Cabul, and now known to your Lordships, of the extent to which Russian influence had penetrated to the very heart of the country. My Lords, it then seemed to my colleagues in the Government of India, and it still seems to me, that the only practical means of counteracting the dangerous Russian influence at Cabul would be to assume ourselves over Western Afghanistan a controlling and commanding position, not dependent on the good or bad faith of any Cabul ruler. Such control can only be exercised from Candahar. The history of the last eight years clearly shows, not merely that the Russian Power is approaching, and must approach, towards India, but that Russia has long sought, is still seeking, and will continue to seek, great political influence over Afghanistan; that this influence has already found a fulcrum at Cabul, and that it must be a permanent source of disquiet to the Government of India, whenever she wishes to embarrass British policy in Europe. Therefore, for the safety of the British Power in India, it is indispensable that the Government of India shall have the means of preventing – at all events, of counteracting – Russian influence in Afghanistan. It is absurd to suppose that you can have any controlling power over a country in which you have no locus standi at all. Now amongst the arrangements contemplated by Her Majesty's Government after the evacuation of Candahar, where do they expect to find a locus standi in Afghanistan? I do not see where… Great as are the undisputed strategical advantages of Candahar, the late Government of India did not regard the retention of it primarily, or mainly, as a military question. We felt that it would give us a political and commercial control over Western Afghanistan up to Herat so complete that we might contemplate with unconcern the course of events at Cabul. If you retain Candahar, and hold it firmly and fearlessly, then you may view with indifference the uncertain faith and fate of Cabul rulers, and the certain advance of the Russian Power. If you retain Candahar, and administer it wisely, you will replace anarchy and bloodshed and difficulty and uncertainty on your own border by peace and prosperity; and if you connect Candahar by rail with the Valley of the Indus, you will be able to sweep the whole commerce of Central Asia, vastly augmented by the beneficent protection of a strong, a settled, and a civilized Government, into the harbours of Kurrachee and Calcutta, and thence into the ports of Liverpool and London. But, my Lords, you cannot do all this unless you retain a garrison in Candahar… If you accept the conclusion admitted by the noble Duke, and affirmed by every Indian statesman, that Afghanistan must on no account be permitted to remain under the forbidden influence of Russia, then, my Lords, for the enforcement of that conclusion you must choose between the retention of Candahar and reliance on the instructions said to have been issued to General Kauffman "not to do it again." There is no alternative. To talk about developing the internal resources of India is nothing to the point. There is no reason why the continued development of India's internal resources should not proceed pari passu with the consolidation of her external securities. But do not fatten the lamb only to feed the wolf. My Lords, all those whose privilege it is to build up the noble edifice of India's prosperity must be content to labour like the builders of the second Temple – working with one hand, but holding the sword in the other to defend their work.

THE SALVATION ARMY (1881)